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Abstract
The Third United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111) that took 
place between 1973-1982 was the most comprehensive political and legislative work ever 
undertaken by the United Nations. Arguably the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
that resulted from the conference in terms of the range of interests involved is the most 
important multilateral treaty Australia has ever signed after the UN Charter itself.
Australia was an influential player at the negotiations in which almost every state in the 
world participated. The Australian position on most issues at the conference was 
accepted in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
This thesis provides a history of Australian law of the sea diplomacy at UNCLOS 111. 
The study seeks to analyse Australian policy objectives at the conference in terms of 
Australian negotiating strategies and tactics. It is argued that at UNCLOS 111 Australia 
moved away from its traditional position on law of the sea issues which was to support 
the maritime powers. Instead Australia moved at the conference to align itself with 
coastal state positions. The study seeks to identify Australia’s overall role in the 
negotiations and analyse the reasons why Australian negotiators were remarkably 
successful in promoting Australia’s interests.
The study draws certain lessons from Australia’s UNCLOS 111 experience that may be 
relevant for Australian participation in future exercises in conference diplomacy. The 
study concludes with a consideration of whether Australia should ratify the 1982 
Convention and discusses Australia’s implementation of the Convention. Conclusions 
are drawn on the relevance of Australia’s law of the sea diplomacy for the future direction 
of Australian foreign policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Australia has significant national interests in the oceans. It has a coastline of 24,000 km, 
the second largest continental margin in the world, and more than 90% of its oil 
production, which amounts to two-thirds of total consumption is located offshore. 
Australia is a major trading nation dependent upon the sea for almost all its imports and 
exports. Its geographical position means that its maritime routes extend in all directions 
across the Pacific and Indian oceans. Australia’s population is heavily concentrated along 
the seaboard; over 90 percent live within 50 kilometres of the coastline and most of 
Australia’s economic activity takes place in the coastal zone. Australia’s coastal facilities, 
including one of the world’s natural wonders— the Great Barrier Reef—give Australia a 
significant interest in the marine environment. Australia’s defence is strongly oriented 
towards the sea.
Because of these interests Australia was a major participant during the Third United 
Nations conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111) when between 1973-1982 the 
international community negotiated a new oceans regime. After nearly ten years of 
negotiations the conference produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, one of the major achievements of international diplomacy, consisting of 320 articles 
and nine annexes. The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) attempts to provide what 
some have called a new ‘constitution for the oceans’: the Convention acts as a signpost 
for state action in almost all aspects of human interaction with the seas.
The treaty is a major contribution toward the establishment of the rule of law over more 
than two-thirds of the earth’s surface. The treaty determines jurisdiction over nearly all 
the world’s oil and gas resources, establishes the conditions under which exploitation of 
polymetallic nodules on the seabed will be carried out, affects the mobility of merchant 
and military shipping, establishes a comprehensive system to protect the marine 
environment, regulates the conduct of marine scientific research and should make an 
effective contribution to the management of world fisheries.
One third of the globe’s surface has been declared beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, and the control of its seabed and resources has been given to a new 
international body yet to be created, the International Seabed Authority. The majority of 
states, including Australia, have signed the Convention. The treaty, however, will come 
into force only for those states ratifying it one year following the receipt of the sixtieth 
ratification. As at August 1990 43 states have ratified.
2In the twenty year period following World War II, Australia became party to some 300 
treaties, almost twice as many as the period between the wars, and between 1979 and 
1984 alone it became party to 146 treaties.1 Arguably, the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention in terms of the range of Australian interests involved, is the most important 
multilateral treaty Australia has ever signed after the UN Charter itself.2
The Law of the Sea negotiations were certainly the most comprehensive political and 
legislative work undertaken by the United Nations. At UNCLOS 111 Australian 
negotiators were extremely successful in promoting Australian interests at what was the 
largest, longest, most complex multilateral negotiations ever undertaken by the United 
Nations. Australia was an influential player at the negotiations in which almost every state 
in the world participated. The Australian position on most issues at the conference was 
accepted in the 1982 LOS Convention. Although in recent years Australia has played a 
significant role in such areas as the GATT and on disarmament issues it is possible to 
argue that Australia’s most important contribution to multilateral international relations in 
the last twenty five years was its role at UNCLOS 111.3
Internationally the world has moved from the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law 
of the Sea to that (apart fom deep seabed mining) embodied in the LOSC as the best 
evidence of customary international law of the sea. The negotiations at UNCLOS 111 
which led to the LOSC certainly dominated international policy concerning the legal 
regime of the oceans from the early 1970’s to the present. This study attempts to provide 
a detailed history of Australian law of the sea policy as it was developed throughout the 
UNCLOS 111 negotiations. Despite the importance of the negotiations to Australia, 
despite the influential and successful role played by Australian negotiators, and despite 
the considerable diplomatic investment in the negotiations by Canberra over a period of 
14 years (if one includes the preparatory period), law of the sea diplomacy has received 
virtually no attention by political scientists and writing on Australian law of the sea policy 
has almost been entirely left to academic lawyers.4 This scholarly lack of attention 
contrasts with the situation elsewhere and probably reflects a more general lack of interest 
in marine policy issues by Australian social scientists.5
This work then seeks to fill a significant gap in the literature on the political aspects of 
Australia’s relationship to the oceans.6 It also seeks to provide a detailed history of an 
important but neglected aspect of recent Australian foreign policy in the field of 
multilateral diplomacy. It provides the most complete treatment of Australian participation 
in a global conference, an aspect of Australia’s international relations that has received 
virtually no attention in the literature.7 While the thesis is a case study in Australian
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diplomacy, and unusually in Australian multilateral diplomacy it is not, except to the 
extent required in Chapters 8 to 10, a study in foreign policy making. That is, it does not 
give an ongoing commentary or analysis of the domestic political, including bureaucratic, 
process of policy making. There are two reasons for this. First, because the purpose of 
this thesis is diplomatic history, not foreign policy analysis and second the sources for 
such a foreign policy making study are not available. The formulation of Australian 
policy, examining the role of key individuals and groups will have to await the release of 
archival documents under the 30 year rule.
This means that the thesis concentrates on Australia chiefly as a ‘unitary actor’ 
responding to pressures and opportunities in its external political environment. It takes as 
its point of departure an agreed policy stance put forward by Australia in the UNCLOS 
negotiations, and then explores the process of Australia co-operating and contending with 
other states similarly acting as sovereign states. When the question of change in policy 
arises, the sources of this change, both domestic and external is discussed.
The study concentrates on the period of UNCLOS 111, 1973-1982 but in order to 
provide some depth and historical perspective, Australian law of the sea diplomacy policy 
at the First and Second United Nations conferences on the Law of the Sea (1958 and 
1960) is considered, along with the setting of Australia’s law of the sea positions in the 
period between 1968-1973 at the United Nations Seabed Committee. It is argued that at 
UNCLOS 1 and 11 Australia’s approach was essentially to support the maritime powers 
and Australia down-played its coastal interests.8 During the preparatory negotiations in 
the work of the Seabed Committee, Australia essentially outlined its positions on most of 
the law of the sea issues that were to be negotiated at UNCLOS 111. It is argued that 
those positions were largely determined by Australia’s coastal interests and marine 
attributes and mirrored attempts at the domestic level by Australia to expand its 
jurisdiction over offshore resources and activities in the mid 1960s through to 1973.
The main focus of the study, however, is to analyse Australia’s participation and role at 
UNCLOS 111.9 The unique structure of the negotiations is outlined along with 
Australia’s key law of the sea objectives. Those objectives essentially revolved around 
Canberra’s wish to exercise greater control over offshore resources and activities. It is 
argued that international negotiations offered Australia the best opportunity to achieve 
those objectives. The study seeks to analyse Australian policy objectives at UNCLOS 
111 in terms of Australian negotiating strategies and tactics. How did Australia manage to 
forward its law of the sea goals during the negotiations and how successful was Australia 
in securing those preferred goals? It is argued that Australian negotiations were 
remarkably successful in promoting Australian policies without seriously compromising
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Canberra’s goals in the negotiations. Australian diplomatic activity is elaborated in 
Chapters 4—7. The approach adopted is to look at the development of Australian policy 
over successive sessions rather than issue-areas. This approach is adopted partly because 
of the complexity of the issues and partly because of the linkages of issues within 
sessions. The study seeks to identify Australia’s overall role in the negotiations and 
analyses the reasons why Australian negotiators were remarkably successful in 
promoting Australia’s interests. The study draws certain lessons from Australia’s 
UNCLOS experience that may be relevant for future Australian participation in 
conference diplomacy. The study concludes with a consideration of whether Australia 
should ratify the LOS Convention and considers Australia’s implementation of the 
Convention. Finally some thoughts are offered on the relevance of Australia’s UNCLOS 
diplomacy for the future direction of Australian foreign policy.
An important theme that arises from this study concerns the making of the UNCLOS 
regime. In the analysis of Australian diplomacy, it is inevitable that broader questions 
arise with respect to the ways that states interacted to produce this international 
agreement, how and why state interests conflicted and were compromised and how the 
values of states in creating a new order for the oceans converged and diverged over time. 
In short, questions about how this most significant new Convention came about, and the 
nature of the politics of this most ambitious law-making venture emerge as a context for 
Australian diplomacy at UNCLOS.
These questions are not addressed directly in the major part of this thesis because of its 
concentration on Australia’s role but they are treated in the analytical chapters 8-10 to the 
extent they bear on Australia’s actions. However, it is useful here to set such questions 
about the creation of a new international regime for the law of the sea in the context of 
some broad theoretical preoccupations in international relations and international law.
Realist theory in international relations is clearly one relevant context here, since much of 
the politics of UNCLOS concerns states acting explicitly in pursuit of competing national 
interests, in a situation where wider interstate conflicts (such as North-South splits) 
powerfully affected outcom es.10 Further, the hierarchy of powers, most clearly 
demonstrated by the late refusal of the United States to sign the Convention, is clearly an 
important factor in the diplomacy of states on this issue. Yet what the UNCLOS story 
shows along with this, is the formation of coalitions of states, on a basis quite other than 
that of alliances or hierarchy, in cooperative and conflictual endeavours to create different 
sets of balances of forces -  coastal states, maritime states, landlocked and geographically
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disadvantaged states -  which cross-cut the structure of international relations (understood 
from a traditional realist perspective) and which prevailed to create a new oceans order.
This points to the relevance of a different theoretical perspective in international relations 
— that of interdependence broadly conceived and regime theory in particular. This 
literature finds some of its concerns raised in Keohane and Nye’s work Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition11 and in the ensuing debates on the 
question of regimes in the late 1970s and 1980s.12 While the law of the sea is arguably a 
paradigm case of an international regime, given the standard definition of international 
regime, international relations scholars with a general interest in regime theory have by 
and large ignored the oceans area.13
Regime building at UNCLOS 111 consisted not only of the revision of the traditional 
regimes of the high seas, territorial sea and contiguous zone but also the re-design of the 
regime for international straits and the continental shelf. Three new regimes were also 
created— archipelagic states, the exclusive economic zone and the international area 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The recent work of Keohane is interesting in 
this context. Keohane focuses on the definition of regimes as a convergence of norms 
and on the conditions that seem necessary for the creation of new regimes in the 
international system.14 In an important sense, this is a return to earlier preoccupations 
with the development of international institutions, how they came about, change and 
decline. The dynamics of regime creation, in the sense of developing norms of 
generalised commitment is given some attention in chapters 4-7 which documents 
Australia’s UNCLOS diplomacy.
Also of broader theoretical significance is the question of change in international law. 
Under what circumstances do states pursue large scale codification and progressive 
development of international law? The codification and progressive development of 
international law is a process of authoritative decision making in the international system, 
and states do not undertake lightly a decision to trigger this process. It is possible to 
argue, as does Professor Johnston, that UNCLOS 111 marked the breakthrough from the 
‘neo-classical’ to the current ‘romantic’ period of international legal development. That is, 
the remaking of the law of the sea took place in a period where legal development has 
been largely taken over by the diplomatic arena and where classical virtues such as 
symmetry, clarity, consistency and universality tend to yield to ‘romantic’ sentiments in 
favour of diversity rather than uniformity, justice rather than order, imagination rather 
than logic, and where participation and spontaneity are felt to be virtues in themselves. It 
is a time when, says Johnston, the process may be judged to be more important than the 
‘product’.15 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is probably the best example of a
product of the romantic approach to law making and raises questions as to whether 
UNCLOS represents the most productive model for legal development.
These broader theoretical and analytical questions cannot be treated in any depth in this 
thesis, since its central preoccupation is an empirical one to provide a political history of 
Australia’s law of the sea diplomacy at UNCLOS 111. To treat these questions properly 
would require a thesis of different purpose and immersion in different literatures. 
Nevertheless, Australia’s law of the sea diplomacy raises these broader questions and an 
attempt will be made at various points in the thesis to not only relate Australia’s policies 
and actions to the main game of ocean politics at UNCLOS 111, but where relevant, to 
comment on these wider theoretical issues.
Before turning to the substantive issues of the thesis a short introduction to the classical 
law of the sea is necessary in order to provide the broad legal and political background of 
the UNCLOS 111 negotiations. The traditional regime of the oceans is known as 
‘freedom of the seas’. That regime is associated with the Dutch legal theorist, Hugo de 
Groat or Grotius. Grotius’s argument on the right of neutral vessels to use the sea freely 
became the basis of subsequent doctrine on the freedom of the seas, and was embodied in 
the Treaty of Paris of 1856.16 Beyond a narrow territorial sea everybody could freely 
navigate and fish. Most states claimed a territorial sea of three nautical miles, where the 
coastal state exercised its sovereignty with foreign vessels having a right of ‘innocent 
passage’. Grotius doctrine had prevailed over the contending idea of dividing the seas 
into national jurisdiction, a system advocated by the British scholar John Seiden in Mare 
Clausum (1635), and supported by the Portugese and Spanish governments. The Dutch 
along with the British developed commercial interests throughout the world and freedom 
of the seas was perceived to be in the interests of the Dutch. The British later came to be 
the dominant maritime power and with some exceptions during wars vigorously defended 
the principle of freedom of the seas.17
In the twentieth century the tension between pressures to enclose marine space and for 
maritime freedom continued. Expanding ocean use early this century led to an interest in 
reaching agreement on the width of the territorial sea and of a special purpose contiguous 
zone. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, a conference for the Codification of 
International Law was convened in The Hague in 1930. At the Hague conference 
discussion revolved around a territorial sea of three or four miles with a small contiguous 
zone beyond but there was neither agreement on the territorial sea nor on the nature and 
breadth of the contiguous zone.18
7Since the Second World War a gradual erosion of the traditional ocean regime has 
occurred. A key development here was the Truman Proclamations in 1945 in which the 
US claimed ownership of the resources of the seabed adjacent to the American coast, and 
established a new fishery conservation zone outside the US 3 mile limit and recognized 
other states’ rights to fishery jurisdiction up to 12 miles from their coasts.19 These 
proclamations were followed by similar claims on the part of many other Arab, Caribbean 
and Latin American states.
These claims varied in their nature, with some claiming jurisdiction and control over the 
resources of the shelf, while others claimed sovereignty over the shelf as such. Other 
claims made by a number of Latin American States extended not only to the shelf but also 
to the superajacent waters and in some cases to the airspace above those waters. Chile 
claimed a 200 mile maritime zone in 1947, with whaling the main offshore interest. Peru 
followed shortly afterwards, claiming a national zone of 200 miles, with tuna and 
anchoveta resources being the most important. Ecuador became the third Latin American 
State to claim 200 miles in 1951. The extensions all claimed the Truman Proclamation as 
a precedent with the 200 mile limit purely arbitrary.20 Australia proclaimed its rights to 
its continental shelf on 11 September 1953 and for the first time attempted to establish a 
specific relationship between the shelf and sedentary species.21 In 1951 Ecuador, 
Romania, and Bulgaria established 12 mile territorial seas. By 1958 sixteen countries had 
made territorial sea or fishing jurisdiction claims or a combination of both extending to 12 
miles. By September 1977, as many as sixty two states had claimed 12 mile territorial 
seas including 13 countries claiming 200 mile territorial seas. There were only 33 
countries with territorial sea claims of less than 12 miles, including twenty six countries 
(Australia was one) with 3 mile territorial seas. As many as forty six states had 
established 200 mile economic or fishery zones. Thus the position has seen a remarkable 
transformation in the traditional ocean regime. The factors behind national enclosure are 
noted below.
In these circumstances of change the notion that there should be some codification of the 
international law of the sea led to the first two United Nations conferences on the Law of 
the Sea in Geneva in 1958 and 1960. Both dealt primarily with the nature and extent of 
coastal state jurisdiction in offshore areas and is discussed in Chapter One. In 1958 and 
1960 UNCLOS 1 and 11 failed by a narrow margin to agree on a six mile territorial sea 
and an additional six mile contiguous zone for fiscal, sanitation, and customs 
enforcement. The first Geneva conference did, however, agree to four Conventions, 
including a Convention on the Continental Shelf, which codified the Truman 
Proclamations by granting to the coastal state ‘sovereign rights’ to seabed resources out
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to depths of 200 metres or beyond that point to water depths at which exploitation was 
possible. The demand for marine resources had been the main driving force for 
extensions of coastal state jurisdiction and from that viewpoint the concept of 
‘exploitability’ made sense. However this Convention was probably not helpful from the 
viewpoint of preventing ‘creeping jurisdiction’ as it was possible to argue that 
technological progress could legitimate national claims to deeper parts of the shelf.
Ocean policy issues were put back on the international agenda in 1967 when Malta’s 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo made a speech where he talked about the 
new pressures on ocean resources and the wealth of the manganese nodules on the deep 
ocean floor. The world at that time was concerned about the physical limits of production 
and the prospect of the seabed nodules providing a secure source of supply for thousands 
of years created an enormous degree of excitement.22 Many developing countries that 
had not participated at UNCLOS 1 and 11 now wished to enter the game of global ocean 
politics to ensure that they would help shape a new ocean regime.
Pardo’s speech resulted in the General Assembly setting up an ad hoc committee, which 
in 1968 became a permanent committee, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea- 
Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the so-called Seabed- 
Committee. The Committee was enlarged in 1970 and from that time until 1973 it worked 
as a preparatory committee for UNCLOS 111. The preparatory work of the seabed 
committee was uneven and UNCLOS 111 was handicapped by inadequate preparation 
and an enormous agenda of over 25 items (and over 100 sub-items). UNCLOS 111 saw 
the number of participants that attended UNCLOS 1 and 11 jump from just under 90 to 
158. The UNCLOS 111 conference met for eleven sessions between 1973 and 1982. On 
the final day of the spring 1982 session, UNCLOS 111 adopted the new Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. There were 130 countries voting in favour, 4 against and 17 
abstaining. The United States voted against the treaty, as did Israel, Turkey and 
Venezuela. Among the countries that abstained were the Soviet Union and her East 
European allies, FRG, Italy, the Benelux countries and the UK. Most developing 
countries voted in favour as did Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Japan and the 
Scandanavian countries. Australia was one of the 113 states that signed the Convention in 
December 1982 at a final session in Montego Bay, Jamaica.
A number of factors are necessary to explain why states have preferred national enclosure 
rather than international management to replace the traditional freedom of the seas.23 The 
chief underlying cause has been the demand for marine resources. Acquisitive impulses 
to exploit fishery resources, offshore petroleum and natural gas and later mineral deposits 
on the deep seabed have been given impetus by technological developments in ocean
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resource exploitation. Offshore technology has advanced rapidly permitting the 
exploitation of marine resources that previously would have been either unexploited or 
under-exploited. Coastal states have also responded to increased dangers to the marine 
environment from human activities on land or at sea by national enclosure. Particularly 
important here was the danger of ship sourced oil pollution with the growth of 
supertankers.
A further factor supporting pressure for national enclosure was the call strongly made in 
the 1970s by the developing countries for a New International Economic Order. The 
demand by the developing countries for a redistribution of the world’s wealth and power 
away from the western developed countries found an avenue of expression in the debate 
on ocean issues. Developing countries argued that the traditional order of the seas had 
been imposed by the developed world and that a new ocean regime was necessary to 
reduce inequities in the development and exploitation of marine resources. National 
enclosure was seen as a significant way in which to gain greater access to marine 
resources. The fact that both the US and the USSR opposed the concept of the 200 mile 
zone based on fears of the implications of national enclosure on military activities simply 
served to strengthen the demands of the developing countries for a new ocean regime. 
Thus a number of factors are necessary to explain why national enclosure has replaced 
the traditional ocean regime.
UNCLOS 111 has extended the process whereby coastal states have appropriated ocean 
space. The Convention includes 12 mile territorial seas, 200 mile economic zones, coastal 
state rights to areas of the continental margin beyond 200 miles, and a new archipelago 
concept which allows groups of islands to enclose the waters between the islands with 
strait baselines. Only in the area of the development of deep seabed mining has the 
Convention adopted international management, although whether that system will work 
successfully will have to await the development of seabed mining which is not expected 
to occur until at least the next century.
Research for this thesis is drawn from primary and secondary sources. The first of the 
two categories of primary sources consisted of United Nations official material as well as 
statements and papers of Australian delegates and archival material (for Chapter One). Of 
particular importance here were the official records of UNCLOS 111, the 18 volume 
collection of documents of the conference collected by R. Platzöder and the Australian 
delegation sessional reports. The secondary primary source of research were interviews 
with key members of the Australian delegation. As is well known UNCLOS 111 largely 
proceeded by informal means and official records were of necessity kept to a minimum.
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Thus in order to gain a full understanding of Australian policies and practices it was 
necessary to speak to Australian officials concerning Australia’s law of the sea 
diplomacy. While it is important to be able to cite sources in all academic work, all 
delegates interviewed asked for confidentiality to be maintained. In a small number of 
cases where interview material important to the argument was not able to be sourced from 
the public record I have simply designated the source as interview. A list of all delegates 
interviewed appears in the bibliography. The secondary sources used pertain for the most 
part directly to the UNCLOS negotiations. These provide a background to the 
negotiations as well as the policies of the other states. Other readings relate to Australian 
foreign policy in general. It should be noted that apart from the original research on 
Australia and UNCLOS 111 this thesis is the first attempt to document Australia's 
policies at UNCLOS 1 and 11 and at the UN Seabed Committee. For that reason and 
because it is extremely unlikely that others will undertake the necessary research I have 
included (unusually) extensive documentation in the notes for Chapters One and Two.
Australia’s policy on the oceans has evolved in the context of the three main international 
negotiations to reach agreement on the law of the sea. At the same time Australian policy, 
like that of most other states, has been to a large degree reflected in the outcome of those 
negotiations.The most important of those negotiations was UNCLOS 111. Before 
turning to analyse Australia’s diplomacy within that forum it is necessary to examine 
Australia’s role at UNCLOS 1 and 11 in order to understand the changes in Australian 
law of the sea policy. It is to an examination of Australian policy in Geneva in 1958 and 
1960 that we now turn.
CHAPTER ONE
AUSTRALIA AND THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Introduction
Australia’s policy on ocean issues evolved in significantly different ways from the early 
period at the international level to the later period of UNCLOS 111. This chapter then 
examines Australia’s position at the First and Second United Nations Law of the Sea 
conferences held in 1958 and 1960 (UNCLOS 1 and UNCLOS 11). It argues that 
Australia’s position at these conferences was basically to resist wide territorial sea claims 
by developing coastal states, thus aligning itself with the maritime powers. Australia, 
however, showed an accommodating attitude to wider coastal state limits once it became 
clear the narrow territorial limits would not be acceptable to the majority of states at the 
conferences. It joined with other traditional maritime powers of the West on most of the 
contentious issues at the conferences where the major political cleavage was between East 
and West. It exhibited in the early years a basic satisfaction with the status quo of 
traditional law of the sea and its cornerstone, freedom of the seas, in contrast to a number 
of newer developing states who wished to revise traditional maritime law and who saw 
that law as something developed by their former colonial masters.
This chapter also briefly considers the factors which undermined UNCLOS 1 and 11 and 
led to the shifts in Australia’s stance a decade later. Australia’s views and alignments on 
ocean issues were to be modified by the time that the law of the sea was to be considered 
at the next treaty making effort at UNCLOS 111. While the next chapter considers 
Australian policy in the lead-up to UNCLOS 111 in order to understand the shifts in 
Australian law of the sea policy it is necessary to consider those factors that served to 
undermine the four Geneva Conventions produced at UNCLOS 1. It is argued in this 
chapter that a number of legal, political and technological developments during the period 
1961-67 served to propel ocean law issues back on the international agenda by the late 
1960s, and helped modify Australia’s law of the sea goals by the time of UNCLOS 111.
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U N CLO S 1
The First United Nation conference on the Law of the Sea met in Geneva from 24 
Februar}' to 20 April 1958. Eighty six states participated in the 1958 session. The 
conference considered all aspects of the law of the sea and produced four Conventions:
(1) a Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone;
(2) a Convention on the High Seas;
(3) a Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas; and
(4) a Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Because the conference failed to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, it 
was decided that a second conference would be convened. The Second United Nations 
conference met in Geneva from 17 March to 26 April 1960, but again there was no 
agreement on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and the related fishing 
zone.1
UNCLOS l 2 was attended by approximately 700 delegates from 86 countries and seven 
specialized agencies and nine intergovernmental organisations as observers.3 The 
composition of the group of states at UNCLOS 1 is worthy of note: 29 were Western 
states, 10 belonged to the Soviet group, 20 were from Latin America, 9 were Arab, 16 
were Asian, and only 2 were African. In terms of developed and developing states they 
represented totals of 38 (the Western and Soviet groups minus Turkey) and 48. The 
Cold War clash meant that the predominant cleavage at UNCLOS 1 (and 11) was based 
on East-West divisions. The East-West division was reflected in the fact that China, East 
Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam were not present while Taiwan, West 
Germany, South Korea and South Vietnam were.4 The conference was also divided by 
maritime versus coastal state alignments with coastal state interests mainly identified with 
the Soviet Union and a group of developing countries and maritime interests mainly 
identified with Western States. Thus support for wide versus narrow limits got tangled 
up with cold war divisions making it extremely difficult for compromise to be reached.
Apart from the cold war divisions and maritime versus coastal state alignments there were 
also the ‘beginnings of a North-South fissure...in the anticolonial resentment evident 
among the new nations who wished to revise the traditional maritime law to serve their 
n eed s’.5 This theme is developed by Friedheim6 who contrasts the views of the 
‘dissatisfied’ states with that of the ‘satisfied’ states. The first group of countries were 
mainly ‘have not’ states associated with African, Arab, and Latin American caucusing 
groups at the UN and constituted 54 of the 86 states represented at UNCLOS l.7
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They argued that the traditional law of the sea had been created by the great maritime 
powers, that it was just a cloak to dominate their own interests and that law created before 
their own states had come into existence was not binding. There was a feeling that newer 
states could help create new laws for new conditions.8 The ‘satisfied’ states by contrast 
argued that international law exists, that it is fundamentally just and provided hope for the 
adjustment of interests.9 They clearly agreed with the broad principles of the law of the 
sea, especially the freedom of the seas doctrine. The core of this group was composed of 
Western European, Benelux, European Community, Scandinavian caucusing groups, 
and the NATO common interest group. Usually voting with these groups were the 
‘White Commonwealth’ states, including Australia , five European states not represented 
in the General Assembly and Israel. In addition the votes of five US cold war allies— 
Japan, Pakistan, and the Republics of China, Korea, and Vietnam—could frequently be 
counted on. Although heavily outnumbered the states in the ‘satisfied’ category can be 
said statistically to have dominated both UNCLOS 1 and 11.10
The most contentious issue at the conference was the breadth of the territorial sea and 
fishing rights beyond the territorial sea. Australia’s position at UNCLOS 1 was to 
basically support the US and UK against what were seen as expansionist claims by the 
Communist bloc members and developing coastal states, led by Latin American states 
whose main concern was to protect their coastal fisheries from distant-water fishing and 
to see their offshore claims recognized in international law. Australia’s overriding goal in 
the negotiations had already been flagged by Sir Percy Spender in the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly on 7 December 1956 in the debate on the ILC’s draft articles. 
Spender pointed out that all of Australia’s ocean interests did not run in the same 
direction. While Australia had a long coastline and fisheries both sedentary and pelagic 
which were ‘largely of the coastal type’ Australia was ‘very largely dependent for 
economic stability as well as for safety in a dangerous world on overseas 
communications’. While noting that ‘in some respects’ Australia was ‘very conscious of 
the special needs’ of coastal states ‘in other respects Australia has always felt as vital the 
importance of preserving the historic freedoms of the sea. On balance, my Government’s 
position is determined by what is, as we see it, the basic element in our national situation, 
namely, our dependence on overseas communications’11 (author emphasis).
Thus Australia sought international agreement on narrow offshore limits and a fishing 
zone, although along with other traditional maritime partners, it was willing to be 
somewhat flexible. On the most contentious issue at the conference, the territorial sea 
question, Australia behaved more as a maritime power than a coastal state. As the leader 
of the Australian delegation pointed out, Canberra judged that its ‘own essential interest
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‘was in making the least possible extension of the territorial sea’.12 Australia was also 
concerned here to defend the interests of its major allies who wanted maximum freedom 
of the seas for naval deployment.
As noted above the major political cleavage at the conference was between East and West. 
Australia inevitably sided with the western powers. As the leader of Australia’s 
delegation later wrote Australia had at stake the interests of ‘the great states with which 
she is associated’ which he identified as being ‘particularly the United Kingdom, the 
other countries of the Commonwealth and the United States’.13
Australia also fell into the ‘satisfied’ group of states. It did not regard the traditional law 
of the sea as unjust or a cloak for the interests of dominant states and that therefore old 
laws should be swept away. Rather, Australia defended the traditional freedom of the 
seas as also of benefit to developing states.14
Committee One—Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
The territorial sea provided for a zone of full coastal state sovereignty including the 
airspace and seabed subject to a right of innocent passage by other states. The 
contiguous zone was intended to permit coastal states to control specific functions or 
activities beyond the territorial sea e.g. customs, fiscal, and immigration regulations. Not 
surprisingly given the military and economic implications of the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone these issues proved the most contentious at UNCLOS 1. The breadth of 
the territorial sea had been examined at the conference for the Codification of International 
Law at the Hague in 1930, under the auspices of the League of Nations.15 It was agreed 
that the territorial sea formed part of the territory of the coastal state and that other waters 
were ‘free’ but the conference could not agree on the width of the territorial sea or on the 
nature and breadth of the contiguous zone. Australia’s position at the Hague conference 
was to support a 3 mile limit.16
At Geneva the maritime states, US, Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Greece, France, 
West Germany and Japan wanted to preserve the three mile limit.17 Australia also wished 
to preserve narrow limits, largely for strategic reasons. As noted in the introduction state 
practice was changing concerning the breadth of the territorial sea by UNCLOS 1. As of 
1958 territorial sea claims were almost evenly divided between those for and those 
against three miles with some 38 states supporting the traditional 3 mile limit while 34 
others favoured 4 miles or more.18
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Australia made clear that it too wished to preserve the traditional 3 mile limit both for 
strategic reasons (closure of straits in South East Asia) and because of Australia’s 
dependence on seaborne commerce.19
Thirteen proposals were presented to Committee One on the limits of the territorial sea 
and all were linked to a contiguous fishing zone.20 Some of these were withdrawn in 
favour of other proposals or compromises and later reintroduced. None of these 
proposals succeeded in committee or in plenary in commanding the necessary majority. 
So the conference failed to reach agreement on the principal issue in relation to the 
territorial sea—its width. Space prohibits a full examination of the debate in Committee 
One. The critical point as far as Australian diplomacy was concerned was that the 
delegation were only prepared to concede a six mile territorial sea and a six mile fishing 
zone and even this concession was largely one imposed on the delegation after both the 
US and the UK moved to support such limits. Conference diplomacy and politics meant 
that there was little choice but to accept wider limits.21
A range of other issues also arose in Committee One that were of concern to Australia. 
They ranged from the question of archipelagos, delimitation relating to irregular coasts 
and closing lines of bays, the issue of straits and prior authorisation of warship passage 
in the territorial sea. On virtually all these issues Australia sided with the maritime 
states.22 Commercial and strategic interests in freedom of navigation and a desire to 
maintain freedom of the seas for Australia’s allied navies were the driving factors here. 
Australia’s interest in freedom of navigation thus overrode any interests Australia may 
have had in preserving fisheries in Australian waters for the Australian fishing industry. 
Apart from pearling, Australia’s isolation from foreign fishing at this time meant that 
broad security interests were dominant in Australia’s thinking in Committee One.
Committee II—High Seas
The second committee considered issues relating to the definition of the high seas, the 
scope of high seas freedom, nationality of ships, safety and rights of navigation, 
prevention of pollution, visit and hot pursuit, piracy and slavery. For the most part these 
issues were not as controversial as in Committee One but political factors were not 
entirely absent. On those issues that did arouse some controversy, Australia sided with 
the major maritime and western developed industrialized states. These issues related to 
naval training on the high seas, testing of nuclear weapons, restricting military activities 
generally and the issue of the immunity of warships. Australia sided with the western
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bloc on all these questions although without appearing to be in the limelight of any of the 
Committee Two questions.23
Committee Three—Fishing and Conservation of High Seas Living 
Resources
The Third Committee considered the ILC’s draft articles concerning fishing and 
conservation of high seas living resources. The main struggle was between those states, 
mainly distant water fishing nations arguing that the ILC had gone too far in recognizing 
the interests of coastal states and those coastal fishing states, arguing that the draft articles 
did not go far enough.24 Australia generally took a middle ground view although overall 
it sided with coastal state views.
Australia did not adopt a high profile in Committee Three. Its overall position was to 
occupy the middle ground. It rejected the position of distant water fishing nations, 
particularly Japan25 that put up stiff opposition to attempts to restrict freedom of high 
seas fishing on grounds of resource conservation.26 On the other hand it did not agree 
with the proponents of coastal state rights for unilateral control over offshore fisheries 
without the need for negotiations, but did support more moderate coastal state 
positions.27
Committee Four—The Continental Shelf
The fourth Committee considered the legal regime for the continental shelf.28 The 
Committee agreed to a mixed definition of the delimitation of the shelf that included both 
a geomorphological description and a depth element related to exploitability. This was a 
favourable result as far as broad shelf countries such as Australia, that supported the 
approach, were concerned but it soon became apparent that the mixed definition required 
refinement and it was to become one of the most difficult issues for Australia at 
UNCLOS 111.29
Australia took the lead on the question of defining the natural resources to which then- 
rights would apply. The extreme positions were to restrict rights to minerals only and on 
the other hand to include not only minerals but also sedentary species and bottom fish.30 
The middle position was to include minerals and sedentary species but not bottom fish. 
For Australia the issue was of some importance for as noted earlier Australia’s shelf 
proclamation for the first time established a specific relationship between the shelf and 
sedentary species.31 Australian policy at Geneva on this issue also had to be considered 
in the context of Australia’s dispute with Japan on the issue.32 The Japanese government
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protested against the Australian parliament’s action in bringing foreign nations within the 
regulatory provisions of the Pearl Fisheries Act 1952. The Japanese government 
protested against this measure claiming that it could not (without contravening 
international law), be applied to Japanese nationals taking mother-of-pearl shell from the 
oyster beds on the shelf off the northern coasts of Australia. The Australian government 
accepted a suggestion of the Japanese government that the legal issue should be submitted 
for judicidal decision and expressed itself as willing to submit the matter to the 
International Court of Justice by special agreement, provided that an acceptable modus 
vivendi was agreed in the meantime. Such a modus vivendi was reached in May 1954 
and registered with the United Nations.33 By the time of the Geneva conference 
agreement had not been reached between the two governments as to the terms in which 
the issue was to be submitted for decision by the court.34
Thus Australia’s interest at Geneva was to secure a definition of natural resources that 
would give international recognition to Australia’s legislation that covered the pearl-shell 
oyster (as well as the trochus, the sea slug, and the green snail).35 Such a definition it 
was felt would serve to strengthen Australia’s case in the contemplated suit before the 
International Court of Justice.36 Australian negotiators were successful in having 
achieved a definition of natural resources which made clear that pearl-shell oysters were 
included as sedentary species37 but in the longer term this was to prove a much less 
important or controversial issue than the definition of the continental shelf.
For Australia the results of Committee Four were very satisfactory.38 The conference 
had confirmed the shelf doctrine and coastal states had been given sovereign rights to 
resources and a legal right to exploit them as far out as they were able. In particular it had 
upheld Australia’s position in relation to claiming the right to control oyster beds and 
pearl fisheries.39
The two months negotiations at Geneva produced four Conventions:40 (1) Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; (2) Convention on the High Seas; (3) 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas and 
(4) Convention on the Continental Shelf. The conference also adopted an Optional 
Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes41 and nine 
resolutions 42 The four Conventions entered into force in the 1960s43 after obtaining the 
22 ratifications as provided in their concluding articles. All were ratified by Australia on 
14 May 1963.44 Australia also acceded to the Optional Protocol concerning the 
compulsory settlement of disputes45 which provided that all disputes arising from the 
interpretation or application of the Conventions should be referred to the International
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Court of Justice, unless the parties agreed within a reasonable time upon some other 
means of peaceful settlement.46
UNCLOS 11
The second UN conference was brief lasting from 17 March to 26 April 1960. Eighty 
seven states attended in 1960. (Afghanistan and Nepal attended in 1958 but not in 1960 
and Cameroon and Guinea attended in 1960 but not in 195 8).47 The 1960 conference 
took up the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea and coastal state jurisdiction over 
fisheries which had failed to be settled in 1958. It was unable to find consensus on these 
issues with the main discussion of UNCLOS 1 between support for a territorial sea of 12 
miles on the one hand and support for 6 mile territorial sea plus a fishing zone on the 
other again being evident. No Convention was produced.48 The details of the 
negotiations and Australia’s role cannot be fully discussed here. What is important to 
note is that the six-week conference saw no change in Australia’s position from 
UNCLOS 1. The same concerns to limit the territorial sea and press only for minimum 
coastal state fishing rights was evident. Interests in commercial and military navigation, 
both surface and air, were noted in Australia’s position at UNCLOS 11. The fact that 
Australia was isolated from foreign fishing again meant that the delegation did not see any 
great need to push for wide fishing limits. Australia supported a six-plus six formula on 
the territorial sea and fishing zone proposed by the US and Canada but it failed by a 
single vote to gain the necessary majority.49
At the first two law of the sea conferences Australia defended the virtues of a narrow 
territorial sea and saw wider boundaries as a threat to navigation rights. In that respect 
Australia aligned itself with the major maritime powers.
There was little interest at the time by Australia to expand its jurisdiction in an offshore 
fisheries zone, either to conserve the fisheries in Australian waters for the Australian 
industry or to protect the area from foreign fishing. At that stage foreign fishing states 
had shown little interest in Australian waters (apart from Japanese pearlers). On the other 
hand it did not entirely ignore its coastal interests: in its policy on the continental shelf 
issue with its support for the exploitability criteria in the ILC definition Australia behaved 
like a coastal state. Maritime interests were heavily identified with the Western States and 
their dependencies and allies at UNCLOS 1 and 11. Australia along with most of the 
states supporting the six-plus-six formula supported the traditional 3 mile limit and 
promoted the proposal as a compromise between themselves and the large group of six 
and twelve mile states. Australia like the UK and US was prepared to consider
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functional jurisdiction to the coastal state for fishing out to 12 miles and the idea of a 
contiguous zone for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulation.
In so far as the 12 mile states represented coastal rather than maritime interests Australia 
aligned itself with the maritime powers who were primarily concerned to preserve the 
maximum freedom of the seas for their naval deployment. Australia also showed itself to 
be one of the ‘satisfied’ states. It showed clear agreement with the broad background of 
ocean law doctrine and its cornerstone, the freedom of the seas against those 
predominantly developing states who felt that traditional law was really a cloak, a set of 
ideas used to camouflage the self interest of powerful states and who demanded 
‘progressive’ changes to traditional law.50
By the late 1960s when ocean law issues were back on the international agenda Australia 
was to behave much more like a coastal state in seeking wider limits and types of coastal 
state controls over resources and activities off its coast. It was to also exhibit a much 
greater degree of flexibility in choosing its allies on law of the sea issues based on 
realizing its interests as a coastal state and to be much more enthusiastic on the need for 
change in traditional law of the sea. The development of Australia’s international policy 
on law of the sea issues to a more coastal oriented position is considered in the next 
chapter. It is necessary to consider briefly, however, those developments that served to 
undermine the Geneva Conventions as a stable basis for the law of the sea, in order to 
place the development of Australian policy prior to UNCLOS 111 in some historical 
context.
Ocean Politics 1961-1967
Buzan identifies four developments in the period 1961-1967 that served to undermine the 
Geneva Conventions.51 First, the Conventions were slow to come into force and did not 
attract the ratifications of a majority of states in the international system.52 Second was 
the influx of dozens of new states into the international system as a result of the last 
round of decolonization. Twenty-two states required for ratification was now a small 
fraction of the international community53 and with the momentum of decolonization those 
states, mainly African, that had not participated at UNCLOS 1 and 11 were not 
necessarily inclined to support conference outcomes at which they had not participated. 
The main weakness of the UNCLOS 1 and 11 conferences was the failure to reach 
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. After 1960 Australia joined with Britain 
and Canada to gain world-wide support from 46 states for a limited multilateral territorial 
sea agreement that would endorse the six-plus-six formula but the effort collapsed for 
lack of US support.54 After the law of the sea conferences, a growing number of states
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in Asia, Africa and Latin America began to adopt 12 mile limits either as territorial seas or 
as fishing zones.55 There were also a number of less modest claims to 200 mile 
territorial seas or fishing zones.56 Thus the failure of the conferences to agree on the 
breadth of the territorial sea encouraged unilateral action.57
The third factor serving to undermine the Geneva Convention was the growth of the 
Soviet Union to full maritime status and a shift in its interests more in line with that of the 
traditional maritime powers.58 Finally technological developments in oil drilling and 
deep seabed mining, ocean transportation and fishing and expanded ocean use all served 
to undermine the Geneva Conventions.59
Thus a number of political, legal and technological developments and actions had taken 
place in the period after UNCLOS 11 that served to weaken the Geneva law of the sea 
regime. It was against the background of those developments that Australia developed its 
law of the sea goals when ocean law issues were thrust back on the international agenda 
when the UN General Assembly voted in December 1970 to convene UNCLOS 111 in 
1973. It is to the development of Australia’s international ocean policy in the immediate 
preparatory period to UNCLOS 111 that we now turn.
CHAPTER 2
PREPARATIONS FOR UNCLOS 111: 
AUSTRALIAN OCEAN INTERESTS AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL OCEAN POLICY AT 
THE UNITED NATIONS SEABED COMMITTEE
This chapter is devoted to providing an overview of Australian law of the sea policy as it 
evolved at the international level in the period 1968-1973 at the United Nations Seabed 
Committee (SBC). Since Australia’s law of the sea objectives were largely derived from 
its ocean interests and marine attributes1 this chapter considers those interests and 
attributes in the context of the development of Australian policy on the broad issues that 
were covered in the preparations for UNCLOS 111. It is suggested that by the 
conclusion of the SBC’s work in 1973 Australia had developed a package of policies that 
it was to carry with it into UNCLOS 111. Those policies were to a large extent dictated 
by its interests as a coastal state and mirrored domestic efforts in the late 1960’s to expand 
Australia’s maritime jurisdiction. Australian law of the sea policy pre-UNCLOS 111 
represented a shift from Australia’s support for narrow coastal state limits at UNCLOS 1 
and 11 where Canberra regarded a six mile territorial sea with an additional six mile 
fishing area as being the maximum Australia required or was prepared to concede to other 
coastal states. That shift can largely be explained in terms of economic interests in wider 
offshore control along with regional and international coastal pressures.
Seabed Committee2
The diplomatic seed which was to grow into the largest multilateral exercise ever 
undertaken by the United Nations was planted on 17 August 1967 when in an historic 
address Arvid Pardo of Malta requested inclusion as a supplementary item on the agenda 
of the General Assembly the following: ‘Declaration and Treaty concerning the 
reservation for peaceful purposes of the seabed and of the ocean floor underlying the high 
seas beyond the limits of present jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the 
interests of mankind.’3 Within six weeks the General Assembly had set up an Ad Hoc 
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits 
of National Jurisdiction (SBC). Australia was one of the co-sponsors of the draft 
resolution that created the SBC4 and was one of the 35 members of the original committee 
that worked from 1968 until 1973 studying issues related to the international seabed 
regime.5 By 1970 the Committee had produced a declaration of principles to serve as the 
basis for the deep seabed regime and by 1971 when the Committee, having become
permanent in 1969, was transformed into a preparatory committee for UNCLOS 111 its 
membership had more than doubled to eighty-six.6
In its expanded format from the end of 1970 the SBC worked to complete possible draft 
articles for UNCLOS 111. The Committee was nowhere near completing its task when it 
was replaced by UNCLOS 111 at the end of 1973. In fact at the end of 1973 the SBC 
had not succeeded in producing a single preparatory document in the form of a set of draft 
treaty articles.7 It is not proposed to provide a history of the SBC as the ground here has 
been extensively covered in the literature.8 The following presents in summary form an 
elaboration of Australian policy on the main issues as they developed at the SBC in the 
context of Australian ocean interests and marine attributes.
International Seabed Regime
Australia’s major attribute of importance with regard to this issue related to its status as a 
mineral producer of those metals that were likely to be produced once commercial 
harvesting of nodules began.9 The metals concerned here were nickel of which in 1975-6 
Australia produced 7% of the world’s production, copper of which Australia produced 
.3% of the world’s production and manganese of which Australia produced 17% of the 
world’s production. These metals earned Australia around $411 million in export income 
in that year.10 Those nodules of greatest commercial interest were expected to be in the 
deepest parts of the Pacific Ocean at depths of up to 18,000 feet.11
The Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources and B.H.P. were involved in the early 
1970s in collecting manganese nodule samples and B.H.P. participated in research on 
recovery techniques but there was no real commitment by Australian mining companies to 
participate in deep seabed mining.12 Australia’s position in the SBC was to take a 
compromise position between the developed states, which wanted a regime dominated by 
national operators and private companies and the developing countries that wanted an 
international authority that would itself control seabed mining. Australia proposed an 
agency that could not only enter licensing arrangements with states but also undertake 
these activities directly from its own income, a position that was to gain widespread 
acceptance at UNCLOS 111. Australia noted during the SBC that it preferred 
international commodity agreements rather than production controls to protect its metal 
market interests, and was careful during the SBC years in formulating compromise 
positions so as to combine support from all groups. This approach was to carry over into 
UNCLOS 111.13
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Continental Shelf
Australia’s continental margin in terms of absolute size, 1,172,600 square miles lies in 
second place behind Canada with 1,240,000 square nautical miles of seabed adjacent to 
its coast.14 In some areas off New South Wales, and much of the south coast of 
Australia the margin is very narrow but off the north west of Australia the margin extends 
beyond 350 miles.15 While we have already noted Australia’s claim in 1953 to the 100 
fathom depth mark,16 political and economic interest in this area did not really take off 
until the mid 1960s where the main interest was in oil and gas made possible by 
technological developments in hydrocarbon recovery. Until 1960 petroleum exploration 
in Australia was exclusively on land. In that year BHP secured exploration permits in 
Bass Strait. Major discoveries in Bass Strait were made four years later stimulating 
further exploration offshore particularly in the north w est.17 With the Federal 
government providing specific encouragement to petroleum, exploration promising 
discoveries were made in areas previously thought too difficult to drill.18 Following 
negotiations with the State governments an agreement was reached on a common code for 
administering offshore resources.19 The point to note here was that petroleum 
exploration was to be encouraged by uniform legislation agreed to by the Commonwealth 
and the States. The shelf was defined in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 
according to the terms of the 1958 shelf definition in the Geneva Convention. The 1967 
act also defined adjacent areas, which were areas within which particular designated 
authorities would apply the rules governing petroleum activities. In some areas the 
boundaries extended for more than 300 nautical miles.20
The delimitation of the outer areas of the shelf of Western Australia, Northern Territory 
and Queensland under the provisions of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act led to 
boundary delimitation problems with Indonesia because the area encompassed the area 
from Torres Strait to south of Timor. Negotiations commenced in March 1971 and while 
agreement on a less controversial area was reached in May 1971 it was not until 9 October 
1972 agreement was reached on the delimitation in the Timor Sea.21 The details of these 
agreements are not of concern in this context.22 Rather what is important to note here is 
that from the start of the SBC economic interest in offshore hydrocarbons (leading to 
exploration permits being granted over wide areas of the shelf)23 combined with the 
opening of negotiations on a seabed boundary in areas north of Australia during the life of 
the SBC made Australia more aware of its interests as a coastal state and determined that it 
would wish to preserve what it regarded as its rights under existing international law.24
Pardo’s proposal in 1967 with its concept of a precisely fixed boundary between national 
and international jurisdiction reopened the question of the outer limits of the shelf and
24
directly affected Australian interests. Since fixing a boundary for the area was in effect 
fixing a boundary for the shelf jurisdiction of coastal states, Pardo’s initiative would 
invalidate the flexible definition achieved in 1958. As Australia had founded its 1967 
petroleum legislation on the expanding rim theory and legislated for areas far beyond the 
200 metre line, Pardo’s proposal raised the possibility that valuable areas of Australia’s 
shelf would pass from national jurisdiction to be internationalised under Pardo’s 
International Seabed Authority. Potentially important also was the delimitation of an 
international boundary with respect to Antarctica. Australia claimed the largest share of 
Antarctic territory (42%) and there was the possibility arising that claims could be made in 
the SBC that the southern boundary of any new international body should be the low 
water mark of the Antarctic continent.25
Australia’s position in the SBC was to argue for seabed rights to the edge of the 
continental margin (shelf, slope and rise), although it only moved aggressively to this 
position in the last two years of the SBC’s work. Australia was mainly concerned to 
argue against a flat 200 mile limit as this was considered an attack on the sovereignty of 
the coastal state and would discriminate against Australia with its broad shelf and 
potentially valuable seabed resources. The evolution of Australian policy is, however, to 
detailed to elaborate here26but by the end of the SBC Australia had found some other 
wide margin allies such as Canada, Soviet Union, Iceland, Italy, UK, Argentina, 
Sweden, Norway, most of the Latin American countries and Iceland, a total of 23 states 
in all.27 However it faced opposition from a number of quarters.28
By the end of the SBC’s work Australia had presented its case for rights of the coastal 
state to the edge of the margin basing its case on existing rights under the 1958 Geneva 
Convention, Australian law and practice (that had seen exploration permits issued over 
distant parts of the shelf) and the I d ’s decision in the North Sea cases. Economic 
interest in offshore resources combined with a certain amount of nationalism underpinned 
what was to be the basis of Australia’s campaign on the margin at UNCLOS 111. It was 
a policy that was crudely, but accurately, described by one journalist as Canberra ‘going 
for grabs’ and seeing how much could be achieved.29
Archipelagos
Australia had significant interests relating to navigation, alliance relations and foreign 
policy considerations on this issue.30
Australia’s position at the SBC was to reverse its previous opposition to the archipelagic 
concept and to give it cautious support. Australia’s support was, however, conditional
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upon there being assured rights of unimpeded passage without notification, at least for 
surface passage, along sea-lanes established by an archipelagic state through its 
archipelagic waters and upon the assumption that responsible criteria would be 
established to limit the number of claims to archipelagic states and the extent of claims by 
individual and archipelagic countries. Australia was particularly concerned to allow for 
the possibility of PNG claiming archipelagic status.31
By the end of the SBC Canberra had come to the view that for a variety of reasons, 
mainly revolving around broad foreign policy concerns that Australia should give 
support, albeit not of an unqualified kind, to the claims of its archipelagic neighbours. 
These claims had been successfully asserted prior to the SBC and there appeared few 
political points to be scored in a policy of opposing such claims. Indeed outright 
opposition would have been seen by regional countries as a deliberate policy by Canberra 
to turn its back on the aspirations of archipelagic countries to achieve improved prospects 
of national security, improved communication and greater economic self-sufficiency 
through the international recognition of archipelagic principles.32 The question was how 
would UNCLOS 111 integrate archipelagic principles in any new treaty in such a way as 
to accommodate the interests of the actual and potential archipelagic states without 
adversely affecting the interests of states like Australia that had specific interests in transit 
rights over archipelagic waters. It was by no means certain that by the end of the SBC 
that this was possible. There was still considerable opposition to the concept from the 
maritime powers that were concerned that if the concept applied to a considerable number 
of states that it could lead to military deployments being inhibited.33
Islands
Australia has a number of offshore island outposts. These include Ashmore and Cartier, 
Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Heard and McDonald Islands, Norfolk Island, Coral 
Seas Islands Territory, Lord Howe and Macquarie Island.34 It was in Australia’s interest 
that these islands should have full 200 mile maritime resource zones. Each island if it had 
such a zone would theoretically generate 125,000 square miles of ocean.35 In order to 
have maintained a consistent policy on the shelf it was reasonable to expect that Canberra 
would advocate extension of the shelf area generated by islands to the edge of the islands’ 
margin.36
Conventional law and Australian practice supported an expansive view of islands at the 
time of the SBCs deliberations.37 Surprisingly, however, Australia was vague in the 
SBC on whether islands deserved to generate economic zones in the same way as coastal 
state territory. The working paper of Australia and Norway on the Economic Zone and
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Delimitation submitted to the final session of the SBC was vague on the point simply 
referring to the zone extending from the ‘applicable’ boundaries for measuring the 
territorial sea.38 Australia, however, appeared to lean to the view that islands should 
generate economic zones, for in the course of its archipelagic statement Australia 
supported the principle that islands are an integral part of the territory of a state.39
Straits and Territorial Sea
It was noted earlier that the impetus for convening UNCLOS 111 was partly due to the 
desire of the United States and the Soviet Union to complete the work that UNCLOS 1 
and 11 had left uncompleted— to determine the width of the territorial sea and the question 
of international straits. The two issues were critically related hence they are treated 
together here. If the breadth of the territorial sea were universally extended to 12 miles, 
116 international straits would be covered by territorial seas as they were less than 24 
miles across.40 High seas corridors would cease to exist in such straits and transit 
would be subject to the regime of innocent passage. This would mean submarines would 
be required to navigate on the surface and there would be no right of overflight.41 The 
innocent passage regime was considered unsatisfactory by the maritime powers as the 
right of warships to passage without express consent of the coastal state had been widely 
disputed 42 By October 1972 there were 63 states that claimed a territorial sea of 12 miles 
and the trend seemed irreversible. Australia was one of only 25 countries that claimed 3 
miles.43
A right of innocent passage when applied to international straits was thus considered 
unacceptable by the major maritime powers, in particular the US. The restrictions on 
overflight, the requirements for surfaced transit of nuclear powered ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs) and the potential denial of the right of innocent passage for 
warships were perceived by the US to pose a threat to the mobility of its aircraft and ships 
through international straits. The requirement that submarines surface in straits or give 
advance notification would, it was believed, threaten the credibility of the sea-based 
deterrent in that SSBNs would expose their locations when surfaced.44
Australian interests were directly involved here, specifically freedom of navigation for the 
Australian navy and airforce, the navigational interests of its main ally, the US and 
principal trading partner, Japan, and broader foreign policy concerns relating to the 
sensitivity of the issue among Australia’s South-East Asian neighbours 45
Australia supported a 12 mile limit on the territorial sea, but in fact Australia did not, 
surprisingly, take a high profile on the straits issue in the SBC tending to leave
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negotiations to the military powers in the user group.46 This was largely for tactical 
reasons, for while Canberra was concerned that trading routes should not be impeded and 
that whatever regulations were necessary should be clear and not subject to sudden 
change, it knew it could accept more regulation such as ‘designated sea lanes (and) prior 
notification than the nuclear weapons powers would’.47
Little momentum developed in the SBC to reach any real accommodation between the 
opposing views of the straits states and the maritime powers.48 Australia’s position was 
more sympathetic to the straits states than the maritime position but Canberra identified 
with the user groups’ views that the straits states position to treat straits as a single entity 
with a territorial sea was unacceptable. On the evidence of the SBC, however, it 
appeared that Canberra was unlikely to adopt a high profile on the issue at UNCLOS 111.
Fisheries
Australia has never been a significant fishing nation and the resource base of fish around 
Australia is not spectacular by world standards 49 Production had risen, however, from 
70,000 lb valued at $7.5 million in 1951-52 to 200,000 lb valued at around $60 million 
in 1969-70.50 In 1971 Australia ranked only 49th among fish producing countries51 
and its industry was geared to export high value Crustacea and molluscs (rock lobster, 
oysters, scallops and abalone). The industry was dominated in the 1960s and 1970s by 
owner skippers with relatively small vessels exploiting inshore grounds on the continental 
shelf.52 Australia’s industry prior to UNCLOS 111 was thus not developed to any great 
extent but Australia was interested in both expanding its own industry and protecting 
those sectors of its fisheries that were considered to be subject to over-exploitation by 
foreigners. As far as the first goal was concerned the Australian fishing industry had 
seen the introduction in the late 1960s of larger vessels capable of extending into more 
distant waters and exploratory fishing operations indicated the presence of resources 
capable of commercial exploitation on the continental slope in waters as deep as 800 
metres.53
Australian fisheries policy pre-UNCLOS was also, as noted above, concerned with 
protecting resources that were seen to be vulnerable to foreign fishing activity. 
Taiwanese fishing around northern Australia was of concern not so much because of 
competition with local fishermen but because of despoliation of the reef environment and 
the possibility of the introduction of plant animal and human diseases.54 More relevant to 
Australian fisheries policy makers were increases in Soviet fishing and whaling activity in 
southern waters and over-exploitation by Japanese tuna long-line fishermen around the 
Australian coast.55
28
Thus in formulating its fisheries policy pre-UNCLOS Australia had two major interests. 
First to develop its small scale fishing industry and second to ensure that the coastal state 
was able to reap significant benefits from its fishing activities in the face of distant-water 
fishing nations. Of relevance within this context was Australia’s responsibility at that 
stage for PNG where there was significant effort being made to develop commercial 
fisheries.56 With an undeveloped fishing industry and with foreign fishermen off its 
coast Australia thus went in to the international negotiations on this issue in the SBC with 
similar concerns on fisheries to many developing coastal states.
Australia’s position as it evolved in the SBC was to seek a significant increase in coastal 
state jurisdiction in an attempt to protect its coastal fisheries. Australian gradually 
accepted a 200 mile limit as the cut-off for a fisheries zone but after 1973 the form of 
Australia’s fisheries position, as opposed to the detailed principles (which it incorporated 
in a joint paper with New Zealand in 1972) moved to support the economic zone concept. 
Here Australia was anxious to ensure that a flat 200 mile limit was not to become the cut­
off for national limits, so as to preserve margin rights beyond 200 miles. Australia was 
also concerned to ensure navigation and communication rights were protected in the EEZ. 
Australia wanted international arrangements for highly migratory species (HMS) like 
tuna. The detailed evolution and analysis of this position cannot be discussed here but 
apart from its position on HMS Australia’s position on fisheries at UNCLOS 111 did not 
really alter from its basic SBC views.57
Marine Environment
As a country with more than 24,000 km of coastline58 including the ‘priceless 
heritage’,59 of the Great Barrier Reef Australia had an obvious interest in the preservation 
of the marine environment. Australia’s coasts, apart from Torres Strait area are, 
however, not subjected to the effects of passing international shipping traffic and thus 
Australia has been in the ‘fortunate position where it can exercise a high degree of control 
over marine pollution by control of ships that enter its ports’.60 On the other hand 
Australia’s interest in reducing marine pollution had to be balanced by its interest as a 
country that is highly dependent on world market as a buyer and seller of goods.61 As 
virtually all Australia’s trade is carried by sea by foreign shippers, Australia also had an 
obvious interest in not introducing unnecessary pollution controls which may affect the 
competitiveness of Australian goods by imposing added costs on shippers.62
Australia’s interest in protecting the marine environment was given added focus when in 
March 1970 the Oceanic Grandeur grounded in Torres Strait causing significant oil 
spillage.63 The ensuing spillage and the detergent used to clean up the oil were believed
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responsible for the destruction of the cultured pearl industry which was being established 
in the area and brought forth outcries from environmentalists concerned about reef 
damage.64 Despite the fact that Australia was an original member of the International 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), a member of its Council from 1959-1973 
and a signatory to IMCO Convention on Oil Pollution65 Canberra was hampered by a 
number of factors in efforts to control pollution on the reef.66
It was thus against a background of an increasing awareness of the dangers of oil 
pollution and in particular the potential vulnerability of the Great Barrier Reef67 that 
Australia approached the marine environment issue in the SBC. Australia exhibited active 
concern on the issue, taking a very strong coastal state line on the need to protect the 
marine environment. Australia worked with Canada and New Zealand in particular to 
argue for stronger rights and a larger role for the coastal state in preventing marine 
pollution and protecting the marine environment. While a strong supporter of the concept 
of port state enforcement rights, for tactical reasons it appeared that Australia did not push 
hard on this issue. Again, the details of Australia’s SBC policies cannot be detailed here, 
but at the conclusion of the SBC Australia’s position was firmly aligned with those 
coastal states wishing to expand their powers over pollution matters. It did not, however, 
entirely ignore its interest in the continuation of unimpeded commercial shipping.68 
Australian delegates had made it clear that Canberra had a significant stake in the 
environmental issues that were to be debated at UNCLOS 111 and that it was ready to 
vigorously assert the need for greater coastal state powers over the marine environment 
even if that meant lining up against traditional allies in the maritime states camp.69
Marine Scientific Research
Prior to UNCLOS 111 Australia did not have a significant capability for marine scientific 
research.70 While it had demonstrated a desire to participate in international co-operative 
ventures in marine research there was no evidence at that stage that Australia was likely to 
undertake such research on its own in distant waters. Thus on the MSR issue Australian 
interests were somewhat conflicting. With its limited MSR capabilities Australia had an 
interest in ensuring that coastal states had adequate power to control activities in offshore 
areas with regard to resources. On the other hand Australia had interests as a researching 
state with many Australian scientists associated with international programmes working in 
foreign waters. In the longer terms also Canberra had to consider the prospect of 
Australia developing its own distant-water capabilities.
The international law on scientific research was not well developed prior to UNCLOS 
111 and there were fairly ad-hoc arrangements applying for researching states to obtain
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consent for MSR projects in a coastal states waters.71 In 1958 the economic and military 
implications of marine science had not acquired great significance.72 A number of 
incidents in the 1960s however created a strong suspicion on the part of coastal states that 
a good deal of ‘pure’ scientific research had military connections.73 On the part of 
developing countries there was also a strong desire to redress what was a widening gap in 
research capabilities between them and developed countries.74 In order to exploit 
offshore areas information was required and in order to meaningfully participate in 
offshore resource development developing countries argued that they must have the right 
to control all research in offshore areas.
In the SBC Australia did not devote much attention to the MSR issue. The main focus of 
the debate was to be later repeated at UNCLOS 111 and concerned the divergence of 
views between the opponents (mainly the maritimes and superpowers) and proponents 
(mainly developing coastal states) of greater coastal state control over MSR in areas 
beyond the territorial sea. The establishment of 200 mile EEZs would bring under coastal 
state jurisdiction that part of the world’s oceans where the greater part of MSR was 
conducted as most ocean phenomena occur along the edge of continents. The area had 
been high seas with no restrictions on research. Researching states were concerned that if 
coastal states had the right to control research in the EEZ this would hamper MSR.75
Australia’s SBC position on MSR was studiously vague but generally envisaged an 
increase in coastal activity at the expense of the traditional freedom to engage in MSR. 
This view was to strengthen at UNCLOS 111, although late at the conference Australia 
swung back to a greater emphasis on the need for researchers’ freedom.76
Delimitation
Australia’s specific interests on the delimitation of maritime boundaries prior to UNCLOS 
111 related to the settlement of maritime boundary issues with Indonesia and PNG. Its 
interest on the question within the SBC was focussed on general principles of boundary 
delimitation. In the SBC Australia had two main goals. First it wanted to ensure that 
when the margin overlapped a 200 mile zone in a situation where opposite states were 
less than 400 miles apart then the margin should prevail in respect of seabed rights. This 
was directly related to seabed delimitation problems with Indonesia. Secondly, Australia 
wanted to ensure that any delimitation arrangement would be effected by agreement, a 
concern that was particularly important in the context of the extremely complex Torres 
Strait delimitation between Australia and Papua New Guinea.77 The SBC made little 
progress on the issue78and it was unclear to what extent Australia would assume a high 
profile on the issue at UNCLOS 111.
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Concluding Remarks
Australia’s pre-UNCLOS position as it emerged in the SBC was to identify itself with 
coastal state views, particularly on the shelf, fisheries and the marine environment. To a 
large extent the evolution of Australian international policy reflected domestic efforts to 
ensure greater control over offshore resources as evidenced in the 1967 fishing zone 
legislation, the 1968 legislation to control all sedentary fish harvesting, the extension of 
control over seabed resources in the 1967 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act and the 
1969 assertion of sovereignty over the Coral Seas Islands.79 In the marine environment 
area Canberra had moved to extend the sphere of Australian control over ship sourced 
pollution in the 1970 amendments to the Navigation Act. Economic developments in the 
area of foreign fleet activity off Australian waters, the discovery of oil and gas resources 
on the shelf, the opening of discussions with Indonesia on a seabed boundary in areas of 
north of Australia and an increasing awareness of the dangers of pollution had made 
Canberra more aware of its interests as a coastal state. At the same time there was strong 
support in the SBC for expanding coastal state jurisdiction and regional countries in the 
South East Asia and the South Pacific were part of the general trend calling for such 
changes. The 1960s had seen an expansion of coastal state jurisdiction undermining the 
Geneva regimes. Thus both external and internal forces pushed Australian policy 
towards a more coastal orientation culminating in the support by the government in 1973 
for the 200-mile economic zone concept.
Australia’s policy at the international level on law of the sea issues was largely completed 
in the 3 years of preparatory sessions of the Enlarged SBC between 1971-1973. Those 
years are best seen as the alliance building phase prior to the formal sessions of UNCLOS 
111.80 The effort to build a common position among states with similar interests resulted 
in the formation of a Coastal States group in 1971/1972, an informal group of about 25 
developed and developing coastal states which was chaired by Canada.81 Australia was 
a member of the group82that was to prove Australia’s main vehicle with which to push 
its policies at UNCLOS 111. Australia had also begun co-operation with other wide- 
margin states, particularly Canada, as a prelude to coalition-building on the issue at 
UNCLOS 111.83 The main groups during the preparatory years of the SBC reflected the 
early stages of UNCLOS 111, the Group of 77, the maritime powers, archipelagic states 
and territorialist and the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states.84 These 
groups are discussed in the next chapter but what is important to note here is that 
Australia’s alignment with coastal state positions in the preparatory years culminating 
with the acceptance of the economic zone concept in 1973 meant that Canberra would 
undoubtedly find itself at times opposed to the views of the maritime powers that wished
to preserve traditional high seas freedoms against those states that wished to extend their 
jurisdiction, particularly over resources.
CHAPTER THREE
UNCLOS 111, AUSTRALIAN OBJECTIVES AND CHOICE OF
STRATEGY
This chapter is concerned to provide a broad overview of the structure of UNCLOS 111 
and to summarize Australian law of the sea objectives just prior to the conference. It 
considers what level of action offered Australia the best opportunity for it to achieve its 
law of the sea objectives and argues that the global level offered Australia the best avenue 
to achieve its ocean law goals.
Structure of UNCLOS 111
The Third UN conference on the Law of the Sea held its first session (devoted to 
organisational matters) in December 1973 and concluded its work in September 1982. A 
final signing session of the conference was held from 6-10 December 1982 (see 
Appendix A). Excluding the signing session the conference met fifteen times for a total 
585 days. (Some sessions were described as ‘resumed’ sessions although they were, in 
all but name, separate sessions). A number of inter-sessional meetings were also held. 
Around 2000-3000 delegates attended each session. There was no deadline for the 
completion of the conference. The General Assembly resolution convening the 
conference in effect left the number of future sessions open. It was the largest, longest 
and most complex exercise in multilateral diplomacy ever undertaken by the United 
Nations.1
The structure of UNCLOS and its negotiating processes have been extensively detailed in 
the literature and it is not proposed to duplicate that work here:2 only the broadest outline 
will be presented in order to provide an understanding of the overall framework within 
which Australian diplomacy operated.
UNCLOS 111 continued the structure of the SBC having three main committees where 
every delegate could, if it chose, be represented. There was a Plenary in which all 
delegations were represented. Although the settlement of disputes was to be dealt with 
by each Main Committee, in so far as it was relevant to their mandates, in practice, the 
question was discussed and negotiated in the Plenary as were the preamble to the 
Convention and final clauses.3
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Most UNCLOS meetings were informal without formal records. There was an enormous 
amount of unofficial documentation but the official records of the conference were limited 
to the records of the formal sessions.4 With over 150 states participating, because of the 
enormous range and scope of the issues with which the conference had to deal and 
because the goal of a single comprehensive treaty UNCLOS 111 was, not surprisingly, 
an extremely difficult negotiating forum. One of the most important features of the 
conference was the decision to proceed by consensus. Whereas at UNCLOS 1 and 11 
the rule was that a proposal would pass by a majority vote in Committee and needed a 
two thirds majority in the plenary session it was felt at UNCLOS 111 that consensus was 
necessary if there was to be a Convention commanding the widest possible support. 
Thus it was considered necessary both by the developed maritime states and the more 
numerous coastal state members of G77 to ‘work into the rules safeguards against hasty 
voting, for cooling-off periods and to provide for special majorities. Another underlying 
rationale was that important interest groups e.g. the major powers, who were numerically 
in the minority, did not want to be railroaded into voting where they might not have the 
votes to win’.5
The SBC’s practice of avoiding the taking of votes on substantive matters influenced 
UNCLOS procedure. The UN General Assembly adopted on 16 November 1973 a 
‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ that stated that the ‘conference should make every effort to 
reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no 
voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus had been exhausted’.6
The letter and the spirit of the rules of procedure were observed by the conference. The 
pattern of negotiations at UNCLOS was avoiding votes and pressing for consensus.7 
There is no doubt that the rules partly accounted for a very long conference for if it was 
not for the rules discouraging voting votes on numerous issues could have been taken. 
As Koh and Jayakumar point out: ‘The delegates had to keep the discussions and 
negotiations going, session after session, in the hope that compromise would eventually 
emerge’.8
After 1975 the conference moved to what Buzan calls ‘active consensus’ which involved 
a variety of techniques designed to provide impetus towards achieving consensus, which 
turned out to be a major innovation of the conference.9 It is not possible to define active 
consensus other than to describe it as it developed over the conference. The most 
important techniques involved granting to the President and the three main Committee 
Chairmen the initiative in providing informal negotiating texts which ‘effectively obliged 
interested states to take positions to encourage or discourage the formation of consensus 
around them ’.10 Other devices included holding most of the meetings on an informal
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basis with no official records, the establishment from April 1975 of informal working 
groups and consultative groups, and the development of informal groups outside the 
conference structure (see below).
Another feature of the structure of UNCLOS was the ‘package deal’ approach. To quote 
Plant:
What is unique to the package deal procedure is the extensive trade-off 
between functionally unrelated issues which cut across committee and 
working group boundaries, often producing mini-packages, but all 
contributing to a single ‘grand package’. The process is designed to meet 
the minimum requirements of the maximum number of participants. In the 
case of UNCLOS 111, however, it also involved the simultaneous 
negotiation of a very broad agenda in an effort to achieve a single instrument 
covering all of its items; this was useful in permitting the co-ordination of 
trade-offs covering every possible subject without necessitating the 
reopening of issues already ‘settled’, but in practice it slowed down the 
negotiations quite considerably.11
Partly because of the range of the agenda and the number of participants, partly because 
the issues themselves cut across many of the standard political groupings in the General 
Assembly and partly because of the attempt to construct a grand package deal without 
resort to standard voting rules UNCLOS 111 saw the development of many groups as the 
preferred way of establishing influence within the proceedings. The use of groups within 
conference diplomacy is not, in itself, unusual. As Buzan points out: ‘In a long and 
protracted negotiation, only the most powerful states can stand alone and still hope to 
forward their interests. For the rest, participation in groups is almost synonymous with 
the struggle to achieve influence’.12 Groups were the machinery by which much of the 
process of negotiations at UNCLOS 111 was carried out. The description and role of 
these groups has been well documented.13 It must be noted however that negotiations in 
and between groups was not recorded. This is hardly surprising for as Kaufmann has 
pointed out in ‘many international conferences informal conversations, encounters and 
meetings, away from the publicity of the open meeting, form the most important part of 
the conference’.14
However, in order to understand the structure in which Australia operated at UNCLOS 
111a brief summary of the main groups is necessary. Perhaps the most important point 
to note here is that while traditional regional groups operated at UNCLOS new interest 
groups that did not exist outside the conference arose and became influential. They were 
unique in so far as they ‘cut across geographical groups and across the traditional lines 
dividing developed from developing country, as well as across ideological lines’.15 
Some traditional groups like Group of 77 were able to form a common position on 
seabed mining issues but because of the diversity of views on law of the sea issues
traditional UN groupings such as the regional blocs (Africa, Asia, Latin America, Arab, 
East Europeans, Western Europe and Others) were for the most part ill-equipped to be 
vehicles for forging common positions.16
New interest groups sprung up and it was not unusual for a state to belong to more than 
one interest group because of its marine attributes or ocean interests.17 The largest and 
earliest was the Coastal States Group which was formed during the SBC and rose to a 
group of 75 delegations (half the conference) made up predominantly of developing 
countries under Mexico’s leadership. The common interest of members was to promote 
their cause of extended coastal jurisdiction and to oppose groups perceived as inimical to 
their interests— for instance the claims of the Land Locked and Geographically 
Disadvantaged States (LLGDS) for rights to living resources in the EEZs of other states. 
The latter group was made up of 59 states, 29 of which were land-locked and 26 of 
which were in the geographically disadvantaged category— the latter category were 
developing countries that either derived no substantial economic advantage from 
establishing a 200 mile EEZ or were adversely affected in their economies by others 
doing so; or else had short coastlines and could not uniformally extend their jurisdiction. 
The LLGDS group was chaired by Austria and Singapore. Broad Margin states, or 
Margineers were those 13 countries that argued that national limits to the shelf should 
extend beyond 200 miles. The archipelagic states group argued for recognition from the 
conference for the right to draw strait baselines connecting the outermost points of the 
outermost islands to create a sense of political unity. The Territorialist Group were made 
up of 23 countries who were a sub-group of the Coastal States Group and who had 
declared territorial seas of more than 12 miles. One of the groups’ objectives was to 
ensure that the proposed 200 mile EEZ conform as closely as possible to their territorialist 
concept.
The Straits States group was composed of states bordering straits whose interests 
revolved around what regime would govern passage through straits. There were two 
groups that formed around support for either equitable principles for delimitation of 
seabed and EEZ boundaries and another group supporting the principle of the median 
line. The maritime powers formed a group to preserve traditional high seas freedoms 
such as military and commercial navigation. There was the Land Based Producers 
Group, a group of about 30 countries who were concerned that seabed mining would 
adversely affect their land-based metal mining production. They combined to negotiate 
production controls on seabed minerals. The Oceania Group made up of island countries 
of the South Pacific (including Australia) pressed its particular views on the issue of 
islands and highly migratory species of fish.
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There were also a number of very important private groups convened outside the formal 
framework of the conference whose main objectives were to bring together informally, 
the leading and important delegations to discuss an issue in a small group. The best 
known was the Evensen Group of Juridical Experts, named after its convenor, Jens 
Evensen, the leader of the Norwegian delegation. It dealt with numerous subjects 
including the EEZ, the marine environment, the shelf, and the rights of LLGDS.18 There 
was a private group on straits chaired by Fiji and the UK convened at the third session, 
the Castenada Group on the legal status of the EEZ that convened at the sixth session to 
break the deadlock on the issue of the legal status of the EEZ, the Nandan group set up at 
the fifth session to resolve issues relating to LLGDS rights and a private group on 
disputes settlement. These groups achieved vital compromises on such issues as straits 
and the legal status of the EEZ and compromise texts on a range of issues that were 
extremely useful to the Chairman of the three committee chairmen.19
UNCLOS 111, like any international conference, produced some key individual 
players,20 but unlike most diplomatic law making conferences UNCLOS 111 did not 
have a basic text in front of it when it commenced its work.21 By the end of 1973 the 
SBC had not succeeded in producing a single preparatory document in the form of a set 
of draft treaty articles. Instead the SBC submitted a report in 1973 to the Twenty-Eighth 
session of the General Assembly with hundreds of proposals and draft articles as well as 
many reports from the three main committees.22 The absence of such a single 
preparatory text meant firstly that it was difficult for delegations to negotiate on the basis 
of countless different texts because states attached importance to their own proposals and 
felt they were losing a tactical point if another state’s proposals were used as a basis. 
Secondly, it meant that the conference itself had to undertake the task of preparing such a 
neutral text which could be the basis of negotiations.23
On the eve of the opening of the March 1981 session, when most delegations hoped to 
see the completion of the conference, the US announced that it was embarking of a 
fundamental review of its attitude towards the Convention, because of dissatisfaction 
with the regime for seabed mining. The review occupied the whole of 1981 and 
prevented effective US participation in both the 1981 sessions. In January 1982 
President Reagan announced that the US would return to the negotiations providing six 
broad objectives were met. At the eleventh session the US submitted between 150-200 
amendments which amounted to unravelling many of the compromises that had been 
agreed to in the years before 1980. They were rejected by the developing countries and 
despite the mediating efforts of twelve industrialized countries (including Australia), the 
US decided it would not participate in the adoption of the Convention by consensus. It
asked that the text and four accompanying resolutions to be put to a vote. The package 
was adopted by a vote of 130 in favour, including Australia, 4 against (Israel, Turkey, 
US, Venezuala) with 17 abstentions.
Australian Objectives and Choice of Strategies
This section is devoted to first outlining Australia’s policy positions as they stood just 
prior to the first UNCLOS session in December 1973 and second to considering the 
question of what level of action offered Australia the best avenue to achieve those goals. 
The development of those goals has already been dealt with in the previous chapter. 
Australia’s position on each of the major subjects at UNCLOS is set out under the 
following headings. Unless otherwise indicated, Australia’s positions are taken from the 
Government’s own position paper issued in October 1973.24
The Continental Margin
Australia claimed rights to the edge of the margin (the shelf, slope and the rise). This 
was an area of about 1,000,000 square miles, a third of the area of the Australian 
continent. Australia based its case here on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and the 1968 decision of the International Court of Justice in the North 
Sea cases. Because Australia’s margin extends for more than 350 miles from the coast it 
was not in Australia’s interests to accept a 200 mile limit to coastal state jurisdiction. 
Australia’s margin claim was linked to support for a 200 mile economic zone so that 
Australia’s claim was to sovereign rights over seabed resources to 200 miles and to the 
outer edge of the margin where this extended beyond 200 miles.
Exclusive Economic Zone
Australia supported the economic zone concept for three reasons. First, the recognition 
of such a zone would lessen the validity of claims to a very wide territorial sea. Second, 
parts of Australia’s margin, particularly the eastern area, the margin is very narrow, 
extending to less than 50 miles. A 200 mile economic zone would give Australia rights 
over a considerably larger area of seabed and subsoil. Third, as the economic zone was 
to cover the water column above the seabed, Australia would obtain rights over fisheries 
as well as rights over minerals extracted from the sea in that area. Australia placed 
importance on the need for freedom of navigation and overflight to be maintained in the 
zone. Australia, therefore, supported the position that the status of the zonal waters as 
high seas should be maintained.
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International Regime for Deep Seabed Mining
Australia rejected the view of those states such as the US, UK, USSR and France that 
advocated a relatively low-powered Authority, acting mainly as an agency regulating 
exploration and exploitation of the area by states. Australia supported the wide scope and 
powers approach to the Authority, in particular the establishment of an organisation with 
wide powers to exploit the seabed on its own behalf, to engage in production sharing 
agreements or joint projects with other states, to enter into international commodity 
arrangements with other states and to control commercial development of the area. 
Australia felt that support for the Authority would be a quid pro quo to states which 
suffer if Australia’s objective of obtaining a wide area of national jurisdiction were 
accepted. It was also considered that the wide powers approach coincided with 
Australia’s interests as a mineral producer and those of the developing countries in 
exercising an influence over the rate of world mineral production. Power to explore and 
exploit on its own behalf would help to ensure that big producers and technologically 
advanced states were not able to obtain a monopoly of these activities in the international 
area. It was noted that Australia could suffer a drop in nickel exports with an increasing 
supply of minerals from the seabed. Australia supported the establishment of an 
organisation which would be empowered to enter into licensing and other contractual 
arrangements with states (subject to approval of the Council) and also to undertake 
exploration and exploitation through its own earned income subject to Council 
approval.25
Territorial Sea
Australia felt that it was politically and legally unrealistic to hold territorial sea claims to 3 
miles. Australia supported a twelve mile territorial sea but support was linked to 
recognition of a right of transit through straits (see below). The government noted that it 
was in its interests to restrict the territorial sea to a relatively narrow limit in order to 
ensure that the area of the sea in which there was almost unlimited freedom of passage 
and overflight was as large as possible.
Archipelagos and Straits
Australia supported the goal of archipelagic states to obtain recognition for the special 
status of archipelagos. Australia’s support was subject to there being satisfactory 
guarantees with respect to passage through archipelagos. As far as the issue of straits 
was concerned the question of the breadth of the territorial sea was important for, as
noted earlier, a 12 mile territorial sea had the potential to convert the waters of 100 
international straits (where ships and aircraft enjoyed high seas freedom of navigation) to 
territorial sea (where submarines would be required to navigate on the surface and where 
there would be no right of overflight). Australia sought to balance the interests of strait 
states and maritime powers by supporting a regime of transit passage which would be 
more restricted than the right of free passage, but would include a right of vessels to pass 
through a strait without prior notification but not to stop (except in an emergency), nor to 
manoeuvre except to the minimum necessary for self-defence and navigation. Australia 
supported both strait states and archipelagic states having similar rights to those which 
already obtain in the territorial sea—over customs, fiscal and immigration and sanitary 
matters— and also the right to regulate marine scientific research (MSR) and make 
regulations for the preservation and control of pollution. Such states would also have 
jurisdiction over the resources in the same waters and superjacent seabed. The laws and 
regulations made in the exercise of those rights would be applicable to all shipping in the 
waters concerned but subject to those laws and regulations all shipping would have a 
right of transit without prior notification.
Fisheries
Australia’s position was that outlined in its 1972 SBC proposal. Coastal states should 
have a right to establish fisheries management zones, the limits to be fixed by reference to 
distance. On 24 January 1973 the Prime Minister announced that Australia supported a 
distance of 200 miles in the limit of a fishing zone along the lines of the 1972 proposal.26 
The coastal state would have exclusive rights to manage the fisheries, but in the interests 
of maximisation of world food supply, where the stocks were not being fished to the 
optimum, the coastal state might enter into agreements with states interested in catching 
surplus stocks. In that way Australia sought to reconcile the interests of distant water 
fishing interests (DWFN) and coastal states. There should also be in any final 
convention dispute settlement procedures for fisheries.
Preservation of the Marine Environment
It was noted that Australia’s coastline was one of the longest in the world and that 
therefore Australia was vulnerable to the effects of marine pollution. It was also noted, 
however, that it was in Australia’s interest to maximize the opportunities for the 
development of sea transport while ensuring pollution controls were effective. Australia 
believed that the coastal state should have the right not only to enforce international 
standards but also to make its own regulations in certain specified circumstances and 
subject to certain restrictions. These regulations would be required to be reasonable and
41
the primary, although not necessarily the conclusive evidence of what was reasonable 
would be international standards. In any disputes as to ‘reasonableness’ the matter 
would be subject to compulsory judicial or arbitral decision.
Delimitation
Australia’s pre-conference view on delimitation issues was not spelled out in the 
government’s position paper apart from noting the view that where a 200 mile economic 
zone overlapped the margin of another country Australia believed that the natural 
phenomenon of the margin should prevail over 200 miles in determining rights to the 
resources of the seabed. There was no reason to believe that Australia’s views on this 
question had altered from the 1972 Australia/Norwegian paper: that document had 
stressed ‘equitable principles’— when agreement could not be reached by parties, 
equidistance should apply unless another boundary was justified by ‘special 
circumstances’.
Islands and Dispute Settlement
No statement committing Australia to support the principle that all islands generate a full 
economic zone appeared in the government’s position paper. Neither was there any 
reference to the issue of disputes settlement apart from a reference to supporting the need 
for disputes settlement for pollution and fisheries matters. There was, however, some 
indication that Australia favoured compulsory dispute settlement. Such a provision had 
been incorporated in the 1973 Australian working paper on the Marine Environment 
tabled in the SBC. The Australian/Norwegian Working Paper on the Economic Zone and 
Delimitation also provided that disputes be settled by negotiation on the basis of equitable 
principles and where such negotiations failed the principle of equidistance should apply 
compulsorily. Australia had acceded to the Optional Protocol for the compulsory 
settlement of Disputes adopted at the First UN conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. 
Pursuant to that Protocol disputes arising out of the interpretation of an application of any 
of the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea were within the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ subject to special dispute settlement arrangements which were 
contained in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas. Australia was also one of the few states which had made a declaration 
under Article 32(2) of the Statute of the ICJ accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the 
basis of reciprocity in all cases not expressly excluded by the Declaration.27 Thus while 
there had been no statement issued on dispute settlement prior to the conference the 
indications were that Australia supported compulsory dispute settlement procedures in 
any Convention.
Marine Scientific Research (MSR)
While Australia was concerned that MSR should be as free as possible from restrictions it 
sought greater coastal state powers to regulate this activity:
The prior consent of a coastal state should be required for scientific research 
in all areas within its national jurisdiction. The coastal state should have the 
right to enforce whatever conditions on such research it considered 
reasonable and necessary, including safety and pollution control, 
participation by the coastal state in research, and access to all data and results 
from it. The coastal state should however not unreasonably withhold 
consent for ‘pure’ research as distinct from investigations for the purpose of 
commercial exploitation. ‘Pure’ research may be distinguished from 
commercially-motivated exploration in that the researcher should be willing 
to publish widely in scientific journals the results of his research and lodge 
the collected data with such bodies as the World Data Centres in Washington 
and Moscow.28
Australia’s pre-conference position can be summarized as a policy of extending coastal 
state control over resources and marine activities in its offshore areas. The pre­
conference positions as elaborated above were in effect a summary of those positions that 
Australia had set out in the SBC and represented (apart from the islands issue) a complete 
defence of Australia’s ocean interests. In terms of Australian goals there was some 
tension between the resource goals and its interests in navigational freedoms, although 
whether they would be difficult to juggle would depend, in part, on the actual course of 
negotiations. It is impossible to establish with any certainty a priority ranking of the 
government’s view of Australian goals at UNCLOS except in a very crude way.29 A 
content analysis of the 1973 government position paper based on the number of lines 
devoted to each subject produces the following ranking:
Continental Shelf 109 lines
International seabed area 104 lines
Straits and archipelagos 81 lines
Marine environment and navigation rights in Coastal zone 68 lines 
Marine Scientific Research 60 lines
Exclusive Economic Zone 34 lines
Territorial Sea 16 lines
That ordering is to a large extent supported by the pattern of major interventions made by 
Australian delegates in the SBC between 1971-1973,30 although the seabed regime and 
the marine environment rank higher here. Of the nineteen major interventions in the 
period six concerned the international seabed area, four concerned the marine 
environment, three concerned the shelf, three concerned fisheries and one each concerned 
delimitation, MSR and archipelagos. These priorities were to change very little over the
conference, although obviously more attention was paid to particular issues depending on 
the degree of progress being made at a particular time.
Choosing a Strategy
Apart from doing nothing, four levels of action are open to states to achieve their 
objectives—unilateral, bilateral, regional and global.31 In that context what were 
Australian options prior to UNCLOS 111 to realize its ocean law goals?
With regard to the international seabed Australia had few options apart from global 
negotiations. As the government’s position paper pointed out without some authority to 
regulate mining there would be a situation where the most technologically advanced 
countries would obtain a monopoly of these activities. A free-for-all system would lead 
to conflict and confusion.32 If Australia was to make a contribution to preventing that 
situation and at the same time ensure some protection for its mining interests, then some 
compromise had to be worked out between the mining states and the developing 
countries: indeed, Australian policy throughout the SBC had been to work towards that 
goal.
On the margin issue Australia had already asserted its legitimacy in existing international 
law to the margin. In its off-shore petroleum legislation in 1967-68 and its fisheries 
legislation Australia had geared its definition of the shelf to the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. This had two components; a physical component which referred to the 
submarine areas to a depth of 200 metres, and an exploitability component which enabled 
the coastal state to extend its jurisdiction beyond that limit where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. In 
1970 Australia was asserting that the outer edge of the margin was the limit of coastal 
state rights and a reference to the rise as the limits of national jurisdiction appeared in the 
1973 Minerals and Petroleum Authority Act. 33 There was no reason that Australia’s 
claim could not continued to be asserted in the absence of international negotiations. 
However, global negotiations could achieve the backing of the international community 
for Australia’s claim, would be useful in opening up linkages with other broad margin 
states and of course a global agreement on the limits of coastal state jurisdiction would 
settle the limits for the international seabed area, a matter of some priority for Australia. 
If a 200 mile limit was accepted Australia would face international pressure to give up 
potentially valuable areas of its shelf beyond 200 miles to the international community. 
The so-called ‘energy crisis’ of the period also consolidated Australia’s wish to receive 
international backing for its margin claim so as to enhance Australia’s prospects of 
exclusive access to potential offshore resources.34
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On fisheries issues Australia had made efforts at three levels to improve its control over 
fishing resources: unilaterally, in 1967 in declaring a 12 mile fishing zone to control 
foreign fishing, bilaterally in negotiations with the Japanese and Taiwanese, and 
internationally at the 1958 and 1960 UN Law of the Sea conferences. There was the 
possibility that Australia could extend its fishing zone to 200 miles unilaterally, followed 
up by bilateral negotiations with the Japanese and Taiwanese. However such action 
would have created conflict with the countries most affected, Japan and Taiwan.35 
Maritime enforcement issues were also a factor here in militating against the unilateral 
option. In the early seventies surveillance and maritime enforcement questions emerged 
as issues on the political agenda. Complaints were made by state Premiers concerning 
the lack of Federal government control in regulating foreign fishermen in Australian 
waters. Of most concern here were Indonesian subsistence fishermen operating off 
North West coast and Taiwanese gathering clams of the Great Barrier Reef. Sightings of 
foreign fishing boats in territorial waters jumped from 285 in 1973 to 431 in 1974 and 
there were repeated calls by state Premiers for the Federal government to upgrade its 
surveillance resources.36 A unilateral declaration of a 200 mile fishing zone would have 
added considerably to the political and practical problems of enforcement at that stage and 
would have involved extensive discussions with the Japanese and Taiwanese in order to 
avoid some of the surveillance and enforcement problems which the size of the zone 
would have created. In the earlier 1968 agreement between Australia and Japan, the 
primary inspection role was given to the Japanese authorities within the new 12 mile 
fishing zone but allowed Australian authorities to visit Japanese vessels.37 There was no 
guarantee that such a solution would have been politically acceptable in a fishery zone of 
200 miles.
On the issue of the marine environment we have already seen how Australia had moved 
in 1970 to extend its control over vessel source pollution beyond the territorial sea to 
encompass any reef forming part of the shelf of Australia. Within IMCO, Australia was 
successful in securing the adoption in 1971 of amendments to the 1954 Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil which defined ‘nearest land’ for the 
purposes of the Convention as the outer edge of the Great Barrier Reef. 38 However as 
noted previously Australia was unsuccessful at the 1973 Marine Pollution conference in 
having accepted a proposal which would have allowed a coastal state to adopt special 
measures in areas within its jurisdiction in relation to discharge standards (but which 
accepted a limitation in relation to ship design not to go beyond international regulations 
except in waters which had characteristics that rendered the environment exceptionally 
vulnerable). We have also noted that Australia was unsuccessful at the 1973 conference 
in securing recognition of the notion of port state enforcement. The failure of IMCO to 
deal with coastal and port state enforcement powers left these issues to be resolved at the
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law of the sea conference. Global negotiations offered the best chance for Australia to 
advance its broad interest in protecting the marine environment on the one hand (no 
coastal state restrictions could guarantee protection from actions occurring further out to 
sea) and on the other hand guarantee to the international community adequate freedom 
and rights of navigation. Any rights acquired by Australia to control foreign shipping in 
its waters would also be acquired by about 120 other coastal states in respect of their 
offshore waters. Global negotiations therefore appeared the best option of ensuring that 
rights acquired by the coastal state would not result in unreasonable interference with 
shipping upon which Australia’s overseas trade depended.
With respect to navigation rights through straits and archipelagos we have noted that 
Australia had come to bilateral arrangements with Indonesia and the Philippines. 
However, Australia’s interests as a straits user and the interests of its principal ally, the 
US, appeared to be best met through global action.
If bilateral arrangements proved inadequate in a particular contingency, Australia and (or 
its allies) would have to force their way through. The use of force has high costs and 
cannot be resorted to on a routine basis.39 As the government’s own position paper 
admitted (in a rather coy manner) there would be ‘political difficulties’ in asserting 
unilateral passage rights through straits and archipelagos.40 A stable regime of passage 
through straits and archipelagos appeared to be best achieved through international 
negotiations leading to an agreed text. Indeed, as we have already noted the question of 
straits was one that had led both the US and the USSR to seek a new law of the sea 
conference in the first place. The straits issue as discussed earlier was linked to the 
breadth of the territorial sea, with Australia backing a 12 mile limit providing there was 
satisfactory rights through straits. A unilateral extension here may have compromised 
Australia’s desire for satisfactory transit right through straits, so a global agreement on 
the limits issue also appeared the most attractive option.
Australia’s goal of greater coastal state control over MSR could have been undertaken 
unilaterally. Such action, however, would not necessarily have been without political 
costs. It may have provoked disputes with marine researching states, particularly the 
US. Given Australia’s limited capabilities in the MSR field and the size of Australia’s 
shelf and potential 200 mile zone it seemed likely that for the near future Australian 
marine research efforts would be conducted with the co-operation of nations who had 
larger marine science capabilities and more substantial investment in facilities for MSR. 
For Australia to have unilaterally adopted tighter coastal state controls may have provoked 
opposition from states that Australia might need to depend on for future research co­
operation. Australia also had to consider that at some future time its MSR capabilities
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could have expanded and that scientific and economic factors required Australian research 
access to foreign waters. Thus Australia’s longer term interest in freedom of research 
had also to be considered. Global negotiations thus offered an avenue to sort out some 
kind of agreement that would meet Australia’s short and long term interests with respect 
to MSR.
Professor Nye has argued that ‘the choice of organisational arena has an important effect 
on setting agendas and influencing outcomes. Actors shop among forums for the power 
arena that will favour their preferred outcome’.41 The argument presented here has been 
that the global level offered Australia the best avenue to achieve its goals, although it also 
held out the danger that compromise would be necessary and that negotiations may not be 
concluded quickly.42 However, Australia had already backed holding a global conference 
in 1970 so that in a sense Australia had already committed itself to an international 
approach to its law of the sea goals. Full unilateral claims preceding the conference 
would have undermined Australia’s credibility as an actor seeking international solutions 
to global problems. It would have also meant that on issues such as navigation rights and 
the regime for the seabed where a global approach appeared most important Australia 
would not have been seen as a committed player 43
Australia’s policies pre-UNCLOS were compatible with Canberra giving priority to an 
international approach to ocean issues. In the event of a failure of the conference to 
achieve its goals there was some evidence that Australia was contemplating not unilateral 
action, but some kind of regional agreements on the main issues facing the conference.44 
Whether that option was developed in any detail is not clear but in any event it was 
through international not regional action that Australia was committed and separate 
regional arrangements to the extent they were contemplated were a fail-back option. The 
main question now facing Australia, however, was whether it would be able to go into 
UNCLOS 111 and successfully negotiate those policy objectives outlined earlier. It is to 
a detailed history of Australia’s diplomatic activities at UNCLOS 111 that we now turn.
CHAPTER FOUR
AUSTRALIA AT UNCLOS 111, 1973-1975
This chapter analyses Australian diplomacy at the first two substantive sessions of 
UNCLOS 111. Australia’s law of the sea diplomacy was largely played out with its 
coastal state allies, although at times Australia found it difficult to reconcile all its 
positions with the Coastal States group. Australia did, however, adopt a flexible 
approach in choosing its negotiating partners on specific issues, a feature that was to 
characterise Australian diplomacy throughout the conference. In Committee Two, for 
example, where coastal issues were at stake Australia focussed its diplomatic activity 
within the Margineers group. In Committee One where the issue of the deep seabed 
mining regime became highly politicised Australia avoided taking sides in the conflict 
between G77 and the developed states. Australia’s position here, while generally closer 
to the developing countries, was overall one of seeking to encourage compromise on the 
issue. On Committee Three issues, where Australia had taken a reasonably high profile 
in the SBC days, the delegation continued to adopt a strong coastal oriented view. 
Australia’s position on marine scientific research (MSR) was similar to that of G77 and 
tended to place more emphasis on coastal interests rather than encouraging MSR.
Australia’s diplomacy in the early years was to exhibit the same characteristics that 
dominated Australia’s role throughout the conference; flexibility and a willingness to 
work with states having similar marine attributes and ocean interests regardless of 
whether such states were traditional allies, a willingness to act as a conciliator and 
mediator and an overall commitment to defend the integrity of the package-deal approach 
to the negotiations. Australia’s positions in the early years did not change markedly from 
the SBC period, although by Geneva the delegation was beginning to spend more time on 
seeking compromise positions (particularly on Committee One issues) rather than 
working to build support for the concept of wider coastal state powers. This strategy 
seemed reasonable given the acceptance at the conference of the concept of wider coastal 
state powers. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had by 1974 
all accepted the concept of the 200 mile zone. No significant policy shifts occurred in 
Australia’s position from the second to the third Geneva sessions, although there was 
some adjustment to policy relating to MSR. On navigational issues generally Australia 
continued its strategy from the SBC of leaving the maritime powers to make the running 
directly with the strait states and archipelagic states.
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By the end of the Geneva session Australia was faring well in the negotiations and the 
broad framework of the conference settlement was set. The package included a 12 mile 
territorial sea, a 200-mile economic zone, an article providing unimpeded transit through 
international straits and perhaps most important in terms of Australian priorities, coastal 
state jurisdiction over the margin beyond 200 miles. On lower priority issues such as 
delimitation and islands the texts contained positions favourable to Australia.
Overall the first three sessions demonstrated that Australia placed great importance on a 
multilateral solution to ocean issues and that it would fight hard on those issues such as 
the margin and the marine environment which it regarded as important. On the other 
hand, Australia also demonstrated that it was willing to play the role of a conciliator and 
mediator to achieve compromises where it felt that disputes looked likely to stalemate the 
negotiations. The fact that Australian negotiatiors had clearly worked out conference 
objectives, and were well prepared on the full range of ocean issues at the conference 
greatly assisted the delegation’s task in establishing its early reputation as one of the 
influential players at the conference. It was a reputation that the delegation were able to 
consolidate during later sessions of the conference.
First Session: New York. 3-15 December 1973
The first session of UNCLOS 111 was convened to settle procedural aspects of the 
conference.1 It agreed to establish three main committees with the same mandate as the 
three sub-committees of the SBC, a General Committee, a Drafting Committee and a 
Credentials Committee. Australia was represented by a small delegation at the session.2 
Australian objectives at the session were basically to seek a seat on the drafting committee 
and a rapporteurship.3 Most states expected the General Committee and the Drafting 
Committees to play critical roles at the conference and fought hard to ensure 
membership. Canada fought vigorously to win the chairmanship of the Drafting 
Committee for its deputy head of delegation,4 leaving Australia with the difficult position 
of choosing to fight for the chair or to relinquish its claim to participate in the Drafting 
Committee.5 In the end Australia’s Ralph Harry was defeated in a ballot (81 to 54) in the 
conference for the Chairmanship of the Drafting Committee by Canada’s Alan Beesley.6 
The Australian delegate Mott was elected Rapporteur of the first committee by 
acclamation, thus giving Australia a full seat on the General Committee.7
The session while settling such issues as the election of officers, agenda and the 
allocation of work did not settle the rules of procedure, including the all-important and 
controversial rules relating to decision-making.8 Australia played an active part in the 
negotiations here9 but in the end it was decided that the rules of procedure should be
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adopted by voting no later than 27 June 1974 i.e. one week after the opening of the 
second session at Caracas and 31 January 1974 should be set aside as the time limit for 
submission of any further amendments to the rules.10 (The conference adopted its rules 
of procedure at Caracas on 27 June 1974.) Australia argued that permanent members of 
the Security Council should not have automatic seats on both the General Committee and 
the Drafting Committee and that the principle should be ‘one country-one seat’.11 In the 
event the USSR was elected on an East European ticket for both the General Committee 
and the Drafting Committee.12 The US, however, was included in a ‘package deal’ on 
the seats in the West European and Others (WEO) category and though it was not 
nominated by the WEO group it submitted to a ballot for Vice-Presidencies as there were 
more candidates in the WEO Group than there were Vice-Presidencies allocated to this 
category.13 The US was elected unopposed as a member of the Drafting Committee.14 
These disputes were in the end rather futile since UNCLOS diplomacy took place in the 
three main committees and the committee chairman were to be the key players in the 
drafting process.15
Second Session: Caracas. 20 June—29 August 1974
At the first substantive session of the conference in Caracas16, Australia demonstrated its 
commitment to the negotiations by sending a delegation of 20 (there were also five 
delegates on the delegation representing Papua New Guinea), one of the larger 
delegations at the session representing a range of bureaucratic interests.17 The 
importance of the conference to Australia was demonstrated by the fact that the 
delegation was led by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator D.R. Willesee. The 
conference had been preceded by six preparatory sessions over three years, and there 
were literally hundreds of draft proposals before it. After a ten week session the 
conference, not surprisingly, found it necessary to request the General Assembly to 
schedule a third session at Geneva in 1975. Australian diplomacy at Caracas was to 
focus first on the Coastal States group in order to build support for Australia’s objectives 
until that group exhausted itself in an effort to get its paper on the table mid-way through 
the session (see below).
Committee One
Australia’s position at Caracas on seabed mining was to elaborate the views presented in 
the SBC, in particular the views incorporated in the proposal submitted to the sixth 
session of the SBC.18 Australia argued that its interests would be best served by a treaty 
which established and maintained a strict balance of powers between the Assembly, 
Council and Operating Arm and where each organ was provided with the powers relating
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to their functional responsibilities. The operating arm would have wide powers relating 
to the exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources but would have 
considerable flexibility in determining which form of operation should be utilized.
The major issues on SBM were a continuation of those raised in the SBC and proved 
again to be politically volatile— who may exploit the area, under what terms and 
conditions and what would be the economic implications of seabed mining.19 Australian 
delegates continued to emphasize the importance of encouraging nodule mining, stressing 
that the machinery must be able to exploit the seabed ‘for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole’.20 Australia maintained its policy articulated in the latter years of the SBC that the 
agency ‘should not merely be a regulatory or licensing authority but should be 
empowered to enter into other contractual arrangements with other states and also 
undertake exploration and exploitation on its own behalf when it accumulated the 
necessary resources and experience’.21 The agency would also give ‘preference to the 
developing countries in distributing benefits derived from production in the international 
area’.22
Australian delegates justified support for international machinery with direct exploitation 
powers firstly on the basis of Australia’s interests as a land based producer of metals that 
would be mined on the seabed and secondly on the basis of a commitment to a law of the 
sea Convention that could be threatened if a satisfactory compromise was not reached on 
the deep seabed regime.23 The Australian delegate Loomes argued that one of the 
guidelines that should be institutionalized in any international regime was to ensure an 
appropriate flow of seabed commodities having regard to the need to provide a reasonable 
return for land based producers. In this context he argued that one of the tasks of the 
conference was to include in any international machinery an organ which would be 
responsible for surveillance of the economic implications of seabed production to 
consumers and producers. He went on to suggest the establishment of a Commission 
composed of experts representing the interests of consumers and producers of the 
minerals to be exploited from the deep seabed with powers to recommend to the Council 
measures appropriate to deal with any adverse implications which may occur as a result 
of deep seabed exploitation.24
Australia’s position was closer to G77 than the developed states (that excluded the 
Authority itself as a potential operator)25 since it was Australian policy to seek 
establishment of an Authority with wide powers of control over exploration and 
exploitation over the area. The role of the ‘good guy’ on side with developing states was 
assisted here by the fact that deep seabed mining appeared to be an activity that would 
arise well in to the future. Australia’s position, however, did not go as far as G77 in one
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respect. Australia qualified the Authority s power to the extent that Australia felt that the 
Authority should only exercise such powers when it had the technical and financial 
capacity from its own income to do so.26 This qualification was not stated in the G77 
text but it appeared that the G77 recognized that the Authority would not have the 
capacity to undertake these activities itself in the early stages. It was for that reason that 
the G77 text was sufficiently flexible as to allow the Authority to enter into contractual 
arrangements with groups to undertake these activities.27 While Australia maintained that 
the main terms and conditions of exploration and exploitation should be established in the 
Convention, Australian delegates appeared open-minded on the question of how 
precisely these needed to be detailed in the Convention 28 The US and other developed 
states, on the one hand, were advancing almost a mining code, whilst the G77 wanted 
more general criteria under which activities in the international area might be carried 
out.29
On the question of controlling the rate of seabed exploitation, Australian delegates were 
unwilling to commit themselves, apart from supporting the notion that any form of 
international regulation of seabed mining must be sufficiently flexible to adapt itself and 
its methods and objectives to a changing economic order and that there was little point in 
specifying precise measures to deal with problems which may arise in the future.30 This 
position did not go as far as the developing countries that presented a solid front in 
expressing the view that the Authority should have the power to control production, a 
position they linked to the expanding North-South debate on the ‘New International 
Economic Order’. The developed states, on the other hand, believed that seabed minerals 
would not disrupt suppliers of land based sources as seabed production would represent 
a small addition to land based production and that seabed production controls would 
inhibit mining, a view that was in part shaped by the impact of the OPEC oil embargo.31
Overall Australia’s position on DSBM at Caracas was closer to G77 than the developed 
states. In particular the support for the establishment of an operating arm with wide 
powers had distinct advantages to Australia not only as a land based metal producer but 
also because support held out the promise of distinct tactical advantages within the 
conference for Australia to gain support for its shelf policy.32
Australia played an active role in Committee One at Caracas33 but it was clear by the end 
of the Caracas session that too strong support for G77 positions was risky if it was 
pushed too hard, for there was always the danger of unilateral mining outside the 
proposed Convention.34 There was a reasonable expectation therefore that Australia 
would not adopt positions in Committee One that could possibly alienate the developed 
states from joining an eventual Convention, although as Australia was not one of the
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major contenders on the issue it did not appear that circumstances would allow the 
delegation to take a high profile.
Committee Two
In Committee Two Australian delegates were most active on the shelf issue and attempted 
to build on the work done by Australia during the SBC years.35 Australia continued to 
press its claim to the sovereign rights to the outer edge of the margin. Just prior to the 
opening of Caracas Australian alternative delegation leader Ralph Harry signalled 
Australia’s hard line on the shelf by stating that ‘the continental margin is our own real 
estate and something we cannot be forced to give away’.36
The Foreign Minister made it clear at Caracas that Australia’s position was not only to 
argue that a new Convention must reaffirm the title of coastal states to their resources in 
their continental margins37 but that the shelf could be defined in terms of the outer edge 
of the margin and to link this position to the economic zone. Australia’s claim, therefore, 
was to sovereign rights over seabed resources to 200 miles and to the outer edge of the 
margin where this extended beyond 200 miles.38 Australian alternate leader Harry 
explained that ‘we cannot refashion nature’ and that the ‘submerged land mass of certain 
states extends and has always extended beyond 200 miles’.39 Harry made it clear that 
Australia stuck firmly to its expansive margin claim by pointing out there was no 
problems in demarcating the outer edge of the margin and underlined the fact by pointing 
to a survey that had successfully plotted the outer edge of the Australian margin.40
In the Coastal States group, Australia and Argentina tried unsuccessfully to have 
incorporated in the article on the shelf in the Coastal States paper a specific reference to 
the margin.41 Australia felt that the formula which eventually emerged in the Coastal 
States paper referring to the continental shelf ‘extending through the natural prolongation 
of its land territory’42 was possibly open to the interpretation that it extended only to the 
200 metre isobath. As a result of the omission of a reference to the margin Australia was 
not able to co-sponsor the Coastal States paper 43 Australia was active in trying to 
gather support for the margin concept and encouraging new supporters.44 Australia’s 
Ralph Harry appealed to the greed of some wide shelf states by pointing out that there 
was a considerable number of broad margin states which had not declared a position in 
favour of the margin ‘but which in the maturing awareness of the potential of their 
continental shelves, might see in such exercise the solution of many problems of 
development’.45
While Australian Foreign Minister Willesee seemed cautious after the Caracas session on 
whether the conference would accept Australia’s margin claim46 there were good
grounds for optimism, despite strong opposition from countries still advocating a flat 200 
mile limit. As Buzan points out, despite the fact there were twenty three states 
specifically opposed to the claim:
the margin states were in a strong position by the end of the Caracas 
session. Their numbers and their unilateral option ensured them a large 
voice in the final settlement, provided that compromises could be worked 
out on sharing and that some of the opposition could be set to rest by 
agreement on a precise definition for determining the outer edge of the 
margin.47
According to the Australian delegation report forty-five countries could be relied on to 
vote in favour of a position that would have the effect of preserving Australia’s position 
on rights to the margin,48 but even if one added those broad shelf states still to declare a 
view, there was still no guarantee that Australia’s position could be assured of being 
incorporated by consensus or in the event of a vote by a two thirds majority of positive 
votes, including an absolute majority of participants in the conference. Buzan’s rider that 
the margin claim would be accepted providing there was some compromise on sharing 
revenue with the international community beyond 200 miles also left Australia with some 
difficult choices. Already a number of developing countries favoured some sort of 
sharing arrangement and the US draft articles on the economic zone contained a provision 
on revenue sharing 49 It remained unclear at the end of Caracas whether Australia would 
show any flexibility on the issue, despite the occasional sign that some concession might 
be required on the Australian side.50
On issues relating to the territorial sea and straits Australia, as on many other issues 
through the conference, took a low profile. On the question of the territorial sea, a 
majority of states, including Australia, favoured a 12 mile limit, maintaining its policy 
developed in the Seabed Committee of tying this to an acceptance of a 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone.51
On the straits issue, Australian delegates took a ‘back seat’ with the Foreign Minister 
simply asserting without elaboration that the conference would have to define a regime 
for straits.52 Debate ranged from the restrictive view that favoured the concept of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea wherever it occurred through to more 
moderate views that would provide assured surface transit but authorisation for warships. 
At the other extreme was the view of the superpowers that there should be a separate 
regime of passage through and over straits but the right would be assured for all 
categories of ships, aircraft and submarines without notification.53
54
Australia’s ‘back seat’ role was based on the strategy that if the archipelago issue could 
be resolved satisfactorily there was no need for Australia to take an active position on the 
straits issue.54 If a compromise solution satisfactory to at least Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia on archipelagic transit was reached, Australia would take an independent 
position on straits that would take account of the need for freedom of communication and 
in particular the US need for military deployments. If a satisfactory compromise was not 
seen as available, Australia’s position was then to support a principle that would give 
archipelagic waters outside designated sea lanes the status of international waters. The 
basis of the concession here would be that in return for providing unimpeded passage 
along sealanes, thus giving sealanes virtually high seas status, the balance would be 
restored by according the remainder of archipelagic waters the status of internal waters. 
Australia correctly assessed that in developing a position on the issue it would have to 
recognize that the straits issue was a sticking point for the major powers and that if there 
was to be a Convention to which they would subscribe it would need to contain realistic 
passage rights through international straits.55
On the archipelagic issue Australian Foreign Minister Willesee underscored the thrust of 
the new Labor government’s efforts to focus on regional relations by observing that 
several of Australia’s neighbours were archipelagic states and were seeking a special 
status for the waters within the compass of their islands. Australia was ‘confident’ that 
this would be achieved but with the proviso that there were defined rights of navigation 
along designated sea lanes.56 During the Caracas session the most significant progress 
towards the development of the archipelagic concept was made in negotiations outside the 
conference, (where Australia played a low-key mediating role) rather than in formal 
debate.57
Australia’s policy at Caracas of trying to encourage the maritime powers to press for only 
minimum rights of passage consistent with their needs was predicated on the assumption 
that such provisions would meet Australia’s defence requirements. But by the end of the 
session it still appeared that Australia had not thought through a position on the important 
emerging issues of submerged transit and overflight rights over archipelagos,58 and it 
also remained uncertain whether Australia would succeed in its efforts to separate the 
straits issue from the archipelago issue by satisfying the archipelagic states. The Caracas 
session had demonstrated that there was still was opposition to the concept not only from 
the maritime powers concerned about the effects on military deployments and maritime 
traffic59 but also from states which saw an acceptance of the concept as reducing the 
common heritage area. Caracas had demonstrated, however, that the Australian 
delegation would not take a high profile on issues relating to straits and archipelagos.
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On the economic zone60 Australia worked with the Coastal States group to draft articles 
reflecting Australia’s position on the EEZ. In a lengthy intervention the Australian 
delegate Harry summarized Australia’s priorities on the EEZ. He made it clear that 
Australia’s main concerns were that the zone in no way compromised Australia’s margin 
policy and preserved rights of navigation and overflight.61
Harry went on to support the Coastal States paper on the EEZ as fulfilling these goals and 
specifically made the point that the articles did not ‘prejudice the rights of a coastal state 
over the natural resources of its continental margin’.62 As noted above the EEZ articles 
in the Coastal States paper were satisfactory from Australia’s viewpoint63 and in no way 
compromised Australia’s margin claim but Australia did not, however, for reasons noted 
above, sponsor the paper. At Caracas Australia could take some comfort from the fact 
that the US, US and UK all publicly supported the EEZ concept for the first time.64 The 
overall trend at Caracas was clearly for overall support for the EEZ concept.65 In 
Australia’s major statement on the EEZ it was unclear, however, whether Australia 
supported the notion that all residual rights i.e. rights not specifically granted to the 
coastal state, should remain with the international community as favoured by the maritime 
powers or with other states.66 It would be necessary, therefore, for Australia to 
consider whether to support the emerging trend in favour of residual rights for the coastal 
state, with the danger that this could erode high seas rights in the EEZ, or whether to 
support the maritime powers in insisting that the international community should have the 
residual rights in respect of the legitimate uses of the sea. The other alternative, of 
course, was to seek some kind of formulation of residual rights compatible with adequate 
coastal state rights, a path that seemed to be foreshadowed in Australia’s major EEZ 
intervention at Caracas.67
On fisheries issue68 Australia continued to promote the approach it had adopted in the 
Australia/New Zealand working paper of 1972 but overall fisheries issues took second 
place to Australia’s efforts to maintain rights over the shelf. Nevertheless the broad trend 
at Caracas in fisheries was a shift to the Australian approach.69
With New Zealand, Australia tabled a proposal on highly migratory species that provided 
first that the coastal states’ fishermen had priority catching rights within the zone, second 
that foreign vessels had access only to surpluses and third that an international or regional 
body be established to manage the species and determine the catch.70 The second 
principle was important for both countries. As the delegation report admitted ‘the local 
fisheries for highly migratory species are essentially coastal in nature, and would be 
disadvantaged in the face of competition from long range fleets’.71 The Australia/New 
Zealand paper was tabled partly in reaction against the other proposal on the subject in the
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US paper which gave no recognition of coastal rights. Under the USA proposal the 
‘coastal state would have no special rights over such species when they entered the 
economic zone. Foreign fishing vessels could operate within the zone in exactly the same 
manner as the high seas’.72 The issue of control over highly migratory species, primarily 
tuna ,was to assume greater importance in the context of Australia’s UNCLOS 
diplomacy, mainly because of the interest of the South Pacific states in developing then- 
tuna resources. The Australia/New Zealand paper , however, was introduced at the end 
of the session so there was no opportunity to test reaction at Caracas.73 At the 
conclusion of the session Australia was confident its approach to fisheries would be 
successful74 but was also realistic in recognizing that ‘many developing countries sought 
absolute sovereignty over fisheries resources, to the exclusion of all other states’.75 This 
was an accurate assessment, for as Gosselin points out, by the end of the second session 
there were ‘numerous’ coastal states still determined to avoid a duty to permit foreign 
access in the 200 mile zone.76
On lower priority issues for the delegation the regime of islands issue debate revealed that 
the issue would be difficult to resolve.77 While Australia’s position was that all islands 
generate their own territorial sea and have their own margin (and to stress that this was 
supported by customary and conventional international law), the delegation was 
instructed to adopt a flexible approach on whether all islands irrespective of size and 
population should generate a full economic zone.78 However, Australia did not take an 
active role on the islands issue for tactical reasons.79 Australia considered public support 
for the principle that islands should generate their own economic zone could possibly 
prejudice Australia’s basic continental shelf position in regard to the mainland, focussing 
attention on large areas of major Australian offshore islands e.g. Norfolk, Lord Howe, 
Coral Sea Islands and McDonald. Thus for tactical reasons Australia did not publicly 
endorse the concept that islands should generate a full economic zone. Australia, 
however, had to bear in mind the interests of South Pacific neighbours with respect to the 
generation of full marine rights of islands, not only because those countries were 
pressing such rights but also because Australia was seeking their support for its margin 
policy.80
Committee Three
In Committee Three the area in which the coastal state could exercise pollution control in 
relation to foreign vessels and the nature of such controls were crucial questions.81 The 
adoption of the EEZ concept would give wide powers to coastal states to control 
resources and the possibility of coastal states obtaining environmental powers in the zone 
generated fears on the part of the maritime powers that the coastal states might achieve
jurisdiction that would creep outwards until it became tantamount to an extension of the 
territorial sea to 200 miles.
Australia took the initiative early at Caracas in calling a meeting of the group that had 
tabled the zonal approach paper at the sixth SBC session.82 It was decided to propose a 
new set of draft articles which would refer to the rights and duties of states under a zonal 
approach to the marine environment.83 The paper was introduced by Canada, Fiji, 
Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, New Zealand, the Philippines and Spain.84 
Australia did not co-sponsor the ten national draft for two main reasons.85 First there 
were difficulties with article 3(2) relating to ‘damage’. The difficulty with accepting a 
draft including a reference only to ‘damage’ and not to ‘hazard’ derived from Australia’s 
case against France in the International Court of Justice where Australia argued that 
creation of a hazard was actionable in itself and that it was not essential to prove actual 
damage.86 Australia also felt that the broad concept of environmental law should include 
prevention of injury to the marine environment.87 Australia also had difficulties with the 
‘special areas’ provision in the ten nation paper. Australia’s position as elaborated at 
Caracas was similar to its SBC position. While Australia supported a position that the 
coastal state may declare an area to be specially sensitive and lay down supplementary 
regulations for ships in such areas ‘such unilateral action must be reasonable in the 
circumstances, with appeal to machinery for the settlement of disputes’.88 In that sense 
the Canadian approach (that would allow coastal states to regulate ship design and 
construction in specified cases) and also the special areas provision in the ten nation draft 
lacked, in Australia’s view, the necessary balance to guarantee adequate protection to the 
coastal state while at the same time attracting sufficient support from the maritime state to 
have a reasonable prospect of success at the conference. In particular Australia agreed 
with maritime states that special measures should not require foreign ships to observe 
design, construction, manning or equipment standards which differ from generally 
accepted international rules. Thus while the delegation’s overall position was to support 
coastal states rights it was also mindful of Australia’s overall dependence on shipping.89
An issue at Caracas that ‘transcended’ all others in the debate on the marine environment 
was the demand by many developing countries for a ‘double-standard’. As explained by 
two analysts:
Developed states, it was argued, had caused the environmental crisis and 
even now maintained a high standard of living at the environment’s 
expense. Why then should the less developed states be burdened with 
costs of pollution which they had not caused and which would hinder their 
present development.90
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The ten nation draft incorporated the double standard and there was intense reaction by 
the maritime states (including the US, UK, Japan and most European states) that argued 
that as well as undermining the competitive advantage of their own industries it would 
militate against the developed states accepting higher international standards in the future 
since they would be imposing a further disadvantage.91 Environmentalists also 
condemned the approach as disastrous as it seemed to leave environmental measures to be 
taken solely according to national self interest.92
Australia’s position here was that, in principle, the obligation to protect the environment 
should apply equally to all countries but that it had to be recognized that the economic 
capacity of some developing countries to meet the obligation could be limited. Therefore 
an article which recognized the varied capabilities of countries with respect to the 
prevention, reduction and control of the marine environment could be supported but that 
in certain areas such as standards for ships in international transit agreed standards for 
ships should apply.93 It was also felt that the principle could only be accepted if there 
was some provision that would impose the same obligation on all states to take all 
necessary measures to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction did not cause damage 
to areas beyond their national jurisdiction.
Australia’s position of support for an article which recognized varied capabilities of 
countries was not in fact a significant concession to the developing countries because at 
that stage no specific exceptions had been agreed . In this context the point raised by 
some developing countries that their shipping and shipbuilding industries would be 
adversely affected if they had to meet the same standards as developed maritime states 
was relevant. Brazil and others suggested that international standards should be 
maximum, not minimum and that maximum should take account of the capabilities of 
developing countries.94 Australia was opposed to escape clauses enabling developing 
countries to observe lower standards than internationally agreed in respect of vessel 
source pollution. Not only would this give a major economic preference to developing 
countries in a non-tariff area and aggravate the flag of convenience problem in world 
shipping but these problems could, Australia believed, be exacerbated if, at the same 
time, the coastal state had no right to enforce stricter standards in its economic zone.95
On issues of enforcement the Australian delegate, Petherbridge, referred to the zonal 
approach to the preservation of the marine environment96 and argued for broad coastal 
state powers against those maritime states that still opposed any change to the traditional 
law of flag state enforcement.97 States should, argued Petherbridge, be empowered to 
exercise effective anti-pollution control over ships in a broad zone contiguous to their 
territorial sea. Petherbridge seemed anxious to placate any fears on the part of the
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maritime powers by pointing out that such actions had to be taken without interferring 
with shipping and that the coastal state should not exercise unfettered enforcement 
powers: ‘My delegation...represents a country which is a major user of world 
shipping...the consequences of capricious or unreasonable action could be at least a rise 
in freight rates and even, perhaps suspension of shipping services. No responsible state 
is wilfully going to run such risks. ’98 Australia believed that for effective control of 
vessel source pollution:
the fullest co-operation between shipping and coastal interests was 
essential. The total environment would be best protected if shipping was 
subject to internationally agreed regulations between all interested parties 
which flag states were obliged to enforce on their own vessels. But, in 
addition, coastal states must remain able to protect their own environment, 
including that of the economic zone for which they are responsible and 
must therefore be able to enforce the internationally agreed regulations. 
Considerations of time, evidence and distance make local enforcement 
essential.99
However, Australia was insistent that the coastal state must be able to take extra 
measures in setting standards beyond those established at the international level. 
Petherbridge pointed out that existing international regulations were not always adequate 
to protect the marine environment. Amendment procedures could be slow at the 
international level so that the coastal state may be forced to act on its own. The final 
Convention must, Petherbridge stated, provide for that.100 As noted above, however, 
Australia insisted that such unilateral action must be reasonable in the circumstances and 
its reasonableness should be appealable to disputes settlement machinery. The issue of 
the right of the coastal state to take special measures was to occupy Australian delegates 
in the third committee for the next three sessions.
By the end of Caracas the enforcement issue remained uncertain with an enormous range 
of proposals on the table with varying provisions relating to inspection, prosecution, 
control of passage and arrest, flag, coastal and port state enforcement rights. 101 There 
seemed little reason to suppose that Australia would not seek to achieve wide coastal state 
enforcement powers in accordance with its pre-conference position.
Australia’s position on marine environmental issues had not altered greatly from the SBC 
position but what was clear from debate at Caracas was that a number of issues were 
emerging in the conference that required detailed consideration by Australia. Such 
questions as ‘special areas’ and whether they should be determined by international 
agreement or unilaterally, the nature and extent of state rights in the economic zone 
(including the extent to which a coastal state may make and enforce laws on ship 
pollution additional to those provided in international Conventions), and questions of
enforcement and liability were all matters that were still to be dealt with by the 
conference.
In contrast to the marine environment Australia did not take on an active role on the MSR 
issue102 where discussion ranged from the definition of scientific research, general 
principles and the right to conduct MSR. Australia stressed that MSR must be as free as 
possible although coastal states had to ensure that interests of the environment were not 
damaged by unregulated activities, in particular research activities which were in essence 
exploration for commercial advantage.103 Only a few delegations referred to the general 
principles for the conduct of MSR, as apparently they were considered self evident.104 
On the question of consent by coastal states to MSR there were four basic approaches at 
Caracas— an absolute consent regime, a qualified consent regime (consent would have to 
be obtained, but would not normally be withheld if certain internationally agreed 
conditions were met), a notification regime (consent would not be required just 
notification given by those conducting research) and a partial consent regime (resource 
research would require consent, all other research would be free).105
Australia’s pre-conference position was closest to that of a qualified consent regime, and 
there was no attempt to elaborate that position further at Caracas.106 Compared with 
issues such as the shelf and the marine environment the MSR issue did not appear to 
have occupied the delegation at Caracas and there was little indication that it would 
receive a high priority in Australia’s overall approach to conference goals. The Third 
Committee did not take up the issue of transfer of marine technology in its informal 
meetings, although Australia as an ‘importer of technology’ welcomed the introduction of 
a text submitted by a group of developing countries at the end of the session.107
Disputes Settlement
On dispute settlement Australia’s Ralph Harry co-chaired with Dr Reynoldo Pohl of El 
Salvador an informal working group of about thirty states on this issue that met eight 
times and focussed on a number of themes concerning dispute settlement.108 Australia 
co-sponsored the working paper on the issue to enable delegations to consider various 
issues before the next session.109
Conference Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
At Caracas Australia worked closely with the Coastal States Group,110 which because of 
its mixed membership of developed and developing countries and because of Australia’s 
close association with the group from 1972, seemed to offer the best promise as a vehicle
for Australia’s policies. Mid-way through the session, however, the group exhausted 
itself in an effort to get its paper tabled and it fell into disuse for the remainder of the 
tim e .111 Only nine members of the group were in the end willing to sponsor the 
paper.112 The split in the group was not just tactical but also appeared to involve internal 
contradictions relating to whether retention of the entire margin should be part of the 
group’s goals.113 In general there were countries such as Indonesia, New Zealand and 
Norway that did not place the shelf at the top of their priorities and were unwilling to risk 
a hard line on the margin for fear of damaging their interests. The second group included 
Australia, Argentina and Canada that placed the shelf near the top of their priorities.
With these difficulties in the Coastal States Group Australia turned its attention later in the 
session to Committee One, as an arena where Australia could coordinate policy among 
G77 in order to build support from G77 for Australian objectives in Committee Two.114 
Australia also participated in the informal Evensen group (where Australia was able to 
have its fisheries articles inserted as a central variant in Evensen draft articles on fisheries) 
and had discussions with the 11 other Antarctic Treaty Consultative parties on problems 
of delineation between the international seabed area and Antarctica. Australia was 
concerned that there was a possibility that claims may be made at Caracas that the 
southern boundary of the international Authority was the low water mark of the Antarctic 
continent. There was agreement that the twelve Consultative parties should try and reach 
agreement with the main option being the 60th parallel or outer limit of national 
jurisdiction as defined by the conference.
The Caracas session demonstrated clearly that Australia would have to operate with other 
groupings to achieve its goals and that despite problems experienced by the Coastal States 
Group, it was that group (if it could revive at the next session), that still seemed the best 
vehicle to achieve compromise positions favourable to Australia’s goals.115 On issues 
relating to seabed mining, the EEZ, fisheries, and archipelagos Australia took a mediating 
role and appeared to adopt positions whereby it was careful not to get itself in a position 
where it could give offence to its coastal state allies. This meant that on questions on 
straits and archipelgos Australia seemed careful not to identify itself with the maritime 
powers. Australia was also careful to acknowledge the importance of the interests of the 
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states116 that proved to be a unified group 
at Caracas, particularly in opposing Australia’s margin policy.117 Australia’s position in 
Committee One seemed very much tuned to the group’s demands for a strong 
international control over the common heritage of mankind,118 although generally 
Australia’s coastal state interests and wide margin claim put it at odds with the interests of 
the group. All of this of course required the most complex management of diplomatic
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activity, and it is argued later that the delegation was successful in dealing with the 
difficulties.
Australia’s basic policy positions enunciated prior to Caracas underwent no fundamental 
change119 and the ‘Main Trends’ Working Paper issued at the end of the session (which 
incorporated proposals receiving more than minimal support) held the outline of a 
C onvention120 that appeared to be broadly favourable to Australia’s policy goals as 
outlined before the conference. In that sense the Minister’s comments on his return from 
Caracas that it was ‘heartening’121 to witness the progress made seemed a reasonable 
assessment. As the Minister frankly admitted there was now a ‘general agreement’ on the 
200 mile zone and Australia, as a country with a long coastline, would therefore be a 
fortunate beneficiary of the conference.122
Third Session: Geneva. 17 March—9 May 1975
Delegates at Caracas recommended to the General Assembly that a further eight week 
session be held in Geneva in Spring 1975. At the Geneva session123 the Chairmen of the 
three main committees were instructed by the conference to prepare a single negotiating 
text (SNT) covering the subjects entrusted to his committee. Mid-way through the 
session the conference President concluded that the session was simply producing a 
stalemate of set positions124 and that because negotiations were now operating in several 
informal consultative groups the conference now had to prepare a single text as the basis 
of negotiation.125 As the conference had reached a stalemate among entrenched groups it 
was decided that by giving the initiative in formulating compromises to the Chairmen that 
this would overcome the unwillingness of delegates to abandon their own set positions. 
The Informal Single Negotiating Text, SNT’s, (released at the very end of the session) 
were seen as the basis for negotiating at the fourth session.126 The texts still left a host 
of issues unresolved—the terms and conditions to exploit the deep seabed, the balance of 
rights and duties in the EEZ and dispute settlement but progress was made on straits and 
archipelagos. From Australia’s viewpoint the Geneva session was favourable as the 
content of the informal texts were in broad harmony with Australian positions.
Committee One
Progress in Committee One was slow at Geneva because radical states within G77 
refused to make any concessions to the developed countries on the conditions of 
exploitation and machinery that would govern mining. With few formal meetings of the 
Committee there appeared no substantive changes changes in Australia’s position127. 
Australia’s main concern appeared to be a desire to avoid a situation where articles on
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deep seabed mining were unacceptable to the mining states such as the US, USSR, West 
Germany and Japan which might endanger the achievement of a total package. Australia 
continued to support a strong and viable authority with machinery with maximum 
flexibility and justified its particular interest in the issue by reference to Australia’s rich 
mineral production.128 Australia’s firm commitment to a strong Authority was elaborated 
by Foreign Minister Willesee.129
Australia’s position was to essentially support the middle ground view of the chairman of 
the Working Group on Basic Conditions of Exploitation who introduced a personal draft 
that focussed primarily on basic contractual joint ventures, including reservation of areas 
for exploitation by states and direct exploitation by the Authority. That proposal was, 
however, rejected by G77 which felt those draft articles that would require the Authority 
to provide access to the area at the request of any state and the reservation of areas for 
private firms represented a derogation of power of the Authority to control all activities in 
the international area.130
In what was the most detailed Australian elaboration of its position on the machinery for 
seabed mining the Australian delegate Lauterpacht put Australia in the middle ground131 
between the developing countries arguing for the dominance of the Assembly (where the 
developing countries views would prevail) and the developed states who argued for 
dominance of the Council with mining countries having most influence.132 The resulting 
SNT on the powers and functions of the Council and Assembly appeared to 
accommodate the points elaborated by Lauterpacht, although in terms of the composition 
of the Council it ignored the interests of Australia as a land based exporter of minerals 
which may be derived from the area.133 From Australia’s viewpoint as a minerals 
producer the economic commission which would maintain continuous surveillance on the 
effects of seabed mining on land based mineral producers was regarded as the most 
important commission to be established by the Council,134 and Australia’s objective 
appeared to be partly attained here when the SNT appeared at the end of the session.135
Within the framework of seeking compromise solutions on the deep seabed issue, 
Australian representatives discussed the merits of particular forms of joint venture 
operations136 and emphasized the need for adequate dispute settlement procedures in any 
final regime.137 Australia’s commitment to a regime that would be negotiated as a 
compromise was evident in its strong opposition to a notice of unilateral action taken by 
American mining interests to claim exclusive rights to exploit 60,000 square kilometres of 
seabed in the Pacific over a period of 30 years after which the area would be reduced to 
30,000 square miles for an indefinite period.138 The Australian Foreign Minister said in
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Committee One that this was a development which caused Australia ‘concern’. As the 
Minister explained:
The company was clearly intending to establish for its own benefit a kind 
of priority right vis-a-vis the future international Authority and anyone 
who might wish to exploit that sector before the Authority’s rights were 
duly recognized...The principle of freedom of the high seas did not permit 
companies of any nationality to claim exclusive rights over the resources of 
the high seas, its seabed or subsoil. Use was permitted; appropriation was 
no t.139
Committee One negotiations were by no means free of conflict as the G77 increased their 
representation on the working group of Committee One and adopted a more vigorous 
strategy of linking the seabed issue with demands for a ‘new economic order’.140 In 
fact, the section in the Geneva SNT dealing with the seabed regime contained provisions 
that went strongly in the G77 direction.141 Given that the SNT provisions dealing with 
access to the area and its resources were therefore likely to prove unacceptable to the 
mining states it seemed probable that at the next session Australia would have to devote 
greater effort to find articles acceptable to the developed states in order that an overall 
convention could be secured.142
Committee Two
In committee two the shelf issue continued as the number one priority for the delegation. 
The main activity here was in the Evensen group,where Australia was a member.143 At 
the same time Australian delegates also participated in a small informal working group on 
shelf issues.144 The main issues discussed related to revenue sharing in the area beyond 
200 miles and defining precisely the outer edge of the margin.145 The US, which had 
supported the idea of jurisdiction coupled with revenue sharing beyond 200 miles or the 
200 metre isobath, whichever was further, indicated that it could go along with applying 
revenue sharing only in the area of the margin beyond 200 miles and suggested an 
illustrative schedule.146 Canada also revived the idea of revenue sharing (from its 
support early in the days of the SBC) as a compromise between the margin and 200 mile 
limit positions147 and the text was included in the Evensen group’s draft on the shelf and 
found its way into the SNT at the end of the session.148 Australia’s position was to 
fight, largely unsuccessfully, against this trend. The delegation took a hard line against 
revenue sharing ideas at Geneva for reasons of principle and unworkability as well as a 
fear of economic disadvantage to Australia, but the principal thrust of Harry’s remarks 
that the concept was an attack on state sovereignty ignored the political fact that other 
broad shelf states were choosing to assert their sovereignty by opting to support the 
revenue sharing concept.149
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As noted above the revenue sharing idea found its way into the Geneva SNT, and it was 
unclear whether Australia would continue to maintain the vociferous opposition that was 
evident in Harry’s intervention. Such opposition ran the risk of upsetting what was, from 
Australia’s point of view a favourable definition of the margin in the SNT (see below). 
There seemed little chance, however, based on the strength of Harry’s intervention that 
Australia would abandon its opposition and positively embrace revenue sharing, so that 
the main issue seemed a tactical matter of how the delegation would play the question at 
future sessions.
On the question of delineating the outer edge of the margin a small group of margin states 
including Australia, was convened by Canada to discuss the definition.150 Australia took 
an independent line amongst the broad margin states here by arguing that devising such a 
definition was not necessary. Australia explained that the law relating to the continental 
shelf was too well established to have significant doubt cast upon it now.151 The 
Australian delegate, Brennan, explained that there was therefore nothing ‘novel’ or 
‘uncertain’ about the proposition that the shelf was the seaward prolongation of the 
continental land mass territory and that the function of the law had been to acknowledge 
those rights. Brennan did however recognise that political reality demanded some 
independent review of a coastal states delineation of the margin.152
However, the thrust of Brennan’s intervention that Australia did not support the inclusion 
of a detailed definition was not really tenable. Despite Brennan’s claim that the non­
inclusion of a formula on the limits issue did not mean that this necessarily amount to a 
device for coastal states to expand their shelf claims, that approach was not politically 
‘saleable’ at Geneva. As Buzan and Middlemiss point out: ‘Since the outer limit of the 
margin was geographically imprecise, some fixed formula was necessary to avoid the 
pitfalls of the 1958 “exploitation” definition. Unless some criteria could be found for 
drawing a line, problems would occur both in relation to suspicion of creeping 
jurisdiction by margin states and indeterminacy over which areas came under national, 
and which under international, jurisdiction’.153 Thus there was a considerable degree of 
cross pressure for Australia to cooperate with other margin states in an effort to reach a 
satisfactory definition at future sessions and it remained doubtful whether Australia could 
continue to maintain such a position.
Despite these problems with Australia’s position by the end of Geneva there was, from 
Australia’s viewpoint, positive movement on the shelf issue. The SNT contained a text 
that made clear that the jurisdiction of the shelf extended ‘throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental m argin’ or to a 
distance of 200 miles where the margin did not extend for that length.154 It also,
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however, contained an article on revenue sharing (article 69) in payment or in kind in 
respect of non-living resources of the shelf beyond 200 miles. The rate of payment was 
not specified but payment would be based on the value or volume of production at the 
site. Thus while it appeared that a final text would be open for signature which 
recognized rights of coastal states to the outer edge of the margin it was also likely to 
contain revenue sharing. It now seemed essential for Australia to examine possible 
alternatives in light of the fact that proponents of revenue sharing (particularly the land 
locked and geographically disadvantaged states) were unlikely to withdraw their 
proposals.
On boundary delimitation issues Australia made its first intervention on the subject since 
the SBC days. Australia spoke in favour of the need to preserve existing boundaries 
where no question of delimitation arose and the need to preserve existing rights on 
delimitation. Australia emphasised that the important element was to promote agreement 
and the need for the conference to include interim measures which would apply pending 
settlement.155 These views were in line with Australia’s pre-conference position and 
were essentially an outline of the Australian/Norwegian paper presented to the SBC. 
Already at Caracas there had emerged a division between those states emphasising 
equidistance (i.e. a median line) and another group supporting ‘equitable principles’.156 
While the earlier Australian/Norwegian paper suggested parties reach agreement 
according to equitable principles the main thrust of Australia’s intervention at Geneva was 
to support the principle of agreement. Australia had taken the decision not to align itself 
with either group as the proposals of both emphasised the importance of effecting 
delimitation by agreement so it seemed that was an area where Australia would also steer 
clear.157
The question of islands was also of relevance in the delimitation context for a number of 
Australian islands (Christmas, Heard and McDonald, Macquarie, Norfolk, Coral Seas 
Island Territory) were potential sources of delimitation if they generated an economic 
zone. At Geneva Australia for the first time publicly supported the notion that all islands 
were entitled to an economic zone which appeared to represent a change in tactics from 
Caracas where a ‘softly, softly’ approach was adopted. Delegation leader Harry pointed 
out that Australia had ‘not seen any other alternative to treating islands on the same basis 
as any other territory of the state, thus attracting an economic zone and continental shelf 
as well as a territorial sea’.158 This was a clear statement of Australia’s position159 and 
supported the South Pacific states who continued to press the importance of islands 
generating marine space.160 Article 132 of the SNT largely fulfilled Australia’s policy 
on the islands issue, although Canberra had to consider its Pacific Islands neighbours 
here.161
67
Fisheries issues were discussed in depth in informal groups rather than formal committee 
where fisheries was given low-key treatment.162 The majority of states were prepared to 
await articles on the EEZ and fisheries being drafted in the Evensen Group. Australia 
participated in debate in the Evensen group where negotiations revealed that the distant- 
water fishing nations (DWFN) had significantly shifted their position since 
Caracas.They now acknowledged that a convention would provide for a 200 mile zone 
which would confer coastal state rights over (amongst other things) fisheries, although 
the EEZ concept was seen as part of an overall package.163 It is not clear what profile 
Australia took in the Evensen group but the the SNT produced at the end of the session 
contained fisheries articles which were broadly in line with Australia’s position. In fact 
in inter-sessional meetings which Australia attended in October 1974 and February 1975 
a number of fisheries articles were drafted which largely reflected the Australian view that 
DWFN should have access to unexploited surpluses of the economic zones of coastal 
states. At the same time the right of the coastal state to determine allowable catch and the 
terms and conditions of the other states into its economic zone were recognized.164
The fisheries issue that generated a great deal of controversy and which Australia played 
an active role was the management of highly migratory species (HMS).165 The issue 
remained contentious principally due to the high level involvement of the US and Japan in 
tuna fisheries and the rejection by the US of the economic zone in respect to HMS. There 
was a hardening of developing coastal state views that sovereign rights in the economic 
zone could not be undermined by regional or international organisations, a trend that 
clearly weakened the appeal of the Australian /New Zealand sponsored paper at Caracas, 
which had proposed either an international or regional body be set up to manage the 
species and actively determine the allowable catch quotas.166
Australia faced significant cross-pressure on this issue from its South Pacific neighbours 
where the Australian delegation report makes clear that the Australian/New Zealand 
proposal ‘proved unacceptable to a majority of coastal states, particularly developing 
coastal states which were not prepared to consider any diminution of their sovereign 
rights over living resources in their economic zones’.167 Evensen in fact drafted an 
article on HMS where international fisheries bodies would have had an important role, 
but was opposed by group members from both the DWFN and coastal states and was 
withdrawn at the last minute.168 Evensen’s final revision, the one submitted to the 
chairman of Committee Two169 simply noted the article was ‘still under discussion’.170 
To what extent Australia argued that the joint Australia/New Zealand proposal offered a 
reasonable compromise was not clear but the final negotiating text on HMS reflected the 
developing coastal state position although it did appear to require (as proposed by the
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Australia/New Zealand paper and again by Australia at Geneva)171 that coastal states 
participate in appropriate regional or international organisations.172
The SNT fisheries provisions that emerged from Geneva were weighted in favour of the 
coastal states to the detriment of LLGDS173 and DWFN. The coastal state had been 
given sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the zone and the coastal state alone was permitted to determine both the total 
allowable catch and its capacity to harvest them. For the most part, however,the SNT 
fisheries provisions were drafted in such a way to broadly satisfy maritime and coastal 
states.174 As far as Australia was concerned the fisheries regime proposed in the earlier 
1972 Australia/New Zealand working paper had largely emerged in the Evensen articles 
and had been taken up in the negotiating text. Article 53 on HMS was, however, a very 
much watered down version of Australia’s proposal that the role of regional bodies was 
actually to manage HMS. Given the intransigence of developing coastal states to this idea 
(as noted above) with what appeared to be little public support from New Zealand it was 
unclear whether Australia would instigate or support a move to reopen the article or 
whether it would take the view that the article represented the best prospect for an agreed 
position on the management of HMS.
On other issues in Committee Two Australia did not appear to take a high profile. On the 
economic zone the informal group of the whole held four meetings but ‘many 
delegations’ simply gave ‘long dissertations on their well-known concepts of an 
economic zone’.175 Negotiations also took place in the Evensen group176 where 
Australia was a member although as noted above there is no evidence on what role 
Australia took in the group. By the end of the session major disagreements existed 
between the maritime states, developing coastal states and LLGDS on such issues as 
coastal state jurisdiction in respect to pollution control in the EEZ, the right of the coastal 
state to control navigation and scientific research in the EEZ, access to renewable and non 
renewable resources and the allocation of residual rights in the economic zone. There was 
no evidence that Australia’s concerns to ensure that articles relating to the economic zone 
did not in any way prejudice Australia’s claim to seabed resources to the margin and 
maintained rights of navigation and overflight of the zone had changed at Geneva.177
On both straits issues and archipalagos Australia was again somewhat of a spectator. 
Australia’s policy on the straits issue from Caracas was to separate out the straits question 
from the archipelagic issue but at Geneva the issues were very closely linked.178 
Committee Two held two informal consultations on straits.179 A clear majority 
participating in the debates favoured a regime of unimpeded transit of straits and the 
dominant trend in the Conference now clearly favoured an unimpeded transit regime.180
Australia was one of thirteen states in a small informal group on straits that was 
convened by the UK and Fiji181 although it attended only as an observer.182 There was 
some attempt at ‘behind the scenes maneuvering’ on the straits issue183 with the group 
submitting a ‘Consensus Text of Private Group on Straits’ to the Chairman substantially 
based on the UK draft articles submitted at Caracas.184 Canada, Chile and Norway 
submitted an aide memoir which attacked the ‘private’ group text in so far as it purported 
to modify the customary definition of international straits.185 Australia does not appear 
to have altered its low profile on the issue but the SNT text on transit passage186 achieved 
‘large support’187 and appeared to hold out the prospect of a workable accommodation of 
the views of the major maritime powers and the straits states.188 In that sense the 
outcome of the straits issue looked promising for Australia, as did developments on 
archipelagos, although the Geneva experience suggested that the issue would be resolved 
between the maritime states and archipelagic states.189 Nevertheless with the straits issue 
looking likely to have been settled it now appeared much easier to deal separately with 
archipelagic issues that may arise— the approach Australia had favoured from the Caracas 
session . 190
Committee Three
Australia continued to take an active role on questions of the marine environment where 
much of the discussion took place in informal groups. 191 Australia was active in 
attempting to avoid ‘double standards’— i.e. a situation where some states would be 
permitted to take less stringent standards to protect the marine environment than others. 
Australia along with other developed countries ‘while recognising the concern of 
developing countries, felt that it was not in the best interests of the environment to permit 
‘double standards” 192. Australia’s policy here was, however, unsuccessful with respect 
to the issue of land based pollution,193 although the article on pollution from the seabed 
in the SNT was in line with Australia’s position that national laws should be ‘no less 
effective than generally accepted international rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures’.194
On ship sourced pollution the main discussions took place in the Evensen Group195 
where Australia was one of a number that argued that in certain limited cases the coastal 
states should have the right to apply unilaterally devised regulations in its EEZ prohibiting 
discharge of tanker washings. 196 Australia was, however, the only state to propose 
effective safeguards to prevent the abuse of the right of the coastal state to take such 
actions. In the event of objections the coastal state would suspend its unilateral rules and 
act in accordance with third party adjudication. That view was consistent with its 
previous intervention at Caracas but no delegation took up the Australian proposal.197
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Australia’s position continued to be opposed by the maritime states. The paper tabled in 
formal session on vessel source pollution by ten maritime states from Eastern and 
Western Europe198 was not in accordance with Australia’s position that the coastal state 
should have the authority to make laws to control traffic in specially vulnerable areas and 
that the coastal state should have authority to make regulations which had not been 
internationally agreed prohibiting discharge of tanker washings. Australia’s main problem 
now in gaining allies on the issue was that many members of the Group of 77 had begun 
to fear that vesting standard setting in the coastal state would result in barriers to their 
own vessels.199
On MSR issues Australia was active in a group of about 20 states considering the 
question of whether consent or only notification should be required for a state to conduct 
MSR in the economic zone of another state.200 At Geneva Australia shifted its position 
on MSR.201 Previously Australia had favoured a consent approach with the qualification 
that consent should not be unreasonably withheld when certain conditions were met. 
Australia’s position shifted at Geneva with Australia taking a view similar to that of the 
Soviet Union at Geneva that coastal state consent was necessary for MSR concerning 
fisheries resources of the economic zone or resources of the seabed within the economic 
zone and the shelf beyond 200 miles but that consent should not be unreasonably be 
withheld. For research not falling within these categories notification was considered 
sufficient.202 The Australian approach was, however, taken up in the SNT where the 
basic distinction was made between ‘research of a fundamental nature’ and ‘research 
related to the resources of the economic zone’, the former subject to notification and the 
latter category to an absolute consent regime.203 The overall effect of the SNT on MSR 
was thus close to that which Australia was seeking, although there still were some 
difficulties.204
One shift, or rather addition to Australian policy, emerged in Geneva and that related to 
technology transfer, an issue ignored in the government’s 1973 position paper. Transfer 
of technology issues received low key treatment at Geneva with only one formal session 
and two informal sessions.205 A proposal by Australia to take into account the language 
of the UN Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States received support206 
Australian interests here aligned it with developed states.207 Australia was concerned to 
ensure its interests were represented by the use of terms ‘suppliers’ and ‘recipients’ of 
technology rather than the cruder classification of developed and developing. Australia 
was also concerned to see that technology sharing was based on voluntary agreements 
between states so that existing laws relating to technology transfer under coastal state 
jurisdiction were not threatened. In that sense the main question here appeared to be what 
attitude Australia would take the SNT provision on technology transfer which gave the
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Authority the power to ensure far reaching benefits for developing countries with 
protection for industrial property rights.208
Disputes Settlement
Australia’s Ralph Harry continued as one of the three co-chairmen of an informal 
working group on disputes settlement, where over sixty countries took part. The group 
met three times a week including an important weekend session in Montreux, 
Switzerland,209 where an informal paper by the Australian delegate Lauterpacht on 
disputes avoidance210 was reflected in the document submitted by the group at the end of 
the Geneva Session.211 One of the main areas of dispute here was the extent to which 
there should be exclusion of certain issues from compulsory disputes settlement.
Three views persisted in the working group.212 One was that no exceptions be 
permitted, the other was that exceptions may be allowed but only in respect to a limited 
category of disputes specifically enumerated in the Convention itself and third another 
view which emphasized the need to recognize complete sovereignty of coastal states and 
thus suggested total exclusion from the compulsory procedures of any dispute relating to 
a matter falling within the jurisdiction of a coastal state. It was unclear at this stage which 
group Australia aligned itself with although it seemed reasonable to suppose that in an 
effort to achieve agreement Australia would logically have favoured some limited 
exceptions. However Australia was committed to a workable Convention and that meant 
it did not seem likely it would favour a system that allowed procedures to restrict 
compulsory procedures from all the important Law of the Sea disputes.213 For that 
reason it therefore seemed likely that Australia would oppose the draft prepared by the 
President that provided that a state would not be required to submit to settlement 
procedures any dispute arising out of the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction under the 
Convention except when it was claimed that the coastal state had violated its obligations 
by failing to apply specified, internationally agreed standards or criteria.214 The 
President’s text was to be the subject of debate at the fourth session.
Conference Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
At Geneva the Coastal States group did not really recover from the problems inherited 
from Caracas215 and Australia sought to achieve its goals by working in ad hoc and 
other groupings, particularly the Evensen group. Australia participated in a group of 30 
states set up by the Chairman of Committee One on basic terms and conditions governing 
seabed mining,216 and was an observer in the informal private groups on straits.217 For 
Australia, however, the most important group at Geneva and the most influential was the
Evensen group which met every day at Geneva218 and where Australia participated with 
the key actors in the full range of coastal issues being discussed in that body, particularly 
on margin related issues. Buzan and Johnson provide a detailed account of the group’s 
work at Geneva.219 By the time of the third session the group had grown from its 
original 24 in 1972/73 to 35 midway through the session and reached forty by the end of 
the session.220 It sought to maintain a representative character but the LLGDS group felt 
the Evensen group was too coastal in its orientation and unsympathetic in its concerns.221 
The Evensen group served as a device to bring together the chief figures in the major 
delegations to initiate bargaining and participants were invited by the Chairman.222 For 
Australia, like Canada 223 the transition to the Evensen group was quite smooth as many 
of the texts of the group reflected coastal state group views and because the purpose and 
method of the group was to find compromise solutions.
The Geneva texts issued at the end of the session were not final documents but rather the 
basis for negotiations at the fourth session. Broadly speaking the texts indicated that 
Australia was faring well in the conference. The texts on fisheries, the shelf (except for 
revenue sharing), MSR and navigational issues largely met Australian objectives. 
However the session revealed that successful resolution of Committee Two issues was 
going to be linked with seabed issues in Committee One. Whereas at Caracas, few 
delegations were talking about trade-offs between Committees One and Two, at Geneva 
the G77 indicated that demands on the seabed regime would be linked to their priority 
items in Committee Two.224 As the Geneva text on Committee One issues were 
weighted heavily in favour of the developing countries it was unclear how Australia’s 
interests would be affected if there was to be continued spill-over effect from Committee 
One to Committee Two issues.
By the end of Geneva there were mixed views on the likely progress of the conference 
ranging from those that felt that a Convention could be concluded in one or two further 
meetings to those that felt that with a number of countries (US, Canada, Norway, Iceland 
and UK) contemplating extending their fisheries jurisdiction the conference may become 
irrelevant.225 Australia’s position was one of optimism. The Australian Foreign 
Minister told parliament shortly after the end of the session that while ‘of course’ 
Australia would study the Geneva texts before the next meeting the conference had been a 
‘tremendously honest attempt at solving the most tantalising problems that one could 
possibly get’.226 Preliminary reaction in Canberra to the texts was favourable227 and the 
Foreign Minister was able to inform the United Nations General Assembly in September 
1975 that his government hoped that the next session would agree on a text ‘which can be 
accepted by Governments and which can become the “Convention of Caracas”.228 For 
Australia the SNT was seen as ‘more than a store or stock from which the ingredients of
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a Convention’ were to be chosen but rather the ‘materials have been formed into shapes 
which already begin to approximate what is desired in the way of finished structures’.229
CHAPTER FIVE
AUSTRALIA AT UNCLOS 111, 1976-1977
UNCLOS 111 met three times in 1976-77, with negotiations totalling twenty-three 
weeks. While the fourth and fifth sessions made little progress, by the end of 1977 most 
questions falling under the responsibility of the second and third committees appeared to 
be on the way to resolution. The regime for deep seabed mining was the most significant 
unresolved issue. The product of the eight week 1977 session was an Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) which was a major step forward in the conference, 
as it had all the appearance of a Draft Convention. The new text met Australia’s key 
objectives on the EEZ, continental shelf, navigation rights through straits and 
archipelagos, marine environmental issues and control over MSR in the 200 mile zone.
The conference politics of this period evolved from the earlier sessions with the LLGDS 
group making a strong effort to get a better deal, provoking a reaction that saw a new 
expanded Coastal States group of sixty-seven. For Australia the critical event in this 
period was the government’s announcement on 19 October 1976 that it would implement 
a 200 mile fishing zone but that it would not act on the decision until after the sixth 
session.
As far as Australian conference diplomacy was concerned no shifts in policy direction 
were evident as a result of a new Liberal Government coming to power in December 
1975. In fact as will be discussed later bipartisanship was to characterise Australia’s law 
of the sea diplomacy through the entire conference. In terms of conference coalition 
politics Australia continued to operate with its coastal state allies, but devoted an 
increasing amount of its diplomatic effort to the Margineers Group and compromise 
groups, in particular a fifteen state negotiating group established under the direction of 
Jorge Castaneda of Mexico.
On Committee One politics Australia was largely a spectator. Its main interest here was 
now to ensure that the divisions in Committee One did not threaten the gains the 
delegation had made in the second and third committees. At the same time Australia did 
direct some of its lobbying activities to improve Australia’s chances of getting a seat on 
the Council of the Seabed Authority.
In contrast to Committee One Australia had an immediate stake in the emerging texts on 
the EEZ, shelf and marine environment in Committee Two and Three. The most
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significant development here was Australia’s support for a formula on the margin that 
was tied to the width of the sediments (the ‘Irish’ formula). Australia stuck to its 
opposition to revenue sharing but this was largely for tactical reasons and it now 
appeared that Australia recognised that it was an untenable view in the longer term. 
Navigation in the economic zone was a heavily contested issue in this period and here 
Australia took on a high profile conciliatory role.
On Third Committee issues Australia moved to a more middle ground view on the marine 
environment, a position largely dictated by a desire not to see any widespread reopening 
of the text, as the end of negotiations appeared in sight. On specific issues here, 
however, Australia acted to defend its interests taking over from Canada the running on 
the question of coastal state powers in areas of special environmental sensitivity and 
acting to resist attempts to weaken port state enforcement powers. On MSR, where US 
security interests made compromise difficult, Australia now moved to try and find some 
middle ground, but was stymied in its efforts by the Third Committee Chairman. While 
the LLGDS now took on a more active role, particularly in claiming a substantial share of 
living resources in neighbouring coastal states zones Australia saw no tactical advantage 
in taking a high profile in opposing the LLGDS states.
By the end of the sixth session in July 1977 a consensus in relation to Committee Two 
and Three issues appeared in sight and Australia’s interest in preserving the overall 
integrity of the negotiating process was thus given added force. The ICNT was proof that 
Australia was faring extremely well, although on issues relating to revenue sharing, the 
environment issue and to some extent the issue of disputes settlement it appeared that 
Australia would have little choice but to accept compromises necessitated by the dynamics 
of conference diplomacy and politics.
Fourth Session: New York. 15 March—16 May 1976
The fourth session of the conference had before it for the first time a complete text 
containing articles dealing with all matters under consideration.1 (The President of the 
conference had prepared a paper on the settlement of disputes based on the draft articles 
submitted to him by the working group at the end of the Geneva session and these were 
the basis of the first formal general debate on the subject.)2 At the end of the session the 
Committee Chairmen produced a revised single negotiating text (RSNT)3 as well as a 
new SNT on dispute settlement.4
The RSNT contained significant changes on the deep seabed regime and on Committee 
Three matters, although there were only minor alterations to the host of articles on
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Committee Two issues. The session was largely dominated by the debate on the 
exploitation of the deep seabed. The RSNT was, however, seen in G77 as a ‘sell out’ to 
the US view on a system of exploitation. Committee discussion at New York continued 
to be informal and Australia worked actively to ensure that the gains it had made on the 
major resource questions would not be jeopardised. The new Liberal government of 
Malcolm Fraser demonstrated its commitment to a successful conference outcome by 
sending the Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrew Peacock, as leader of the delegation.
Committee One
The regime for deep seabed mining was perhaps the most contentious issue before the 
conference. Australia’s broad concern in Committee One continued to be to find a 
satisfactory resolution to the differences between some developed states and G77 but for 
the most part Australia took no sides in the confrontation between the developing states 
and the developed mining countries. Without such a resolution, however, there was 
unlikely to be a Law of the Sea Convention so the delegation was concerned to ensure 
some reconciliation of the divergent views of the developed and developing countries.5 
The SNT had reflected the position of the developing countries and the United States had 
attempted between sessions to persuade developing countries that the texts, particularly 
those relating to access to the area, needed to be modified before they would join a 
Convention6.
The Australian legal advisor presided, at the Chairman’s request, at an inter-sessional 
meeting in New York in November 1975 to discuss key issues and in February 1976 the 
Chairman called together a core group of 33 countries, where Australia participated, to 
hold further discussions.7 Articles on the functions of the Authority and general 
principles regarding activities in the international area were redrafted and although they 
were not formally presented at New York they were considered important in facilitating 
debate.8 The Australian delegate Lauterpacht chaired a group concerned with rules, 
regulations and procedures9 while the Australian Rapporteur John Bailey chaired a small 
group which prepared the first draft on the financial arrangements to be incorporated in 
contracts between the Authority and states and companies.10
However, Australia was not directly involved in or exercised much influence over the 
controversial and emotional debate on who shall exploit the area and the system of 
exploitation where the US was threatening unilateral action on nodule mining if 
agreement was not reached quickly.11 Nor was Australia involved in two small private 
groups that were negotiating and reviewing texts on behalf of the Chairman.12 It became 
apparent at New York that there was a movement towards Australia’s moderate position
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by certain influential members of G77 that acknowledged the ‘right of access by states 
and companies to exploit the area directly themselves under a contractual relationship with 
the Authority and an operating arm, the Enterprise which would also have the right to 
exploit the area itself or under arrangements with states or companies on behalf of the 
Authority’.13 What was very unclear, however, was whether the new texts on the issue 
would be acceptable to G77.
The new text reflected a dual or parallel system providing a right of access to states, 
companies, state organisations and the Enterprise on equal terms but was seen by certain 
G77, as a ‘sell-out’ to the American view.14 The text appeared to balance the interests of 
the developed and developing states and the Authority itself by incorporating a banking 
system, or reserved area system and was along the lines sought by Australia.15 The new 
text was certainly much more favourable than the SNT to the developed countries as they 
now had a right to participate directly in exploitation.16 As the objectives that Australia 
had sought had now, in the main, been adopted by the major developed countries, the 
question, in Australia’s view, was ‘whether the group of 77 will be prepared to follow 
the lead given by its moderate members’ at the next session.17 By the end of the session 
G77 were divided on the issue,18 but there seemed little reason to suppose that Australia 
would alter its position from that expressed by the Foreign Minister at New York that ‘we 
hope for the acceptance of a system of assured access to the seabed areas for individual 
states and their nationals as well as the seabed Authority itself—a system which will 
ensure active application of capabilities to the development of seabed resources.’19 In 
that sense it seemed that Australia would try and defend the parallel system in the RSNT.
On the issue of protection for land based producers there was movement towards a 
compromise to meet the interests of land based producers who may be adversely affected 
by the exploitation on the deep seabed. During the session the US proposed (following a 
speech by the US Secretary of State that foreshadowed the move)20 the inclusion of an 
article which would give temporary protection for a fixed period by limiting production of 
the seabed minerals for the projected growth in the world nickel market, then estimated 
by the US to be 6% per annum. They proposed that such a limitation should apply for a 
period of 20 years after coming into force of the Convention and thereafter that seabed 
production be governed by market forces. The American proposal was incorporated in 
the RSNT.21 The nickel issue arose right at the end of the session22 so there was little 
time for Australia to develop a firm view on the matter. Despite the Foreign Minister’s 
statement at New York that Australia supported measures made with a view to ‘protecting 
the interests of those states which are significant producers of the same minerals as will 
also be produced from the seabed’23 the official Australian reaction was cautious.24 With 
the end of US objections it seemed probable that other resistance to production controls
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would collapse25 so the issue facing Canberra was not whether production controls 
would be included in a final Convention but what kind.
Also of interest to Australia as a land based producer was to secure its representation on 
the Council of the International Seabed Authority. There was some movement at New 
York toward agreement that the Council of the Authority take into account special interest 
groups of states and reflect geographic representation,26 a move supported by Australia, 
that argued that the organs of the ISA should have a ‘satisfactory representation of 
interests’.27
Australia again did not take a high profile in Committee One issues partly because it was 
not invited to two small group deliberations and partly no doubt because at that stage a 
high profile would weaken any attempt at compromise between the major players.28 As a 
major land based producer of nickel Australia’s most pressing requirement would now be 
to carefully scrutinise and comment at the next session on the RSNT articles that 
purported to protect such producers.
Committee Two
In Committee Two a ‘rule of silence’ was adopted whereby it was agreed that a 
delegation supported the SNT if it made no comment to the contrary. This did not 
prevent more than 3,700 interventions being made during the session.29
On the shelf issue Australia was active in participating in the Margineers group examining 
the defmition of the margin. That group produced a ‘rather complicated formula based on 
a relationship between the thickness of sediments on the rise and the distance from the 
base of the slope’ which received ‘widespread support among the margin states’.30 This 
was the so called Irish formula.31 Three other proposed definitions were also advanced 
in the second committee on this issue32 but in the end the Chairman of Committee Two 
did not consider it appropriate to include a precise formula in the RSNT and suggested 
that ‘at the end of the session, a group of experts could perhaps be convened to give more 
exposure to the question’.33
Australian Foreign Minister Peacock continued to stress the need for the Convention to 
confirm ‘the acquired rights of those coastal states which possessed appurtenant 
continental shelves’34 and defended the natural prolongation to the outer edge of the 
margin definition in the Geneva SNT. This was a repeat of the Geneva line that there 
was no need to define the concept with any greater precision in the Convention.35 
However, such a view would have isolated Australia in the Margineers Group as well as
running against the trend in the conference for an overall settlement of the boundary 
issue. Thus conference politics pushed Australia to shift its position and move directly to 
support the Irish formula.36
While Australia’s position on the definition of the margin question was that such a 
definition was not necessary Australia’s room for manouvre in the Margineers Group 
was limited as the Irish formula received widespread support among the Margineers.37 
It was by no means clear, however, whether Australia at that stage had carefully 
considered what the formula would mean in terms of gains and losses. The main 
Australian intervention on the issue was silent on this critical point.38 Australia’s support 
for the Irish definition was linked with its support for a Boundaries Commission on shelf 
limits, a prudent tactic in the face of fears by some LLGDS states that certain states could 
not be trusted to delineate accurately their margins.39
On revenue sharing Australia continued its minority opposition against the concept,40 
stressing that it was inconsistent with the principle of sovereign rights with respect to its 
shelf and was also impractical as ‘we have serious doubts whether revenue sharing of 
this kind would lead to any increase in real aid flows’.41 Apart from the issue of 
principle there was also interest in prospective areas off the North West Shelf that were 
beyond the 200 mile limit. Australia was reportedly awaiting the outcome of the 
conference on the issue of shelf rights before granting concessions on the plateau42 so it 
was not surprising the delegation continued to hesitate on the issue. However, 
Australia’s main reservation continued to be focussed on the political objection that 
revenue sharing was a derogation from Australia’s sovereignty rather than the financial 
considerations of sharing. The Chairman of Committee Two included a resource sharing 
proposal in the RSNT (Article 70) along the lines of the US proposal at Geneva, although 
omitting American percentages 43
The revenue sharing issue was clearly a difficult one for Australia where it had few allies 
in its opposition to the concept. Even a politically acceptable alternative (if it could be 
devised) would have been unlikely to have gained enough support for the revenue 
sharing articles to be eliminated from the text and could have jeopardised the continued 
inclusion of what were, from Australia’s viewpoint favourable shelf articles. While there 
is no evidence that Australia was actively pursuing any alternative to revenue sharing it 
appeared that Australia’s final position would be determined when there had been an 
opportunity to consider the Convention as a whole, but there was no indication Australia 
would adopt a cautious approach to the question.44
80
While the fact that some kind of revenue sharing arrangement looked inevitable it was by 
no means certain that Australia would drop its opposition to the concept. What did seem 
more consistent with Australia’s posiuon as described above was the delegation adopting 
a greater degree of tactical flexibility on the issue at the next session. There were 
however limits in which the delegation could move given government sensitivity on the 
issue. The delegation had clear instructions to oppose revenue sharing. In the event that 
adherence to that position looked likely to prejudice other Australian objectives the 
delegation were instructed to inform the Minister who would, if necessary, bring the 
matter back to Cabinet.45
The archipelagic issue was again one where Australia was something of a spectator,46 as 
it was on fisheries issues where the LLGDS group asserted their requirements regarding 
access to EEZ fishery resources. This led to a polarisation of positions between the 
coastal states and LLGDS,47 with some coastal states reverting to a position of 
supporting a 200 mile territorial sea.48
In the end, however, the position of the LLGDS was made worse in the RSNT with the 
new text swinging more categorically to limiting LLGDS to rights to the surplus only.49 
For Australia this situation was difficult—on the one hand Australia was attempting to 
seek a widely accepted Convention and generally supported the fisheries articles. On the 
other hand Australia, like other coastal states, was keen to avoid a situation where the 
LLGDS had rights which might supercede rights in its own EEZ and was careful to 
ensure that the definition of region or sub-region would not place Australia in the position 
of having to confer special rights in respect to developing LLGDS in an Australian 200 
mile zone.50 Generally, Australia’s tactic here was to adopt a neutral role in the debate on 
this issue but the delegation attended several meetings of the Evensen group meeting to 
discuss the issue.51 Overall there seemed little to be gained by Australia taking a strong 
position against the LLGDS states.
In contrast to the LLGDS issue, Australia was active at New York in trying to work out a 
satisfactory compromise to the dispute between coastal states and DWFN states like the 
US and Japan on HMS. Australia continued to stress the necessity for adequate 
international management but it was evident that there were still differing views on 
regional arrangements for the management of HMS.52 Many coastal states, including the 
South Pacific states were in favour of a position that either deleted the article altogether or 
if it were to be retained that any international body would operate only beyond the EEZ.53 
Despite the fact that the article was, as noted earlier, inconsistent with the philosophy of 
the Australian New Zealand paper (that saw international or regional bodies having an 
actual management role) Australia swung to the view that in the light of the views of
developing coastal states, in particular the island states of the South Pacific, it represented 
the best prospect of an agreed position.54 As the RSNT was a redraft of the SNT article 
(although removing provisions relating to marine mammals to a subsequent article) 
Australia’s view was unlikely to change on the merits of the HMS article.55
The EEZ debate proved highly charged as the LLGDS group asserted that coastal states 
rights should be lessened and the more territorialist states introducing amendments that 
would make the zone more akin to a territorial sea.56 Australia played a mediating role 
here on the critical debate on the juridical status of economic zone. About fifty maritime 
states and LLGDS states spoke in favour of retaining the status of the zone as high seas 
except for resource rights accorded coastal states. About the same number argued that 
apart from rights delegated to third parties for purposes of navigation, overflight and 
communication residual rights in the economic zone should be vested in the coastal 
state .57 Whereas the previous Australian intervention at Caracas was vague on the 
question of the juridical status of the economic zone by the fourth session Australia was 
more on the side of the maritime powers who argued that they should be high seas 
subject to the rights of the coastal state contained in the Convention.
Australia sought support for the position that the international community had residual 
high seas rights in the EEZ by introducing a compromise amendment that reflected a 
middle position whereby the EEZ was neither high seas (the preferred position of the 
maritime powers) nor territorial seas but had the effect of preserving the EEZ as high seas 
‘except with respect to the exercise of coastal state rights contained in this Convention’.58 
Australia’s position that only resource rights should be given to the coastal state was not 
new. However, the New York amendment was the clearest Australian expression that 
the safeguarding of navigation interests was critical to Australia accepting the economic 
zone articles.59
Reactions to the Australian amendment were favourable60 but the Chairman of Committee 
Two concluded at the end of the session that the question of whether or not the EEZ 
should be included in the definition of the high seas was the matter over which the 
committee was most divided.61 In his final report the Committee Two Chairman sought 
a compromise on the issue. He noted that ‘there is no doubt that the exclusive economic 
zone is neither high seas nor the territorial sea. It is a zone sui generis. ’62 The RSNT 
was in fact biased towards the territorialist position and away from Australia’s position 
that had sought the middle ground63 and Canberra’s view after the session was that 
difficulties remained with respect to whether residual rights belong to the coastal state or 
to the international community.64
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Delimitation issues, the regime of islands and transit passage did not occupy the 
delegation but delegates were active in searching for compromise on the issue of standard 
setting in the territorial sea.65
Australia proposed an amendment, almost certainly with the Great Barrier Reef in mind 
which appeared designed to overcome the fact that the SNT had not taken account of 
areas of special vulnerability to pollution damage or exceptionally hazardous navigation in 
coastal state laws relating to prevention of marine pollution for ships on innocent 
passage .66 The amendment attempted to give the coastal state clearer powers over 
maritime traffic although ensuring that measures taken by the coastal state should 
conform to international standards. The latter proviso was important as far as the 
maritime powers were concerned. They were strongly of the view that the coastal state 
should not be authorized to establish construction, design, equipment of manning 
regulations more strict than international regulations.67
The relevant article in the SNT was controversial: it provided that while a coastal state 
may make laws and regulations ‘relating to the preservation of the marine environment 
...and the prevention of pollution’ for ships on innocent passage ‘such laws and 
regulations shall not apply to or affect the design, construction, manning or equipment of 
foreign ships or matters regulated by generally accepted international rules unless 
specifically authorized by such rules. ’68 The US, Canada, and many other coastal states 
were concerned about what they saw as the potential restrictiveness of this provision for a 
coastal states jurisdiction in the territorial sea seeing it as creating an order whereby the 
flag state would have absolute sovereignty.69 The provision in the article removing from 
coastal authority any ‘matters’ regulated by ‘generally accepted’ international rules was, it 
was argued, so vague as to cover virtually any commonplace regulations ‘regardless of 
how minimal the level of international standards’.70 While not sharing Canada’s and 
other coastal states concerns the fact that the Australian proposal removed the broader 
restriction on other ‘matters’ seemed to offer the basis of some kind of compromise, 
between the coastal states and the maritime powers on standard setting in the territorial 
sea .71
At Geneva while there was general agreement that activities which constituted non 
innocent passage should be listed there was no agreement on whether the list was to be 
exhaustive or illustrative.72 At New York amendments were directed at making clear that 
the list of amendments was illustrative.73 Australia sided with the maritime states here 
and did not support these moves believing that the amendments should make it clear that 
the definition was exhaustive.74 The question now was to what extent Australia would 
be successful if it decided to press for deletions in the RSNT that broadened the concept
away from the notion that passage was innocent as long as it did not affect the defence 
and security of the coastal state. The nub of the issue here of course was whether 
Australia’s interest as a coastal state in expanding its powers in the territorial sea would 
override its interests in maintaining navigational freedoms for commercial and military 
purposes .75
One other issue engaged Australia’s direct attention in Committee Two— the issue of 
Territories Under Foreign Occupation or Colonial Domination. There was general 
agreement that the ‘rights recognized or established by the present Convention to the 
resources of a territory whose people had not yet attained full independence shall be 
vested in the inhabitants of that territory’ rather than in the colonial power.76 However 
with respect to the provision that where there was a dispute over the sovereignty of a 
territory under foreign occupation or colonial domination the rights referred to above 
‘shall not be exercised until the dispute has been settled in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’, there were a large number of states, 
including Australia, that argued that the article would have the effect of ‘delaying or 
denying access of some emerging and developing countries to their resources’ and should 
therefore be deleted.77 The rationale presumably referred to the fact that the article would 
prevent such states from establishing an EEZ and thereby allowing unrestricted access by 
DWFN to the resources of such areas. No doubt also Australian support for the deletion 
was seen as tactically useful in gaining support of the Oceania group, in particular PNG, 
for Australia’s shelf policy. Australia’s position here was opposed to that of the interests 
of France and the US with their overseas territories in the Pacific in view and illustrated 
the extent to which Australia was shaping its law of the sea policies independently of its 
major ally.78
Committee Three
Informal discussions on issues relating to the marine environment took place under the 
Chairmanship of Mr Jose Vallarta of Mexico in the Informal Committee of the Whole and 
in a smaller group of interested delegations, including Australia, invited by Vallarta to 
consider the issue .79 A great deal of discussion concentrated on ship sourced 
pollution.80 Australia’s position on the issue as it related to pollution in the territorial sea 
was noted above in the context of innocent passage. Australia repeated its view in the 
third committee that the coastal state should not require foreign vessels, as a condition of 
the right of innocent passage to observe design, construction and manning or equipment 
standards which were different from those agreed internationally but that other pollution 
control measures, including the regulation of marine traffic should be left to the discretion 
of the coastal state, subject to the obligation not to hamper innocent passage.81 (Australia
had in mind here such things as setting sealanes and traffic separation schemes, 
prescribing under keel clearances and compulsory pilotage.)82
Australia’s position here was again ‘middle of the road’ between the maritime powers, 
insisting that all coastal states pollution control measures conform to internationally 
agreed rules and the more extreme coastal states that argued that territorial sovereignty 
could not be subject to strict limitations.83
On the issue of standard setting in the EEZ, Australia shifted from its Geneva position 
that supported the right of the coastal state to apply unilaterally devised regulations 
prohibiting discharge from tanker washings to a position closer to the maritime powers 
that coastal states should only have the right to enact laws and regulations in the EEZ 
(apart from ‘special areas’) giving effect to internationally agreed rules and standards.84 
This did not, however, meet the maritime powers position that were unwilling that these 
rights should extend beyond 50 miles from the coast.85 On enforcement powers in the 
EEZ Australia expressed the view that it was not necessary to arrest ships or persons on 
board in order to enable a coastal state to take proceedings. Such proceedings, Australia 
argued could be taken in absentia providing that there were adequate provisions in the 
Convention to enable a coastal state to obtain the necessary evidence. Such provisions 
should also include the right to board in the EEZ where there were clear grounds for 
believing that a breach of applicable pollution control rules was committed.86 There was 
no indication, however, that Australia drew any support on the issue and it remained 
doubtful whether such a position would be acceptable to coastal states.
Australia did, however, support the majority coastal state view that supported coastal 
state enforcement rights throughout the EEZ even extending to proposing that the coastal 
state should have the right to board vessels in the EEZ for investigation when there were 
clear ground for believing that the breach of applicable pollution control rules had been 
committed,87 and to expel vessels that failed to comply with an order from a coastal state 
to cease polluting the zone. The latter proposal did not appear to find much favour as it 
was not included in the RSNT, although the new text did meet Australia’s objective with 
respect to the right to board.88
The special areas provision was still of concern to Australia but was only briefly 
discussed in New York.89 The new text, however, was not satisfactory from Australia’s 
viewpoint and left the delegation with a problem for the next session.90
By the end of the New York Session the general shape of the marine environmental 
articles was clear.91 The RSNT struck a balance between coastal and navigational
interests, but fell short of meeting Australia’s claims in key areas. It provided for a 
moderately strong port state and coastal state enforcement regime along with 
internationally set standards in the economic zone. The RSNT in providing for the 
retention of the flag state as the basic authority in standard setting did not meet Australia’s 
requirements with respect to special areas, nor with regard to coastal state enforcement 
powers did it permit the right of a coastal state to divert a polluting vessel out of its EEZ. 
On the other hand from the days of the SBC Australia had given support to the notion of 
port state enforcement and this concept was, for the first time incorporated in the 
RSNT .92 Given that the principle of the universality of port state enforcement (that the 
port state could prosecute discharge violations in the high seas) had been an Australian 
objective it appeared likely that attempts to limit the principle would be resisted by the 
delegation.
Australian positions on the marine environment shifted at New York from its earlier 
strong coastal state oriented positions to a more middle ground position. Indeed the 
Australian delegation was describing its position on the marine environment as a ‘middle 
of the road’ line.93 While the closed nature of the sessions make it difficult to determine 
the precise nature of the shift (from its earlier strong coastal state views) it appeared that 
with the end of negotiations apparently in sight for the first time it was clear that a 
‘relatively extreme position on coastal state rights (on the marine environment) was not 
acceptable at the international level’.94 Australian diplomacy on the marine environment 
appeared to move with and be shaped by that trend.
On Marine Scientific Research (MSR) there was movement on the part of some states 
from a strictly notification regime but there was little or no shift on the part of those states 
seeking a pure consent regime95 and the delegation found itself involved in an uphill 
battle to find a middle ground. Differences largely revolved around varying conceptions 
of the concept of the EEZ with developed maritime states regarding the EEZ as part of the 
high seas and the developing coastal states regarding the EEZ as an extension of the 
territorial sea.96
Australia made a strenuous but unsuccessful effort to bridge the gap on the MSR issue in 
New York particularly in a negotiating group convened by Australia’s Keith Brennan 97 
Australia did, however, successfully move amendments designed to give coastal states 
greater access to data produced by MSR activities in a coastal state’s offshore waters.98 
Australia’s Geneva position that coastal state consent should be required for MSR 
concerning resources of the EEZ and shelf but that consent should not unreasonably be 
withheld came under some attack .99 The RSNT maintained the SNT distinction of 
research bearing substantially upon the exploration of natural resources but the revised
text was not in any sense a negotiated text and it seemed certain to come under attack 
from all sides,100 thus again holding out the prospect that the delegation would play its 
increasingly familiar conciliating role on the issue.
Discussions on the development and transfer of technology were dealt with at four 
meetings of the informal sessions of the Committee of the whole under the Chairmanship 
of Mr Metternich (Federal Republic of Germany).101 While Australia did not have a 
large stake in this issue it joined with developed countries and insisted that the objectives 
of marine technology transfer was broader than assisting developing countries as the 
transfer of technology between developed states was of ‘great importance’.102 Australia 
continued to be concerned to ensure the rights of suppliers of technologies103 and a 
number of amendments to ensure adequate protection were in fact incorporated in the 
RSNT104 and appeared to satisfy any concern that patents over which the government 
had no rights would be passed on to the developing countries.
Disputes Settlement
Disputes settlement had not been discussed in any committee or in Plenary until New 
York, having been limited to the activities of the Informal Group on the settlement of 
disputes co-chaired by Australia’s Ralph Harry. The group continued to meet during the 
early part of the New York session under Harry and Adede of Kenya and was attended 
by representatives from 84 states.105
Australia made a detailed statement in plenary on disputes settlement and elaborated a 
number of principles that were necessary for adequate disputes settlement.106 Harry 
emphasised the importance of disputes avoidance and endorsed Annex 3 of the 
President’s text here. This was in fact the contribution of Australia’s delegate Lauterpacht 
in the informal working group.107 Harry voiced Australia’s concerns that there must be a 
balance between the protection of coastal state’s discretionary rights within the economic 
zone against that of the international community.108
The nub of Harry’s argument here, as one of the co-chairmen of the informal group on 
disputes settlement notes, was against the exclusions allowed under the Article 18(2) of 
the President’s informal text that would give states the option to exclude from 
compulsory procedures disputes arising out of the exercise of discretionary rights by a 
coastal state pursuant to its regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction under the 
Convention.109 In other words the option favoured by developing coastal states that a 
coastal state could make a declaration excluding from dispute settlement procedures 
virtually all disputes under the Convention was clearly not acceptable to Australia (a view
shared by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe).110 That view was, however, to be 
gradually watered down in the face of the views of its coastal state allies.
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Conference Diplomacy
During the fourth session Australia played an active role in a revived Coastal States group 
convened early in the session to counter the attack mounted on the EEZ by the LLGDS 
group.111 Towards the end of the session the group had expanded to 54 delegations112 
from the original core membership of 16.113 In particular Australia found the group 
useful in ‘considering positions’ on the territorialist type attacks on the EEZ concept by 
the LLGDS.114 Australia continued to work closely with the Oceania group which met 
weekly during the session.115 The group looked to Australian support on the 
archipelagic issue and were able to offer some support to Australia on the shelf issue. 
There were also consultations on the HMS issue with the group, and Australia was able 
to assist in reporting to the group on the work in various committees and developing 
tactics. Australia attended several of the meetings of the Evensen group that confined 
itself to the question of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states and kept a 
‘close watch’ on developments (although it was considered tactically preferable not to 
contribute on an issue where Australia was not directly concerned).116 The Evensen 
group’s influence appeared to wane at New York with the LLGDS privately complaining 
that they could not trust Minister Evensen.117 Australia, however, continued to give 
strong support to the continuation of informal groupings as a means of work at the 
conference.118
At the fourth session Australia’s main role appeared to move more strongly to that of a 
lubricating agent on the deep seabed mining issue as confrontation increased between the 
US and the developing countries. The main concern of Australia appeared to be prevent 
Committee One issues undermining the chances of a successful conference. The margin 
issue was clearly of continuing concern, particularly the revenue sharing provisions but 
on most committee two issues the RSNT looked to broadly satisfy Australia’s objectives. 
On issues in Committee Three the MSR issue and dispute settlement still appeared to 
require further negotiation. The main interest now appeared to ensure that the gains on 
Committee Two issues were not jeopardised by a breakdown in the conference. Here 
Australian Foreign Minister Peacock warned that the greatest danger would be countries 
taking ‘premature’ unilateral action to secure extended coastal state jurisdication.119 The 
US half way through the session established a 200 mile fishing conservation and 
management zone to become effective on 1 March 1977120 and Canada announced one 
month after the end of the session that it would implement a 200-mile fishing zone by 1
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January 1977.121 At that stage however there were no definite signals that Canberra was 
impatient at the progress of the conference.122
Fifth Session: New York. 2 August—17 September 1976
Despite the fact that there was considerable opposition in G77 to a second session in 
1976 (both because of other commitments and a desire to study the RSNT), the United 
States had exerted strong pressure at the fourth session on other delegations to agree to a 
second session in New York the same year. Both the US State Department and the 
Pentagon considered that without such a session unilateral mining legislation would be 
passed in the Autumn of 1976 wrecking the prospects of a Convention.123 At the 
beginning of the session the President of the conference circulated a note in which he set 
out the main areas on which he felt further negotiation was needed. Each committee was 
to identify the key issues in its respective part of the RSNT and to develop procedures for 
dealing with those issues.124 The consideration of the key issues occupied the entire fifth 
session.125
Little progress was made at the session in resolving key issues. The work of Committee 
One became highly charged with demands by G77 that all issues on DSBM should be 
open for negotiation. This conflict spilled over into the work of the other two 
committees. It was clear that the matters being dealt with by the first committee were 
testing the political will of many governments and that without some movement towards 
compromise here there would be a diminished chance to achieve a comprehensive 
Convention. For Australia the concern here was whether these difficulties would threaten 
the package approach to securing a comprehensive Convention, a key Australian 
objective.
Committee One
Committee One discussions were dominated by the G77 which argued that as a result of 
the way in which the Chairman of Committee One had produced the RSNT text at the 
fourth session (through consultation with an unrepresentative group) the text should not 
have the status of a Revised SNT.126 The G77 argued that the Seabed Authority should 
have the power to make all important decisions while the developed states strongly 
opposed this as a means of limiting access to the area beyond national jurisdiction. The 
gap here reflected wider philosophic differences over the principle of the common 
heritage concept with the developing countries seeing the parallel system as one which 
provided the right of multinational companies to exploit the area. Only the Authority, 
argued the developing countries, would represent the interests of all mankind.127
These differences emerged in a workshop of the whole Committee where Australia 
participated, and in general discussion where previously stated positions on the issue of 
assured access and powers of the Authority were rehearsed and little progress made.128 
In an endeavour to promote an accommodation US Secretary of State Kissinger in a 
speech outside the conference made a number of important proposals, none of which 
appeared to make any real impact on the fears of developing countries that the parallel 
system of exploitation would meet their interests.129
Generally speaking the Australian delegation continued its conciliatory role in Committee 
One, working with Canada.130 As the parallel system in the RSNT was very much along 
the lines that Australia had sought and was broadly acceptable to the developed states 
Australia’s approach was to attempt to convince G77 to adopt a more flexible approach 
by arguing that the issues were not so much political but rather technical and in that sense 
required further study.131
With the Committee focussing almost exclusively on the system of exploitation132 
Australia’s interests in the nickel issue did not appear to be pursued by the delegation. 
Whatever the merits of Australia’s efforts to pursue compromise through stressing the 
‘technical’ nature of the issues, Lauterpacht’s call for more ‘detailed study’ seemed to 
fall on deaf ears in the ‘hot house’ atmosphere of Committee One at the summer New 
York session. Australia , it appeared, could not do a great deal to affect the situation133 
and the main concern of Australia was now the real threat the issue posed to the 
successful conclusion of the conference.
Committee Two
In contrast to Committee One politics where Australia was somewhat of a spectator the 
delegation was active in many of the issues in Committee Two. In Committee Two all 
negotiations were conducted in open ended negotiating groups established by the 
Chairman and in small groups when it appeared that the negotiating groups had carried 
issues as far as possible. Three negotiating groups were established to deal with the legal 
status of the EEZ, questions of landlocked states and a third to deal with issues relating to 
revenue sharing and the definition of the outer edge of the margin.134 Australia 
participated in the first and third groups (to which any state could volunteer) and later in 
the session in two consultative groups selected by the Chairman on the legal status of the 
EEZ and the outer edge of the margin.
As noted above a single negotiating group was established to consider the definition of 
the margin issue and revenue sharing but in practice a smaller informal group of margin
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states met on the delimitation issue.135 A consultative group was also established and 
Australia was involved here.136 The shelf issue occupied most Australian attention in 
Committee Two. In an endeavour to ‘broaden acceptance’ that the shelf extended to the 
outer edge of the margin the Margineers group proposed the Irish formula along with a 
Boundary Commission ‘with the power to certify that the boundary of the continental 
shelf had been correctly delineated’.137 There was in fact widening support for the 
principle of national jurisdiction over the margin as evidenced by the Chairman’s 
comments that ‘recognition of the rights invoked by states with continental shelves 
extending beyond 200 miles is in fact one of the main components of the package 
deal’.138 However at that stage the Margineers formula was losing ground to the simpler 
US formula of 60 miles beyond the foot of the slope139 and some Arab and African 
states continued to insist that the margin should not extend beyond 200 miles.140
In the negotiations on revenue sharing between 200 miles and the edge of the margin 
discussions ranged on the way contributions were to be assessed, whether all states with 
a shelf extending beyond 200 miles had to contribute, which states would benefit from 
the contribution and what authority would be responsible for collecting and distributing 
them.141 These negotiations took place not only in negotiating group 3142 but also in a 
wider group of coastal states and land locked and geographically disadvantaged states 
known as the Group of 21. Australia was not a member of this group (see below). While 
the delegation now clearly recognized that the margin policy would only be acceptable 
with a revenue sharing component,143 Australia made clear that Australia’s claim to the 
margin was not negotiable— only when the margin claim was confirmed by the 
conference would Australia consider the question of whether to share revenue. The 
thinking here was that at that stage there was no political advantage to be gained by 
removing opposition while other more contentious issues of greater economic and 
strategic importance remained before the conference and that opposition would provide 
coastal states with a lever to obtain the best possible position for coastal states.144 This 
put Australia at odds with most other broad margin states that indicated that a compromise 
solution might lie in a system of revenue sharing.145
The juridical status of the EEZ was the most contested issue in Committee Two.146 The 
US made clear that they could not agree to ‘any text which makes it clear that the zone is 
not high seas. On the contrary, the text must somehow explicitly accord high seas status 
to the zone but without the recognition that the zone is not high seas with respect to the 
exercise of coastal state rights provided for in the Treaty’.147 The US exerted heavy 
pressure on the residual rights issue since both military maneuvers in the economic zone 
and scientific research would be restricted by denying the high seas status to the 
economic zone.148 The opposite view was expressed by the more territorialist states who
insisted that the zone be characterized as one of national jurisdiction in which other states 
enjoy only subordinate rights of navigation, overflight, and communication.149 Australia 
resisted US pressure to support its views but worked closely with the US to try and find 
a solution to the problem.150 While the US indicated that they could support the 
amendment moved by Australia at the spring New York session, key coastal states 
indicated that Australia’s amendment was not acceptable and Australia did not introduce it 
again at the session. Australia worked with other moderate coastal states (Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand and Norway) to modify proposals of the more territorialist 
members of the coastal state group. Australia was still anxious to ensure that the EEZ 
should be defined in such a way as to make it clear that it was not territorial sea but at the 
same time pointed out to the US that there was no possibility of having all the residual 
high seas rights accorded to the international community.151 For Australia it appeared 
that a consensus could be reached which would state that the EEZ was neither territorial 
seas nor high seas but which would need to make clearer the extent of the rights of the 
maritime states in the EEZ.152 However the fifth session had demonstrated that 
compromise was still some way off.153 Given that Australia’s amendment proposed at 
the fourth session had failed to attract support from key members of the Coastal States 
group it seemed that any attempt to gather support for the amendment would be a 
sensitive exercise if Australia were not to jeopardize relations with its coastal state allies.
There was initially no discussion of the RSNT fisheries articles. However the fact that in 
relation to fisheries there was ‘the virtual absence of attack on Articles 50 and 51 which 
confer on the coastal state the power to manage the living resources of the EEZ’154 was 
an encouraging signal that a key Australian goal on fisheries had been largely achieved. 
The key development on fisheries at the fifth session was the formation of a group of ten 
coastal states and ten LLGDS states to deal with the issues of whether the LLGDS should 
have a general right to harvest EEZ resources or whether such right (if conceded) should 
relate only to what was surplus to the harvesting capacity of the coastal state. Australia 
was not a member of the the Group known as the Group of 21 (chaired by Fiji’s Satya 
Nandan).155 Australia participated in a coastal states working group to develop a coastal 
states position on the basis for negotiation with LLGDS, but generally Australia appeared 
to play its consistent low profile on the issue.156 The general attitude of Australia here 
continued to be that while the interests of some of the least developed states would need 
to be accommodated it was important in working towards the conclusion of a Convention 
that no action be taken which would prejudice the interests of friendly coastal states. That 
meant Australia supported coastal states views that right of access by LLGDS be limited 
to surplus stocks only.
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While the issue of straits and delimitation occupied some time at the session Australia 
continued to play a fairly peripheral role. A negotiated settlement on straits, however, 
seemed closer to achievement.157
Committee Three
The Chairman of Committee Three suggested that the key issues facing the Committee 
were vessel sourced pollution in the territorial sea, MSR in the EEZ and transfer of 
technology.158 Australia took over the leadership of the ‘special areas’ case from Canada 
and achieved a result that was probably the best that could be achieved. On the MSR 
issue the delegation’s concilitory efforts were in the end stymied by the Third Committee 
Chairman.
Discussions on the preservation of the marine environment were devoted almost 
exclusively to the question of vessel source pollution in the territorial sea but extended to 
the question of pollution in the EEZ and related enforcement questions. In total 142 
amendments were submitted on the articles in RSNT relevant to this question.159 Debate 
took place in thirteen informal plenary meetings and at eleven meetings of a negotiating 
group under Mr. Vallarta of Mexico160 where Australia was a member.
The debates on vessel sourced pollution in the territorial sea remained largely unchanged 
and ‘tended to assume the character of a debate on the extent of a coastal state’s 
sovereignty in the territorial sea rather than that of a search for formulae which would 
control pollution without hampering innocent passage’.161 The debate continued to 
revolve around the maritime states view that coastal states should not have powers to 
make laws and regulations which differed from international rules and standards with 
respect to matters of design construction, manning and equipment. Other states, such as 
Canada and the United States, felt that coastal state sovereignty would be eroded if their 
right to make national laws was curtailed.162 Again the debate on the vessel sourced 
pollution was similar: the maritime powers arguing that RSNT articles were adequate and 
that national laws and regulations should conform to international rules and standards and 
the extreme territorialist states in favour of unlimited powers for coastal states to control 
pollution in the EEZ.163 No consensus emerged between the groups.164
Australia did not directly enter these discussions mainly because it took the initiative in 
the area of major concern to Australia in the third committee— protection of the 
environment in areas where there were special environmental or other conditions. As 
previously noted the RSNT did not satisfy Australia’s interest here in that it allowed the 
coastal state to apply to special areas which it might wish to designate within the EEZ
only those internationally agreed rules and standards. While those rules prohibited 
discharges within special areas they did not cover ‘rules such as traffic separation 
schemes, compulsory pilotage or under-keel clearances’ which Australia ‘might want...to 
introduce for protection of the Great Barrier R ee f.165 Australia took over the leadership 
on this issue from Canada at the fifth session166 and proposed a number of amendments 
of article 21(5) of the RSNT167 but these were criticized by the maritime powers.168 
Redrafts were attempted by the Australian delegation to take account of their 
objections.169 Australia’s arguments for coastal state flexibility was supported by certain 
states concerned about passing tanker traffic—Egypt, Malaysia, India, China—as well as 
by the more territorialist states such as Kenya and Ecuador. However, the Netherlands 
and Germany argued that the role of the ‘competent international organisation’ be 
strengthened and were supported by Turkey, Japan, Bulgaria, Argentina, United 
Kingdom and Liberia.170
The text which was read into the official records171 achieved ‘near consensus’172 but 
gave the international organisation a ‘much expanded role’.173 For that reason it did not 
completely meet Australia’s initial preference for no international veto over the 
establishment of special areas. Australia wanted simply, ‘consultation(s) with 
appropriate organisations’ with recourse to dispute settlement procedures174 but in the 
end even Australian proposals were including a veto element.175 While Australian 
reaction within and outside the conference was positive towards the new text176 it was 
clear opposition from the maritime states (that feared that economic zones may be turned 
into ‘special areas’ unless the question was regulated at the international level)177 resulted 
in less coastal state flexibility than Australia wanted.178
On other marine environment issues Australia was active in resisting moves by maritime 
powers to weaken port state enforcement powers179 and pushed for stronger coastal state 
enforcement powers by authorising the diversion of a polluting vessel providing it did not 
arrest or unduly delay such vessels.180 By the end of the session the marine environment 
text looked reasonably stable with the Chairman of committee three reporting that the 
basic concepts in the RSNT had received wide support.181 It thus appeared unlikely that 
Australia would push for amendments that would have the effect of altering the balance in 
the text.
On MSR issues the delegation’s role was very much that of the consensus builder, with 
Australia’s Keith Brennan in particular making vigorous efforts to seek to build common 
ground.The main discussion revolved around Article 60 of the RSNT— whether the 
consent of the coastal state should be required before research could be undertaken in its 
EE Z:182 ‘Researching states maintained firmly that research other than research
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concerning resources should not be subject to the consent of the coastal state. 
Developing countries not only resisted this stand but sought a strengthening of the 
Revised SNT in favour of a consent regime...Discussion of these issues...appeared to 
produce a divergence rather than a convergence of views’.183
The US defence department was particularly concerned that without a clear statement that 
the exclusive economic zone was part of the high seas an extensive definition of coastal 
states rights on research, when combined with the already extensive definition of such 
rights over living and non-living resources would produce the functional equivalent of 
territorial seas, thus affecting military research and military navigation rights in the EEZ. 
Secretary of State Kissinger in fact privately told delegations from groups seeking such 
controls that the US would not ratify a treaty which contained the RSNT articles on 
M SR.184 Australia was directly involved in the search for a compromise in numerous 
fora— informal plenary meetings,185 in a group of between 30 and 50 delegations 
(‘Friends of the Chairman’ group), in a ‘special group of heads of delegations’ created 
by the Chairman186 and finally in private meetings convened by Australia with moderate 
coastal states. The negotiations focussed on trying to define those situations where the 
coastal state could exercise controls over researching states in the EEZ or on the shelf. 
Late in the negotiations the Chairman (Yankov from Bulgaria) presented what he called 
his ‘test proposal’ as an amalgamation of the main texts considered by the group.187 His 
proposal reproduced article 60(i) of the RSNT but sought to place greater restrictions on 
the exercise of the right to decline consent.188 The Chairman stated that the text was 
viewed by a majority of delegations as a basis for negotiations,189 but in fact researching 
states strongly criticized it for moving further towards a consent regime than the 
RSNT.190 The Chairman’s proposal was really a feint in an attempt to retain the RSNT 
text 191 but it seemed clear at the session that the Chairman was intent on excluding 
genuine compromise proposals which offered competition to his own proposals.
This was most evident in the way in which an Australian compromise proposal was 
treated by the Chairman. In Committee, Australia tabled an amended version of article 60 
of the RSNT192 which ‘did not necessarily reflect the preferred Australian position but 
was an attempt to mediate on a particularly contentious issue’.193 Keith Brennan 
expressed the hope, after reading out the text (that closely followed the language of the 
RSNT and appeared designed to meet both Australian and American concerns to limit the 
criteria for denying consent)194 that other delegations would give it serious 
consideration.195 Apart from the US, several researching and coastal states expressed 
interest in the Australian text (United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Argentina, Singapore, Portugal, Mexico, 
Colombia, Republic of Korea), but it was rejected by a number of states taking a more
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territorialist line (Kenya, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Somalia, Tunisia and Tanzania).196 
Later in a point raised by Brazil, the Chairman reversed an earlier ruling and refused to 
allow the text to be included in the summary record at which the text had been read 
because it had not been formally introduced.197 After Australia had pointed out that other 
informal proposals had been included in the summary records a heated debate followed 
where Brazil, Ecuador, Kenya and the Chairman argued that Australia’s proposal not be 
included in the summary record. Australia, in what appeared to be a move to avoid 
provocation, withdrew its amendment.198
While the Chairman encouraged Australia to continue its effort at finding compromise 
solutions199 the incident seemed to confirm the assessment of the US delegation that the 
Chairman was pushing his own test proposal and ignoring other proposals.200 With the 
USSR openly stating for the first time that it was prepared to accept a consent regime for 
MSR in the EEZ201 it now appeared more likely researching states would be obliged to 
accept a form of consent regime and that Australia also would have to accept a more 
limited consent regime than the mixed regime for research that it preferred. The fifth 
session demonstrated, however, that Australia’s main interests in the MSR issue was 
now to find a solution to the stand off positions of polarised groups in order to establish a 
Convention. That meant that Australia seemed likely to continue its efforts of putting 
forward proposals that would lead to a generally accepted compromise.
With regard to the issue of transfer of technology the Committee as a whole met in two 
informal meetings and two meetings of smaller open-ended groups.202 As already noted 
this was an issue where Australia had little at stake although of concern to Australia was 
an Iraqi amendment to delete the reference in the preamble to article 86 to the protection of 
the rights and duties of ‘suppliers, holders and recipients of technology’.203 This was a 
phrase that Australia had succeeded in having included in the RSNT at the first New York 
session.204 From Iraq’s statement it was not evident what the motivation was, although 
it appeared from Australia’s response that Iraq’s view was that the Authority could 
dispose of acquired technology as it chose. Australia argued that it was: ‘important to 
retain the reference to the rights and duties of holders and suppliers of technology, not 
only in the interests of those holders and suppliers but also in the interests of recipients. 
If the reference was deleted, the International Authority might not fully recognize those 
rights, and would inevitably impede the transfer of technology. The acquired rights of 
holders and suppliers of technology must therefore be recognized and protected if the 
transfer of technology was really to be encouraged’ 205
The brief session on technology transfer in committee206 meant that it was not possible to 
determine whether Australia received any support on the question. On this issue,
96
Australia s interests were more aligned to developed states. Technolgy transfer, Australia 
believed, should not be limited solely to developing states but also should pass to 
developed states.207
Disputes Settlement
On disputes settlement the informal plenary met to review the President’s first revision of 
Part IV of the RSNT.208 The President’s revised articles now no longer required states 
to make declarations on what disputes should be settled by compulsory procedures and 
those to be excluded but stipulated a general clause which while extremely complex 
would have excluded disputes relating to living resources or MSR to dispute settlement 
procedures (article 18(1)). Article 18(2) provided that a state may expressly accept 
dispute settlement procedures in relations to specified disputes. These related to seabed 
boundary delimitations, disputes concerning military activities and disputes in relation to 
which the Security Council had become involved. The main conflict focussed on what 
exceptions would be allowed to a compulsory settlement regime. Some delegations, 
including the Coastal States group felt that with regard to 18(1) the above provision 
should be deleted entirely as there should be no general international jurisdiction over 
matters relating to sovereignty over resources and the article did not make this clear.209 
The other extreme was that international law applied and must be recognised as applying 
to all parts of the ocean in spite of the discretions given to coastal states, a view supported 
by the maritime states, the US and the Soviet Union.210 Australia’s formal position as 
indicated at the fourth session, was that the article 18(1) was opposed to Australia’s 
desire for a system of compulsory dispute settlement. If there were to be exceptions, 
then the existing paragraph 1 was far too broad in the categories of dispute which it 
excluded from dispute settlement procedures (especially MSR and fisheries).211 
Nevertheless conference diplomacy dictated Australia’s response to exceptions permitted 
under the Art IV of the RSNT. A desire not to depart too far from the coastal states 
strongly held view, that there should not be a general international jurisdiction over 
matters relating to sovereignty over resources212 and a general desire to maintain a 
balanced relationship with the group, saw Australia adopting a rather moderate stance on 
a provision that represented a substantial departure from the preferred policy preference 
of Australia.213
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Conference Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
Australia continued to work mainly through the Coastal States group at the fifth session. 
By the end of the fourth session as previously noted, the group of eighteen coastal states, 
that had been working together for more than three years, decided to enlarge the group by 
inviting delegations that shared the position of the group to join the group under the 
Chairmanship of Jorge Castaneda (Mexico). Australia was approached by the group to 
be part of a small co-ordinating group (along with Argentina, Canada, Fiji, India, Kenya, 
Norway, Peru and Senegal).214 It was clear that the territorialist members of the group 
were becoming more influential on such issues as the status of the EEZ and disputes 
settlement. In the case of the EEZ lack of coastal state support saw Australia withdraw its 
amendment proposed at the fourth session to article 75. Clearly Australia was finding it 
difficult to convince the more territorialist members of the group that the EEZ should be 
defined in such a way as to indicate clearly that it was not teiritorialist sea (thus avoiding 
the problem of creeping jurisdiction). In the case of dispute settlement the overwhelming 
weight of the coastal states opinion to exclude disputes related to coastal states rights in 
the economic zone saw Australia adopt a very reserved position on articles that were 
fundamentally opposed to Australia’s view that disputes settlement procedures would be 
undermined if exceptions were framed too broadly. Despite these problems the 
delegation at the end of the session were arguing that ‘the Group remains possibly the 
best instrument for the advancement of Australia’s objectives’.215
Australia’s activity at the fifth session was mainly directed to compromise so that gains 
over resource questions (shelf and fisheries) would not be undermined. This was true 
with respect to issues on MSR and the marine environment. Even on revenue sharing it 
appeared that Australia was unlikely to adopt a last ditch rigid position of opposition, but 
rather its position would change in the tight of tactical considerations to do with a broader 
acceptance of its margin policy. For the first time, however, it appeared that Australia 
was becoming impatient that progress at the conference was too slow, despite the fact that 
a consensus appeared to be in sight, particularly in relation to Committees Two and 
Three. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly twelve days after the session 
Australian Foreign Minister Peacock argued that Australia was disappointed at the ‘slow 
progress’ made at the session: ‘We consider it essential that the negotiating momentum 
be maintained during the inter-sessional period so that delegations can come to New York 
in May next year with the feeling that agreement is within reach. My Government will 
play its part in the process of negotiation and consultations to find solutions to 
outstanding problems. A loss of will or lack of resolve now could put at risk the 
Herculean efforts of the last few years, and usher in an era of uncertainty and difficulty as
nations may feel compelled to take unilateral action to preserve important economic 
interests’.216
Despite similar warnings on the dangers of unilateralism at the end of the fourth session 
by the Foreign Minister Australia was clearly considering the unilateral option. Amidst 
wide press speculation that Australia was considering legislation to declare a 200 mile 
resource or economic zone217 Australia pointed out less than a month after the Foreign 
Minister’s statement to the General Assembly that if a successful result was not achieved 
at the next conference session ‘one of the options before Australia would be to take 
unilateral action to declare Australian jurisdiction over resources to 200 miles’ albeit that 
such action ‘would only be taken in consultation with friendly and like-minded countries, 
including those of the South Pacific’.218
Sixth Session: New York. 23 May—15 July 1977
The Foreign Minister’s warning after the fifth session that Australia may pursue the 
‘unilateral option’ was soon confirmed. Speaking in Parliament on 19 October 1976 
Foreign Minister Peacock stated that the South Pacific Forum countries, including 
Australia, had recently agreed to the concept of introducing 200 mile exclusive zones but 
that all countries had agreed not to act on this decision until after the sixth session of the 
Law of the Sea conference. Peacock pointed out that the fifth session had been 
disappointingly slow and warned that the momentum to bring about a Convention should 
not be lost. While he stressed that a multilateral Convention providing for 200 mile zones 
was preferable to a unilateral declaration and that a ‘series of unilateral declarations before 
the conference could pre-empt the possibility of a successful outcome’ to the sixth 
session, the Australian government was of the view that if the session should ‘not 
succeed’ then Canberra would feel ‘bound to consider acting unilaterally in regard to a 
two hundred mile exclusive economic zone’.219 The phrase ‘not succeeding’ was not 
explained in the Minister’s parliamentary statement, although what he appeared to have in 
mind was a failure to conclude a Convention.220 The Minister, however, appeared 
uncertain about the legality of a move to extend offshore jurisdiction in the absence of a 
Convention being achieved.221 That uncertainty appeared to be shared by other officials 
in Canberra who felt that unilateral action could seriously jeopardise the outcome of 
negotiations and threaten Australia’s respected position at the conference.222 Whatever 
residual doubts there may have been in official Canberra circles about the effects of a 
unilateral move to extend offshore jurisdiction, Australia was clearly signalling that it 
wanted the conference to move rapidly towards a final Convention. By the end of the 
sixth session Australia could take some comfort from the session’s work. The outcome 
was the production of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), a unified
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document containing all the draft articles which until then had existed as separate parts 
prepared by the Chairman of the Three Committees and Part IV, prepared by the 
President, on disputes settlement.223 This result was rightly regarded by Australia as a 
‘significant advance’224 and in that sense the session was judged by Australia as 
‘markedly successful’.225
Committee One
Negotiations on Committee One issues were complex with the conference devoting the 
first three weeks to deep seabed matters.226 From Australia’s viewpoint the issue of 
protection of land based producers was the major issue. Australia at both the 5th and 6th 
sessions let Canada make the running on this issue. Canada and other land based 
producers like Papua New Guinea, Chile, Zaire and Cuba were concerned that the text in 
the RSNT did not afford any real protection to land based producers.227 Australia’s 
neutral role here was based largely on the publicly expressed view that in the absence of 
clear knowledge on the actual conditions which would prevail in the future there was little 
point in trying to incorporate specific formula in the Convention.228
In general Australia did not adopt a high profile in Committee One, but rather attempted to 
facilitate movement on difficult issues.229 Australia did, however, actively push for a 
seat on the Council and submitted a proposal on the composition of the Council that 
appeared designed to achieve that goal.230 Australia’s efforts were partly rewarded as the 
ICNT did include, as Australia’s amendment had expressed, the opportunity for election 
of developed exporters in one of the categories.231 On the actual system of exploitation 
Australia did not appear to have been active 232 The changes made in the ICNT were 
unacceptable to the US as they still did not provide inter alia an adequate degree of 
certainty in negotiating contracts with the Authority by private firms and there were still 
serious difficulties with respect to the rights of technology suppliers.233 There was some 
evidence that Australia, at this stage, was optimistic that the ICNT would provide a 
satisfactory solution to the seabed mining issue in the near future.234 However, given an 
extremely hostile reaction by the US to the composite text concerning the system of 
exploitation there was some indication that the US was looking to Australia to take a 
mediating role on this issue at the next session, a role that the delegation were now 
finding quite familiar.235
Committee Two
In the second committee Australia participated in negotiating groups on the legal status of 
the EEZ and the rights and duties of coastal and other states in the EEZ and a group on
the margin. Australia also played a significant role in the so-called Castaneda— Vindenes 
group formed towards the end of the session to consider issues related to the EEZ.236
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On the shelf question Australia continued to oppose the concept of revenue sharing,237 
although participating in discussions on the issue within the Margineers group. There 
appeared no change to Australia’s line at the fifth session that while Australia was 
conscious that revenue sharing had achieved a wide consensus Australia was still 
concerned at the slow progress on the definition question and that the Australian 
government would be advised accordingly. Australia’s opposition still seemed based on 
similar tactical considerations that were operating at the fifth session. In any event the 
question seemed close to a final resolution with the ICNT specifying the precise revenue 
sharing obligations of coastal state beyond 200 miles for the benefit of developing 
countries (contributions commencing in the sixth year of production at a particular site at 
one percent of the value of production and increasing by one percent per year until the 
tenth year after which the rate would remain at five percent).238 The delegation’s report 
thus stated unequivocally for the first time that revenue sharing would form part of a new 
C o n v en tio n 239 and thus the issue for Australia continued to be one of tactical 
considerations.240
On the definition of the margin issue, where the LLGDS with African and Arab support 
continued to oppose the broad margin policy, discussion in the negotiating group was 
focussed around the Irish formula introduced by the Margineers.241 There is no evidence 
that Australia and other Margineers made any move away from backing the Irish 
formula. Although the Irish formula drew ‘widespread support’242 it appeared that 
consensus could not be reached as there was no change to the ICNT shelf definition.243 
What was particularly interesting was that Australia had obviously examined the 
implications of the Irish formula since the fifth session and had found that Australia may 
suffer some losses. In a revealing admission before the second committee the Australian 
delegate Guppy admitted that ‘one new effect (of the Irish formula) was to reduce 
(author’s emphasis) the area of the continental margin substantially, a factor which could 
have far-reaching effects on Australia’s jurisdiction’.244 Australia’s support for the Irish 
formula now clearly looked to be based on a wish by Australia to maintain solidarity with 
the Margineers rather than from considerations of gains in offshore territory. While this 
was the first public admission that the Irish formula may not have totally suited 
Australia’s interests in securing the widest area of margin as possible it should not be 
thought that this signalled a change in Australian backing for the Margineers proposal.245 
Generally speaking, the sixth session saw growing support for the Irish formula although 
the opposition of the LLGDS group was now the major obstacle to be overcome by 
Australia and the other Margineers.246 In part the opposition of the LLGDS group
related to the frustration at lack of progress on access to the living resources of the EEZ 
(see below) so that progress on that issue now appeared critical if there was to be a final 
resolution of the margin issue.247
Australia’s mediatory role within the conference was evident in informal discussions on 
issues related to the territorial sea. Australia was active in trying to find a compromise on 
the issue on coastal state powers in the territorial sea with regard to design, construction 
and manning and equipment of foreign ships. Canada’s view was to support the deletion 
of article 20(2) on the grounds that it was a totally unwarranted restriction on coastal state 
sovereignty.248 Australia maintained its view that coastal state should have jurisdiction to 
regulate marine traffic but not to have power to require foreign ships to observe design, 
construction or manning standards which differed from generally accepted international 
rules. The stumbling bloc here was the phrase ‘or matters’ in the article, which as 
previously noted, was regarded by Canada and other coastal states as so vague as to 
cover any regulations such as packaging, safety of navigation, containerization, 
regardless of how minimal the level of international standards. Australia attempted to 
overcome the latter difficulty and introduced an amendment as follows: ‘Such laws and 
regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign 
ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international ru les’.249 
Australia’s amendment proved to be an acceptable compromise amongst the maritime and 
other coastal states for it was included in the ICNT, thus concluding what had been a 
controversial issue in Committee Two.250
The EEZ was again the most difficult issue in Committee Two where the maritime 
powers continued to oppose the territorialists and to express concerns that article 44 of 
RSNT could adversely affect freedom of navigation. They argued in favour of ‘the 
preservation as far as possible of the rights of the international community subject only to 
the subtraction of the resource rights which should be given to the coastal state’.251 In a 
lengthy intervention in the Consultative Group on the issue of the legal status of the EEZ 
and the rights and duties of other states in the EEZ Australia supported the fundamental 
basis of the compromise in the RSNT— that is the sui generis character of the zone with 
the regime of high seas governing the relationship of states one to another in the EEZ 
except to the extent that the Convention modified that regime in the EEZ.252
The real negotiations on the EEZ were, however, played out in the informal Castaneda— 
Vindenes Group253, where Australia played a ‘prominent part’ in seeking to break the 
impasse between the territorialists and the maritime states.254 The group consisted of 
Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, India, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, 
Peru, Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania, UK, USA, USSR and held a total of 13 meetings
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between 25 June 1977 and 12 July 1977 at the end of which it submitted to the Chairman 
of the Second Committee proposed amendments which were accepted by the Chairman 
and were subsequently incorporated in the text.255 The work of the group has been 
discussed by two key participants (one of whom was the leader of the Australian 
delegation) and it is not proposed to repeat that discussion here.256 While it is not 
possible to judge the contribution of Australia to the Castaneda group’s text on the 
EEZ257 it is noteworthy that Australia’s Keith Brennan was widely regarded as having 
played an extremely important role in the group’s work in reaching a compromise.258 
For Australia the outcome on the status of the EEZ which incorporated the Castenada 
product was to satisfy the basic Australian objectives of ensuring coastal state rights over 
resources in the zone, to prevent the EEZ becoming in fact (and law) a territorial sea and 
to preserve the maximum possible high seas freedom in the EEZ.259 In so far as the 
article appeared to enjoy a reasonable consensus260 it also satisfied Australia’s objective 
that the EEZ articles be acceptable to both maritime and coastal state powers.
On fisheries issues, the dominant issue concerned provisions for landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged states to the living resources of the EEZ but again tactical 
considerations saw Australia sticking to its cautious approach here.261
On the issue of HMS where Australia interests were involved through the relations with 
Pacific island states in the Oceania group little progress was made.262 The ICNT, 
however, contained no new provision on the subject, nor fisheries matters in general. As 
the RSNT fisheries provisions were satisfactorily settled from Australia’s viewpoint, the 
ICNT provisions also appeared to meet Australia’s objectives in the fisheries area. On 
other lower priority items such as delimitation and islands Australia again stood apart, 
although it did become involved in negotiations on the archipelagic issue.263
Only limited discussion took place on archipelagos but informal discussions between 
archipelagic states and the US reached a ‘satisfactory conclusion and their agreed 
amendments (were) reflected in the Composite Text’.264 Australia became involved in an 
issue that was the subject of direct negotiations between the US and Indonesia—whether 
as provided in the RSNT commercial aircraft should have the right of archipelagic sea- 
lanes passage.265 The US wished to maintain the RSNT not only because it felt that as a 
matter of principle a high seas route existed and a route with a similar regime should exist 
after the establishment of archipelagos but also because there could be a spill-over into 
straits. The right would also leave some bargaining power for negotiations or bilateral 
agreements in the event of denial of overflight. Indonesia was, however, proposing that 
archipelagic states may deny overflight above archipelagic sea lanes if such a state denies 
overflight in its airspace of the civil aircraft of an archipelagic state. Australia supported
the American view that overflight of sovereign territory was not the same as overflight 
over what were then high seas and what would involve a similar regime for the future 
i.e. sea lanes. Australia expressed this view to the Indonesians stressing that while 
Australia supported the notion of archipelagos it did so on the basis of satisfactory 
guarantees with respect to passage not only through but also over archipelagic waters. 
The ICNT did reflect such rights266 and thus there appeared little reason to believe that 
Australia would wish to reopen the subject in further debate. While Australia lent support 
to US views here it should not be thought that Australia simply supported its major ally 
automatically, for as will be shown later, Australia adopted many views on UNCLOS 
issues at variance with US policy.
Third Committee
On the MSR issue Australia ‘sought to play a mediating role and as far as possible tried to 
develop proposals calculated to identify and build on the common ground between 
opposing views’.267 The delegation’s report explained that the ‘sharp division’ of views 
on MSR made it all the more desirable that states who ‘might be in a position to 
contribute to a negotiated solution should seek to do so’.268 The delegation’s interest in 
resolving what was now proving to be a difficult issue appeared to be explained by the 
delegation’s observation that ‘marine scientific research was one of a relatively small 
number of issues which had to be resolved before the Law of the Sea negotiation could 
be successfully concluded’.269 Thus with consensus in sight Australia now clearly felt 
its role was to aim for the best available compromises on MSR.
Australia participated in the group called together by the Chairman to discuss the issue but 
it failed to make much progress .270 In the light of what seemed a stalemate in 
negotiations Australia’s Keith Brennan called together a group of delegations representing 
a broad spectrum of views without including delegations adhering to extreme views.271 
The group did produce a text 272but the initiative appeared to be lost as intensive 
negotiations, in which Australia was also participating, had begun in the Castaneda—  
Vindenes group. Indeed it was the text on MSR produced by the latter group that was 
largely incorporated in the ICNT .273 Researching states, led by the United States now 
acquiesced to a regime based on an unambiguous statement of the principle of coastal 
states consent for MSR projects in their EEZs. They also went along with a formulation 
of the coastal states duty to grant consent which was limited to ‘normal circumstances’. 
One of these was if the research was of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources.274 Given that Australia’s main interest on MSR was 
now to find a regime acceptable to the major researching and developing coastal states
there seemed little reason to believe that Australia would not accept the MSR provisions 
as part of a delicately balanced package on the EEZ.
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On the marine environment Australia participated in discussion in informal meetings and 
in meetings of a smaller group of delegations with a particular interest in marine 
environmental issues, known as the Friends of the Chairman. Both sets of meetings 
were presided over by Mr Vallarta of Mexico.275 Australia’s compromise on standard 
setting for the control of vessel sourced pollution has already been noted but Australia 
was also active in defending coastal state enforcement powers against the maritime 
powers.276 Australia did not appear to push the amendment it had proposed at the fifth 
session whereby the coastal states would be given greater power to divert a vessel out of 
the EEZ but no power of arrest, as ‘virtually all delegations accepted a right of arrest in 
the EEZ for flagrant or gross violations resulting in discharges causing major damage to 
the coastal state’.277 Nor is there any evidence that Australia joined a number of 
delegations seeking to strengthen coastal state powers in special areas.278 It appeared 
that the RSNT consensus text now commanded the support of the large majority of 
delegations and that Australia’s position was not to re-open the issue.
Also noteworthy was Australia’s resistance to attempts to weaken the universality of port 
state enforcement. For instance, Australia opposed a French proposal to limit the power 
of the port state to take enforcement action in respect of discharge offences on the high 
seas to those cases in which a request for such action had been received by the flag 
state.279 As a defender of port state enforcement it seemed that Australia would continue 
to oppose amendments designed to weaken port state enforcement measures in the high 
seas (Article 219 of ICNT was the only enforcement measure available for pollution 
offences in the high seas).
The ICNT provisions on the marine environment were very much of a package nature, 
with some delicate compromises between maritime and coastal states. As far as Australia 
was concerned it now appeared that the text on the marine environment had advanced to 
the stage where it could feel satisfied that its major interests were preserved.280
Disputes Settlement
Disputes settlement issues were dealt with again in informal meetings of the plenary 
where Part IV of RSNT was discussed for the first time.281 By the sixth session the 
system of choices proposed under the disputes settlement scheme had been largely 
accepted by states. Australia found the system of choices proposed acceptable in so far 
as it maintained a basic obligation of compulsory settlement leading to a binding
decision .282 The most controversial issue was, however, the scope of applicability of 
compulsory procedures where some coastal states made clear they would not have their 
control over fisheries challenged. Some of the LLGDS group however saw the 
provisions as too restrictive .283 These issues were central of course to the matters 
relating to the legal status of the EEZ and the Castaneda group included texts on this issue 
in its draft articles.284 In the Castaneda group Australia expressed doubt whether 
limitation of remedies to conciliation in the case of fisheries would lead to a consensus. 
Australia argued that there could be cases where a dispute could arise as a result of a 
failure to exercise a discretion properly because irrelevant matters had been taken into 
account or relevant matters disregarded. A Tribunal should not substitute its discretion 
for that of the coastal state but should be empowered to find that the coastal state had 
exercised its discretion incorrectly and remit the matter for re-determination.285 This 
suggestion did not seem to generate much support as it was not included in the Castenada 
group’s text (which did, however provide for compulsory conciliation on fisheries 
issues).286 In the end the ICNT did not include compulsory conciliation for fisheries, 
but rather strengthened the position of coastal states regarding fisheries in their EEZ 287 
As noted in discussion on the fifth session the thrust of these provisions represented a 
substantial departure from early Australian support for exceptions not be be framed too 
broadly. Australia had reluctantly come to the conclusion that these provisions were ones 
that were not only generally supported by Australia’s natural allies in the conference (the 
Coastal States Group) but that they probably represented the best solution achievable 
given that they had been effected to maintain a close link with the EEZ provisions.288
Conference Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
The sixth session saw Australia play an active role in what was undoubtedly the key 
negotiating group at the session, the Castaneda group. Australia’s participation did not 
require any real modification of its goals and Australia’s active role in the group can be 
explained by the fact that the group’s work soon appeared to be crucial in finding a 
widely accepted compromise on EEZ issues.
The Coastal States Group was still important in forging negotiating positions amongst 
coastal states and Australia continued its role on the coordinating Committee of the 
group.289 However Australia appeared to focus its activity in smaller working groups of 
the main committees.290 For example, when the Evensen group became the Chairman’s 
negotiating group in the first Committee, Evensen called together a small group of key 
delegations selected on the basis of their special interest or contributions to the conference 
to assist in formulating compromise proposals. Australia was included in that group. 
Keith Brennan’s activity in calling together moderate states on the MSR issue is also
relevant in this context. The Margineers group continued to be active and still offered the 
best hope of achieving final conference acceptance of Australia’s margin claims.
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Australia also continued to liaise with the Oceania Group. It agreed that suggestions that 
the existing provision on transitional provisions should be deleted and a Protocol to the 
Convention substituted were not in the best interests of the group as this would simply 
see a repetition of earlier debates where Arab countries had sought provisions to 
accommodate the Palestine Liberation Organisation. In what represented a change for 
Australia (and the Oceania Group) from its position to support deletion of a provision 
stating that ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no EEZ or continental shelf’291 the group agreed that reopening the issue 
would jeopardize what was generally regarded as a satisfactory provision on islands. 
The only slight element of discord which entered Oceania Group discussions related to 
difficulties raised by Papua New Guinea in relation to the generation of complete 
maritime space of islands in the Torres Strait. Papua New Guinea with Torres Strait 
negotiations with Australia in mind argued that in-shore islands should be excluded from 
delimitation provisions. It is not clear why but in the end PNG did not raise the issue in 
the discussions in the second committee. It seemed that in future sessions Australia 
would have to take more formal account of regional developments in the group. Six 
weeks after the session was completed Australia and eleven other South Pacific Forum 
states agreed in Port Moresby to legislate to establish a 200 mile fishing or economic 
zones as soon as possible, preferably by 31 March 1978. They also agreed to establish a 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency to be based permanently in the Solomon 
Islands.292 In fact two weeks before the South Pacific Forum meeting the government 
had foreshadowed this development by stating it had decided to proclaim a 200 nautical 
mile fishing zone with the timing of its introduction to be discussed with Forum 
countries,293 (and ignoring its previous warning that states should not preempt the 
conference by unilateral extensions until there was a Convention).294 It now seemed 
evident that Australia regarded the conference as already succeeding in generating new 
legal norms that legitimated the extension of coastal states rights to 200 miles, for there 
were no signs in the government’s announcement of Australia’s intention to declare a 200 
mile zone that such unilateral action would adversely impact on the conference 
negotiations.295
As noted earlier Australia regarded the production of the Composite Text as a major step 
forward in the conference. The addition of a draft preamble and Final Clauses gave the 
document the appearance of a draft Convention, although it was in fact only the basis for 
further negotiations. From Australia’s viewpoint the question of the status of the EEZ 
had been resolved satisfactorily as well as the fisheries provisions. It also seemed the
marine environmental provisions were accepted by Australia as a broadly acceptable 
balance between the maritime states interest in freedom of navigation and the interest of 
coastal states in promoting coastal states’ and port states’ powers to regulate and enforce 
measures to control marine pollution, especially vessel-sourced pollution. There seemed 
reasonable grounds for believing that the Irish formula that Australia and other 
Margineers had been supporting would be accepted. Questions relating to production 
control of seabed minerals, delimitation and revenue sharing still remained for settlement 
and these were of direct interest to Australia. The ICNT was the first text which covered 
all the issues before the conference so for the first time it was possible to get an idea of 
the overall package that might emerge. From Australia’s point of view the ICNT was 
judged as meeting its ‘key objectives especially in so far as it would permit coastal states 
to claim exclusive economic zones, up to 200 nautical miles in breadth, and would 
confirm a coastal states’ sovereignty over the resources of its continental shelf.296
While it was recognised that a final Convention would include revenue sharing beyond 
200 miles297 the Foreign Minister, Mr Peacock, intimated that on a range of other issues 
such as the width of the territorial sea, navigation rights through straits and archipelagos, 
marine environmental issues and control over MSR in the EEZ the ICNT was satisfactory 
to Australia .298
Despite Canberra’s benign assessment of the ICNT there were other signals coming from 
Canberra that Australia was becoming somewhat impatient at the progress of the 
conference and its negotiating methods. Two days after the session had ended Australia 
signed a letter with six other states requesting the Secretary General review the multi­
lateral treaty making process. In that letter it was stated that the law of the sea 
negotiations had been ‘time-consuming’ and ‘led only slowly to results which are as yet 
incomplete’299 and that ‘having regard to the pace at which the conference has moved and 
the difficulties which it has experienced, there is certainly room for consideration whether 
the adoption of different methods might have led to better results’.300 Despite the feeling 
that progress was slow the official reaction to the ICNT, as noted above, was favourable 
and there was little doubt that the ICNT while an informal document represented 
substantial progress towards completion of a draft treaty. That judgement was one that 
was shared by Canberra for the official view was that the seventh session would be 
‘crucial’ in ‘provid(ing) an indication whether a widely accepted Convention is within 
grasp’.301
CHAPTER SIX
AUSTRALIA AT UNCLOS 111, 1978-1979
Over the next two years UNCLOS 111 met four times for a total of 24 weeks. From 
1977 negotiations on the regime for deep seabed mining dominated the proceedings and 
became extremely technical. Many of the issues, however, in turn yielded to negotiations 
throughout 1978-79. At the eighth session in Geneva the conference was able to issue a 
revision of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT/Rev.l) that included new 
texts on seabed mining, the shelf, environmental matters and a range of other matters.
Australian diplomacy over this period largely focussed on the issue of delimitation of the 
shelf where the most important development was a new formula that found its way into a 
revised text at the end of the resumed eighth session. Australia found the new formula to 
be quite generous and quickly acted to defend it against Africa, Arab and LLGDS states 
still pressing for a flat 200 mile limit. Australia initially opposed the decision to modify 
the formula to take account of the fears of some states that the formula would allow states 
situated on mid-oceanic ridges to claim much of the deep seabed, but conference politics 
forced the delegation to modify this stand. Australia also continued to attack revenue 
sharing schemes but towards the end of the period realised that the task of removing such 
provisions was impossible. Shelf questions were greatly complicated in this period by 
virtue of the LLGDS linking progress here to their claims to resources in neighbouring 
EEZs and Australia worked actively and successfully with the Margineers to break this 
linkage.
For the most part Australia’s main work in this period focussed on Committee Two 
issues but the delegation was inevitably drawn into conflict with the US in Committee 
Three, when the US attempted to rewrite the texts relating to MSR on the shelf beyond 
200 miles. Washington was here concerned to gather domestic support by US marine 
scientists for a final treaty but the Australian delegation ended up taking a reasonably high 
profile against the US and then later moderating its stand as Canberra’s shelf position 
looked secure.
In Committee One Australia became actively involved in trying to settle the question of 
production controls over seabed nickel. Australia’s position now moved from cautious 
support for controls and from a position where Australia had let Canada and the US make 
the running on the issue, to an active policy of ensuring the production controls would 
directly assist LBPs. Australia’s position was not always easy here as Canberra took a
different approach to Canada, its only developed country ally within the LBP group. On 
other contentious Committee One issues Australia continued to adopt its mediatory role.
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Australian delegates continued to operate actively in the Margineers, Coastal States Group 
and the Oceania group. At times, however, Australia found some of the more 
territorialist members of the Coastal States group forcing Australia into positions that 
were not as moderate as the delegation would have preferred. There seemed little 
alternative, however, for the group was still the most useful vehicle to pursue Australia’s 
overall goals, in particular to counter the activity of the land locked group on Committee 
Two issues. Australia’s diplomacy during this period, as through the rest of the 
conference, was greatly assisted by the fact that the delegation received strong domestic 
support, as well as having a well co-ordinated approach to the issues under discussion. 
These matters are taken up later, but here it can be noted that the Australian delegation 
during this period played quite an active role in virtually all the ocean issues that emerged 
in the period. By the beginning of 1980 nearly all elements of the package were finalised 
and the Australian delegation was now increasingly taking on the role of custodian of the 
package, again a role that will be discussed later.
Seventh Session: Geneva. 28 March—19 May 1978
Notwithstanding the fact that the first two to three weeks of the seventh session were lost 
due to a crisis relating to the Presidency of the conference1 the session did prove to be 
productive.2 A new method of negotiating was established whereby negotiating groups 
(NGs) were established outside the formal Committee structure to deal with seven ‘hard 
core’ issues with the Chairman of each negotiating group reporting to the relevant 
committees and to Plenary. It was agreed that each hard core negotiating group would be 
constituted by a nucleus of countries principally concerned but with the understanding 
that the groups were open-ended.3 The ICNT was not revised at the session because 
there was an uneven pattern of progress and there were strong objections by several 
delegations to revising one part of the ICNT while other parts were being negotiated, 
particularly as many parts of the text were linked to each other. What emerged from the 
seventh session was the collation of all the reports of the negotiating groups in one 
document.4 That outcome fell short of the original expectation in the conference that the 
ICNT would be revised,5 although Australia’s judgement was that ‘the latter part of the 
session had been one of the most productive periods of negotiation in the recent history 
of the Law of the Sea conference’.6
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Seabed Negotiating Groups
Australia attended three intersessional meetings convened between the sixth and seventh 
sessions.7 Forty eight states, including Australia, were nominated by the President in 
consultation with Committee Chairmen and Regional Groups to comprise NG1 but the 
group was open ended and meetings were widely attended. The negotiating group’s 
mandate covered three issues; the system of exploitation, resource policy and the Review 
Clause.8 Australia does not appear to have taken a high profile in the group.
The system of exploitation was expected to raise difficult problems at the seventh session 
because of the hostile reaction that the ICNT text had received from the US. Obviously 
after a closer analysis of the ICNT, Australia shared the concerns of the developed 
countries, and the US in particular, that the ICNT ‘did not provide a clear right of access 
for companies or State instrumentalities to the Area’ and bestowed on the Authority ‘wide 
discretionary power in negotiating with an applicant on such matters as the transfer of 
technology and financial arrangements’.9 The issue was not one where Australia could 
exert much leverage and this time Australia does not appear to have taken an active 
mediatory role. As real progress was made on the issue of the system of exploitation in 
bringing the text much more in line with Australia’s preference for a genuine parallel 
system without making transfer of technology a precondition for obtaining a contract with 
the Authority, such a role was probably not called for.10
The question of protection for land based producers by a production limitation formula 
was one largely played out by the US (the world’s largest nickel consumer) and Canada 
(the world’s largest nickel producer) although Australia did occasionally mediate between 
the two parties. Australia’s position as it had developed over the sessions had been to 
remain fairly neutral in debates on this issue, believing that there were difficulties in 
agreeing to a precise formula years before seabed mining became a reality, and that what 
was required was the creation of an effective mechanism, such as international 
commodity agreements between producers and consumers that would have the power and 
flexibility to decide appropriate measures at the time and in the light of prevailing 
circum stances.11 While that had remained Australia’s preferred position, it had been 
recognised before Caracas that some kind of production formula would almost certainly 
form part of a package. Thus Australia had leaned in favour of land based producers in 
terms of general objectives.12 Canada and a number of other developing producer 
countries felt that the formula in the ICNT was ineffective in protecting producer 
countries.13 Canada entered into formal negotiations with the US delegation early in the 
session and a formula, ad referendum because of the necessity of referring the matter to 
government approval was agreed to by both delegations and jointly tabled at the
conference.14 Canada invited Australia to participate in the Land Based Producers 
Group15 which Canada formed at the fifth session to co-ordinate interests of developing 
and developed mineral producers.16 Previously Australia had not been invited to attend 
meetings of the group, probably because Australia’s position had not been to publicly 
support specific formula in advance of seabed mining becoming a reality.17 While 
Australia had soft-pedalled this issue the delegation felt that the Canadian-US agreement 
was a ‘favourable developm ent’,18 urged other states to consider the proposal 
sympathetically in the negotiating group and made a point of commenting that Australia 
‘hope(d) that the arrangement will provide the basis for a widely acceptable 
com prom ise’.19 Australia’s position here at this stage seemed dictated by tactical 
considerations. The formula sought to provide protection for LBPS without undermining 
the incentives for mining to proceed and thus seemed likely to receive the support of both 
the US and less developed states in the LBP group.
On the other hand Australia did not support the establishment in the ICNT of a special 
compensation system for developing countries adversely affected by seabed mining. 
Australia’s view here was that there were liberal compensatory financing facilities which 
already existed particularly under the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility .20 
However, Australia did not vigorously oppose compensatory financing mainly because it 
saw no real chance of deleting a reference to a provision that developing states in the LBP 
group considered important. 21
While, as noted above, the main developments on the production control issue were 
played out in private Canadian-US negotiations Australia did participate in a group of 
experts chaired by Mr Archer of the United Kingdom delegation.22 The group produced 
three reports which illustrated the enormous complexities involved in the development 
and application of a production control formula 23 The work of the group along with the 
US-Canadian provisions was reflected in the revisions on production limitations24 and as 
noted above Australia saw this development as a constructive step towards compromise. 
Despite the fact that Australia’s approach on the inclusion of a production limitation 
formula was, as noted earlier, not the same as other land based producers Australia’s 
positive reaction to the Canadian-US agreement was an indication of how Australia was 
working towards shoring up genuine attempts at reaching a position that would satisfy 
both developing and mining states on the seabed issue, and was consistent with its 
overall approach in Committee One to ensure that negotiations here did not threaten the 
goal of a universally acceptable treaty.
In NG2, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore was appointed Chairman to consider the 
financial arrangements of the Authority, Enterprise and financial terms of contracts to be
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concluded between the Authority and State Parties. Suggested compromise proposals 
were put forward25 with the Australian Rapporteur Bailey assisting Koh in the 
negotiations. Australia’s main role in what were extremely complex negotiations was to 
facilitate discussions and to try and generate support for Chairman’s proposals that were 
seen to be acceptable to both developed and developing groups. Australia was not really 
in the lime-light in discussions dominated by potential seabed miners and G77.26
In negotiating group three Australia acted to again ensure that Australia had a voice on the 
Council of the Seabed Authority. Australia argued against changes that contemplated 
prospects of two developed land based producers being represented on the Council be 
reduced to one.27
Second Committee and Relevant Negotiating Groups
Four negotiating groups were established to consider hard-core issues relating to the 
Second Committee and the Committee itself met informally to consider other issues.28 In 
the negotiating group on the continental shelf there were seven meetings.29 For Australia 
the most significant development here was undoubtedly the shift by the Soviet Union 
from its long established proposal that the 500 metre isobath should be the outer limit to a 
new Soviet proposal which would accept the outer limit of the edge of the margin as the 
limit of the shelf, but provided that the limit would not extend more than 100 nautical 
miles beyond the outer limits of the EEZ.30 Australia and other wide margin states 
rejected the proposal,31 presumably because they saw no merit at that stage in accepting a 
distance limitation on the Irish formula.32 Australia also participated with other wide 
margin states in meetings with the LLGDS group to try and gain support for the Irish 
formula but support did not appear to be forthcoming largely because debate on seabed 
issues was to a great extent becoming a hostage to progress on the rights of access of 
LLGDS to the EEZ.33 The provision of a map by the Secretariat illustrating the various 
formula for the definition of the shelf did, however, assist the Margineers by showing 
that the Irish formula was not only workable but also one which limited the margin, as 
Australia had pointed out at the previous session.34
The question of the access of LLGDS to the living resources of the EEZ occupied NG4 
under the Chairmanship of Nandan (Fiji). Australia was one of 17 coastal states 
represented in the group.35 For Australia this issue was becoming more important to 
settle for as noted above the LLGDS were now quite clearly linking progress on the 
delimitation of the margin with progress with respect to the question of access to living 
resources. As mentioned, Australia met with the LLGDS in the Margineers Group to try 
and gain support from the group on the Irish formula. When the revised text was
presented in plenary36 Australia linked the issues in reverse order by stating the 
accommodation on the revised texts presented by Nandan would be unacceptable unless 
there was progress on the shelf limits issue.37 Australia received strong support here 
from members of the Margineers and Coastal States38 thus indicating that for the texts to 
be incorporated in the ICNT there would need to be agreement on the shelf question.
The LLGDS issue was also linked with the question of fisheries disputes which was dealt 
with in NG5 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Constantin Stavropoulos 
(Greece).39 The problem here, as far as Australia was concerned, was that while it had 
reluctantly accepted the restrictions placed on the dispute settlement procedures in the 
ICNT40 with regard to fisheries, the attitude of its coastal state allies had hardened from 
earlier sessions. They would not tolerate any qualification of their exercise of sovereign 
rights over the living resources of the EEZ, even the limited provision for compulsory 
procedures in the ICNT. On the other hand the LLGDS and distant -water fishing 
nations were proposing to strengthen the ICNT to bring more disputes within 
compulsory adjudication.41 The NG5 had to find another third party procedure other 
than judicial ones which could be used to settle fisheries disputes. The solution was 
compulsory (but non-binding) conciliation in such cases, which was the method adopted 
in the earlier Castaneda text.42 For Australia this outcome was regarded as 
‘satisfactory’.43 This article may have been satisfactory from the viewpoint of offering a 
reasonable prospect of consensus being reached44 but the provision was (as were the 
ICNT and RSNT provisions) a substantial departure from the general policy preference 
of Australia for compulsory system of dispute settlement without broad exceptions. As 
noted in the previous chapter the fact that the coastal states treated as anathema the 
possibility of involving compulsory judicial procedures for challenging coastal states 
powers meant that Australia had little choice but to come to terms with the trend to reject 
disputes on fisheries being subject to compulsory settlement.45
The second committee met on a number of occasions informally and received proposals 
on a wide number of issues—territorial sea, straits, archipelagos, the EEZ and 
delimitation.46 Australia’s main intervention was to support the package which had been 
negotiated on the EEZ in the ICNT. In the face of a Soviet proposal supported by the 
East Europeans to disrupt the package47 Australia along with 39 other coastal states 
proposed, in what appeared to be a tactical device to defend the ICNT package, an 
alternative to Article 55 on the legal regime of the EEZ 48 The coastal states position was 
opposed by the LLGDS49 but no change was made to the ICNT text, and indeed only 
three minor drafting changes on all Committee Two issues were recommended by the 
Chairman of the Committee in his Report to Plenary as a result of the discussions in 
Committee Two.50
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Committee Three
Most delegations had considered that negotiations on the marine environment had been 
closed at the sixth session, exemplified by the fact that the issue was not listed as one of 
the outstanding issues identified in the intersessional meeting.51 However, what opened 
the issue up again, particularly the issue of vessel source pollution, was the Amoco Cadiz 
oil spill that resulted in heavy pollution off the coast of Brittany.52 The French altered 
their position from an advocate of maritime state attitudes to an exponent of coastal state 
positions53 and the United States, responding to congressional reaction to a series of oil 
spills off the US coast, strongly pushed for environmental positions.54 Canada also 
continued in pressing for wider coastal state powers in relation to the question of coastal 
state rights to set national standard for design, construction, manning and equipment in 
the territorial sea and generally in support of stronger coastal state rights in protecting the 
marine environment.55 The renewed push for greater coastal state rights created tactical 
problems for Australia. As noted previously the ICNT environmental provisions had, as 
far as Australia was concerned, advanced to the stage where a consensus had been 
achieved that met Australia’s overall interests. Australian delegates were instructed in fact 
not to reopen the marine environmental text as this would only prejudice the prospects of 
final consensus.56 This meant that Australia appeared unsympathetic to amendments 
proposed during the session designed to strengthen coastal state controls and early in the 
session adopted positions that placed it on the side of the maritime powers.57
There was no doubt that during the session there was a shift in the conference towards a 
greater willingness to accept a marginal strengthening of coastal state controls 58 For the 
most part those provisions on which consensus was reached were broadly in line with 
Australia’s views,59 but the negotiations on this issue underscored the importance of not 
assuming that debate on the marine environment had concluded. Australia’s assumption 
that any attempt to reopen the marine environment question would be to Australia’s 
disadvantage because of the possibility that failure may open up further matters for re­
negotiation was not borne out at the seventh session. The outcome of the session 
suggested that a number of coastal states did not share Australia’s view that the ICNT 
should not be reopened. That result clearly required Australia to reassess its position for 
the next session although the indications were that by the end of the session Australia saw 
the overall compromises suggested as improving the ICNT text.60
Discussions on MSR and the transfer of technology occupied only one informal meeting 
at the seventh session, although it was raised in subsequent meetings of the formal 
committee and in Plenary.61 The United States argued that the MSR articles should be 
altered to bring it more in line with the Castaneda-Vindenes text at the sixth session.62
Australia supported the US and also expressed support for the ‘compromise text’ and 
‘after referring to the circumstances in which the text was produced, the Delegation gave 
its own assessment that the text was the nearest thing to a negotiated text that had 
emerged on this subject’.63 In formal committee the US and Australian view was 
supported by FRG, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Israel and New Zealand and opposed 
by Argentina and Brazil.64 The earlier Castaneda text incorporated a consent regime but 
did not include a paragraph in the ICNT text that appeared to confer a coastal states rights 
in relation to the EEZ that could be interpreted as more appropriate to territorial sea 
rights.65 The Soviet Union stated in informal committee that the ICNT text should not 
be disturbed66 and both in the informal committee67 and in his final report to plenary the 
Chairman indicated he had no mandate to alter the MSR text.68 As Australia’s stake in 
this issue was not enormous it seemed likely, therefore, that unless there were further 
initiatives to amend the ICNT text that Australia would not take moves likely to endanger 
the consensus on the basic consent regime in the MSR articles.
There was little discussion on the subject of the development and transfer of marine 
technology, but there was ‘general agreement among developed country delegations, 
including Australia, that the Third Committee text on this could not be brought to finality 
until the First Committee “package” became clear.’69
Conference Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
The Margineers and the Coastal States group continued to be the major vehicles for 
Australian diplomacy through the session. The group had met for two full days prior to 
the February intersessional meetings in New York and also during those meetings.70 At 
the seventh session it met several times during the session.71 Following an Australian 
initiative the Coastal States Group decided that:
(i) the group should maintain solidarity with the broad margin states;
(ii) that a link had been established between the work of NG4 (on access to fisheries 
by the LLGDS) and NG6 (on the continental shelf) by the LLGDS and that the 
coastal states should insist that the link between the two remain. They should 
therefore oppose any amendment to the ICNT on the basis of the work of NG4 and 
NG5 (dispute settlement relating to exercise of sovereign rights in the EEZ) unless 
amendments to the ICNT based on the Irish formula went forward;
(iii) that the Irish formula was itself a compromise since it involved the surrender by 
coastal states of substantial areas of continental shelf to the common heritage of 
mankind; and
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(iv) that the coastal states group had reached the limit of its negotiating flexibility in 
regard to the work of NG4, and that the LLGDS should expect no further 
concessions in the area as the price of agreement in NG6.72
The solidarity of the Margineers Group thus became an even more important 
consideration for Australia during the session for it was through that group that Australia 
could exert influence on the Coastal States group on the margin issue. With the LLGDS 
now making clear that no progress could be made on the shelf delimitation issue, the 
Coastal States group was obviously of vital importance in trying to induce movement in 
LLGDS on the margin issue. Given that such socialist countries as Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland were members of 
the latter group73 there was a high probability that they would support the USSR 
proposal. It was to be expected, therefore, that the work of the Margineers and Coastal 
States group would assume greater importance at the next session.
As far as Australia was concerned the session had produced mixed results. On seabed 
matters in the first committee where Australia was principally concerned to see a 
settlement, the texts produced were much more acceptable to the developed countries, 
although it was still uncertain whether the developing countries would accept the parallel 
system. The work of NG2 involving the complex questions on financing where 
Australia’s John Bailey was directly involved in facilitating discussions, had produced a 
useful report. The work of NG3 on voting and composition on the Council revealed that 
there was still some way to go before consensus could be reached. The accurate 
assessment of Australia on seabed mining issues was ‘much more needed to be done’ to 
reach a degree of wide acceptance.74 While the question of boundary delimitation 
remained deadlocked in NG7 Australia’s interest in ensuring that delimitation should be 
reached by bilateral agreement was preserved in the ICNT, and it looked likely that that 
aspect of the text would survive. The main question for Australia concerned the future 
prospects of the Irish formula that set a limit at the point where the thickness of the 
sediment was at least one percent of the distance from the foot of the slope. The Soviet 
proposal appeared to cut across the emerging support for the Irish formula. The issue 
now facing Australia was whether sufficient support could be generated from the LLGDS 
group to back the Margineers’ proposal.
Resumed Seventh Session: New York. 21 August—15 September 1978
It was accepted early at the session that the ICNT could not be revised by the end of the 
session and the outcome of the negotiation was once again reflected in the reports of the 
Chairman of Committees and of the Negotiating Groups.75 Significantly for Australia, it 
was not possible to make any real progress on the shelf issue, largely because the Soviet
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Union stuck to its position it established at the seventh session that the shelf should have 
a maximum limit of 100 miles beyond the 200 mile EEZ. Progress on Committee One 
issues was made more difficult by developing countries criticism that the United States 
was not negotiating in good faith because of US legislation (that was pushed through the 
House on 26 July 1978) permitting their companies to mine the deep seabed. Australia’s 
judgement was that while the session had a promising start ‘little substantive progress on 
the major outstanding issues’ was achieved, partly because there had been a lack of time 
between sessions for some delegations to obtain revised instructions.76
Committee One and Seabed Negotiating Groups
The three working groups established at the seventh session continued their work at the 
resumed session. The session saw considerable criticism by developing countries of 
other states that were legislating unilaterally to allow their companies to mine the deep 
seabed. Chief among these was the United States, where legislation had already passed 
the House of Representatives and was before the Senate, but it was also understood that 
Japan and the EEC countries were planning similar action to that of the United States.77 
The Chairman of G77 made a statement in plenary that such legislation was contrary to 
international law,78 with several developed countries rejecting that claim.79 Canada 
pointed out the negative effects of unilateral action was having on the negotiations80 
while Australia’s approach, along with New Zealand and some Scandanavian countries, 
was to draw the attention of the conference to the need for a comprehensive Convention, 
including agreement on seabed issues. Australia’s Keith Brennan argued that: ‘Although 
some people might feel that the negotiations aimed at establishing an international regime 
for exploiting the sea-bed were not essential, his delegation wished to re-emphasize the 
great importance which it attached to those negotiations. The conference on the Law of 
the Sea had been convened, not only to clear up all of the uncertain areas on the existing 
legal rules, but also to establish an equitable regime for the seabed. In his view, there 
was no reason to be excessively impatient over the delays encountered by these efforts, if 
one bore in mind the considerable progress which had been nevertheless achieved’.81
Australia’s response here was an expression of its principal concern that the chances for a 
successful negotiation of a seabed regime should not be unduly prejudiced while the 
conference was in progress.82 The mediating role did not prevent Australia from taking 
positions that supported its own interests. Although there was no formal discussion of 
the production control issue at the session,83 Australia, despite its earlier luke warm 
approach to production limits, recognised that such controls were an integral part of the 
Convention. As the delegation’s report stated if the resource policy did not apply to all
activities in the Area ‘then there could be a serious undermining of the concept of 
production control’.84
Australia does not appear to have taken any direct initiatives in Committee One at the 
session, although Australia’s Bailey continued his work in assisting the Chairman of 
NG2 on financial arrangements.85 The official Australian judgement of the session’s 
work was that ‘considerable work needed to be done’ on the seabed regime86 with the 
single most important aspect outstanding being an elaboration of the financing and scope 
and functions of the Enterprise.87 The basic thrust of Australian activity in the first 
committee continued to be work towards compromise solutions in order to ensure that the 
seabed regime did not prejudice the conference as a whole. The main Australian concern 
was that ‘failure to develop successfully a regime for exploitation of the international 
seabed may undermine the gains made elsewhere in the conference’ and that dictated that 
Australia continue to play a ‘leading mediatory role’ on the issue.88 Negotiations in 
Committee One had now reached a fairly delicate stage with the US willing to resort to 
national mining legislation as an interim or fall back measure. The point had been 
reached where both developed and developing countries would have to take high level 
political decisions for the ICNT to be revised in such a way as to offer substantially 
improved prospects of consensus.89 For that reason also there seemed no reason to 
believe that Australia would not continue to work constructively towards the conclusion 
of negotiations in the first Committee.
Second Committee and Relevant Negotiating Groups
On the question of access by LLGDS to the living resources of the EEZ there were no 
substantive negotiations that took place,90 and on the shelf issue in NG6 there was no 
real progress made. The problem as far as Australia and other Margineers were concerned 
continued to be the Soviet proposal that shelf rights should be limited to a maximum of 
300 nautical miles.91 On the positive side from Australia’s viewpoint was that there 
continued to be a slow increase in support for the Irish amendment.92 As noted above, 
Australia along with the Margineers, were of the view that unless the margin issue was 
settled final agreement could not be reached on the issue of access by the LLGDS to the 
fisheries of other states. As far as revenue sharing was concerned the Seychelles, on 
behalf of the Africans, submitted a proposal for sharing ten per cent of the revenue 
beyond 200 miles as the price for support of the Irish formula.93 Broad margin states 
resisted attempts to raise the level above the five per cent (starting in the tenth year of 
production) in the ICNT.94
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In informal negotiations a number of issues that were of interest to Australia arose. The 
US proposed a strengthening of the article 65 on marine mammals95 and the 
establishment of a right of an international organisation to regulate such mammals. While 
the Australian delegation report notes that states with an interest in whaling agreed to 
consult,96 it was difficult to see how this US proposal (in contrast to an earlier US 
proposals)97 cut across Australia’s support for the International Whaling Commission. 
Australia’s policy on whaling had been to accept the recommendations of the IWC in the 
determination of quotas and management measures and to actively promote accession of 
all whaling countries to the IWC.98 There was nothing in the US proposal that would 
suggest the US did not recognize the position of the IWC on whaling issues but at that 
stage Australian policy on the US proposal was unclear.99
Second, Australia defended the EEZ compromise in ICNT by speaking (along with 27 
other delegations) against an earlier Soviet proposal reintroduced to clarify the high seas 
status of the economic zone.100 Australia’s position here aligned it with Latin American 
and some African delegations that also attacked the proposal on the grounds that it was 
part of a plan by the maritime powers to convert the EEZ into high seas.101
Committee Three
Discussions on the marine environment were discussed in informal meetings of the third 
committee and in a small working group of invited delegations (including Australia) 
presided over by Mr Vallarta of Mexico.102 The delegation’s judgement was that the 
marine pollution text ‘appears to have reached an advanced stage, has been extensively 
negotiated and leaves little room for further amendment’.103 Australia would appear to 
have had no major problems with the proposals on which consensus was reached at the 
session that broadly speaking strengthened the powers of coastal states.104
The Australian delegate McKeown observed that ‘he doubted whether the Third 
Committee could improve on the many articles considered during the current session in 
both Geneva and New York’ and added that while many of the positions agreed to did 
not ‘reflect Australia’s position exactly’ his country was ‘nevertheless prepared to accept 
them as compromise solutions’.105 It was clear from McKeown’s observation that 
Australia now had no wish to reopen the marine environment issue. However, as the 
delegation itself recognised, no final consensus on the marine environment texts was 
likely to emerge while other important areas of the negotiation, particularly in the first 
committee were still outstanding.106
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MSR issues were only discussed in less than two full informal sessions and were 
discussed in the context of a series of US amendments tabled late in the session.107 The 
effect of these amendments was to ‘reopen a highly controversial question which had 
been thought to be basically resolved at the sixth session’.108 While a number of the US 
amendments were simply aimed at clarifying and simplifying the text:
Other amendments made substantial changes to the text but did not alter the 
fundamental balance between maritime and coastal state interests effected 
in the 1CNT. However, the effect of the proposal to delete all reference to 
the continental shelf in the main articles of Part XIII was to introduce a 
major change to the nature of the marine scientific research regime. 
Although the consent regime would remain for research in the territorial 
sea and EEZ, research on the continental shelf outside the EEZ would now 
be governed by something less than a notification regime. New Article 
258 bis would have the effect of making the provisions with regard to the 
supply of information (Article 249) and the duty to comply with certain 
conditions (Article 250) applicable to marine scientific research on the 
continental shelf which was of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of its natural resources. As the text was silent on the point, it 
could be inferred that the decision whether or not the project was of direct 
significance for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources 
would be left to the researching State. In situations which fell outside the 
scope of Article 258 bis, researching States would be under no obligations 
with respect to research which they conducted on the shelf of another 
country beyond 200 miles (except the prohibition against drilling contained 
in Article 81).109
Virtually all delegations who spoke regarding these amendments did so in a preliminary 
manner and reserved more substantive comments for the eighth session,110 but Australia 
and other broad margin states expressed reservations concerning the proposal that 
different treatment be accorded to MSR on the shelf beyond 200 miles.111 The US was 
concerned to see this wider margin more easily accessible to foreign research vessels than 
the shelf within the 200 mile zone in order to build up domestic support for the treaty. 
US marine scientists were worried about the restrictions of the MSR regime and the US 
was concerned that the MSR regime as it stood would mean the scientific community 
would oppose ratification of a final treaty.112
Australia had a number of difficulties with the US proposals that would exclude the 
application of the consent regime to the shelf beyond 200 m iles.113 First, the 
amendments appeared to downgrade the importance of the resource rights enjoyed by 
coastal states with respect to the shelf as compared to their rights over the EEZ. The 
implication that coastal states would not have the right to withhold consent to MSR in 
respect of the shelf was seen by Australia as implying that sovereign rights to the shelf 
would merit a lesser degree of protection than sovereign rights of coastal states in the 
EEZ. Second, in practice the adoption of these amendments would mean that the shelf
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beyond 200 miles would be treated on a different basis to the shelf within 200 miles. 
Acceptance of that proposition by coastal states, particularly at that sensitive stage of 
negotiations was viewed by Australia as potentially weakening the bargaining position of 
the Margineers group in securing recognition of their rights over the shelf out to the edge 
of the margin. Third, the regime proposed by the US was seen as far too permissive, in 
so far as coastal state consent would not even be required from researching states for 
projects which were of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of the 
natural resources of that part of the shelf beyond 200 miles. The US proposals that 
researching state obligations were limited to the provision of certain information and 
compliance with certain conditions was seen as unacceptable. (The US proposal was that 
if in the opinion of the researching state the research was not of direct significance for the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources, then the researching state was under no 
obligation whatever to the coastal state). Finally, Australia was concerned that by the US 
pressing these amendments there would be a significantly reduced opportunity to gain a 
consensus on the MSR text, and to reopen the issue could place in jeopardy the resolution 
of the EEZ text.
Australia’s position was that with respect to MSR on the continental shelf beyond the 
EEZ Australia supported a regime involving notification and the opportunity to participate 
in and the receipt of all the results of MSR related to resources. The coastal state, 
Australia believed, should have complete control over research and the right to decide 
whether a particular research project was resource related or not.
Given these views it was not surprising that Australia assessed the US proposal on the 
MSR regime for the shelf as making a ‘major change’ in the balance of the ICNT.114 It 
was to be expected therefore that if the US pressed those changes they would be opposed 
by Australia at the next session. However, Australia wished to secure a widely accepted 
Convention and that this meant that tactically Australia would be under pressure to be as 
helpful as possible in overcoming the difficulties the US had with the MSR text. The 
Australian delegate McKeown recognized this fact, noting at the end of the session that 
Australia was ‘prepared to examine any proposal aimed at improving and clarifying’ the 
text on MSR and it was therefore ‘desirable for the Third Committee to consider at its 
next session’ the US proposals.115
Diplomacy and Summary
Australia continued to work through the Margineers and Coastal States group during the 
session.116 The Margineers continued to maintain the link between NG4 and 5 and 
NG6 which was first initiated by the LLGDS group in seeking a satisfactory solution to
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issues in NG4. In view of the problems caused by the Soviet proposal on the shelf it 
was clear that it was going to be difficult to arrive at any final package in NG4 and 5. 
The mood of the conference was one of impatience with one observer pointing out that 
many nations were expressing ‘frustration at the interminable nature of the negotiations, 
doubts that the objectives could be obtained, and disappointment in the lack of political 
will and proper mechanisms that would enable the conference to make progress. There 
was also the occasional threat that should the conference resort to voting, it would be 
possible to have a Convention ‘today’ by application of the two thirds majority rule’.117 
For Australia a resort to voting would not have been in its interests. Such action would 
have resulted in the imposition of the will of G77 in the First Committee and therefore 
what would emerge would not be supported by the developed countries thus undermining 
Australia’s goal of a widely accepted Convention. A vote could also have had adverse 
consequences with respect to the outer limit of the shelf. Accordingly it was evident that 
Australia’s interest in a comprehensive and widely supported Convention pointed the 
delegation in the direction of expending greater efforts in promoting an atmosphere in 
which consensus on outstanding issues could be reached. The fact that the US had 
reopened the highly controversial issue of MSR (which had been thought to have been 
basically resolved at the sixth session) meant that if the US pursued their proposals 
Australia’s shelf position would need to be defended, thus potentially complicating any 
mediatory role in negotiations in Committee One. Australia, however, was also showing 
signs of impatience, with Australian delegate John Bailey urging the conference to make 
the revision of the ICNT an objective of its next session.118
Eighth Session: Geneva. 19 March-27 April 1979
The eighth session saw a revision of the ICNT. Most of the changes were in the deep 
seabed text and reflected substantial progress towards the middle ground on the issue. 
These changes were welcomed by Australia.119 The most significant developments from 
Australia’s viewpoint here related to ongoing discussions on the production limitation 
formula. Overall, however, it was the emergence of a new formula on the continental 
shelf limits that was to occupy the attention of Australia during the session. The 
Australian Foreign Minister speaking 11 days after the session concluded asserted that he 
regarded the session as one of ‘considerable achievement’ with ‘important progress’ on 
the deep seabed issue.120 With regard to the limits of the continental shelf, an issue 
which he described as of ‘absolutely major and fundamental importance to Australia’, the 
Minister felt that the session had made a significant advance by incorporating a text 
defining the extent and limits of the shelf.121
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Seabed Mining
The most interesting negotiating development in Committee One was the emergence of 
a new negotiating group— the Group of 21 to deal with outstanding issues. The Group 
of 21 took over from NG1, 2 and 3 in the fourth week and was composed of ten 
delegations from G77, ten from developed countries (selected on a regional group and 
interest basis) and China and the Chairman of the First Committee, with the addition of 
the other Chairman of the First Committee Negotiating Groups and the Chairman of the 
Group of Legal Experts. Australia was a member of Group of 21. This was the ‘first 
time within the official framework of the conference that a limited membership group 
(had) been established to enable representatives of developed and developing countries to 
negotiate directly’.122 However the attempt to restrict membership of the working group 
failed: the general Committee had failed to follow its practice of consulting the plenary on 
major procedural decisions and the group again became open-ended.123 Australia was 
elected to the Group of 21 (G21) but the significance of this in terms of placing the 
delegation in the centre of negotiations on the seabed mining issue was diminished when 
the group became open-ended and negotiations and consultations on seabed mining 
continued to be carried on in ad-hoc informal groups set up by the chairman.124
For Australia the most important first committee issue was the production policy question 
and here numerous meetings took place under Ambassador Nandan (Chairman of NG1) 
between land based producers and industrialised consumers.125 That group began by 
meeting informally with over 25 delegations under the Chairmanship of Ambassador 
Satya Nandan of Fiji but it was cut to ten (Australia, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Indonesia, 
US, UK„ France, FRG and Japan).126 The critical issue here was the fact that the US 
and other industrialized countries accounting for more than 80% consumption of the 
metals to be produced from seabed mining made clear they would be the major miners of 
the seabed. They wished to impose the 60/40 split, in order to increase benefits to seabed 
miners in periods of high growth rates and downside protection (i.e. a nickel production 
‘floor’ in addition to the ‘ceiling’ of 60%) against low growth rates to avoid a cut-off in 
access.127 The land based producer group, including Australia, maintained the position 
that the formula produced in Article 150 was acceptable. The US delegation observed 
that the ‘60/40 split has almost become a political slogan amongst land-based producers 
that will inevitably be difficult to change’.128
In fact, the ICNT Rev 1 issued at the end of the session incorporated the revision of 
article 150 that resulted from the ad referendum agreement between the US and 
Canada,129 but by the end of the session it was evident that the US was coming under 
pressure from its own industry and other consumer countries in Europe and Japan to
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make changes to the formula adopted so as to ensure seabed production when nickel 
growth was low (i.e. a guaranteed ‘floor’). It therefore appeared that the issue would 
remain contentious.130 Australian policy on the question now seemed to be tied in very 
closely with the Land Based Producer (LBP) group. From luke-warm support earlier 
Australia now believed that a production limitation formula was a ‘sine qua non' of an 
acceptable regime for seabed mining.131 However, Australia differed with other land 
based producers in seeing production controls as being a short-term measure. Speaking 
in Plenary, Australia’s Brennan responded to criticism from West Germany that 
production controls would lead to two different resource policies, one for land based and 
one for sea-based production which would greatly disadvantage certain countries, by 
pointing out that ‘production policies as envisaged in the draft Convention would place 
the emphasis on the efficiency and the stability of the markets for products obtained from 
the exploitation of the area and sold at prices that would be remunerative for the producer 
and equitable for the consumer...the principal instrument of those policies was the 
development of commodity agreements, production limitation being merely a temporary 
measure’132 (author’s emphasis).
Australia did, however, agree with other LBPs on the importance of production controls. 
Just after the eighth session ended, the Australian rapporteur of Committee One (Bailey) 
stressed that a production control formula would benefit ‘land based producers of the 
metals concerned’ and that Australia had to ‘look to its more immediate interest as a 
mineral producer’. Bailey noted that any ‘formula acceptable to the major protagonists 
would be likely to be acceptable to Australia’ adding that the formula in the Revised 
ICNT was a ‘considerable improvement’ on that in ICNT and was satisfactory to land 
based producers.133 Thus at that stage there was no indiction that Australia was about to 
ditch its approach to this issue, a position that was to emerge in later sessions.
On the system of exploitation Australia does not appear to have made any direct 
intervention. It would appear here that both developed and developing countries were 
willing to make compromises and the resulting ICNT reflected substantial progress 
towards a middle ground position on seabed mining.134 Australia’s reaction to these 
developments was favourable as the delegation recognized that there was finally some 
light at the end of this difficult negotiating tunnel.135
That is not to say that the system of exploitation in ICNT Rev 1 completely met 
Australia’s objectives. Australia, for example, supported US moves to delete the 
provision granting the Enterprise immunity on taxation on its assets, property and 
revenues.136 The Group of 77 successfully argued that unless the Enterprise was to be 
given some protection here it would be unable to compete against the multinational
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corporations which would be its competitors and which could be expected to either force 
it out of business or to neutralise the effect of its competition.137 Australia’s view was 
that ‘if excessive commercial advantages were enjoyed by the Enterprise, they would 
introduce into sea-bed mining distortions which would cause national operators to seek 
protection by subsidies from their governments. All sea-bed production would have 
non-commercial support—a result which would be harmful for land-based producers 
including Australia’.138 On this issue it was clear that the final outcome would depend 
on the attitude of the mining countries and G77. What was unclear was to what extent 
Australia would push its views if it appeared likely that these provisions were necessary 
to obtain the agreement of developing countries to a negotiated package.
Generally, Australia took a fairly low key role on most committee one issues but viewed 
developments on the seabed at Geneva as positive. In particular it regarded the 
establishment of group of 21 as making a significant contribution to the development of 
negotiations.139 The overall impression of Australian activity on Committee One at 
Geneva was a continuation of its policy of working towards the conclusion of 
negotiations in the Committee. Australian Foreign Minister Peacock summarized 
Australian views on the changes on the seabed regime in the revised text and Australian 
interests in the Committee One by pointing out that there were now ‘new grounds for 
optimism that the revised formulations developed in Geneva will bring developing and 
developed countries closer to agreement’.140
Committee Two
Negotiations in NG6 on the outer limits of the shelf dominated Australian diplomacy 
during the session. Inter-session negotiations had taken place between the UK and the 
USSR and had led to what came to be called the ‘biscuits formula’.141 The USSR, had 
felt that the Irish proposal was deficient for the purposes of drawing lines on a map 
which clearly set the outer limits of the shelf. During intersessional meetings between the 
UK and USSR the ‘biscuits’ formula evolved. This formula restricted the breadth of the 
continental shelf, as defined by the Irish amendment, by adding to the formulation the 
proviso that the shelf should not extend more than 150nm from the outer limits of the 
EEZ or beyond 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, whatever the coastal 
state chose to employ.142 Australia had considered the formula before the session and 
had concluded that on the information available it was unlikely to result in the loss of any 
areas of major resource interest to Australia.143 Australia pointed this out to other 
Margineers but made the point that the timing of accepting the formula needed to be 
considered, particularly in the light of gaining a full understanding of the nature of the 
rights that the US (with respect to the MSR) and the USSR was seeking beyond 200
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miles. Australia also stated that the ‘biscuits formula’ was only acceptable to Australia if 
it was a specific amendment to the Irish proposal. In this way the geological and 
morphological nature of the shelf would continue to be the predominant criteria in 
determining the outer limit. Finally, Australia stressed to other Margineers that any total 
package of rights over the shelf must be acceptable to the Coastal States Group as a 
whole before it could be endorsed.
Australia was involved in a series of negotiations with the Margineers, within the Coastal 
States Group, bilaterally with the USSR and separately with Chairman Aguilar on the 
margin issue. Opinions diverged on, inter alia, the extent of distance limits and on how 
to refer to oceanic ridges.144 In the end the Margineers, despite some variation in 
national positions, agreed that a ‘biscuits’ type formula would provide a substantially 
improved prospect of consensus and the Chairman as a result of consultations with the 
Margineers agreed to circulate a revision of article 76 with the biscuits formula.145 In 
Plenary there was widespread support for the Irish formula and the Chairman’s 
compromise although some Arab, African and LLGDS states continued to argue for a 
200 mile limit.146 Of importance was the fact that Ireland and the USSR argued that the 
new text was a step towards compromise147 but significantly both the US and USSR 
were linking support for the formula for changes to the MSR regime beyond 200 miles, 
where both superpowers were concerned to preserve freedom of research and where in 
both cases their 200-mile zones embraced nearly all their shelf.148 Australia stated quite 
bluntly that it supported the compromise text ‘for the simple reason that article 76 would 
give a coastal state vastly greater areas of continental margin than any other proposal 
under consideration’.149
On the basis of the debate the collegium of the conference decided to include the 
Chairman’s revision of article 76 in the revised text.150 The revised text was, as noted 
above, viewed by Australia as a satisfactory result ‘notwithstanding it involved some 
limitation of the natural prolongation principle’.151 Australia was convinced that the 
revised article was ‘now in a form which will be part of the new Convention 
(and)...represent(ed) a major step forward in the work of the conference’.152 From 
Australia’s viewpoint, it stood to profit greatly from the Biscuits formula and there was 
every reason to expect that Australia would continue to resist the protests of African, 
Arab and LLGDS states.
The new article 76(7) ICNT Rev 1 also provided for a Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf to be set up under an Annex on the basis of equitable geographic 
representation. The Commission was to make recommendations to coastal states on the 
matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of the shelf. The limits of the shelf
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established by a coastal state, taking into account the recommendations of the 
Commission were to be final and binding. Australia as noted earlier had supported the 
Boundaries Commission at earlier sessions. Although ‘not enthusiastic about having its 
determination of the limits of its continental shelf subject to review’153 Australia had 
agreed with other Margineers that the Boundaries Commission was useful in overcoming 
fears of certain states that proper regard would not be had to geomorphic criteria in 
determining the limits and useful to the margin states in limiting discussion of delineation 
to a technical tribunal, thus avoiding the possibility of other states contesting the 
delineation by reference to dispute settlement procedures. Australia felt that any 
proposed commission must put the ultimate power of decision in the hands of the coastal 
state and the revised text made this clear: the coastal state had simply to ‘take into 
account’ the recommendations of the Commission.154
While the question of revenue sharing was not discussed in much detail because of the 
preoccupation with the definition of the margin155 the Soviet Union proposed to increase 
the rate of revenue sharing to seven percent with a consequential increase in the time 
period in which this rate was to be reached from ten to twelve years.156 Despite 
objections of certain broad margin states to the increase there was considerable support 
for it and it was included in the Chairman’s proposals in in ICNT Rev l .157 While there 
was no sign that Australia had dropped its opposition to revenue sharing Australia 
appeared careful not to make its opposition a focal point in the negotiations.158
Indeed, with an acceptable definition of the margin incorporated in the revised ICNT it 
was noted by one senior Australian delegate shortly after the session concluded that the 
government would now give ‘serious consideration’ to the proposal with a view to 
seeing whether Australia could live with such a form of payment as part of an overall 
package on the continental margin.159 Australia’s main interest now appeared to be to 
ensure that any revenue sharing provision minimised the financial and economic impact 
on coastal states. Canada had expressed some concern at the prospect of a relatively high 
revenue sharing figure160 and the US also had some concerns,161 so that there appeared 
to be some negotiating ‘coin’ to obtain the minimum rate of payments.162
Fisheries issues in NG4 on the issue of LLGDS rights received little attention at 
G eneva.163 However, Australia did find itself involved in opposing US moves to 
strengthen protection for marine mammals. While Australian policy on whales and 
whaling had changed since the commencement of the eighth session from one of 
conservation utilization to one of opposing whaling Australian policy was still committed 
to be a supporter of the International Whaling Commission and through it seek a world 
wide moratorium on whaling.164 Australia objected to US attempts at Geneva that,
according to Australia, provided for one body to protect all cetacea (whales, porpoises, 
dolphins). Australia emphasized the need to protect all marine mammals (including 
Antarctic seals, which are not cetacea) and pointed to the possibility that more than one 
organisation might be needed.165 The US clearly did not accept the Australian view for 
what the US saw as ‘textual improvements with respect to cooperation in an appropriate 
international organization for the conservation of cetaceans’.166 Given the difficulties 
Australia was having with the US in the MSR area (see below) it was unclear how far 
Australia would push its view here in the face of strong US opposition.167
While opposing the US position on marine mammals, Australia gave strong support to 
the maritime states, including the US, in opposing a Belgium proposal to include the 
phrase ‘for the safety of shipping’ in article 25 on innocent passage in the territorial 
sea .168 The suggestion was designed to deal with Belgium concerns with the 
interference of artillery exercise of the coastal state because of the presence of merchant 
ships through practice areas,169 but maritime powers clearly saw the phrase as potentially 
providing coastal state powers to restrict the passage of nuclear powered/and or armed 
ships.170 Australia was particularly concerned as it felt that if the Belgian phrase was 
added to article 25 there was the danger that archipelagic states might seek its inclusion in 
article 52 (thus providing the archipelagic states the right to suspend innocent passage for 
security reasons). Such an addition, Australia felt, could provide additional restrictions 
on A ustralia’s right of innocent passage through the Indonesian and Philippines 
archipelagoes (by allowing specious safety reasons to restrict innocent passage).171 
Australia’s position was that article 25 would best be confined to non-innocent passage 
for security reasons and there was adequate protection already to regulate innocent 
passage for safety reasons. A variant of the Belgium proposals ‘or for the safety of 
ships’ was, however, widely supported and included in the revised text thus leaving 
Australia a difficult problem for the next session.172
Committee Three
In the third committee, undoubtedly the most difficult issue faced by delegates was the 
introduction of the US amendments on MSR from the previous session. The United 
States, still concerned about US domestic opposition to the MSR text from marine 
scientists and the USSR, primarily concerned about encouraging freedom of oceanic 
research, both made clear to the Margineers that acceptance of the ‘biscuits’ formula was 
linked to the acceptance of MSR amendments that provided for different regimes on the 
shelf beyond 200 miles. Australia adopted a low key approach on this issue in the third 
committee but made quite clear in meetings with the leader of the US delegation that 
linkage of the two issues was creating dangerous uncertainties in the conference and that
the US should avoid such tactics.173 Only one delegation indicated unequivocal support 
for the US proposals on the MSR on the shelf beyond 200 miles174 but Australia avoided 
public comments on the issue. Australia preferred to discuss its objections directly with 
the US rather than be seen to take a leading role in opposition. That tactic was largely 
motivated by a desire to meet the Americans concerns as far as possible with respect to its 
MSR proposals as the US made it known that US support for a final Convention would 
be contingent on changes in the MSR regime. In fact Australia publicly expressed a 
strong supportive attitude to many of the US proposals relating to MSR within 200 
miles, and urged other delegations that the conference would need to find some 
accommodation with the US on MSR articles if the conference were to succeed.175 It 
was clear that while Australia would not accept the US position, that would deprive the 
coastal state from withholding its consent for projects of direct significance for its 
resources beyond 200 miles, Australia wished to be as helpful as possible to the US in 
order to ensure that the issue would not undermine the prospect of the US becoming a 
party to the Convention.176 The issue looked likely to become more difficult given that 
G77 were threatening to table proposals for a MSR regime more in the direction of a 
consent regime if the US persisted in its proposals.177
The only proposal to receive detailed consideration and negotiations at the session on the 
marine environment concerned article 236 on Responsibility and Liability. Negotiations 
were complex here but the main point of Australia’s active diplomacy on this issue 
appeared to be to prevent the negotiations becoming bogged down on a highly 
controversial subject that was probably best dealt with in other more specialised fora.178
Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
Australia’s main activity at the Geneva session revolved around negotiations between the 
Margineers and the USSR on the margin issue179 and activity within the Land Based 
Producer Group and Nandan Group on the production control issue. On the former issue 
the result was favourable as Australia had concluded that it could live with the ‘biscuits 
formula’. The Margineers continued to be the main vehicle for Australia’s policy on the 
issue and while receiving group support for the biscuits formula it was more evident than 
ever (with the rise in percentages in ICNT Rev 1) that Australia’s was somewhat isolated 
in the group in its opposition to revenue sharing.
With the resolution of the distance issue, it was now likely that focus of attention would 
shift to revenue sharing formula. While Australia argued that acceptance of such a 
principle was a derogation of sovereign rights, other Margineers clearly felt that 
acceptance of such a principle was not a contradiction of their sovereign rights but an
exercise of them— an undertaking voluntary assumed. The issue was becoming more 
important in tactical terms for Australia. As Kimball observes participating nations were 
now willing to ‘abide little more than another year’ of the conference.180 The production 
control issue was also more critical with the US now indicating it could not accept the 
previously agreed formula with Canada. Australia had now shifted from early luke-warm 
support for production controls to a recognition that some kind of formula was necessary 
for a final agreement. The issue, however, was now becoming more complex with a 
rejection by the US of a formula that Australia had viewed as largely favourable to land 
based interests. Australia’s best interests appeared to lie in some kind of resolution 
between the LBP group and the US and the developed states. There was no reason to 
expect that Australia would take an independent initiative on the issue, for as noted earlier 
Australia now viewed the formula as essential for a final package to be concluded, and 
had tended to let Canada make the running on the issue.181
The MSR question was now a difficult one for while there were strong indications that 
Australia was prepared to meet in part US concerns on the issue, it also had to bear in 
mind its broader relations with the Coastal States group, many of whom were opposed to 
the US amendments. The Margineers group would also be important on how best to 
resolve US concerns with respect to its goal of seeking greater freedom for research on 
the shelf beyond 200 miles.182
Resumed Eighth Session: New York. 19 July—24 August 1979
At the resumed eighth session,183 Australia played a vigorous role in seeking to resolve 
the outstanding issues relating to the Council of the new Seabed Authority and continued 
to play a facilitating role on the financial aspects of seabed mining. The most notable 
result in the first committee was the achievement of the renegotiation of the texts relating 
to financing the Enterprise and financial terms under which contractors could mine the 
seabed. Australia was directly involved in negotiations on the production control issue 
where the question was left unresolved. The most difficult question for Australia in 
Committee Two was the issue of oceanic ridges relating to shelf limits which, when it 
appeared at the previous session looked like predominantly a technical issue but emerged 
at the resumed session as a political issue which threatened the ‘biscuits formula’. In the 
Third Committee the United States offered a compromise formula on research on the 
shelf beyond 200 miles which met Australian concerns. While no revised text was issued 
to ICNT Rev 1 the conference did agree to adopt a treaty following 10 weeks of meetings 
in 1980. Signing was to take place in Caracas sometime in 1981. Outstanding issues 
such as seabed mining, MSR and the continental shelf were deferred to the ninth session.
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Outside events were to complicate the session when news accounts appeared detailing a 
new US policy of naval and air incursions where coastal states claimed territorial seas 
beyond the three miles then recognized by the US.184 Australia joined in a statement by 
the Coastal States Group expressing concern at press reports that the US had embarked 
on such a policy but Australia’s position here was dictated largely by tactical 
considerations.
The Group’s statement expressed the view that customary international law recognized a 
territorial sea up to a limit of 12 miles and that US claims that the regime of high seas 
commenced beyond three miles were an ‘anachronism’.185 Several participants resented 
what they saw as a US pressure tactic to spur completion of a law of the sea treaty.186
Seabed Mining
Issues relating to decision making in the Council and production controls dominated 
Australian efforts in the first committee. The critical issue relating to the Council 
remained whether western industrialized states could be assured of a blocking vote or 
not. The ICNT Rev 1 enabled 10 members of the Council (assuming the 36 members 
were present) to block a decision.187 It would not therefore have enabled the western 
industrialised countries who claimed to have an overriding interest in seabed mining to 
bloc decisions adverse to their interests. As delegates were, after all ‘setting up the 
executive body of the first international organization with the prospect of automatic 
revenue of billions of dollars, a body moreover with broad jurisdiction over half the 
surface of the globe’188 the issue was, not surprisingly, highly charged. The main issues 
discussed revolved around whether the same majority should be required for all decisions 
of substance and the size of a blocking vote if there was to be one. The G77 were 
adamant that it ‘would not agree that minorities could bloc all substantive issues. With 
respect to the size of the blocking vote the United States, EEC and Japan were insistent 
that they should be able to bloc a decision without the need to secure support from any 
other group in the Council. The Eastern Europeans on the other hand (would) not permit 
western industrialized countries to have a blocking vote if Eastern Europeans (did) not 
have one also’.189 Australia’s desire to see outstanding first committee issues resolved in 
the interests of an overall Convention saw the delegation actively involved in seeking 
compromise.
Australia chaired a small drafting group to consider the issue190 that was instrumental in 
producing a formula, that while leaving the crucial blocking figure unresolved and the list 
of issues over which the industrialized countries needed special protection,191 did 
produce a system which was considered by the Chairman of Committee One as one that
‘must be kept in view as an idea which may lead to consensus’.192 In the same group 
chaired by Australia a proposal was produced relating to the issue of approval of work 
plans by the Council which again was a sensitive issue between seabed mining countries 
and G77.193 Because of the closed nature of this work it is not possible to evaluate 
Australia’s role within the group. It is notable, however, that the Chairman of the 
Working Group of 21 and NG3 on the Assembly and Council gave special thanks to 
Australia’s Keith Brennan for his work on these issues in the working group.194 As will 
be discussed later the high quality of Australia’s delegation, particularly its leader 
Brennan, allowed Australia to often take the limelight in mediating efforts through the 
conference.
Australia continued its work in the working group of 21 on the question of financial 
terms of contracts where the group was most successful in renegotiating the texts relating 
to financing the Enterprise and financial terms under which contractors could mine the 
deep seabed.195 Australia’s main interest as far as the Enterprise was concerned seemed 
to be in tentatively raising the issues of the commercial advantage that the Enterprise was 
seen to enjoy and limiting the financial burden on states with respect to financing the 
Enterprise.196 These concerns had been muted at earlier sessions and raising these 
concerns at this stage seemed inspired by the fact that with a convention now close the 
new provisions would have immediate financial implications for states once the 
Convention came into force.197
The most difficult issue for Australia in Committee One continued to be the nickel 
production control issue. Various floor tonnages were prepared by both LBPs and the 
US, EEC and Japan with the LBPs still concerned that the figures being offered by the 
consumer countries were below their estimates of market growth, so that an agreement on 
such a floor would have meant seabed miners becoming their own suppliers, squeezing 
out the LBPs.198
Australia and other LBPs felt that at least some of these countries would, 
in treating seabed production as domestic production, be drawn into 
resorting to protective devices such as subsidies, quotas, administrative 
controls or the like to ensure that seabed production would have a market 
in a situation of over-production even if it was less economical than land- 
based production.199
Australia felt that the proposals put forward by the industrialized consumer countries at 
the session only heightened these dangers and ‘left the impression that these countries 
were sensitive only to their own short and medium term interests’.200 Despite the 
strength of Australian feelings it should not be thought, however, that the LBPs were 
totally united on tactics. Australia clearly felt that an over-riding importance was to get
the US committed to the actual level of the floor while other members, particularly 
Canada, rejected the proposals on the grounds that sufficient compromises had been 
made.201 According to the US delegation in the last three days of the session, Australia’s 
Chairman of the Delegation Keith Brennan, supported by other ‘moderate’ LBPs made 
‘an extraordinary effort to reach an agreement on an initial tonnage minimum floor’ and 
Chairman Nandan ‘worked closely with land-based producers such as Brennan and also 
with many consumer delegations, especially the US and the UK, in an unsuccessful, last- 
minute effort to produce a positive result. Despite this effort, the group was unable even 
to agree on a report of the meeting’.202 These negotiations were ‘some of the most 
technically complicated of the whole conference, for many different scenarios were 
proposed and the number of variables was daunting’.203 Behind the figures of course 
was the concern of Australia and other LBPs, that any result did not hurt their land based 
producers. The indications were that the issue would continue to be a difficult one and 
that Australia would maintain its position within the LBPs to lock the US into a formula 
that was seen to offer adequate protection for the LBPs.
C om m ittee Two
Shelf issues dominated Australian policy in New York.204 At the Geneva eighth session 
the USSR presented an argument that there would need to be a specific provision to deal 
with the issue of oceanic ridges and the need for such an acceptable formulation was 
reflected in a footnote to Article 76 of ICNT/Rev l .205 However what appeared as 
merely a technical issue of plugging a loophole at the eighth session ended up in New 
York raising very complex issues which had ‘significant political implications’.206
The nub of the issue was the Soviet fear that ‘enormous extensions of marine territory 
would accrue to states situated on oceanic ridges, at no point more than 2,500 metres 
below sea level’ 207 The USSR proposed a cut-off of 350 miles in respect of all oceanic 
ridges.208 Australia, however, was not in favour of opening up the definition for the 
delegation had bureaucratic advice that any exclusion of oceanic ridges from continental 
margins would have substantial implications for the margin claimed by Australia.209 
However, apart from USSR there also seemed to be support from the US to close what it 
saw as a loophole in the text.210 The Margineers agreed to negotiate from the position 
that a provision on this subject should include a definition so as to protect ridges forming 
part of the natural prolongation.211 Australia’s position within the Margineers was 
difficult. Australia made it clear that no Australian interest required a cut-off limitation be 
added to the formula in ICNT Rev 1 and that a correct interpretation of the Irish formula 
did not lend itself to improper exercise of coastal state jurisdiction of submarine areas 
beyond the submerged prolongation of the land mass.212
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Indeed it was only after ‘very lengthy private negotiations’ that Australia had come to the 
view that the acceptance of this ‘quite significant limitation on coastal state rights was 
necessary in the interests at arriving at a solution which could be more generally 
acceptable to the conference as a whole’. The Australian delegate McKeown argued that 
Australian departments responsible for matters relating to Australia’s shelf would have 
greeted with ‘amazement’ the view that acceptance of cut-off limitations imposed no 
significant sacrifices on Australia’s part. Indeed the acceptance of a cut-off line on top of 
the limitations of the Irish formula ‘cumulatively amount(ed) to a very significant 
surrender of a position of sovereign rights which coastal states believe they already 
possess under customary international law’.
While McKeown recognized that a solution to the problem would have to avoid a 
situation in which the coastal state could use ocean ridges to extend their shelves far 
beyond what is ‘generally understood to be the natural prolongation of their land mass’ it 
was also necessary to preserve legitimate application of the natural prolongation concept. 
However, given the Soviet and US position on the issue it seemed the Margineers had 
little choice but to negotiate a formula that would somehow ensure that any provision 
would not limit the rights of a coastal state in accordance with the ‘biscuits’ formula.
In the end Australia, despite its reluctance to even have the issue opened, sponsored a 
proposal on the issue with other Margineers.213 Australia made it clear, however, that its 
support for the proposal was only on the basis that it was important for the ‘conference as 
a whole’ that concerns that abuses could occur be resolved. What lay behind Australia’s 
approach was a real concern that the shelf limits would come unstuck by an inadequate 
approach to this issue.214
In the event the Margineers’ proposal ran into trouble because the LLGDs group claimed 
that (like the Soviet proposal) far from limiting the coastal states rights it would enable a 
coastal state to extend its control over ridges to which it would have no legitimate claim 
from 200 to 350 miles.215 A proposal by Japan then emerged that sought to meet these 
concerns by cutting off mid-oceanic ridges at 200 miles216 received broad support within 
the negotiating group217 thus leaving Australia with the task of considering whether it 
could live with such a formula at the next session.
Sri Lanka lobbied hard at the session to have its amendment to the Irish formula 
accepted,218 which was intended to provide for the unusual Sri Lankan continental 
margin, where application of the Irish formula would have deprived it of approximately 
half of its 600 mile wide margin.219 Australia again demonstrated its sensitivity to any 
reopening of the biscuits formula here. Australia was opposed to giving Sri Lanka a
unique exemption from the cut-off lines in the ‘biscuit formula’ although it felt that it may 
be possible to devise some amendments to the Irish formula to accommodate Sri 
Lanka.220 While Sri Lanka’s draft received much sympathy Australia was by no means 
alone in believing that the text should not be ‘cluttered with single state exceptions’221 
and the issue remained unresolved.222
Revenue sharing discussions were overshadowed by the question of the delineation of 
the shelf and much of the discussion amounted to a ‘reiteration of well known 
positions’.223 Australia, however, outlined its views in both Margineers Group and in 
NG6. While there was broad support for the system outlined in Article 82 there were 
differences with respect to both the grace period and the rate. The Margineers group held 
fast on the five year grace period, but some thought that the rate of 7 per cent too high. 
However, some LLGDS considered the rate too low.224 Australia stressed its opposition 
to Article 82 although instead of highlighting its position of in principle objections to 
revenue sharing acknowledged that such an article was inevitable in any final 
Convention. Australia’s main concern in participating in discussions was to minimize 
rates of payment by stressing that marginal projects must not be prevented from going 
ahead. In particular Australia’s role within the Margineers was to get the group to think 
through all the implications of the article so as to get the most favourable position for the 
group in negotiation. The risk here of course was that by taking on a high profile in 
opposing the issue the delegation was at risk of being blamed for any failure to reach 
agreement.225
Finally on shelf issues Australia worked with other Margineers in negotiations with 
USSR in an attempt to draft an annex to describe the composition and functions of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.226 The main problem as far as 
Australia was concerned here was the call by Singapore for a Boundaries Commission far 
stronger than that envisaged in ICNT Rev 1. Singapore’s proposal involved that the 
words in Article 76(7) ‘taking into account these recommendations shall be final and 
binding’ be replaced by ‘shall be in accordance with these recommendation. However a 
coastal state may deviate from these recommendations in consultation with the 
Commission and in accordance with a decision mutually arrived at’.227 It has already 
been noted that for Australia a basic issue here was the extent to which the coastal state 
would retain the ultimate power to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf. 
Australia’s position was, therefore, to support moves to retain the initiative and final 
decision as to the outer limit in the hands of the coastal state. Given, however, that the 
ICNT Rev 1 provision was criticized as putting into the hands of the coastal state 
unfettered discretion to place its outer shelf where it pleased228 (except that it should ‘take 
into account’ the views of the Commission) it seemed that a compromise would need to
be arrived at. In that situation Australia’s position seemed likely to be guided closely by 
the Margineers.
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Finally in Committee Two there were two other matters where Australia became 
involved. First the issue of innocent passage through the territorial sea was an issue left 
over from the eighth session because of the Belgium amendment and was resolved to 
Australia’s satisfaction without much controversy.229
Second, Australia now supported US attempts to strengthen protection for marine 
mammals. Tentative agreement was reached with a group of interested states, (including 
Australia), called together by the United States to negotiate improvements on the 
conservation of marine mammals.230 The US draft text231 still referred to the singular 
expression ‘international organisation’ (and not organisations as Australia thought may be 
necessary) in the area of management of marine mammals.232 It was reflected in the 
Chairman’s Final report as the basis for further discussion.233 Australia’s reaction to the 
US text was this time generally favourable although Australia had some concern that one 
phrase in their proposal could have been interpreted as weakening international authority 
over marine mammals.234 Generally, however, Australia was more supportive of US 
efforts to strengthen the conservation of marine mammals than it had been at previous 
sessions, a position in part that appeared to be prompted by a desire to reach some 
accommodation with the US in the MSR area, and also because of the change in policy in 
April 1979 from one of conservative utilisation of whale stocks controlled by 
international agreement to an active policy of protection.235
Committee Three
MSR was the only subject discussed in the third committee and the US amendments 
dominated discussion.236 The main issue for Australia was that of research on the shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles. Early in the session a middle ground emerged on a system 
whereby (1) coastal states would be notified of all research on the shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles; (2) coastal states would have rights of participation and have access to 
results of all such research; (3) coastal state comment would be required for any research 
entailing the use of explosives, drilling or artificial islands; (4) coastal states would defer 
the exercise of the right of consent in areas other than those which they designated as 
being of exploration and exploitation interest to them.237
Australia’s view of the US proposal was that it represented considerable progress on the 
issue.238 Australia was concerned that if something was not done to meet the US on this 
issue the American scientific community would actively lobby against ratification of an
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eventual convention. Australia was somewhat more relaxed also about the implications 
for its overall position on the shelf of the acceptance of a dual regime for MSR as the 
‘biscuits’ formula was now incorporated in the ICNT Rev 1. The Americans, who had 
been linking their support for the biscuits formula to gaining support for their MSR 
proposals, could no longer pursue that tactic so Australia also felt it could adopt a more 
sympathetic approach to the US position. The notion of giving freedom of research on 
the shelf beyond the EEZ except in areas where the coastal state designated as being of 
exploration and exploitation interest was, from Australia’s viewpoint, politically, 
administratively and legally attractive. It would constitute a compromise more likely to 
attract consensus than the original US proposal, would protect the coastal states existing 
interests and arrangements and from a legal viewpoint the shelf rights of the coastal state 
would not be differentiated solely by reference to the 200 nautical mile limit. The coastal 
state would retain the right to develop additional areas, thus ensuring that the consent 
regime would be expanded to cover all areas of future resource interest. The compromise 
proposal emerged from small group negotiations (in which Australia did not take part) 
and was seen by some coastal states as going too far in the direction of researching state 
interests in allowing for designation of areas only in which ‘exploitation or exploratory 
operators such as drilling is occurring or about to occur’.239 Nevertheless Australia saw 
much merit in the proposal.240
Australia’s more sympathetic approach to the US position appeared to be one that was 
generally shared for by the end of the session there was ‘widespread, if grudging 
acceptance that the text (i.e. ICNT/Rev 1) will have to be improved from the point of 
view of the United States which is anxious to secure some relaxation of the power of the 
coastal state to withhold consent for marine scientific research projects on the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’.241
Conference Diplomacy and Concluding Remarks
The most awkward issue for Australia in terms of its relations with coastal state allies 
arose with respect to the group’s reaction to US naval and air incursions where coastal 
states claimed territorial seas beyond three miles 242 Australia argued243 that in the light 
of US assurances that the law of the sea package on territorial sea and rights of innocent 
passage was still acceptable to the US there was no need for the Coastal States group to 
issue a statement. What remained, Australia argued, was a dispute between some 
governments and the United States on the status of customary international law and such 
disputes could be resolved bilaterally. If the Coastal States group were to proceed with a 
statement then the draft would need to be moderate in tone so as not to ‘play into the 
hands’ of these wishing to weaken the conference. Australia above all appeared
concerned not to adopt a position that could have been used by other states to restrict the 
freedom of operation of its main ally. Australia worked with other moderate coastal 
states (Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Ireland) to try and reach an agreement on the best 
approach. Australia was left with the main burden of moderating the text with a principal 
aim of including a reference to the fact that the Coastal States group were committed to a 
package deal on navigation issues. The final statement did not meet Australia’s concerns 
here244 but Australia went along with the text because of the importance with which it 
attached to the Coastal States group and a wish not to get ‘off-side’ with key coastal state 
players that may adversely impact on the shelf negotiations. For those reasons Australia 
did not make any reservation statement in plenary to the Coastal States position.245 The 
incident illustrated the extent to which Australia subordinated traditional alliance relations 
to its overall conference goals, a point taken up later.
Australian activity with the Oceania Group consisted of co-sponsoring a proposal with 
Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Samoa to allow Cook Island and Niue to 
become parties to a final convention.246
From Australia’s viewpoint there were now solid prospects of reaching an adequate 
agreement on two issues of particular interest—the nickel question and the criteria for 
determining the outer limits of the shelf. The MSR articles relating to the degree of 
control a coastal state could exercise over its shelf now looked close to a final 
compromise that would be satisfactory from Australia’s desire to protect its resource 
interests. Australia felt that the New York session brought ‘much closer’ the objective of 
adopting a comprehensive Convention247 and saw no reason why the conference could 
not stick to its agreed program of work intended to result in the formal adoption of a final 
text at the resumed session of the conference in July-August 1980.248
CHAPTER SEVEN
AUSTRALIA AT UNCLOS 111, 1980—1982
This chapter concludes the history of Australian diplomacy at UNCLOS 111, focussing 
on the final two year stretch of the conference. This period was dominated by the 
implications caused by changes in US law of the sea policy. By September 1980 all but a 
handful of issues had been resolved. Although most states, including Australia, had 
difficulties with individual provisions in the text, consensus had been reached on 
hundreds of articles. Apart from refining some of the details the text of the Convention 
was complete. Indeed the text as it existed at the end of 1980 was little different in 
substance from the one finally signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica in December 1982.
Immediately prior to the opening of the tenth session in March 1981, a session which 
most states hoped would end the negotiations, the Reagan Administration which took 
office in January 1981, announced that it was undertaking a fundamental review of its 
policy towards the Convention. The review took nearly twelve months and delayed the 
US from participating in two entire sessions of the conference (the tenth and the resumed 
tenth sessions). In January 1982 President Reagan announced that the US delegation 
would return to the negotiations on the basis of six objectives, which he outlined in very 
general language. The political crunch came at the final negotiating session in March and 
April 1982 when the US submitted a book of between 100 and 200 amendments that 
would have involved unravelling much that had been achieved in the years leading up to 
1980, including many critical compromises. The amendments were rejected as a basis of 
negotiation by G77. Twelve smaller industrialised countries, of which Australia was 
one, submitted amendments which it thought might bridge the gap between G77 and the 
US. Serious negotiations on these proposals was deferred until it was too late. A 
decision was later taken by the US that it would not participate in the adoption of the 
Convention by consensus. It asked that the text and four accompanying resolutions be 
put to a vote. This was agreed and the final package was adopted 130 in favour, 
including Australia, 4 against (Israel, Turkey, US, Venezeula) and 17 abstentions.
The thrust of US objections to the treaty were largely ideological and focussed on the 
regime for deep seabed mining. The mixed economic system for the regulation and 
production of seabed minerals was not consistent with the new Reagan Administration’s 
free market philosophy. While earlier US Administrations believed that its law of the sea 
goals could be achieved through a widely accepted multilateral treaty the new 
Administration believed that they could be realised through unilateral measures and
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bilateral arrangements. The talk in Washington was building up a 600 ship navy and 
achieving maritime superiority in a decade and of the growing dependence on strategic 
minerals from overseas sources, which could be provided from the deep seabed. Deep 
seabed mining was now seen as a high seas freedom and with Vietnam and the Iranian 
disaster behind it the US was now embarked on a new drive to achieve maritime 
superiority. This would mean that no longer would the US be required to stick with 
previous US policy of a willingness to trade off access to resources for navigation rights. 
More particularly US policy was being driven by domestic politics, in particular the 
hostility of the US mining industry to the UNCLOS regime. The mining industry found 
ready access to key US officials in the new Administration who were hostile not only to 
the law of the sea negotiations but more generally to the concept of a new international 
economic order and the North-South dialogue.
For Australia the result of the change in US policy towards the negotiations created an 
extremely difficult situation. The goal of a widely accepted and comprehensive 
Convention was one Australia had worked towards from the start of the conference. US 
actions were seen as posing a grave threat to the possibility of realising that goal. The 
stalemate in negotiations meant that from March 1981 Australia directly nearly all its 
negotiating efforts toward bridging the gap between the US and its like-minded allies on 
the one hand and G77 and the East European states on the other. Australia’s delegation 
leader Keith Brennan played an extremely prominent role amongst a group of 11 middle 
industrialised countries that drew up concrete proposals in an attempt to bring the US 
back to the negotiating table, without at the same time undermining the basis of the 
mining regime. In the end, as noted above, the long cherised aim of the conference in 
general and Australia in particular, of adopting the Convention by consensus proved 
unattainable.
Apart from its role as a mediator and as a staunch defender of the package deal approach 
Australian diplomacy was also directed towards that of initiating a number of proposals in 
the conference. The period from 1980 saw Australian delegates move into the limelight 
in Committee One and the LBP group to adopt a vigorous campaign to seek the inclusion 
of clauses that would prevent states from subsidising the deep seabed mining operations 
of their nations, as well as from using unfair trading practices in the markets of minerals 
from the international area. These proposals followed a dramatic turnaround in 
Australian policy on production controls, where as a result of a direct intention by the 
Australian mining industry to Prime Minister Fraser, the Australian delegation were 
instructed to adopt a total free market approach to seabed production. Australia’s change 
of policy was far too late in the day to be acceptable to the conference, for production
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controls had long been accepted, even by potential seabed mining states, as an integral 
part of a final Convention. The delegation was forced to quickly ditch its ‘free market’ 
approach. However, Australia was more successful in gaining both an anti-subsidies and 
free market access clause in the final Convention, an impressive victory fought not only 
against potential seabed miners but at times against the LBP group that saw their interests 
being protected through production controls.
The margin issue was finally settled to Australia’s satisfaction, but in this period Australia 
gave up the fight to jettison revenue sharing, and had to accept stronger powers that it 
wished for in the Continental Shelf Boundaries Commission. On shelf issues, the most 
active diplomacy by Australia focussed on attempts to moderate new demands by both the 
US and USSR for greater freedom for researching states on the continental shelf beyond 
200 miles. Australia and other Margineers had a rather difficult task here and were only 
partly successful in resisting the two superpowers.
Overall Australian diplomacy in this period was dominated by the actions of the US, and 
the delegation exhibited all the roles that had characterised Australian activity throughout 
the conference and that are taken up in the next chapter—iniator, mediator, group actor 
and defender of the package deal. As will be discussed later when the final Convention is 
considered in the light of Australia’s negotiating objectives it is clear that the Australian 
delegation achieved much success.
Ninth Session: New York. 3 March—4 April 1990
The ninth session1 saw substantial progress on the remaining issues. The most 
significant feature of the session from Australia’s viewpoint was a radical shift in 
Australian policy on production controls brought about as a result of the direct 
intervention of the Prime Minister after lobbying by the Australian mining industry. 
Australia also adopted a high profile in Committee One in an attempt to alter certain 
aspects of the financing of the Enterprise. Australia’s unsuccessful action here was a 
significant departure from the steady-state mediatory role it had adopted to date. In 
Committee Two the Margineers were able to reach a consensus with the USSR on ocean 
ridges and on an Annex providing for a Boundary Commission (there were no 
negotiations on revenue sharing). On other issues in Committee Two Australia 
welcomed the adoption of a new version of article 65 on marine mammals and played a 
role in the proposal to add Southern Bluefin Tuna to Annex 1 (on highly migratory 
species). The MSR problem on the shelf beyond 200 miles was also solved to 
Australia’s satisfaction. A newly revised ICNT was released at the end of the session,2
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which formulated agreed language on virtually the whole gamut of issues at the 
conference.
First Committee
The most dramatic shift in Australia’s policy on seabed mining emerged at the ninth 
session when the Australian delegation attempted to unravel the production control 
articles. On the eve of the departure of the delegation last minute pressure was placed on 
the government with a visit to the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, by Sir Arvi Parbo 
Chairman and Chief Executive of Western Mining and Sir Roderick Carnegie, Chairman 
of CRA.3 The successful intervention of the mining industry meant that Australia had no 
clear instructions on the production policy issue in the early part of the session.4 The 
mining industry expressed a clear preference for no quantitative limits on minerals from 
the seabed, no financial assistance for seabed production by consumer countries to their 
companies, no preferred access for minerals produced from the seabed by consumer 
countries to their companies and no protection for land based producers.5
They believed that this strategy would be more successful in avoiding a situation where 
the major nickel consumers, the US, Japan and EEC, could become their own suppliers 
of nickel and wipe out the market for land based producers. The mining industry view 
was that if Australia agreed to production controls it would open the gate for consuming 
countries to argue for the subsidisation of deep-sea mining and therefore to disruption of 
the market place. If deep seabed mining was competitive, then, so the Australian miners 
argued, it should be left to market forces to determine. The more rigid the controls placed 
on seabed mining the greater incentive towards subsidisation. Limits on access to seabed 
resources would induce greater incentives for would-be participants to rush to secure a 
place and create disadvantages of a ‘gold rush’ situation. In these conditions if the rate of 
seabed production was low there would be little impact on other producers. If seabed 
developers proceeded rapidly then a strong market in terms of demand and price would 
be a prequisite. Therefore, the Authority’s revenue would be sufficient to compensate 
any developing country producer which may have been placed at a consequent 
disadvantage. Such conditions would also be favourable to the Enterprise. If it had to be 
accepted that a system of production controls was inevitable then they urged the 
delegation to support the proposition that governments should not provide financial 
assistance to seabed mining and that consumer governments should not undertake to give 
preferred access to their markets for minerals produced from the seabed by their 
companies.6
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The direct intervention of the Prime Minister meant that the delegation were instructed 
shortly after their arrival in New York to embarrassingly reverse their position and opt for 
no regulation at all.7 Not surprisingly the ‘market forces’ approach was opposed by all 
land based producers.8 Indeed, one journalist observed that ‘other land-based nickel 
producers were astonished and those countries which saw the potential of the deep sea 
nodules were amused to find the production limitation clause, which was designed to 
protect land-based producers when deep sea mining commenced, a point of concern for 
the Australian industry. Canada, the leading land-based producer of nickel and ore and 
one of the keen proponents of such a formula, was angry’.9 Not unexpectedly therefore 
the Australian delegation reported back that land based producers were intractable on the 
point and the production limitation formula should stand. 10 The fact that the ‘market 
forces’ approach proved fruitless would have come as no surprise to the delegation. 
Before the reversal ‘sections of the bureaucracy’ (undoubtedly the Department of Foreign 
Affairs) were of the view that things had already progressed too far and that if Australia 
did not become involved in the negotiations on production controls it could weaken the 
position of LBPs and result in just the situation the mining interests were seeking to 
avoid. Australia could not opt out of a negotiation they did not like and at the same time 
struggle to win much desired concessions on critical issues such as control over the shelf. 
In any case, the ‘market forces’ approach was irrelevant in the face of the fact that the 
world’s passionate free-marketeers, US, Japan and EEC, had all agreed to the need for 
an international structure of controls.11 While law of the sea officials in the department 
of Foreign Affairs rejected the free-market approach there was little they could do given 
the Prime Minister’s direct intervention.
In the event, when the market forces approach met with opposition the delegation ‘sought 
the addition of provisions aimed at preventing the subsidisation of seabed miners and 
discriminatory access by them to the domestic markets of the consumer countries’.12 
Australia distributed draft texts on both these issues. 13 Indeed Australia, while 
acknowledging that a production control formula would include a floor and a ceiling, 
argued that the provisions requiring non-discriminatory access and non-subsidisation 
were essential elements of the package.14 The reaction of countries such as the UK, 
FRG and Japan was negative— they believed that in principle those matters should be 
dealt with under the GATT. The Socialist bloc countries objected to the use of the term 
‘subsidisation’ and stated that they would not tolerate interference by an international 
body in matters of economic management which in socialist states included subsidisation 
of most industries.15 Industrialised countries, particularly in Europe and Japan did not 
wish to be prevented from assisting seabed mining if and when they decided it was in the 
interests of national self-sufficiency in times when access to minerals and metal 
commodities was threatened. 16 It was not clear at that stage whether all land based
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producers shared Australia’s goals of including provisions on market access and anti­
subsidisation in the Convention, although Canada and Argentina were sympathetic, but 
the issue would undoubtedly be complex.17 The potential seabed mining countries (such 
as the US, UK, Japan, France) regarded seabed production as domestic production and it 
was unlikely that they would agree to a provision treating seabed production as imports. 
An anti-subsidisation provision directed only at seabed mining would thus be difficult for 
industrialised countries to accept. Australia did, however, succeed in getting the issue on 
the agenda. Ambassador Nandan in his report agreed with Australia that both the 
question of unfair trading practice and subsidisation needed to be discussed at the next 
session and noted that Australia attached great importance to the proposals and 
‘conditioned its acceptance of any form of production control on the solution of these two 
issues’.18
In another move that represented a departure from Australia’s traditional mediatory 
policy in Committee One, Australia attempted to reopen the financial package relating to 
the Enterprise. In line with the Australian view that if excessive commercial advantages 
were enjoyed by the Enterprise that would introduce distortions which would cause 
national operators to seek protection by subsidies from their governments (thus 
potentially harming Australian producers),19 Australia sought to have it accepted that the 
loans from government should be interest bearing and that the ratio between loans from 
governments and borrowing from financial institutions should be 1:2 instead of 1:1.20 
Both moves, however, were rather clumsily executed and ignored the entrenched nature 
of these provisions.21
The attempt by Australia to reopen the provisions on financing the Enterprise was counter 
to Australian policy in attempting to reach acceptable compromises and at the end of the 
session Australia conceded that the provisions were part of the overall package.22
Committee Two
Shelf issues once again were the main area of Australian diplomacy and during the 
session NG6 moved close towards resolving the outstanding issues.
Particularly intense consultations and negotiations took place on the oceanic ridges 
issues, between the Margineers and the Soviet Union.23 Given Australia’s interventions 
at the previous session, there was no doubt Australia was seeking some form of words 
that would not cost it any areas of margin that could have resource prospectivity. 
Australia defended the existing text as a generous concession.24 In the end the 
formulation recommended by the Chairman of the Second Committee which appeared in
the ICNT Rev 2 appeared to meet Australia’s concerns,25 although it was made clear by 
the Chairman of the delegation (in what was presumably a reference to the Arab Group 
and a number of LLGDS states that still wanted a simple distance limit to the shelf) that 
Australia supported the new text lif other delegations accepted that formulation as part of 
the over-all package on the outstanding issues concerning the continental shelf (author’s 
emphasis)’.26
With respect to the Continental Shelf Boundaries Commission a draft annex was 
presented which had been produced by Canada (on behalf of the Margineers) and the 
USSR.27 The text incorporated in the ICNT Rev 2 provided that a coastal state must 
determine the limits of its shelf ‘on the basis o f’ the determination of the Commission 
rather than the earlier formulation ‘taking account of’. The latter expression was 
‘unacceptable’ to a number of states,28 on the grounds that it gave unfettered power to 
the coastal state, but the majority of states raised no objection to the revised formula, no 
doubt agreeing with the West German delegate that it met ‘the need for the boundary 
commission’s findings to be given maximum force’.29 Australia argued that the existing 
formula ‘more accurately reflected the sovereign nature of the rights of coastal states over 
their continental shelf’ rather than the new formulation,30 a view shared by Canada, 
Denmark, France, Pakistan, the UK, Uruguay and Venezuela.31 Australia, however, 
reluctantly accepted the change,32 despite what it saw as a threat to coastal state 
sovereignty.
As far as the Sri Lankan exception was concerned it was widely agreed that an exception 
would best be accommodated in a statement of understanding by the President of the 
conference incorporated in an Annex to the Final Act of the conference.33 This approach 
was probably congruent with Australia’s interest (and other Margineers) in that it did not 
incorporate an exception to the ‘biscuits formula’ into the Convention.34
However, there was no doubt that a special ‘fix’, outside the general rules laid down by 
Article 76, raised the possibility of other states calling for special ‘fixes’ in relation to the 
margin or other parts of the Convention. It was not clear at that stage whether Australia 
and other Margineers would willingly admit that the Irish formulae was not capable of 
being applied in a universally equitable manner. Too willing an admission, could, as far 
as Australia and other Margineers were concerned, raise unwelcome suggestions that the 
fundamental components of Article 76 should be reopened.35
A number of miscellaneous issues arose in Committee Two that were of interest to 
Australia but issues relating to shelf questions occupied nearly all the delegation’s time in 
the Second Committee.36
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Third Committee
MSR was the sole issue discussed in the Third Committee. The most difficult question 
continued to be the regime for MSR on the shelf beyond 200 miles. At the session 
negotiations focussed on the level of MSR state activity required before the coastal state 
could designate areas in which the normal consent regime would apply.37 Unlike some 
Margineers that feared that the test for designation of areas was too stringent (arguing that 
the term ‘such as exploratory drilling’ suggested a stage of development too close to 
exploitation)38 Australia argued that the Chairman’s formula from the previous session 
was a good ‘middle ground’.39
As noted earlier, Australia’s position was more moderate than some of its Margineer 
allies, in particular Canada, which wished for greater flexibility in the designation of 
areas outside 200 miles in opposition to the US which was seeking a formula restricting 
the designation by coastal states to those areas where there was substantial evidence of 
coastal state resource exploitation.40 Australia participated in a small group of 
approximately 10 countries (chaired by Ambassador Rozental of Mexico) that produced 
texts on the most contentious MSR articles.41 The new texts on research beyond 200 
miles contained some concessions to Margineers.42 Australia, while acknowledging 
that it preferred greater flexibility in designating areas, curiously seemed more concerned 
to register the fact that the new text should not give rise to any implication that the coastal 
state had no discretion to withhold consent in relation to MSR on the shelf within 200 
miles.43 That concern was shared by Canada, Ireland and Norway.44 Margineers such 
as Norway, Canada and the UK were not entirely happy with the new text on the 
grounds that it may have unduly restricted exploratory operations by the coastal states.45 
As far as the researching states were concerned, the US pointed out that the compromise 
proposals themselves offered far less protection for marine scientific research than the US 
and the scientific community considered desirable but that the US would accept the new 
provision in the interests of consensus provided no changes were made.46 Generally 
Australia and the other Margineers had a rather up-hill struggle on this issue. As Sanger 
observes, the Margineers:
found little support from coastal developing states and were up against not 
only the United States but also the Soviet Union, for with both the 
superpowers the 200 mile zone embraces nearly all their shelf (except in 
the Arctic, where natural factors are likely to limit foreign research). So 
under their joint pressure this amendment was accepted 47
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Diplomacy and Summary Conclusions
The ninth session had seen Australia’s traditional mediatory policy on Committee One 
issues set aside with a surprising reversal of policy on production controls and an attempt 
to reopen the financial package in Committee One. The policy change occurred as a direct 
result of Prime Ministerial intervention as a result of expressions of concern from the 
mining industry. The policy change was undoubtedly an embarrassment for the 
delegation coming so ‘late in the day’. It was difficult to judge whether Australia’s 
standing in the LBP group was severely damaged, despite Canada’s expression of 
annoyance. What was clear, however, was that Australia would need the support of the 
LBP group in its drive on the issues relating to unfair trading practices and excessive 
subsidisation of seabed mining. While Australia’s proposals with respect to these issues 
were not included in the new text the Chairman’s report indicated that Australia’s 
proposals would receive further discussion at the next session. Australia’s attempt to 
reopen the final package, like its attempt at a ‘free market’ approach on the production 
control issue (that all mining should be controlled by market forces) met with no support 
from any major grouping and on both issues Australia conceded that there was little point 
in raising these concerns at the next session.
On Second Committee issues Australia seemed to be reasonably happy with the outcome 
of the ridges issues although the annex providing for a Boundaries Commission was a 
stronger version than it would have liked. (Revenue sharing issues were not discussed 
so that there was no opportunity for Australia to press its concerns here.)48
The recommended text on MSR on the shelf beyond 200 miles was probably about the 
best Australia and other Margineers could have hoped for given the position of the 
superpowers favouring greater freedom for researching states.
The conference was now moving into its final phases with work on final clauses, issues 
relating to reservations and participation of entities such as the EEC, national liberation 
movements and associated states. Consideration was now being given to the 
establishment of a Preparatory Commission composed of signatories to the Convention to 
carry out those tasks which would enable the Authority and its principal organs to 
function as soon as possible after the Convention entered into force. The conference was 
now on its ‘final stretch’49 and Australia’s hope was that the next session could complete 
negotiations on the remaining outstanding issues in order to produce a final revision of 
the negotiating text and thereafter move to the formal stage of its negotiations.50
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Resumed Ninth Session: Geneva. 28 July—29 August 1980
The session saw the revision of the negotiating text and in order to indicate that the 
revision was close to final form it was given the title Draft Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.51 From Australia’s viewpoint the session was successful. In the first committee 
Australia was able to have included in the new text a market access clause, while the 
consolidation of the Second and Third Committee texts was in broad harmony with 
Australian objectives. There was no significant reopening of the shelf package and the 
text on the difficult issue of MSR beyond 200 miles now appeared well entrenched. Of 
particular importance in moving the conference towards a final resolution was the fact that 
there now appeared to be a solution at hand to an issue that had proved most intractable— 
decision-taking in the Council of the Authority.
Committee One
The production control issue continued to dominate Australian activity52 but the attempt to 
have production controls removed was dropped as an Australian goal. Two issues were 
involved here; the attempt by some LBPs to alter the formula in the ICNT Rev 2 and 
secondly, the attempt by Australia to secure clauses prohibiting unfair subsidisation of 
SBM and prohibiting discriminatory market access practices.
On the first issue the LBPs broke into two factions. The seabed miners, and LBPs, 
including Australia, Indonesia and the Latin American producers were prepared to accept 
the provisions in the ICNT Rev 2 relating to the ‘floor’53 (i.e. if consumption growth 
should fall below 3 per cent a year, production would be permitted to the levels which 
would result from a growth rate of 3 per cent) and the safeguard clause that provided 
under no circumstances could seabed production be authorized in excess of 100 per cent 
of the estimated growth in nickel consumption. According to Canada, the Philippines 
and some African land-based producers the floor should be reduced from 3 percent to 2.5 
percent and the safeguard from 100 percent to 70 cent.54 Papua New Guinea also 
believed the 3 percent regime was too high and provided no protection for land based 
producers.55 Australia’s view was that ‘it could not associate itself with these latter 
suggestions because in conditions of very low consumption growth they could give even 
less scope to seabed mining than ICNT Rev 1, and therefore be an inducement to 
subsidised seabed mining’.56 The Australian view was that the higher the floor the more 
likely it was there would be no market distortion therefore ensuring LBPs would be able 
to compete.57 While Australia saw the formula as having the ‘necessary checks and 
balances’ to meet the ‘essential needs’ of LBPs58 Australia believed that the compromise
formula was compatible with support of the ‘common heritage’ principle. It would 
ensure that seabed mining would be able to proceed as a viable activity at low growth 
rates (assuming it was competitive). This was regarded by Australia as ‘an essential 
element in the package if the common heritage (was) to be developed’.59 The text in the 
Draft Convention was that concluded at the ninth session, but ‘the dissatisfaction among 
some African states in particular’60 pointed to the need for further discussion at the next 
session .61
Australia’s drive to include clauses prohibiting unfair subsidisation of seabed mining and 
a prohibition on discriminatory market access practices was partially successful, with the 
Australian market access clause being included in the Draft Convention.62 While the 
delegation’s report states that the land-based producers group ‘threw their weight’ behind 
Australia’s proposals63 the situation was in fact more complex. Canada and some 
African LBPs saw their ultimate protection not in any market access or anti-subsidy 
clause but in a more restrictive production ceiling. The market access clause was 
negotiated in spite of the general opposition of the potential seabed miners64 who feared 
that such a provision would impinge on their domestic trade policy65 and also in spite of 
lack of ‘active support from other land based producers’.66 Canada strongly criticized 
the clause included in the Draft Convention as being ‘extremely weak’ and as one which 
would encourage seabed miners to classify all production of minerals and commodities 
from nodules as domestic production.67 These views were also shared by African 
LBPs.68 Canada wished to classify in any market access clause production derived from 
nodules as imports. This desire was based on the belief that if classified as domestic 
production, production of these commodities could be freely subsidized without any 
recourse to GATT ,69 a view which Australia regarded as mistaken .70 While the 
Australian mining industry saw the clause as ‘something of a compromise’71 and 
recognised that some delegations doubted its effectiveness72 Australia was satisfied that 
its clause had been included in the Draft Convention.73
The main question on this issue now for Australia appeared to be how to play the issue at 
the next session if it came under attack from some LBPs. Given that Australia had 
negotiated the text with the seabed miners any movement by Australia to support a 
supposed strengthening of the text could lead to a loss of credibility with that group, 
which could work to Australia’s disadvantage in discussions on the related anti-subsidy 
clause.
The anti-subsidies question was clearly much more difficult than the market access issue. 
The main problem here was that the seabed miners ‘could not accept a clause which was 
not “even handed”, that is to say, which prohibited the subsidisation of seabed mining
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but did not also prohibit the subsidisation of land-based production’.74 LBPs were not 
prepared to accept an ‘even-handed’ prohibition because the Convention was ‘not 
concerned with mining except mining from the seabed’75 and there was generally little 
interest from African LBPs.76 There were also other problems with Australia’s proposal. 
As noted before the socialist countries which include subsidisation of most industries had 
particular problems with a policy that was seen to intrude into domestic policy.77 
Another difficulty was what to define as a subsidy. As Chairman Nandan of the 
Negotiating Group on production policies observed: ‘it was noted that the practice of 
granting aid to certain growth industries by way of tax relief, investment credits, etc was 
widespread. This could make it difficult to establish that aid to seabed mining could be 
construed as discrimination’.78 In the end Chairman Nandan concluded that it was not 
possible to propose a text which would take account of all the points of view in a text 
which ‘gives a meaningful protection from unfair practices within the industry and at the 
same time not run the danger of intruding into the trade policies and domestic affairs of 
states’.79 The issue was thus extremely complex and one which appeared a difficult one 
for Australia to resolve. While the delegation had been successful in elevating the subject 
into a major issue in the conference over the previous two sessions it was by no means 
certain that Australia, with the support of other LBPs, could overcome the difficulties still 
outstanding on this question.
The most important issue to be resolved in Committee One was the issue of decision 
making in the Council.80 Australia participated in consultations with Ambassador Koh of 
Singapore on this issue and a paper by Koh presented to the Chairman of the First 
Committee drew on an Australian proposal that the Council should work by a consensus 
of interest groups.This was the ‘Brennan formula’ (named after the leader of the 
Australian delegation, though the idea originated with Ambassador Rattray of Jamaica) 
which provided a two tiered mechanism for decisions of substance.81 The main 
negotiations were between G77, Koh himself and the US, on the issue,82 with Australia 
not appearing to play a high profile role. The eventual agreement was a three tiered 
system for substantive issues and the only decisions taken by simple majority were 
procedural ones. The most sensitive questions, in particular rules covering seabed 
mining and distribution of benefits had to be adopted by consensus (defined to mean the 
absence of any formal objection).83 While many delegations expressed reservations on 
the new texts on decision-making ‘it was generally recognized that no other approach 
seemed likely to command general support’84 and in plenary Australia stated that the new 
system ‘provided the necessary measure of flexibility in view of the complexity of the 
issues w'ith which the Council would be dealing’.85
151
On financial arrangements for the Enterprise Australia had clearly given up the notion that 
it could unravel critical aspects of the financial package after its abortive attempt at the 
ninth session. Australia, however, voiced concern that there was a need to avoid any 
shortfall provision that may act as a disincentive to early ratification.86 The amendment 
to the text on this point was regarded by Australia as meeting that particular concern.87
Committee Two
Only one meeting of the Committee took place because the Chairman considered that any 
amendment to the text in ICNT Rev 2 would reduce rather than increase its prospects of 
becoming a consensus text.88 While the issue of revenue sharing was not discussed 
Australia continued to express its ‘acute difficulty’ both on practical grounds and on a 
point of principle.89 However, Australia’s views on the issue were now dominated by a 
desire not to jeopardise the delicate package on the shelf. Following on from a first 
meeting between the Australian Petroleum Exploration Association (APEA) and 
members of the Foreign Affairs Department in June 1980 APEA expressed a number of 
concerns relating to the revenue sharing article.90 The government now felt, however, 
that there would be:
considerable danger that attempts to spell out aspects of the text more 
definitely could result in clarifications to or interpretations of it which are 
contrary to the interests we are trying to protect. Moreover while other 
broad margin states share some of our difficulties they are concerned that 
any attempt to reopen Article 82 at this stage of the conference could not 
only result in a revenue sharing provision of greater detriment to broad 
margin states, but could also lead to a reopening of the provisions which 
give recognition to coastal states rights over the continental shelf, defined 
in terms of natural prolongation. Australia shares this assessment.91
For tactical reasons then Australia had given up the fight on this issue: the momentum of 
the conference and the desire by Australia to conclude proceedings meant that pressure 
from the offshore mining sector was resisted in Canberra. Similarly Australia did not 
wish to see other contentious issues opened for the same reason 92
Third Committee
The third committee met only to examine drafting proposals.93 Some broad margin 
states, including Australia, wished to reopen the question of MSR beyond 200 miles but 
‘soundings suggested that it would not be possible to secure a change helpful to them and 
so the idea was not pursued’.94 While Australia’s plenary statement that the regime for 
MSR beyond 200 miles still continued to create difficulty for several delegations it was 
significant that Australia did not associate itself directly with those concerns. Rather
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Brennan simply noted that negotiations in the third committee, like those in the second 
committee, had been essentially completed.95 Brennan’s statement gave a clear indication 
that Australia did not wish to open up issues that would threaten the early completion of 
the conference and Brennan’s judgement that the work of the third committee had been 
completed was officially endorsed in the Report of the Chairman of the Third 
Committee.96
Concluding Remarks
The great majority of speakers in the general debate in plenary agreed that the 
compromises that emerged at the session should be included in the revision of the text.97 
The Australian statement in plenary was generally supportive of the achievements of the 
session and the ‘achievements of the session matched Australia’s expectations of what 
might realistically be hoped for’.98 In particular from Australia’s point of view the 
further consolidation of the second and third committee texts was looked upon as a 
favourable outcome99 and in the first committee the inclusion of market access clause 
represented an improvement. While Australia had succeeded in raising the issue of the 
prohibition of subsidies to a major concern in the conference, it was not at all certain that 
the support from the potential seabed miners would be forthcoming.
The overriding goal of Australian diplomacy at the session appeared to be to concentrate 
on wrapping up the market access and subsidies issues so that the conference could finish 
its work. By the end of the session Australia was in fact optimistic that the tenth session 
would be the concluding session and that a Convention could be open for signature in 
September 1981. The tenth session, it was felt, would principally be a ‘mopping up’ 
operation with its main function to ‘reveal whether the world at large accepts or rejects the 
package that has been negotiated’.100 Australia at this stage was optimistic that 
developing countries and industrialised countries would accept the convention pointing to 
such benefits to developing countries as the EEZ, rights over archipelagic waters and 
shelf, the ‘common heritage’ principle and rights of seabed exploitation given to the 
Enterprise and increased coastal state powers over the marine environm ent.101 
Industrialised countries would also gain ‘substantial benefits’ and a rejection by them of 
the Convention would, Australia warned, give rise to ‘disappointment and bitterness 
amongst developing countries’.102 This was to be a prophetic statement by Australia as 
the US moved to a new phase in its law of the sea diplomacy.
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Tenth Session: New York. 9 March—24 March 1981
The tenth session103 proved against all expectations to be a lame duck session. This was 
a direct result of the announcement by new the United States Reagan Administration that 
it had ordered a fundamental review of its policy in regard to the law of the sea. The US 
delegation spent little time at the session and not surprisingly the US decision had a 
serious impact on the work of the conference. From Australia’s viewpoint the most 
useful aspect of the session was growing support for a non-subsidisation clause, but 
overall the US decision meant that there were useful discussions only on a small range of 
issues.
United States Policy Review
All expectations that the tenth session would finally witness the conclusion of a 
Convention were dashed one week before the session when the new United States 
Reagan Administration, that took office in January 1981, announced a policy review of 
the entire draft Convention and instructed its delegation to seek to ensure that the 
negotiations did not end until that review had been completed.104 The previous leader 
and several other members of the US delegation were removed barely forty-eight hours 
before the session105 and as a consequence the new officials were not active at the 
session.
The review took nearly twelve months and presented the US from effectively 
participating in both the 1981 sessions. The US decision was motivated by complex 
factors relating to fears about the precedent creating effects of the deep seabed regime as 
well as substantive aspects of the mining text as well as changes in US perceptions on the 
value of a law of the sea treaty.
The main thrust of the objections were directed towards Part XI of the Convention—the 
regime dealing with deep seabed mining. Republican critics voiced two classes of 
objection here. First were objections to specific provisions in the text, such as the 
provisions on the transfer of technology or the provision for a Review conference. More 
serious were the ideological objections that essential concepts in the Convention were 
unacceptable. Here Republicans did not like the idea that an inter-govemmentally owned 
corporation could mine the seabed in competition with private enterprises; that the new 
Seabed Authority should have sources of revenue which would make it independent of 
the annual appropriations of States parties and that an industry should be subject to 
international regulation.106
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What concerned Australia was the effect US action could have on the conclusion of a 
comprehensive Convention. In contrast to many in G77 that spoke in strident terms 
against the US in plenary,107 Australia’s public statement, while making clear Australia’s 
concerns about the effect of the US move, sought as far as possible to ameliorate the 
position of the US delegation. In what appeared to be an attempt to ensure than the US 
would not suffer so much embarrassing criticism within the conference that would 
prevent it from rejoining at an early date,108 Australia’s Keith Brennan elaborated at 
length on Australian interests in the law of the sea and pointed out that it was an 
‘important objective of his country’s foreign policy that some of the doubts which existed 
in international law should be removed and that some imaginative new concepts, which 
had already secured very wide support, should be recognized’.109 Brennan went on to 
point out that Australia like many other delegations saw ‘no possibility’ that Australia’s 
ocean interests could be secured otherwise than under a single widely-accepted 
international Convention. Brennan stated that:
He hoped that the United States delegation would give due weight to the 
objectives and views of his Government in its review of United States 
policy; those objectives were widely shared by the conference, and there 
was no possibility that they could be achieved otherwise than through a 
single widely-accepted international Convention. For any delegation to 
suggest that it might not accept those basic ideas might have the unintended 
consequence of putting at risk the attainment of those objectives. He 
therefore urged that the area of uncertainty be narrowed as much as 
possible and as quickly as possible. The resumption of negotiations on the 
understanding that those basic ideas represented a consensus would be in 
the interest of all delegations.110
Brennan also attempted to point to the gains that American mining companies would 
secure from the treaty.111 Without the guarantee of an unchallengeable right to mine 
many companies would not be prepared to risk the large amounts of investment needed 
for deep seabed mining.112
While Australia’s public stance was conciliatory on the US need for review113 in private 
Australia registered its deep concerns more forcefully to the US. Australia argued that a 
serious interruption to the negotiating process might jeopardize the attainment of a 
Convention. Representations were made by the leader of the Australian delegation,114 
and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Street in discussions with US Secretary of 
State Haig during the session.115 Mr Street told Haig that Australia’s interests would 
best be protected by an early adoption of a comprehensive and widely supported 
C o n v en tio n 116 and that if a Convention was put at risk by the US review ‘both 
Australia’s vital interest and the strategic interests of the United States could be at 
risk ’.117 Similar representations during the course of the session were made by Sir
Nicholas Parkinson, the Australian Ambassador to the United States to the Deputy 
Secretary of State, Mr Williams Clark.118 The Australian government hoped that the US 
review would be completed quickly so that a Convention ‘in which Australia has vital 
interests can be adopted as soon as possible’.119 Australia recognised, nevertheless, that 
it was unlikely that the US review would be completed by the next session to be held in 
August.120 Australia’s real worry of course was not just that the US review would delay 
the conclusion of a Convention but as one journalist shrewdly observed that ‘the US 
might decide to pull out of the treaty negotiations altogether or that the Third World 
Countries might become impatient with America’s new objections to the treaty and go 
ahead without it’.121
Given the US action the main question now facing Australia appeared to be how to work 
so as to ensure that there was no overall breakdown of the conference. Australia would 
now have to rethink exactly how it should approach the task of securing a Convention, in 
the light of a serious risk that if the US pressed for substantive changes to the Draft 
Convention (based on objections to the seabed mining text) then the consensus text could 
unravel very quickly.
First Committee
While the first committee saw some discussion on the so-called Preparatory Commission 
(Prepcom) whose function was to make arrangements to enable the Authority and its 
organs to function as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Convention,122 
Australia concentrated its attention around its drive for an anti-subsidy clause. (Expected 
attempts by some LBPs to strengthen the market access clause did not eventuate) .123 
Discussion on the subject proved limited because of the US review but Australia took the 
view that it was important to keep up momentum on the issue for if there was no 
discussion on it at the tenth session it could have proved difficult to reopen.124 Australia 
clearly took some heart from the fact that within the LBP group it had picked up increased 
interest with support from the Latin American producers.125
It appeared, however, that Australia’s position differed from other members of the LBP 
group on the relative merits of the non-subsidisation clause as opposed to the production 
formula. Whereas ‘several members’ of the group saw the non-subsidisation clause as 
complementary to the production control formula Australia apparently hoped that the 
clause would replace the formula.126 While ideally Australia appeared to favour a 
situation where there was no production control formula and the non-subsidisation (and 
market access) clause(s) stood alone the thrust of Australian diplomacy was to see an 
anti-subsidy clause included in the text and Canberra was clearly prepared to accept a
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situation where such a clause would augment a production formula.127 There was 
criticism from a number of delegations from developed countries that it was dangerous to 
reopen the whole production control issue.128 The overall result of Australian diplomacy 
on the issue was in fact successful in so far as the issue was kept alive for resolution at a 
future session, a reasonable result given the US position to review its policies towards 
the conference made it impossible for the conference to engage in substantive 
negotiations.
Committee Two
As the US indicated that it was not in a position to negotiate Committee Two issues it was 
not possible for real negotiations to take place.129 The Chairman of Committee Two 
indicated that delegations should not reopen issues which had been the subject of 
negotiations over many years.130 Nevertheless G77 were adamant that the issue of 
innocent passage of warships through straits should be reopened so as to require prior 
authorisation or at least notification of passage to the coastal state.131 The proposal by 
the Philippines and others132 absorbed the attention of the committee for most of the four 
meetings.133 The US delegation report stated that of the approximately 70 speakers on 
the subject, roughly one half opposed the amendment and one half favoured. Those who 
opposed were split between those who spoke to the substance of the article and those 
who thought that the Committee text had been ‘highly negotiated’ and should be be 
reopened.134 Australia’s remarks straddled both views135, although Australia was 
aligned here with both the major maritime powers, including the eastern bloc in 
opposition to the change.136
The other issue that received attention in the Committee was a proposal by the United 
Kingdom to amend a position in the Draft Convention (article 60(3)) which provided that 
abandoned or disused oil installations or structures should be entirely removed. This was 
the legal situation as provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, but the UK argued that the provision was too onerous as the costs of entirely 
removing installations or structures would be enormous.137 The UK proposal was to link 
the requirement to remove installations to the need to ensure the safety of navigation and 
other lawful uses of the sea, such as fishing.138
The interest of reconciling the needs of fishing interests, navigation and the marine 
environment made this a potentially difficult issue particularly given the late stage at 
which the UK introduced its proposal. However the UK move received a surprising 
degree of support.139 Australia supported the U K ’s initiative to have the issue of 
offshore rig abandonment reopened, a reversal of policy by Australia and driven in part
by domestic pressure from the mining industry and state governments and in part by a 
recognition that a reopening of the article was not likely to unravel other parts of the 
text.140
In his report to Plenary the Chairman of the Second Committee stated that there was a 
virtual consensus that it was not desirable or practical to reopen discussion on the basic 
second Committee issues, which, while they did not in all cases represent a consensus, 
were the formulae that come closest to commanding general agreement. He went on to 
point out that it might be possible to introduce minor changes to supplement or clarify the 
Draft Convention provided they commanded the necessary support but that the text as a 
whole was acceptable to the great majority of delegations.141 The danger here of course 
was that any widespread attempt by the United States to reopen and renegotiate articles 
within the Second Committee’s interest could lead to a flurry of counter-actions by other 
delegations. It was that situation which Australia no doubt hoped would not eventuate at 
the next session, 142 although it was recognised in Canberra that with the US policy 
review most likely not to be completed the resumed session ‘might be a difficult one with 
the possibility of the United States being seriously at odds with the developing 
countries’.143
Third Committee
No substantive work took place on Third Committee issues as the Third Committee had 
earlier completed its work at the informal stages of proceedings on parts XII, XIII, XIV 
of the ICNT. One meeting of the Third Committee was held to determine if there was 
any wish to reopen discussion on any item .144 The most significant intervention was 
from the United States that reminded the Committee of its position that as far as the US 
was concerned all of the Draft Convention was within the scope of its current review .145
Concluding Remarks
The US review meant that the session proved to be disappointing in resolving 
outstanding issues.146 Some progress was nevertheless made. The work of the Drafting 
Committee in preparing the final form of the different language texts was ‘one of the 
more encouraging aspects of the work of the session’.147 From Australia’s viewpoint it 
was also encouraging that the eligibility of the Cook Islands and Nuie to be parties to the 
Convention was accepted in principle as well as other categories of associated states, 
such as in due course, the United States Pacific Trust Territories. Australia spoke, along 
with other countries from the Pacific region, in support of this outcome and the issue, 
unlike other aspects of participation, proved to be non-controversial.148
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Nevertheless there was no escaping the fact that the conference had run into serious 
trouble. The fact that there emerged no consensus about the purpose of the resumed 
session was ‘further grounds for misgivings’ .149 Australia could only hope that the 
outcome of the US review would not reopen the whole package, for as the delegation 
remarked ‘there have been clear warnings from the conference that there will be major 
difficulties ahead if the result of the review is that the Untied States seeks too many 
substantive amendments to the Draft Convention or seeks fundamental changes in the 
approach that has been taken to the regime for the exploitation of the resources of the 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction’.150
Resumed Tenth Session: Geneva. 3 August—28 August 1981
On a number of occasions between the announcement of the US policy review and the 
opening of the resumed tenth session the Australian government made representations to 
the US government on the importance it attached to securing a widely accepted 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the value it attached to the United States 
participation in such a Convention.151 The US had not in fact completed its review 
before it came to the session and the US delegation was under instructions to keep open 
all options, including the option that the United States might ultimately disengage 
completely from the negotiations.152 The United States had a long list of ‘concerns’ the 
negotiability of which the US delegation was under instructions to assess without 
entering into actual negotiations. Because the US delegation ‘was not in a position to 
negotiate, its “concerns” could not be heard in any of the negotiating bodies of the 
conference. Consequently, it had to have recourse to informal procedures in order to air 
its “concerns” and test their negotiability’.153 Most of the American ‘concerns’ were 
with the seabed regime and voting in the Council,154 but by the middle of the session the 
US delegation was at loggerheads with the rest of the conference. Even sympathetic 
delegates were fed up and one journalist observed that only efforts by other delegates to 
break the deadlock allowed the session to end without great tension.155
Australia’s Response to US Action
Australia’s general approach to the US position was to ‘volunteer’ its services in 
generating an atmosphere for discussion of US views and work for the adoption of 
procedures to assist in averting any breakdown of the conference. The delegation ‘did 
everything possible to assist the United States Delegation in having its “concerns” 
listened to and in being given every opportunity to assess the negotiability of those 
“concerns”.’ 156
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The G77 in informal plenary sought to highlight the dangers of the US undoing a 
delicate package of compromises and that no one state could be justified in upsetting 
the entire package by attempting to renegotiate settled issues.157 In Australia’s 
statement Keith Brennan generally supported the sentiments expressed by the G77. 
After oudining the reasons why the conference had been convened and stating that the 
Australian government had concluded that it would best protect Australian interests 
through a comprehensive and widely accepted Convention Brennan argued that while 
Australia supported the present text there was some scope for changes,158 and that 
the US demands be at least considered by the conference.159
In response, the US made clear it was not bound by a flawed text and advised that the 
current text would not obtain the consent of the Senate.160 Australia’s stance in wishing 
to pursue a dialogue with the US was more conciliatory than many other countries as 
‘many delegations wished to avoid an open ended commitment to renegotiate when the 
United States had not affirmed its support for a treaty in principle and was not in a 
position to make concrete proposals or to give an exhaustive list of its problems’.161 The 
real problem was that US, in refusing to co-operate with Koh, labelled themselves as 
intransigent in the eyes of moderate delegates, on whom they had to depend if they were 
to get anything at all for the United States.162
Australia’s wish for negotiations with the US on areas of its concern was partly realized, 
however, when informal consultations were convened by the President of the conference 
and the Chairman of the First Committee.163 At these informal meetings the leader of the 
US delegation delivered an eight point statement of US concerns which covered the 
whole gamut of the seabed mining regime.164 Australia’s tactic in these negotiations was 
to stress the fundamentals of the package, although leaving some scope to reexamine 
some of the provisions in Part XI (the seabed mining section).165
Despite Australia’s conciliatory plea for some consideration of US concerns the fact was 
that the US was not in a position to negotiate nor offer concrete proposals. The basic 
criticisms by the US to the treaty were essentially ideological, and with the change of 
leadership from Carter to Reagan, seabed mining was elevated to top priority ahead of the 
political and military interest in freedom of navigation and overflight. In this situation 
there was little Australia could do to alter that situation, apart from assisting the US in 
having its concerns aired and listened to by others, but negotiations proved impossible 
without the US.166
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Anti Subsidy Issue
On other first Committee issues Australia was, however, able to make progress on the 
insertion of an anti-subsidies or ‘unfair practices’ clause, with the Chairman of 
Committee One encouraging ‘serious consultations’ on the matter.167 Discussions with 
potential seabed mining countries revealed that to be negotiable any such article should 
not go beyond obligations they had already accepted under existing multilateral trade 
agreements (for example GATT) and that the article should avoid duplicating existing 
international dispute settlement systems.168 Australia was the most visible protagonist on 
the issue and arranged three informal meetings of the LBPs to discuss the anti-subsidy 
proposals. 169 It was evident that there was a degree of suspicion on the part of some 
LBPs that Australia may have concluded an arrangement with the US to ditch the 
production formula for an anti-subsidies clause.
Australia’s intervention to the LBPs170 seemed to satisfy the LBPs that Australia was not 
out to throw over the production formula for the group was able to produce a text which 
was read into the formal records of the conference. 171 In his statement to plenary the 
leader of the delegation, who had been invited by the Chairman of Committee One to 
present the results of Australia’s consultations on the issue,172 made it clear that Australia 
regarded the negotiated text as so eminently reasonable that seabed miners would have 
difficulty in refusing it. In particular it was evident that Australia and other LBPs were 
convinced that a clause which went beyond the obligations accepted under existing 
multilateral trade agreements would not be negotiable with the seabed miners.173
Applying the GATT rules and the GATT dispute settlement procedures did not satisfy all 
the LBPs174 but at that stage it was probably about the best that could be achieved in the 
circumstances. Nevertheless the plenary session ‘witnessed the strange sight of the 
British delegate speaking on behalf of the whole European Community against the 
inclusion of this anti-subsidy clause’.175 Britain said that interested parties had not made 
progress towards consensus and that they did not consider it appropriate that such a 
clause be included in the Convention .176 The statement was relatively mild but 
Australia’s Keith Brennan ‘robustly’177 replied that he could see no reason for this 
opposition since the obligations under the clause were the same as those accepted by all 
industrialised countries under GATT, and that there were provisions on that subject in 
agreements between Australia, the United Kingdom and members of the EEC. Brennan 
added that the unfair economic practices clause had commended itself to several Asian, 
African and Latin American delegations and he hoped the UK reservations would be 
withdrawn.178 No other formal comments were made on Australia’s statement.
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The only other First Committee matter where progress was made was on the selection of 
a site for the International Seabed Authority and the Law of the Sea Tribunal.179 On a 
vote Jamaica was chosen for the site of the Authority and Hamburg for the Tribunal. 
Australia supported both the winning candidates. It was somewhat surprising that 
Australia did not support its regional neighbour Fiji for the site of the Authority given that 
Fiji was an important member of the Oceania group at the conference, a group that 
Australia had given strong support. However, the reason appeared to be that Australia 
had already committed itself to support Jamaica in 1975 at a time when Jamaica was the 
only candidate in the field.180
Other Issues
The most noteworthy advance in the second committee came on the delimitation issue 
(which Australia had not played a direct role). Both the leaders of equidistance and 
equitable principles group confirmed that they would support a new text which was 
inserted in the revised Draft Convention181 which eliminated any reference to median or 
equidistance line and limited the entire provision to a rule of delimitation by agreement 
that did not, as such, purport to lay down a normative rule to be applied in the absence of 
agreement.182 As Australia’s main interest had been to try and ensure that the principles 
in any Convention were flexible enough to cover all particular circumstances and that 
emphasis was placed on effecting delimitations by agreement the compromise here met 
Australia’s concerns.183
Other issues such as offshore installations and innocent passage of warships (where a 
number of delegations expressed a desire for change that would require prior 
authorisation) that were the subject of corridor discussions were not discussed in Second 
Committee despite attempts by several delegations to have the matters raised.184
Concluding Remarks
While Australia made progress on the anti-subsidy front its main diplomacy was focussed 
on trying to create an atmosphere whereby US concerns could be discussed. To some 
extent it was successful in so far as the US was given the opportunity to air its concerns 
in informal gatherings which allowed it to assess the ‘negotiability’ of those worries but 
as noted earlier Australia’s position was hamstrung because the US refused to even co­
operate with the conference President in the negotiations.185 The danger therefore that 
the Convention could still be scuttled was still real. G77 were unwilling to renegotiate 
substantive parts of the seabed mining provisions and the US was still not in a position to 
negotiate until its review process was completed. US participation was really now the
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main outstanding issue. Australia’s Keith Brennan argued shortly after the session that 
‘the fact that the Americans were able to gain the hearing they did and that moves to 
formalise the Convention for signature were staved off enables the Session to be rated as 
successful’.186 To the extent the session survived the strains of the uncertainty of US 
intentions Brennan’s view seemed reasonable. Australia’s position was to stress the 
fundamental consensus package of the Convention, including Part XI, but being prepared 
to leave some possibility for meeting American concerns if that was at all feasible.187 
W hether that was a realistic option was becoming increasingly doubtful for many 
delegations, largely those of G77, made it clear that although they would prefer the US to 
participate in the Convention, they intended to ensure that a final Convention on the Law 
of the Sea would be open for signature in later 1982, whether or not the US was ready to 
jo in .188 For the US part it was now also becoming increasingly clear that what the new 
Reagan Administration wanted was to dismantle the provisions on the seabed and replace 
it with an ideologically ‘sound’ free enterprise system that would amount to exploitation 
by only the most technologically advanced states.
Eleventh Session: New York. 9 March—30 April 1982
The eleventh session concluded on 30 April 1982 with the adoption of the text of a 
Convention. The Convention and the accompanying resolutions were adopted by a vote 
of 130 in favour, 4 against (Israel, Turkey, United States of America, Venezuala) with 17 
abstentions. Australia voted in favour of the Convention. The session was dominated by 
the diplomatic effort, in which Australia played a leading role, to bring some resolution to 
US concerns, but in the end the US decided to stand aside from the Convention because 
of what it regarded unacceptable elements in the seabed mining regime.189
Australia and US Policy
Australia’s determination to get the US back to the negotiating table was evident when 
less than one month after the resumed tenth session, the Government and Opposition 
voted unanimously in the Parliament for a motion urging the US to join with the rest of 
the world in working for a successful conclusion of the conference at the next session.190 
Speaking in support of the motion, the shadow spokesman on Foreign Affairs Lionel 
Bowen (who proposed the motion), elaborated at length on the importance of the 
conference to Australia and its Pacific neighbours and argued that ‘the greatest single 
power in the world and our ally, the United States, has thrown the success of the project 
into doubt’ as the US had made no final commitment to attend the eleventh session.191 
Bowen referred to a conversation with a Prime Minister of one of the ‘leading Pacific 
countries’ who told him that the US would not have a ‘friend left in the Pacific’ if it did
not co-operate. The Opposition nor the Government wanted to see that happen, argued 
Bowen.192 Seconding the motion, Foreign Minister Street stressed the importance of the 
conference to Australia as ‘an island continent with extensive off-shore areas and heavily 
dependent on international trade’193 and explained that Australia’s hope that the US 
would work towards a successful conclusion of the conference was one ‘widely shared 
around the world.’ He pointed out that the Forum countries in the Pacific had suggested 
that the conference be discussed at the next Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting.194 The Leader of the Australian delegation was also publicly warning that if the 
US withdrew from the negotiations it would ‘divide the world’.195
By December 1981, the Australian government was growing increasingly impatient at the 
nine months it had taken for the US to complete its review and come to a decision on 
whether to rejoin the negotiations.196 The US finally made its decision to rejoin the 
conference after completing its review on the 29 January 1982, but the six objectives 
announced by President Reagan were judged by the leader of the Australian delegation to 
be so general that it was not possible to determine whether they would involve few or 
many changes to the Convention.197 Nevertheless, both he and Foreign Minister Street 
welcomed the US decision with Street expressing the hope that the US would adopt a 
constructive attitude towards achieving a comprehensive and widely accepted 
Convention.198 As noted above, the Australian delegation leader viewed President 
Reagan’s objectives as too general to judge whether they would involve many changes to 
the Convention but speaking just prior to the final session he was clearly down playing 
the problems ahead. Just prior to the final session, Brennan told a seminar at Columbia 
University attended by leaders of delegations, that it was the view of many in G77 that an 
agreement had already been reached which met substantively Mr Reagan’s requirements 
and that in recent sessions ‘scores’ of amendments were made in the text in the interest of 
seabed miners.199
Brennan urged the US not to overload negotiations in the first weeks of the session on 
matters which had been brought to finality and pointed out that it was unrealistic to expect 
the conference to alter its position on issues which had already been exhaustively dealt 
with. It may be difficult, Brennan asserted, to secure a reopening of matters simply on 
the grounds that the US would like to reconsider them.200 Indeed, in addressing a 
number of US concerns relating to seabed mining Brennan argued that while Australia 
would prefer the production ceiling not be included in the Convention (and reminded his 
audience that Australia had attempted to have it deleted) ‘our experience leads us to 
believe that no Convention will be open for signature which does not contain something 
close to the present text’. He went on to state that Australia would welcome some 
measure of simplification of the system for approval of contracts, pointing out that the
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Australian delegation had identified 17 obstacles which an applicant would have to 
overcome which would not prevail if he were applying for a licence in Australia, but 
poured cold water on US hopes to change decision making procedures in the Council. 
He gave mild encouragement for the US demand to reexamine the issue of transfer of 
technology stating that Australia would like to see some loosening up of the provisions 
which might scare investors.201 The thrust of Brennan’s remarks were thus to point out 
that from Australia’s viewpoint US demands for fundamental changes to the text were not 
practical, but marginal amendments were possible.
Indeed, Brennan only a few days prior to the session made it clear that Australia would 
make every effort to ensure that the US join a final treaty.202 While not predicting how 
the session would turn out, Brennan was ‘encouraged’ that President Reagan chose to 
use the word ‘objectives’ when discussing United States’ areas of proposed change in the 
treaty, rather than outlining a hard and fast list of demands.203 Australia’s cautious 
optimism was, however, soon disappointed. During inter-sessional meetings the US 
representatives had communicated the Reagan objectives in the form of a comprehensive 
paper without suggesting specific language. The Group of 77 however rejected such 
language.204 The United States in a response prepared a set of between 150 and 200 
amendments based on the most extreme of its proposals which became known as the 
‘Green Book’.205 Australia was dismayed at what ‘would have involved the unravelling 
of dozens of critical compromises that had been agreed in the years leading up to 1980, 
many on the insistence of the USA itself. In their totality, they seemed to us (i.e. the 
Australian delegation) to go far beyond what was necessary to secure President Reagan’s 
six objectives. It was immediately apparent that such far reaching proposals could only 
be counter-productive’.206
After considering the amendments for two days, the Group of 77 rejected the Green 
Book, even as a basis for negotiations. The conference was therefore deadlocked.207 At 
the initiative of Canada the leader of its delegation convened a meeting of the following 
eleven delegations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The Netherlands subsequently joined the 
group. The group became known variously as the Group of 12, Group of 11, the 
Friends of the conference and the Good Samaritans.208 Australia along with Canada, 
Norway and Denmark, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and 
Switzerland submitted proposals on four key areas where changes appeared possible 
without completely undermining the seabed regime.209 What followed was a period of 
‘delicate maneuvering’210 involving a certain amount of ‘shuttle diplomacy’211 by 
Australia and the G 12 to initiate discussion on the points of substance dividing G77 and 
the US and the other potential seabed miners— UK, France, FRG and Japan— the so-
called Consultative Group of Five.212 The Group of 12’s credibility was assisted by the 
fact that representatives participated in their personal capacities and were not permitted to 
advance their own nations positions in the Group,213 but there were problems for both 
G77 and the US in the Group of 12 proposals 214 In plenary Australia referred to the 
necessity for negotiations between G77 and seabed miners and urged that essential 
elements be addressed if consensus was to be reached.215
While Australia’s head of delegation was optimistic two weeks before the end of the 
session that consensus would be found,216 in the end the response from Washington was 
an apparent rejection of the Group of 12 proposals. The deputy leader of the US 
delegation later suggested this may have contributed to a ‘tragic failure of communication’ 
within the conference.217 The US only fully accepted the Group of 12 package on the 
final day of the conference but by then it was too late.218 The President did not feel able 
to put forward all of the amendments proposed by the Group but the text of the 
Convention contained important concessions by G77 to the US.219 It was the view of 
the Australian delegation that the conference came within hours of consensus and did not 
in fact because there was lack of time to properly consider the Group of 12’s 
proposals.220 From Australia’s view it was indeed ironic that one of the major stumbling 
blocks for the US in securing improvements in areas that it regarded as critical in the text 
was its insistence until almost the very end that the production ceiling should be totally 
eliminated.221 It was exactly those provisions which Australia had tried unsuccessfully 
to remove at the ninth session but which Australia had publicly emphasized just prior to 
the final session were an integral part of any final Convention.222
On the issue of Australia’s drive for an anti-subsidy/unfair practices clause Australia was 
finally successful. The detailed negotiations on the issue have been recorded elsewhere 
and it is not proposed to duplicate that history here.223 In broad outline Australia224 was 
joined for the first time directly by Canada to push for the clause. The clause was also 
supported by the LBPs but some expressed reservations about the references to the 
GATT in the proposed revision, (in particular they did not accept that disputes arising out 
of the interpretation of the provision in the Law of the Sea Convention should be referred 
to another dispute settlement procedure). Most industrialised countries opposed the 
proposal taking the view that the matter should be left to GATT. By the end of the fourth 
week four delegations specifically referred to the subject in plenary with Australia, 
Canada and Zaire supporting the inclusion of such a proposal and the US considering it 
not appropriate.225 The Reagan administration opposed the idea, largely as a tactic to get 
the necessary bargaining leverage that would permit the production ceiling formula to be 
deleted.226 Australia and Canada worked closely together and co-sponsored an anti
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subsidies proposal227 which in general debate drew support from Argentina, Zambia and 
Zaire.228
Opposition was expressed by a number of European Community delegations and by 
Japan both in formal plenary229 and in informal negotiations.230 The United States said 
the proposal was ‘totally unacceptable on the grounds which included the consideration 
that under the Draft Convention being negotiated it might be necessary for some seabed 
mining countries to subsidize their companies’ operations’.231 What followed was a 
complex set of negotiations involving Ambassador Nandan of Fiji undertaking (at the 
request of the conference President) negotiations between Australia, Canada, France, 
FRG and the United States232 which eventually led to a text being included in the final 
Convention.While a watered down version of Australia’s early draft it was still one 
which Australia felt provided something that Canberra could ‘hang its hat on’ in relation 
to subsidisation by acknowledging the competency and primacy of the GATT to seabed 
mining.233
Other Issues
Many suggestions were put forward at the final negotiating session that had failed to gain 
sufficient support to be included in revisions of the Draft Convention. A number were 
important from Australia’s viewpoint.234
First, a number of states from G77 attempted to reintroduce the issue of prior 
authorisation or notification of warships through the territorial sea235 and a large group of 
states introduced a formal amendment which would have given a coastal state the explicit 
right to make laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea 
for the prevention or infringement of its security laws.236 This amendment was 
understood to mean that the coastal state would be able to make laws and regulations 
requiring prior authorisation and notification for innocent passage of warships.237 
Australia joined maritime powers and the superpowers in arguing that ‘if the traditional 
right of innocent passage was subject to the authorisation of a coastal state, it would no 
longer be a right but merely a facility to be granted at the discretion of the coastal states. 
Similarly, a requirement of prior authorisation could be used to impede or suspend lawful 
innocent passage’.238 Before the amendments on the issue could be voted on, the 
President prevailed on the sponsors to withdraw saying that if they were pressed and 
voted on the prospects of achieving consensus would be destroyed.239
Australia felt that an important objective at the session was to get acceptance of the UK 
proposal on abandoned or disused offshore structures.240 The UK introduced a
proposal241 that was supported by Australia242 and thirteen other states243 when it was 
first introduced. Later in second committee Australia again spoke in support of the 
proposal along with 21 other countries.244 The proposal by the UK was the only 
substantive change made in the Draft Convention outside the area of seabed mining and 
represented an often quoted example of the utilisation of the consensus procedure in the 
conference.245 The article would permit partial removal of offshore structures provided 
adequate provision was made for the safety of surface and sub surface navigation and 
provided that rights of others, particularly fishermen was protected.246
The straddling stocks issue with which Australia had become associated through its co­
sponsorship of an earlier proposal that sought to place coastal states and harvesting states 
under an obligation to reach agreement on conservation measures for such stocks was, in 
the end, withdrawn in the hope that the Convention might be adopted by consensus.247 
From the viewpoint of the Australian fishing interest it was probably no great setback for 
as noted earlier Australia’s support for the proposal had more to do with solidarity with 
the Coastal States Group.
On the issue of straits, a common understanding on the application of the Convention to 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was presented to the conference by Malaysia on 
behalf of the littoral states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore). As well as the three 
littoral states, the states participating in the understanding were Australia, FRG, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States (France took note of the understanding and the 
confirmatory letters).248 The issue here had arisen because an amendment proposed at 
the fifth session of the conference which sough to amend the SNT while allowing straits 
states to enforce laws ‘limiting the right of transit passage of vessels, which because of 
their insufficient under keel clearance, constitute a grave danger to safety of navigation or 
to the marine environment of that state’.249 The maritime powers were unwilling to 
introduce an exception into the text to cover straits with ‘special peculiarities’ and the 
states bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore ‘then took the approach that the best 
way of protecting their interest would be to enter into an understanding with the major 
users of the Straits, including Australia, on the purposes and meaning of Art 233 of the 
Convention (which related to enforcement or threatening major damage to marine 
environment of straits) in its application to those straits’.250 Australia first participated in 
the preparation of this statement at the resumed seventh session but as a minor user of the 
strait Australia’s role was fairly limited and consisted largely of offering comments on 
various US draft statements.251
Finally, it should be noted that Australia participated ‘actively’ in the discussions on the 
question of which entities other than states (such as international organisationas and
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national liberation movements) would be able to participate in the Convention252 and in 
the work of the Drafting Committee and of the English language group.253 From 
Australia’s viewpoint the most important aspect of the participation debate was that 
entitles such as Cook Islands and Niue and (at a later stage) the US Trust Territories 
could participate in the Convention.254
The Adoption of the Convention
On 30 April the Convention and its accompanying resolutions came up for adoption. The 
US delegation notified the President in writing that it wished the Convention to be put to 
a vote.255 The Convention and the accompanying resolution were adopted by a vote of 
130 in favour (Australia) 4 against (Israel, Turkey, the US and Venezuela) with 17 
abstentions (Belgium, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Thailand and East 
Europeans). Three potential seabed mining industrialized states voted in favour—Japan, 
France and Canada.256 Australia’s immediate reaction to the adoption of the text of a 
Convention was to describe it as an event of ‘historic occurrence’ culminating years of 
endeavour by the international community.257 The fact that the Convention was not 
adopted by consensus with the US voting against the adoption and the abstention of UK, 
FRG and USSR, was regarded by Australia as a ‘bitter disappointment’.258 Four days 
after the session had ended the Foreign Minister stated in Parliament that the adoption of 
the Convention had ‘brought one step closer the objectives of this Government, and, 
indeed of the Australian Parliament, of getting a comprehensive and widely accepted 
international Convention...’.259 The Foreign Minister went on to state that it was:
disappointing that the text was not adopted by consensus, and it was 
particularly disappointing to us that the United States voted against the 
Convention. We understand the concerns of the United States ... but I 
hope that, as the heat of the debate cools in the aftermath of the conference, 
the United States and other countries which did not support adoption of the 
Convention will carefully reconsider their positions as the Convention is 
open for signature. I hope that they will look again at the advantages of 
working within a secure and agreed international framework, even though 
it might be at some cost to their own national goals. I hope they will agree 
to do that.260
The government’s hopes were dashed on this score when on 9 July President Reagan 
announced that the US would not sign the Convention. At bottom the US rejection was 
based on ideological objections to the text and domestic politics. The President stated that 
while the United States approved of ‘those extensive points dealing with navigation and 
overflight and most other provisions of the Convention’ it could not support the 
provision in the Convention relating to the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction.261 Free market philosophy had it appeared finally dictated
US policy, but at the end of the day US domestic politics saw the Reagan Administration 
turn its back on multilateralism. Republican opposition and the US mining industry 
hostility to UNCLOS 111 to the seabed regime in the end determined US policy.262
Two days later the Australian Foreign Minister expressed fairly muted criticism of the US 
decision pointing out that the government was ‘disappointed’ in the US decision, that the 
Convention offered substantial navigational and resource benefits to Australia and that a 
Convention would provide a secure and agreed framework for all aspects of the uses of 
the seas. He pointed out that the government had urged the US to look more favourably 
on the negotiations and that the US decision could weaken the effectiveness of the 
Convention and was a ‘setback to those many countries that had worked so hard to try 
and ensure that the new Law of the Sea was supported by global consensus’.263 The 
government specifically stated that it shared the concerns of those countries that if the US 
tried to mine the seabed outside national jurisdiction there could be ‘serious repercussions 
for international relations, particularly in the North/South context’.264
In the autumn of 1982 President Reagan sent a personal emissary, former Secretary of 
Defence Donald Rumsfield, to EEC capitals and to Japan to encourage those countries not 
to sign the Law of the Sea Convention.265 Australia made clear it had absolutely no 
sympathy with this approach for when Canberra announced its decision to sign the 
Convention on 18 November 1982 it specifically gave as one of its reasons the fact that 
by signing the Convention Australia would be in a better position to encourage other 
countries, including regional states, to sign early and to influence attitudes to the new 
Convention.266 The Foreign Minister stated that Australia’s decision was based on a 
number of factors, including the achievement of Australia’s long-term objectives of 
freedom of navigation and access to living and non-living resources: ‘If countries with 
substantial maritime interests were not to support the Convention, difficulties over transit 
and resource exploitation arrangements would almost certainly increase’.267 The 
Minister also stated that the decision would allow Australia to participate fully in the work 
of the Preparatory Commission whose task was to prepare detailed rules and regulations 
for the operation of the International Seabed Authority and the Law of the Sea Tribunal. 
While Australia would have preferred seabed mining provisions ‘based more on the 
operation of free market forces’ the provisions were the ‘best that could be negotiated in 
the circumstances’.268
At the signing ceremony in Jamaica in 6-10 December 1982269 the leader of the 
Australian delegation in a lengthy statement emphasized the importance of the package 
deal nature of the Convention, the ‘historic’ achievements of the conference and rejected 
any attempt by states to work outside the seabed mining regime in the Convention.270
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Australia was one of 117 states that signed the Convention on the day it was opened for 
signature (10 December 1982) in Jamaica—never before had so many countries signed a 
Convention on the first day.271 For Australia, as for many delegations, it was not the 
end of their work, but it was the achievement of the goal of the conference after 14 years 
of negotiation—eight at UNCLOS 111 itself and six in the SBC.
CHAPTER EIGHT
AUSTRALIA’S ROLE AT UNCLOS 111
This chapter in concerned to provide an overview of Australia’s role at UNCLOS 111. It 
was noted earlier that UNCLOS 111 was the most ambitious intergovernmental 
conference in diplomatic history. The complex political processes involved in multilateral 
conference diplomacy with the importance of key individuals, issue linkages and group 
politics is nowhere better illustrated than the structure and process of negotiations at 
UNCLOS 111. Again as noted earlier much of the negotiations at these kinds of 
conferences is simply not observable to the outside analyst where negotiations take place 
in informal networks and groups. In the case of UNCLOS where there is a paucity of 
formal records and where group politics dominated the problems of evaluating the role of 
a single state actor are compounded. Nevertheless the approach taken here is to analyse 
the material from chapters four to seven in order to provide an overview and 
understanding of Australia’s role at the conference.
Australia’s various roles at the conference largely derived from the set of objectives that 
Australia established at the start but important aspects of Australia’s UNCLOS diplomacy 
were shaped by the imperatives of alliance building and conference politics. The game of 
ocean politics demanded the players adjust to the demands of multilateral political 
negotiations and Australia, like other players, found itself selecting goals and 
compromises that were not always to its liking. How well Australia fared in the 
negotiations and the reasons why the outcomes were favourable for Australia are reserved 
for the next chapter. The emphasis in this chapter is, however, on Australia’s role within 
the structure of ocean politics as it was played out at UNCLOS 111. Australia’s role can 
be considered under the following: initiator, group player, mediator and ‘Package Deal’ 
custodian.1 These categories are not meant to suggest that a particular activity can only 
be seen within the context of one particular role. Clearly aspects of Australia’s wide 
ranging diplomatic activity at the conference spill-over into more than one role e.g. an 
initiative to mediate. Nevertheless the four roles elaborated here encompass and broadly 
delineate the wide ranging diplomatic and political activity of Australia over the life of the 
conference.
Initiator
Australia’s broad goals at UNCLOS were to increase the rights of the coastal state to 
control offshore resources. Thus it supported the extension of the territorial sea to twelve
miles, the 200 mile EEZ and sought a formula to secure shelf rights to the edge of the 
continental margin. Apart from the margin claim these goals were in line with the broad 
trends of the conference and the whole development of the coastal state movement that 
had been developing prior to the conference. This point is taken up in the next chapter 
but the point to note here is that in terms of Australia's overall role in the conference there 
were few occasions when it can be said that Australian goals required it step outside of 
group politics at the conference and undertake an independent initiative to seek specific 
Australian objectives. (Attempts at mediation and protecting the package deal are , 
however, relevant here and are considered below.)
In the area of Committee One Australia’s main interests were first to reconcile the 
conflicting views of the developed and developing countries, which was seen as the 
prerequisite of obtaining a comprehensive Convention (see below). Second, Australia 
was interested in protecting its nickel production from deep seabed mining that may have 
had an impact on w'orld nickel markets. Australia, along with Canada, is sometimes 
given credit for first suggesting a parallel system in which the ISA and private companies 
or state enterprises would conduct mining operations alongside each other but on separate 
sites.2 Certainly Australia was an early proponent of a parallel system and its formulation 
in the SBC for an International Seabed Operations Organisation mirrored the eventual 
system in the Convention. On Committee One issues Australia independently pushed for 
market access and anti-subsidies clauses. Its attempts, however, to have production 
controls deleted proved to be simply unacceptable. The production control idea was 
accepted as an integral part of the Convention and Australia’s initiative simply came too 
late in the conference. Similarly Australia’s late initiative to reopen some of the finely 
balanced compromises on the financing of the Enterprise in an attempt to reduce what 
were seen as the commercial advantages enjoyed by the Enterprise was unsuccessful. 
Neither the G77 nor the seabed miners saw any advantage so late in the day to renegotiate 
this issue.3
In Committee Two the coastal state issues of high priority were negotiated— the margin, 
EEZ, fisheries and navigational questions and Australia attached highest priority to this 
committee. Australia’s independent attempt to oppose the concept of revenue sharing did 
not meet with any success as other margin states accepted the fact that some gesture 
would need to be made to the conference (particularly the LLGDS group) in order to win 
acceptance for the margin claim. Australia’s isolation on the issue did not see Australia 
formally accepting the provision but did witness a change in tactics from one of high 
profile vociferous opposition to a quieter policy of participating in negotiations with a 
view to minimizing the financial impact for coastal states. Australia’s opposition did not, 
as indicated, see the removal of the revenue sharing provision but its hard-line stance that
a mandatory obligation to share revenue was inconsistent with the sovereign nature of a 
coastal states’ rights may have assisted the Margineers Group in countering more extreme 
demands for revenue sharing and probably provided some negotiating coin to the 
Margineers in the negotiations regarding such issues as the rate of payments and the area 
in which revenue sharing would apply.
In the fisheries area Australia’s early 1972 proposal (with New Zealand) was an attempt 
to strike a middle ground between DWFN and coastal states. Later Australian 
delegations endorsed the earlier approach and the principles of coastal states rights and 
duties relating to fisheries in the final Convention are very similar to those in the earlier 
Australian/New Zealand paper.4
In Committee Three Australia was largely left by itself from 1976 to fight for a provision 
which would give coastal states a limited degree of discretionary rights in relation to 
special areas and at the fifth session initiated and successfully negotiated the provision 
which basically appeared in the Law of the Sea Convention. While the final compromise 
was weaker than Australia would have liked Australia’s initiative was in the face of 
determined opposition from the maritime powers.
Australia also found itself in a minority position at the sixth session on the issue of 
coastal state enforcement powers. In opposing the power of arrest in the EEZ Australia 
found itself at odds with the overwhelming majority of coastal states and several of the 
maritime powers that accepted the right of arrest as pan of an overall package.5
For the most part the actions of other states and sometimes events outside UNCLOS set 
the agenda throughout the negotiations and provided the negotiating boundaries within 
which the Australian delegation operated. The broad trend towards coastal states rights 
meant that there were few occasions where Australia was required to step outside the 
general structure of conference politics.
Group Player
As discussed earlier UNCLOS 111 was dominated by group politics. In any multilateral 
negotiations, and particularly one of the size and scope of UNCLOS 111 no state can 
hope to achieve its objectives by acting along. As Nye points out patterns of influence 
within conference diplomacy are often different from what could be predicted from 
current or underlying structural indicators, such as size of GNP or military strength.6 
Even in the case of the superpowers there is a necessity to build up support from other 
delegations, although of course the number of such delegations will vary from issue to
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issue and also relate to the size of negotiations. In the case of UNCLOS 111 where the 
rules of consensus prevailed it was critical for states to work with other states as 
negotiating partners in order to achieve their goals.
Through the life of UNCLOS an enormous number of groups were formed and like most 
states at the conference Australia soon realized that no one group would serve to realize 
Australia’s broad interests at the conference. (The role of compromise groups is 
discussed below.) The range of issues at UNCLOS combined with the geographic 
attributes of states created a diverse patch-work of interest groups that did not fit neatly 
within the existing geographic or political groupings within the United Nations. 
Nevertheless, Australia right from the beginning of the conference had a clear view that 
its overriding goal at the conference was to push for its coastal state interests. That is not 
to say defence and trade interests in maintaining freedom of navigation across EEZs, 
straits and archipelagos were ignored. Indeed, Australia’s interests in seaborne trade and 
freedom of mobility for its navy and its allies invariably saw Australia line up with the 
major maritime powers on most navigational issues. However, the desire by Australia to 
seek broad resource rights in offshore areas and a desire for a more effective regime for 
the protection of the marine environment, though one which emphasized internationally 
agreed measures (as opposed to unilateral coastal state action), meant that on many issues 
related to its coastal state interests Australia was opposed to entrenched maritime 
interests.
Thus Australia’s role in the overall conference was played out for the most part in those 
groups which were often opposed to the positions taken by friendly Western States 
which were adopting more maritime positions. Clearly the view was taken that for 
Australia to realize its objectives to achieve greater rights and control over offshore areas 
then it would be necessary for the delegation to have the widest choice of negotiating 
partners and to choose those partners on the basis of particular issues.7 Australia’s 
influence at the conference stemmed in large part from its ability to build coalitions. This 
was related both to the technical expertise of the delegation and its diplomatic skill, (see 
Chapter Nine).
Australia’s choice in joining the Coastal States Group was significant in terms of building 
coalitions. That group was a major actor within the conference and pushed for interests 
that would expand coastal state resource control and improve coastal protection. It was 
the major group in opposition to the maritime group whose basic position was to protect 
traditional high seas freedoms. As a member of the Co-ordinating Committee of the 
group Australia was an important player and saw the group as possibly the main political 
support for many of Australia’s policy goals against not only the maritime group but also
175
against the LLGDS group on delimitation of shelf issues as well as on fisheries matters. 
That is not to argue that Australia’s role within the Group was always easy. At times 
Australia no doubt felt uncomfortable with the more territorialist states in the group— 
those that favoured a 200 mile zone more akin to a territorial sea. At times Australia’s 
membership of the group seemed to restrict its ability to achieve preferred outcomes such 
as in the area of dispute settlement. Here a desire by Australia to keep in step with the 
group’s views saw Australia adopt a kind of grudging acceptance of the watered-down 
version of the disputes settlement provisions that Australia preferred. Similarly the 
statement of the Group at the resumed eighth session on US policy on challenging 
territorial sea claims was stronger than Australia preferred. On the whole, however, the 
decision to join and actively participate in the work of the group undoubtedly raised 
Australia’s profile at the conference.
The active role taken by Australia in the Group also allowed Australia to demonstrate its 
support at the conference for the interests of the developing world, as the group was 
predominantly made up of developing countries. Particularly relevant here was 
Australia’s support in Committee One for a seabed regime that would benefit the 
developing world. Australia insisted throughout the conference that developing countries 
could not be simply spectators in the development of seabed mining. Australia’s 
identification with the developing world on Committee One issues through its diplomacy 
in the Coastal States Group was also self-serving and involved some general trade-offs, 
for Australia clearly recognized that forming strong relationships with many of the 
developing countries was critical for the success of many Australian positions. In 
Committee One Australia’s position of general support for the developing countries was 
based partly on tactical considerations: Australia did not wish to create the impression 
that it was attempting to grab every last inch of marine resources (through its margin 
claim) while not making any attempt to secure a seabed mining regime that would take 
into account the particular needs and interests of developing countries.8 On the other 
hand Australia was at times able to build up its support for its margin position within the 
Group.
Australia’s diplomacy within the Group also served the broader foreign policy goal of 
support for the developing world. From the start of the conference the Labor government 
and from 1975 the Liberal/National Party government generally gave strong support to 
demands by the developing world for a new international economic order. Indeed, from 
1975 when the Liberal Party assumed power Prime Minister Fraser made himself an 
‘earnest advocate of the Southern position in the North-South dialogue’ and from the US 
viewpoint ‘tiresomely insistent on...global negotiations for a New Economic Order’.9 
From the start of UNCLOS the north-south conflict was the major backdrop against
which conference negotiations were played out, and the G77 saw the oceans as one area 
where there was an opportunity to decrease the widening gap between the rich and the 
poor states. Australia’s role within the Coastal State Group complemented the broader 
thrust of Australian foreign policy here, which was to take a higher profile in support of 
the interests of the developing world in its overall foreign policy. As an active and 
influential actor within the Group10 Australia developed a reputation in the conference as 
a reliable interpreter of the views of developing states.11
The work of the Margineers group was also extremely important in its goal of ensuring 
that a Convention would state unequivocally that the sovereign rights of the coastal state 
extend to the edge of the margin. Australia’s Keith Brennan often assumed the role of 
spokesman for the group.12 Australia devoted an enormous amount of its diplomatic 
energy in pushing its margin claim through the activities of the Margineers, in particular 
opposing the LLGDS, the Arab states and the Soviet Union. From about 1975 the 
margin claim looked like it would be accepted within the conference, but as noted earlier 
Australia’s role within the group was to reject the quid pro quo on revenue sharing. The 
problem of finding a satisfactory formula for delimitation of the margin saw Australia 
accept the Irish formula even though it felt it involved some compromise from Australia’s 
support for the principle of natural prolongation. Support for fellow Margineers was a 
factor in Australia’s support for the Irish formula. That formula combined with the extra 
cut off limits found in the final formulation reflected the anxiety of Margineers not to 
‘prejudice unduly the significance of the common heritage of mankind. This was...all the 
more necessary while a fair number of states, led by the Arab group, were pressing for a 
limitation of the continental shelf to a breadth of 200 miles’.13 Australia adopted a high 
profile role in the group on the issue of oceanic ridges largely because the delegation was 
advised that significant areas of margin were at stake. However, its preference not to 
have the issue even raised was unsuccessful mainly because the Soviet Union with 
support from developing coastal states saw some potential for abuse in the Irish formula. 
Australia, along with other Margineers recognized that a Boundaries Commission might 
be useful in over-coming the fears of those countries that argued that it was not possible 
to delineate the outer edge of the margin and in limiting discussion to a technical tribunal 
(thus avoiding the possibility of other states contesting the delineation by reference to 
dispute settlement procedures). Australia’s work with other Margineers did not pay off 
here as the recommendatory body they had in mind was not reflected in the final text. The 
role of the Margineers was critical to Australia’s campaign to building support within the 
conference for the margin claim and resisting attempts to set the margin at 200 miles. 
Australia was a leading actor in the group. The fact that early in the conference it 
appeared that Australia’s margin claim would be successful undoubtedly strengthened
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Australia’s drive to find compromises on other issues that would bring about a final 
Convention.
The Land Based Producers Group also permitted Australia to pursue its goals to protect 
its metal export interests. Probably because of a certain ambivalence about the value of 
production controls Australia was not a prominent supporter of such controls and was not 
invited to attend early meetings of the group formed by Canada. However, the group 
later turned out to be an important vehicle for Australia’s later goals on market-access and 
anti-subsidy clauses. Australia and Canada were the only developed states in the group 
and Australia’s interests as an exporter of minerals likely to be mined from the seabed 
were thus opposed by other industrialized countries who were all importers of those 
minerals. Australia’s role in the group from 1976-1980 was, however, to let Canada 
make the running on the issue, adopting the view that any formula acceptable to the 
miners and Canada would be acceptable to Australia. In 1980 Australia’s relations with 
the group suffered a setback, when the delegation unsuccessfully attempted to adopt a 
‘free market’ approach to the issue. Whatever the strain in relations caused by Australia’s 
policy reversal here it did not do lasting damage to Australia’s reputation in the Group: 
Australia was able to build up support for its anti-subsidies drive although its success in 
securing the market access clause was largely achieved in spite of other LBPs. Certainly 
in the case of the anti-subsidies drive it would have been improbable that Australia’s 
campaign would have been successful without the support of the LBP group.
The Oceania Group permitted Australia to support the ocean aspirations not only of its 
Pacific neighbours and G77 but also Australia’s support in the Group for the archipelagic 
concept (which was important to countries such as PNG, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands) permitted Australia to back the archipelagic aspirations of its Southeast 
Asian neighbours, Indonesia and the Philippines. From the start of the conference 
Australia made clear that it would ‘have in mind the interests of its friends and neighbours 
in the Pacific area and Southeast Asia’.14 Australia’s role within the group to achieve that 
aim was evident in several ways. First, Australia provided practical help through the 
conference to a number of members of the group in the form of secretarial assistance, 
reporting of developments in the conference and advice on tactics. This practical 
assistance over nearly a decade was not unimportant as a number of the smaller island 
countries simply did not have the resources to properly monitor the various committees. 
Second, Australia supported the demands by the Pacific countries that all islands generate 
an economic zone. At first Australia was instructed to adopt a flexible approach to this 
question15 but by the third session Australia support was strongly behind the principle. 
The delegation was active in supporting South Pacific states in resisting proposals to 
limit the maritime space to be generated by islands. Generally speaking Australia’s
support here was cost-free: not only was it in Australia’s interest that its own small 
offshore islands generate a 200 mile zone but also there was in fact surprisingly little 
opposition to restrict the rights of owners of islands to maritime space. This was partly 
because of the difficulty of devising an objective definition of an inhabited island that did 
not result in arbitrary distinctions between islands generating EEZ and shelves and those 
not, and partly because of the sympathy for the predicament of small, isolated and not 
very populous oceanic states.16
Third, Australia offered the group support, albeit more qualified than in the case of the 
islands issue, to the archipelagic principle. Speaking at the Caracas session of the 
conference, Foreign Minister Willesee stated that ‘several of his country’s neighbours 
were archipelagic states which were seeking a special status for the waters within the 
compass of their islands. His delegation was confident that a way could be found to 
recognize that status, while allowing defined rights of navigation along designated sea 
lanes’.17 Australia’s overall role on this issue was not to adopt a high profile but to offer 
support for the principle, whilst insisting that reasonably precise criteria had to be 
established to determine what was an archipelagic state and that adequate freedom of 
navigation and overflight should be preserved. The overall impression of Australia’s 
approach to the question within the group (and also in the wider conference) was to offer 
Australian support for the concept while making clear to the archipelagic states the need to 
accommodate the interests of navigation.
As far as the issue of archipelagic passage was concerned Australia stayed clear of 
negotiations here. The navigation question with respect to archipelagos and straits issues 
was largely played out in direct negotiations between archipelgic states and straits states 
and the major maritime powers. Australia’s approach here was largely motivated by the 
assumption that a solution acceptable to the military and maritime powers would be 
acceptable to Australian interests.18 In the sense that a high profile on navigational rights 
in straits and archipelagos ran the risk of alienating Australia’s regional friends, there was 
probably little point in Australia making a ‘song and dance’ within the conference about 
concerns that were being forcefully pushed by Australia’s major ally, the United States. 
There was also, of course, the possibility that in the event of the conference failing to 
reach agreement on this issue Australia would have had to fall back on bilateral 
arrangements with those states to ensure adequate passage rights through their areas. For 
that reason also there was probably little point in duplicating the work of the military 
powers, particularly the US. Sanger’s comment on Australia’s approach to the straits 
issue in the SBC years applies equally well to Australia’s approach to the issue of 
archipelagic and straits passage at UNCLOS 111: ‘Australia...tended to leave 
negotiations to the military powers in the user group (i.e. users of straits) because (it)
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knew (it)...could accept more regulation (designated sea-lanes, prior notification) than the 
nuclear weapons powers would’.19 For the reasons cited above this was probably a 
realistic strategy on Australia’s part: it lessened the risk that the delegation could be 
criticized by important strait and archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the Philippines 
and members of the Oceania group that Australia was simply promoting US interests.
Within the Oceania Group, Australia supported the rights of coastal states to control 
highly migratory species against the views of DWFN like the US, USSR and Japan. 
Control of tuna resources was of critical importance for the island countries of the Pacific 
where they were looking to their fishery resources in their ocean zones for long-term 
economic gain. Australia’s position was, however, not as strong as the island countries 
earlier in the conference, where Australia was promoting with New Zealand a more 
international approach to tuna management (albeit with the association of the coastal and 
fishing nations). With the Oceania group members opposing international management 
into the economic zone Australia was largely isolated within the group on the issue. 
From around the fifth session and in particular from the time of the South Pacific Forum 
countries decision in October 1976 to proceed with the establishment of 200 mile zones 
and in principle to establish a South Pacific fisheries agency (later endorsed at the Forum 
meeting in August 1977) Australia’s position on HMS was strongly and directly linked to 
the South Pacific states.20
Australia also supported the Oceania Group on issues relating to participation in the final 
Convention and co-sponsored a proposal on this issue.21 While the island countries in 
the group looked to Australia for support on issues relating to islands, archipelagos and 
HMS, Australia looked to the group for support on the margin issue. Although none of 
the group had margins wider than 200 miles members of the group did on occasions lend 
useful support to Australia’s claims (although not Australia’s objections to revenue 
sharing) on the margin beyond 200 miles.22 Australia in turn was able to offer support 
not only on the issues noted above but also its general orientation on seabed mining 
issues supported the aspirations of the developing island countries to ensure that the 
seabed mining regime offered advantages to the developing world.23
The Oceania Group proved to be a most useful regional grouping for Australia enabling 
the delegation to assess not only the views of the region on Law of the Sea issues but 
also served to provide a window into G77 views, thus enabling Australia to gain a greater 
understanding of G77 thinking. (Because the straits and archipelagic issues were 
dominated by direct negotiations between the maritime powers and individual states in 
Southeast Asia, the Oceania group was a more effective vehicle for Australia to tap the 
thinking of G77 than the ASEAN states). The group maintained close co-operation
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throughout the conference and its stature within the conference was assisted here by the 
importance of a key figure within the group—Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji who at 
various times chaired NG4, was Rapporteur of Committee Two and Chairman of the 
Group of 21.24 Apart from the Latin Americans the Oceania group was probably the 
most cohesive of the regional groups,25 and caucusing and lobbying together as the 
Oceania Group ‘was perhaps the first experience the countries of the Pacific had of 
working together at the international level’.26 Such cohesiveness was not disturbed in 
any real way by virtue of PNG’s different position on prior authorisation or notification 
of warships.27 The one issue that could have potentially served to disrupt Australia’s 
relations with the group were the negotiations between Australia and PNG on the Torres 
Strait. PNG was a member of the ‘equitable’ principles school on delimitation issues28 
where Australia avoided taking sides. However, PNG supported the Australian position 
that existing negotiated boundaries should remain,29 and while at times the Torres Strait 
issue spilled over into PNG’s UNCLOS diplomacy it did not do so in a way as to 
undermine the group’s cohesiveness at the conference.30
Australia’s membership of the West European and Others Group did not undermine the 
support for members of the Oceania group. WEOG mainly functioned for electoral 
purposes, organisation and procedural matters and as Miles notes, Australia (along with 
Canada and New Zealand) constituted a sub-group within ‘this very diverse group of 27 
countries and on law of the sea issues (was) closer to the Group of 77 than to other 
advanced countries’.31 Nor did Australia’s alliance with the US exert any great leverage 
over the Australian delegation’s ability to act within the group, despite the fact that 
Australia’s position on a number of issues was opposed by the US (see next chapter).
Mediator
Australia at various times throughout the conference adopted the role of mediator either in 
compromise groups in which it was invited or initiated, or by presenting statements of 
positions in formal and informal meetings. Such statements took a number of forms 
from detailed oral analysis of a problem, to presentation of draft articles or papers. 
Australia’s skill at organizing coalitions was also evident in its role of mediator.
The possibility of acting as a conciliator to moderate opposing positions and finding some 
middle ground in multilateral diplomacy is ‘usually open when an actor has no direct 
stake in the negotiations and is not associated with a strong viewpoint on the issue’.32 
This observation was generally true as far as Australia’s mediatory role was concerned 
although on occasions (such as the EEZ) Australia did attempt to play a mediatory role 
where it was directly concerned with the outcome.
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In Committee One, Australia had few direct interests at stake apart from protecting its 
metal exports as no Australian mining interests were seeking to participate in seabed 
exploitation. Australian policy was basically to ‘steer a middle course between the 
aggressive demands of Western mining interests and the ideologically opposed 
developing states with Australian delegates Mott, Bailey, Harry and Keith Brennan 
seeking to bring about compromises between the main parties’.33 ln NG1, 2 and 3 and 
later in the Working Group of 21 Australia consistently adopted middle ground positions. 
Apart from a strong desire not to see the collapse of the conference (see next section), 
Australia’s mediatory policy in Committee One was also based on tactical considerations: 
a conciliatory policy on seabed mining was seen as useful in building support for 
Australia’s margin claim in Committee Two. In the end of course Australia could not 
determine the outcome of the seabed regime, for other states basically set the agenda.
Australia played an active role in two of the most important compromise groups of the 
conference— the Evensen Group and the Castaneda group (where Australia’s Keith 
Brennan became the Chairman after Castaneda became the Foreign Minister of Mexico). 
These groups played an extremely important role in the conference in getting compromise 
solutions to a number of difficult issues in Committee Two and Three. Australia’s 
participation in the Evensen group inter-sessional meetings allowed Australia to have an 
opportunity to contribute to the work of the group. On the EEZ issue Australia was 
concerned that a final solution on its legal status not compromise navigation rights but 
this did not prevent the delegation from pursuing a mediatory role between the more 
extreme territorialists in the Coastal States Group and the United States. To what extent 
Australia was successful here is difficult to say as there is nothing on the public record 
concerning the details of these negotiations, although Australia’s proposal on the EEZ at 
the fourth session was not pushed for lack of support from both camps. The most that 
can be safely said with respect to Australia’s mediatory efforts on the EEZ issue was that 
it played a ‘prominent’ part in the work of the Castaneda Group34 whose product was 
incorporated in the ICNT at the end of the sixth session.
On the MSR issue Australia played a leading role in promoting a settlement. Australia’s 
goals were to some extent conflicting here. On the one hand Australia had limited 
capabilities to conduct MSR and therefore argued that the coastal states should have 
adequate power to control and regulate activities in its offshore area with regard to 
resources and the preservation of the marine environment. On the other hand from the 
scientific viewpoint Australia’s interest was as much that of a researching state. In the 
past many Australian scientists had worked in foreign waters and for an understanding of 
important aspects of Australia’s marine environment it was necessary for research to be 
carried out in foreign waters (in particular waters adjacent to Indonesia, PNG and New
Caledonia).35 These two concerns led Australia to take a middle of the road stance on 
MSR as a solution acceptable to the researching states and coastal states was always 
likely to be acceptable to Australia. Australia at various times throughout the conference 
proposed compromise texts and initiated private meetings of moderate states to find 
solutions to the problems surrounding MSR .36 The latter course was tactically not 
without risk: in forming private groups the reputation of the Chairman and his delegation 
were at stake. Compromise texts could result in criticism not only of the proposal but 
also the Chairman.37 Australia’s efforts in the MSR did not appear to have attracted any 
adverse reaction even though efforts late in the conference to meet some of the concerns 
of the US on the MSR issue saw Australia adopt a more accommodating position than 
some of its allies in the Coastal States Group. In adopting such an attitude it appeared 
that Australia’s emphasis early in the conference for a fairly strong coastal states rights 
orientation with respect to MSR shifted slightly at the end towards a greater degree of 
support for the value of freedom of scientific research.
On the marine environment issue Australia’s position shifted from a fairly strong coastal 
state position to a more middle of the road view that sought to reconcile the interests of 
shipping with adequate protection of the marine environment.38 The best example here 
was Australia’s compromise proposal (included in the final Convention) on the issue of 
coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea relating to vessel source pollution that had 
been on-going from the second to the sixth session.39
In the area of navigational issues Australia generally sided with the maritime powers but 
did play a role in group discussions which sought to clarify the circumstances where 
innocent passage could be suspended.40 In the area of dispute settlement Australia 
participated in the private group on this issue which saw Australian actors Harry and 
Lauterpacht play active roles (Harry being a co-chairman of the group). Australia was 
one of eight members of the group that submitted a working paper to the conference 
containing alternative texts on basic provisions of a chapter of the Convention on dispute 
settlement.41 The working group in fact made a ‘significant contribution towards the 
evolution of the disputes settlement part of the final convention’.42 In the mediatory role 
Australia’s proposal at Caracas on procedures for the conference contributed to the 
compromise solution that was reached on the rules of procedure 43
Custodian of the Package Deal
Right from the start of the conference Australia made it clear that it wanted a 
comprehensive and widely accepted Convention. Critical to the achievement of that goal 
was for states to accept certain articles that may not meet their interests in order to achieve
an overall Convention: ‘Implicit in this package deal concept was the assumption that the 
Convention should meet the minimum interests of the largest possible majority while 
accommodating the essential interests of the major powers and the dominant interest 
groups...implicit in this package deal concept was that there would be trade-offs and 
reciprocal support between various claims...’.44
Australia’s role in Committee One can be largely seen in terms of Australian delegates 
ensuring the survival of the ‘package’ approach. Australia’s interest in a comprehensive 
treaty meant that ‘no-one issue should threaten to collapse negotiations. When it soon 
became evident that the seabed mining issue was going to be the most difficult to resolve, 
Australia worked hard to ensure that the issue did not threaten the whole law of the sea 
conference’.45
Australia’s protests at Caracas against US unilateral action in regard to seabed rights, its 
pleas to the US for patience in the light of US intentions to enact legislation for unilateral 
seabed mining were evidence of Australia’s desire not to see a collapse of the ‘package 
deal’ approach at the conference. Australia’s moderating role at the resumed eighth 
session in the Coastal States group on negotiations on how to respond to US policy on 
challenging territorial sea claims wider than 3 miles was also (partly) motivated by a 
desire to protect the prospects of securing widespread agreement for a final package 
approach to a Convention.
Similarly, Australia’s warnings early in the conference against unilateral offshore claims 
was motivated by a fear that the package approach may be undermined. It could be 
argued that when Australia joined in 1976 with other South Pacific states to introduce 200 
mile zones that Australia’s commitment to a final package was weakened. By that stage 
of the conference, however, it was already clear that the conference by incorporating such 
provisions, had already succeeded informally legitimating such action. In that sense the 
timing of Australia’s announcement did not really appear to be a contradiction of its role 
of protecting the integrity of the UNCLOS negotiations. In fact Australia delayed 
introducing the formal legislative changes to implement the zone until April 1978 and the 
zone was not proclaimed until 1 November 1979. When the government introduced the 
amendments to the Fisheries Act to assert jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 miles in April 
1978 it stated that one of the reasons for the delay was the ‘desire to work towards a 
comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention’ and that the extension of the zone by 1979 
was not likely to be prejudicial to agreement in other areas.46 There was no doubt, 
however, that the unilateral declaration of EEZs and fishing zones did contribute to a 
hardening of the position of certain coastal states on the issue of access by LLGDS.47
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Nowhere was Australia’s role in promoting the ‘package deal’ more evident than in its 
work at later stages in the conference to bridge the gap between the US and developing 
countries. Australia clearly recognized that the US action of reviewing the treaty risked 
collapse of the negotiations and that an eventual Convention without the US would be a 
weaker treaty than one to which it was a party. The ANZUS treaty was to play no part in 
moderating the US stance. The delegation while stressing that the failure to achieve a 
comprehensive Convention would have adverse effects on Australia’s interests tried to 
assist in generating an atmosphere in which the US views of Australia’s alliance partner 
could be discussed. Australia’s effort was most concentrated at the final session in the 
Group of 12 but in the event consensus could not be reached.
Australia’s defence of the ‘package deal’ in order to arrive at a comprehensive and widely 
accepted Convention needs to be seen in the context of broader concerns of Australian 
foreign policy and its overall ocean policy goals at the conference.
First, much of the discussion in Committee One was viewed by the developing countries 
as arriving at a seabed regime that would ensure real benefits to the developing world. 
Throughout the period of the conference, as noted earlier, Australia supported demands 
by developing countries for a new international economic order. Part of that support 
from the period of the Liberal government’s assumption of office in 1975 was based on a 
belief that if the demands of the developing world were not at least partly met then many 
of these countries would turn to more extreme solutions and look away from the West to 
realize their demands for international justice.48 A breakdown at UNCLOS would have 
been viewed by the developing countries as a sever blow in their search for a new 
economic order.49 Australia’s efforts to preserve the grand package approach must 
therefore been in the context of the wider Australian foreign policy objective to minimize 
the strains in North/South relations.
Australia’s role in preserving the package deal also complemented Australia’s broader 
support for the United Nations in general and its role in the multilateral treaty making 
process in particular. Through the period of the conference Australia had given strong 
support (particularly in the period of the Whitlam Labor government) to the work and 
principles of the United Nations.50 A breakdown in the ability of UNCLOS to deliver a 
widely accepted package Convention would certainly have undermined confidence in the 
UN as an institution to find solutions to pressing international problems and thus been 
regarded by Australia as constituting a set-back for the institution.
Australia had also supported the work of the UN in multi-lateral treaty making and 
wished to improve that role. In what was later described to be a ‘timely’ initiative51
Australia proposed in 1975 that the United Nations undertake a study of the multilateral 
treaty making process within the UN.52 Australian Foreign Minister Peacock speaking 
before the General Assembly in 1976 noted Australia’s call the previous year for a review 
of the process by which the international community legislates and argued that ‘the ways 
in which were approach multilateral treaty making area are varied, chancy, frequently 
experimental and often inefficient. They place great burdens upon the governments of 
members—especially upon the developing countries. And it is open to question whether 
the community could not find more economical and efficient methods of drafting 
Conventions’.53 Peacock’s comments served to underscore the fact that Australia did 
take the role of the UN in multilateral treaty making very seriously. Canberra’s support 
for the integrity of the UNCLOS negotiations thus demonstrated its wider commitment to 
the UN in its law-making role.
Finally, Australia’s role of trying to ensure the integrity of the multilateral bargaining 
process must also to be understood in the context of what Canberra perceived as the costs 
of conference failure. As Professor Shearer has observed: ‘If one could put Australia’s 
objective (at UNCLOS 111) into one word or phrase it was stabilisation of the 
international law of the sea. What was sought was some stable basis upon which 
national claims to seabed resources and jurisdiction in maritime areas could be 
harmonised and put on a clearer basis than was previously afforded by the interaction of 
customary international law and the earlier Geneva Conventions’.54 Australia’s goal of 
seeking greater certainty in the Law of the Sea would not have been achieved if the 
conference had broken down. Indeed Australia saw the conference as vital in 
overcoming the uncertainties that had emerged on ocean law in the 1960s.55
Protecting the integrity of the international negotiations was thus vitally linked with 
Australia’s assessment that a comprehensive and widely accepted package would restore 
some certainty and predictability to international ocean affairs and that a breakdown could 
see a reversion to the disorder of the 1960s. The costs of such a reversion in terms of a 
strong possibility of creeping jurisdiction and a greater possibility of conflict over living 
and non-living resources were perceived by Australia to be significant enough to work 
consistently throughout the conference to ensure that a comprehensive and widely 
accepted treaty would be produced.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has sought to analyse Australia’s role at UNCLOS. It has been argued that 
Australia’s role was affected both by the nature of the objectives to achieve greater control 
over offshore areas and more generally by broader foreign policy concerns. Interests in
securing rights to the shelf to the edge of the margin, a fisheries regime favourable to 
coastal states, a stable regime for transit through straits and archipelagos and a clear basis 
for the assertion of coastal state rights over pollution matters in the EEZ could all be 
argued to have been dominant goals, since Australia took a strong position on these 
issues (although leaving the running on navigational issues to the maritime powers). 
Australia’s reactions and responses to such issues as revenue sharing, MSR beyond 200 
miles, and shelf rights were strongly influenced by considerations of sovereignty 
protection.
Priorities in Australian goals did of course alter over the conference— for instance there 
appeared to be more emphasis on the marine environment in the early years while issues 
relating to MSR increased in importance later with US moves to introduce a separate 
regime for MSR beyond 200 miles. The issue of protecting metal exports via anti­
subsidies and market access clauses ‘took off’ later in the day. The margin goal was the 
top priority over the life of the conference. Direct trade-offs were for the most part 
unnecessary for as different alignments formed around various issues there were in fact 
few areas where states could sacrifice one set of interests to achieve others. By and large 
Australia’s approach to the negotiations was functional and focussed on issues, and 
policies evolved in the course of negotiations.
Did Australian policy goals undergo substantial alteration as a result of conference 
diplomacy? It would appear that Australia’s position on revenue sharing was moderated 
by reluctantly accepting its isolation on the issue and policy changed from vocal 
opposition to trying to moderate its effects. Australia’s position on HMS was altered by 
the views of the Oceania group. Its acceptance of a watered-down version of its disputes 
settlement preferences resulted in large part from the imperatives of diplomacy within the 
Coastal States Group. The acceptance of the Irish formula was partly motivated by the 
need to keep in step with the Margineers. Other shifts such as a stronger emphasis on the 
interests of shipping in environmental controls or a desire for a greater coastal state 
flexibility on rig abandonment are less easily explained in terms of the imperatives of 
UNCLOS diplomacy, although support for the UK on the latter issue was partly the 
result of the fact that the UK proposal gained enough support not to threaten opening up 
other Committee Two issues. It is possible to suggest that a shift in Australian policy on 
MSR late in the conference that placed more emphasis on freedom of research for MSR 
(as opposed to coastal state rights) was due to a desire to meet US concerns on the issue 
in order to bring the US into a Convention.
The most striking aspect of Australia’s role was, however, the fact that Australia’s initial 
goals remained substantially the same despite certain alterations of emphasis and one
major alteration in priorities (the late move against production controls and the goal of an 
anti-subsidies clause). The only two major gaols that were effectively abandoned were 
the goals of seeking revenue sharing removed and the objective at the ninth session to 
have production controls dropped. None of the changes (apart from the move to a ‘free 
market’ approach on the production control formula) constituted significant departures in 
policy direction but for the most part were really tactical shifts to accommodate the 
changing patterns of conference diplomacy. Nye has observed that the politics of 
conference diplomacy are a special political process in which ‘influence in the conference 
is not the same as power outside the conference’.56 UNCLOS 111 with its emphasis on 
consensus, group politics, coalition formation and issue linkages opened up the 
possibility for smaller states to play an influential role within the conference. Australia 
was able for reasons examined in the next chapter to take advantage of the structure of the 
conference to exert influence at UNCLOS 111 beyond its economic or political weight.
Australia was one of the leading actors at UNCLOS 111 and Australia’s policies played 
an important role in shaping the final Convention. Edward Miles, a close observer of 
UNCLOS diplomacy, included Australia in a list of the twenty five most influential 
countries at the conference and Australian delegates Harry and Lauterpacht in his list of 
the 36 most influential individuals at UNCLOS.57 Professor Nye includes Australia in a 
list of 20 important countries at the negotiations.58 Two most important figures at the 
conference (including one of the most important players) include Australia in a list of 
fifteen of the most active and influential members of the 76 member Coastal States 
Group.59 Sanger includes Australia in an illustrative list of 6 countries that achieved 
more ‘clout’ at the conference than they would normally have expected at the international 
level.60 President Carter’s Special Representative on Law of the Sea Issues, Elliot 
Richardson, pointed out that Australia had been resourceful at developing approaches to 
difficult issues and that the Australian delegation had a ‘high degree of respect and 
influence’.61 Timagenis lists Australia (along with Canada and New Zealand) as one of 
the developed states that played leading role as coastal states at all fora (UNCLOS as well 
as the IMO) on marine pollution issues.62 One of the leading figures at the conference 
described Australia’s delegation leader Keith Brennan as a ‘pillar’ of UNCLOS 111,63 
while another observer has pointed out that Brennan was ‘trusted by everyone’ and 
worked without credit on some of the most intractable problems in Committee One.64 
Given that more than 150 nations attended UNCLOS (virtually every country in the 
world) and that between 2000-3000 delegates attended most sessions these judgements 
testify to the diplomatic skill and effort by Australia over the life of the conference. They 
also underscore the importance with which Canberra attached to the negotiations. 
Australia’s overall goal in the conference it was suggested was to realise its coastal state 
interests in a setting where the main division was between coastal and maritime interests.
Australia’s broad foreign policy goal of supporting the thrust of the arguments of the 
developing world on North-South issues happily coincided with Australia’s interests as a 
coastal state, for most of the Coastal States Group were developing countries. Thus 
Australia was able to demonstrate its support for developing states while fairly 
aggressively pushing its own coastal state concerns. That fact raises broader implications 
for the future direction of Australian foreign policy that are sketched in the concluding 
chapter.
CHAPTER NINE
AUSTRALIA, THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 
AND AUSTRALIAN SUCCESS
This chapter first outlines the structure of the final Convention and argues that it went a 
long way towards meeting those objectives that Australia worked for during the 
conference. In the light of that analysis, the second section considers the reasons for 
Australia’s success at the conference. While it is suggested that broad trends in the law 
of the sea favoured Australia, other factors are necessary to explain Australia’s successful 
and influential role at the conference. The chapter concludes by considering whether the 
UNCLOS 111 experience carries any lessons for future Australian participation in global 
conferences.
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
The final Convention is a mammoth document running to over 320 articles.1 It is not 
proposed to outline the Convention in any detail here. The author has provided a broad 
overview elsewhere2 and there is now a sizeable literature analyzing various aspects of 
the Convention.3 What is proposed here is simply a summary discussion of the 
Convention in terms of how it meets Australia’s objectives as outlined by Australian 
negotiators through the conference.4
Resources and National Limits
On the continental shelf the text incorporates the Australian position that the coastal state 
exercises control to the edge of the continental margin.5 This was the dominant goal of 
Australia throughout the conference. As Australia’s shelf extends beyond 200 miles it 
was felt that a limit of 200 miles would compromise Australian sovereignty and Tose’ 
offshore resource rights. In two areas relating to the continental shelf the Convention did 
not meet Australian objectives. These relate firstly to making payments or contributions 
in kind in respect of the exploitation of the margin beyond 200 miles (Art. 82) and second 
the provision relating to the powers of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (Art. 76(8) and Annex 11). As we have already seen Australia opposed the 
revenue sharing provision throughout the conference but in the end accepted it as part of a 
final package. It has not, however, formally accepted the revenue sharing provision.6
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Coastal states must submit information on their shelf limits to a Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Commission makes recommendations to the 
coastal state on matters related to these limits. Following this procedure, the outer limit 
would be firmly fixed.7 Australia while supporting the establishment of a Commission 
preferred that the Commission be advisory only and not make its own determination of 
the outer limits.
As well as incorporating Australia’s position on the limits of the margin the Convention 
also incorporates Australia’s position on the territorial sea limits. The Convention 
provides that nations can adopt a 12 mile territorial sea (Art. 3), finally settling an issue 
left unresolved from the earlier UN conferences.
The Convention provides for a 200 mile exclusive economic zone8 and for the right of 
Australian island territories to generate such zones, both Australian goals. In a 
compromise which departed from previous international law the Convention provides that 
rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own do not have 
an entitlement to a territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf (Art. 121(3)). Australia along 
with other Pacific island countries sought to have this rider removed although it was 
accepted by the Oceania group, including Australia, that this would not be possible.9 
Australian past practice had with regard to the Barrier Reef and Coral Sea Islands not 
supported such restrictions, as will be noted in the next chapter. Australian practice has 
continued to regard islands as generating their own maritime zones even if they could be 
regarded to amount only to rocks.10 Australia has not yet declared an EEZ but its 200 
mile fishing zone proclaimed in 1979 is the world’s third largest 200 mile zone, although 
both the countries whose EEZ are larger owe the size of their zones to overseas 
territories.11 The fisheries provisions benefit the Australian fishing industry as the 
Convention preserves the fisheries of the 200 mile zone primarily for the coastal state. 
While the Convention does provide for the interests of DWFN by allowing access to the 
surplus it is the coastal states that has the final say over setting that surplus and who is 
allowed to fish in the zone.12 The Convention also confirms that the coastal state has 
sovereign rights over highly migratory species— a particularly important goal of the 
South Pacific island countries that Australia supported in the Oceania group.13
Two other issues are also relevant when considering the issues of limits and resources in 
the new Convention. First, the Convention basically preserves the earlier baseline rule in 
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, although adding a 
provision on islands having fringing reefs (Art. 6). Australia’s only interest here was 
for the conference to leave open the possibility of Australia drawing baselines along the 
outer edge of the Great Barrier Reef. The issue of baselines did not occupy the
conference and Australia felt that on tactical grounds specifically pushing for a provision 
relating to the Great Barrier Reef may have adversely impacted on Australia’s margin 
claim, with some countries possibly regarding it as an attempt by an already advantaged 
state to further extend control over offshore waters.14 From 1979 the question was not 
an issue in any event, as the option of drawing baselines along the outer edge of the reef 
was decided not to be pursued for domestic political reasons.15
Australia’s goals with respect to delimitation were also largely achieved. Australia was 
concerned to emphasize the importance of effecting delimitation by agreement and 
protecting existing agreements. The delimitation articles 74 and 83 achieve those goals 
with respect to delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ.16 Australia was 
unsuccessful in its attempt to ensure a provision relating to protecting its position with 
respect to prior sovereign rights designed to strengthen its position with respect to first 
Portugal and then Indonesia in the Timor Sea. It is extremely doubtful whether this 
disadvantaged Australia in any way with the Indonesians.17
Navigation
The Convention recognises the 200 mile zone as legally sui generis. As we have already 
seen because of the fear of creeping jurisdiction the maritime powers argued that the EEZ 
should have a residual high seas character, i.e. that any activity not falling within the 
clearly defined rights of the coastal state would be subject to the regime of the high seas. 
The Convention (articles 55 and 86) makes it clear that the EEZ does not have a residual 
high seas character. Nor does it have a residual territorial sea character i.e. it does not 
create a presumption that any activity not falling within the clearly defined rights of non­
coastal states would come under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. The EEZ is a 
separate functional zone of a sui generis character.18 Australia supported the sui generis 
compromise that was incorporated in the ICNT at the conclusion of the sixth session.
The Convention recognises the sovereignty of an archipelagic state over the waters 
enclosed by archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with the Convention and to the 
air space over them (Art 49). This was an important goal of Australia’s Asia/Pacific 
neighbours that Australia supported.19 At the same time the Convention provides the 
balance that Australia sought between the rights of archipelagic states and rights of other 
states to sea passage and overflight of archipelagic waters by providing for archipelagic 
sea lanes passage which cannot be suspended.20 If the archipelagic state does not 
designate sea lanes or air routes that right may be exercised through the routes normally 
used for international navigation.
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As far as passage through straits is concerned Australia’s navigational interests have been 
strengthened with the introduction of the concept of transit passage which is the same in 
effect as archipelagic sealanes passage.21 There may be a temporary suspension of 
innocent passage in the territorial sea, but no suspension of transit passage in straits used 
for international navigation. Transit passage includes overflight which is not a right in 
the territorial sea. As was noted earlier the right of satisfactory transit rights through 
straits was considered critical by the maritime powers and Australia tied its acceptance of 
the twelve mile territorial sea limit to a satisfactory regime of straits passage, as a twelve 
mile territorial sea would close off as territorial sea 116 straits used for navigation which 
previously had high seas passage. Sixty three of these straits affected by the 
Convention’s 12 mile territorial sea limit lie in the South Pacific, Western Pacific, South 
East and East Asia.22 In the words of one senior Australian naval officer, the regime of 
transit passage ‘can only be regarded as an important new contribution to freedom of 
navigation’,23 although how navigational freedom will be protected will depend in part 
on the operational practices of the world’s navies.24 The straits regime applies in Torres 
Strait and may potentially apply in Bass Strait if Australia moved to a 12 mile territorial 
sea.25
The regime of innocent passage adds more detail to the regime than existed under the 
1958 Convention. The Convention provides for an objective rather than subjective test 
for innocence, since the test for innocence is linked to activities while in the territorial sea, 
rather than passage itself (Art. 19). Australia supported the elaboration in greater detail of 
the meaning of innocent passage, although it objected to the listing of two activities ‘any 
act of wilful and serious pollution, contrary to this Convention’ and a catch-all provision 
‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’ that appear in Art. 19 of the 
Convention.26 To the extent that the Convention reduces the ambiguity of the earlier 
1958 Convention by providing an objective rather than a subjective test of innocence it 
meets Australia’s goal of not compromising navigational freedoms without derogating 
from previously held sovereign rights. Much will depend on the practice of states here. 
This will be the case particularly with regard to the question of whether warships need to 
notify the coastal state or obtain authorisation before exercising the right of innocent 
passage, a question that the Convention leaves unanswered.27 Australia’s position is that 
prior consent or notification is not necessary for the passage of warships through the 
territorial sea.28
Other Issues
The new regime for MSR29 gives the coastal state the power to regulate MSR in the EEZ, 
although in ‘normal circumstances’ it should grant its consent to states and competent
international organisations. The regime thus favours Australia’s position that those 
intending to engage in research within 200 miles must obtain the consent of the coastal 
state, yet these should not unreasonably withhold consent. States may withhold their 
consent where the research is of direct significance to the exploration or exploitation of 
the natural resources, involves drilling or the use of explosives, or construction of 
artificial islands, though this discretion does not exist in relation to the margin beyond 
200 miles except in specially designated areas. To guard against undue bureaucratic 
delay there is a provision for implied consent. Researchers may proceed within six 
months of supplying the required information, as long as the coastal state has not within 
four months questioned the objectives or asked for more information (or decided to 
withhold consent under one of the categories mentioned above). The right of coastal 
states to participate in MSR projects is provided (Art. 249), an important objective for 
Australia as a country with limited MSR capabilities that wanted maximum data on its 
offshore areas. Generally the new MSR regime supports Australia’s objective of seeking 
a consent regime while at the same time not placing unreasonable restrictions on MSR.30
As far as the provisions on marine pollution are concerned they are quite in harmony with 
Australia’s desire for increased coastal state control while ensuring that coastal state 
abuses of such control that may pose a threat to navigation were minimized.31 The text 
reflects in a number of areas opportunities for coastal states to extend their jurisdiction to 
control pollution but also includes an obligation ‘to protect and preserve the marine 
environment’ (Art. 192). In other words not to do so will be a breach of international 
law. That goal was one Australia had supported since the SBC. States that are parties to 
the Convention are required to work in the international community to establish rules and 
standards through competent international organisations or general diplomatic 
conferences. A state may proceed against an offending vessel in one of its ports, 
notwithstanding that a discharge has occurred outside the states jurisdiction (Art. 220). 
Australia had been a strong supporter of port state enforcement at the conference. Of 
particular concern to Australia was the protection of the Great Barrier Reef, so Australia 
argued for greater coastal state flexibility in taking measures that might not be 
incorporated in international instruments. A provision (substantially drafted by Australia) 
appears in the Convention and despite the fact that it was something of a compromise, 
met Australia’s requirements.32
The Convention’s environmental provisions represent a careful balancing of coastal state 
interests in the protection and preservation of the marine environment on the one hand, 
and the rights and interests of others in preserving navigational freedoms and various 
shared uses of the world’s oceans on the other.33 Australia welcomed the Convention’s
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environmental provisions describing them as a ‘new and promising regime for the 
protection of the marine environment, particularly in offshore waters’.34
Seabed Mining
As far as Australia’s interests in the deep seabed regime are concerned the Convention 
does meet Australia’s wish that the developing countries achieve real benefits. The area 
beyond national jurisdiction and its resources are the ‘common heritage of mankind’. 
Traditional ideas of free exploitation on the high seas have been replaced by principles of 
non-appropriation, international management and equitable sharing of benefits.35 The 
‘parallel system’ whereby national firms may mine the seabed alongside the Enterprise 
was supported by Australia right from the start of the conference.36 Australia’s interests 
in protecting its seabed exports were partly met in the Convention through market access 
and anti-subsidies clauses (Art. 150(j), 150(8)). The Convention does contain 
production limitations on seabed mining37 which Australia unsuccessfully tried to remove 
at the ninth session. While the anti-subsidies clause negotiated at the final session by no 
means provides a guarantee against subsidised mining Australia has found it useful as a 
‘peg’ on which to hang its arguments for a strengthening of anti-subsidies in the work of 
the Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Prepcom), which was established at the end of 
UNCLOS 111 (see next chapter). The Convention, however, grants many commercial 
advantages to the Enterprise which Australia felt may cause national operators to seek 
subsidisation.38 Whatever the shortcomings of the mining regime as far as Australia was 
concerned Canberra accepted them on the basis that they formed part of an overall 
package in the Convention.39
Australia’s interest in Committee One matters was very much determined by Canberra’s 
wish to conclude a comprehensive treaty, and to prevent the mining regime from 
becoming an obstacle to achieve a widely accepted Convention. In that context the 
mining regime did not suit Australian interests because it was that part of the Convention 
that caused the US not to sign and other supporters such as UK, FRG to stand out. The 
UK and the FRG are participating in the Preparatory Commission, although the US still 
refuses to participate as an observer.
Dispute Settlement and Development and Transfer of Marine Technology
Australia supported a system of comprehensive dispute settlement in the Law of the Sea 
Convention. A detailed discussion of the disputes settlement provisions of the 
Convention is not possible here but generally speaking the system combines direct
negotiations between states and obligatory third party settlement.40 The Convention, in 
so far as many multilateral treaties make no provision for binding dispute settlement, does 
represent progress and to that extent meetsAustralian objectives of including such 
provisions in the Convention. The Convention by prohibiting all reservations eliminated 
a loophole for dispute settlement.41 However whether the Convention will resolve 
difficult and protracted disputes is open to question, given that there are escape clauses to 
avoid procedures. Given that Australia wanted a comprehensive dispute settlement 
system it remains to be seen how the dispute settlement system meets that objective. 
Ultimately it will be judged on ‘how workable the system is going to be in its application 
to concrete situations’ 42
In the area of technology transfer Australia was concerned to protect the rights of holders 
and suppliers of technology and this was incorporated in the Convention (Art. 266). 
Australia was also concerned to support the interests of developing countries in gaining 
access to marine technology, although it did not adopt a high profile on this issue. The 
Convention goes some way to meet the general objectives of the developing countries 
here43 and to that extent Australia supported the technology transfer provisions. Part 
XIV of the Convention deals with the Development and Transfer of Marine Technology 
and for the most part the provisions are fairly bland: they do little more than exhort states 
to cooperate in facilitating marine technology directly or through competent international 
organisations. Art. 273 does, however, require states to ‘cooperate actively’ with 
competent international organisations and with the Authority to encourage and facilitate 
the transfer to developing States, their nationals and the Enterprise, of skills and marine 
technology with regard to activities in the area. Art. 275 imposes an obligation to 
‘promote’ and to give adequate support in establishing and strengthening national marine 
scientific and technological research centres, particularly in developing countries.
The technology transfer provisions in Part XI formed an important part of the unease that 
prompted the US to not sign the Convention, and to the extent these provisions resulted 
in a lack of overall consensus they did not meet Australian interests.44 It should be 
noted, however, that Australia itself did not regard the conditions imposed by the 
Convention as constituting unreasonable burdens on any Australian company that might 
one day become involved in seabed mining and therefore incur obligations of technology 
transfer to the Enterprise.45
Antarctica
As a country claiming 42 percent of Antarctica it is necessary to make some brief 
comments on the Law of the Sea Convention and Antarctica. It was noted that Australia
discussed with the Antarctic treaty parties questions of boundary delimitation and the 
International Seabed Authority.46 However, Antarctica did not really figure at UNCLOS 
111. While suggestions did turn up at the conference that Antarctica should become part 
of the common heritage of mankind such suggestions met with strong opposition from 
the Antarctic Treaty parties.47 Generally, however, there was a feeling at the conference 
that adding Antarctica to the list of conference problems would only add to the difficulties 
of any final settlement.48 The Antarctic Treaty parties operating under the Antarctic 
Treaty system have attempted to offset potential jurisprudential conflict with the Authority 
operating over the deep seabed. The new Antarctic Minerals Convention if it comes into 
force will apply on the continent of Antarctica and all Antarctic islands including all ice 
shelves south of 60° south latitude and in the ‘seabed and subsoil of adjacent offshore 
areas up to the deep seabed’. For the purpose of the Convention ‘deep seabed’ means the 
seabed and subsoil beyond the ‘geographic extent of the Continental Shelf as the term 
continental shelf is defined in accordance with international law’.49 The obvious intent 
here is to establish limits of jurisdiction over the circumpolar seabed similar to the limits 
set out in the Law of the Sea Convention for coastal states over their shelves. The issue 
of any conflict between an International Seabed Authority and the Antarctic minerals 
treaty is at the moment an academic issue in the sense that neither treaty is in force. 
However it is possible that jurisdictional questions on mining rights in the southern ocean 
may arise at some future date, although it does seem likely that any exploitation offshore 
will be regulated by the minerals regime and not the Law of the Sea Convention.50
With respect to declaring 200 mile zones, Australia declared 200 mile fishing zones off its 
sub-Antarctic islands, Heard and McDonald in 1979. However, with regard to 
Australia’s Antarctic territory Australia decided not to enforce the provisions of the 
Australian Fisheries Act against foreign fishermen in Antarctica. The proclamation 
establishing the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) applied to all foreigners on 1 November 
1979 but with effect from the following day foreign fishermen in waters off Australia’s 
Antarctic Treaty were exempt from the ambit of the proclamation.51 Australia was not 
alone in being cautious not to offend the international community here. Although all 
seven states claiming sovereignty in Antarctica have declared economic zones or fishing 
zones around their metropolitan territory none has enforced such limits around 
Antarctica.52
The interaction between the Antarctic Treaty and the Law of the Sea Convention and the 
degree to which the latter will become more important in the management of Antarctic 
maritime activities remain uncertain at this stage, although undoubtedly Malaysia and 
other states will continue to press for the internationalisation of Antarctica.53 The main 
effect, or rather side-effect of the Law of the Sea Convention on Antarctic matters has
been to sustain calls by some third world states for Antarctica to become the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’.54 Australia has vigorously opposed such arguments at the UN 
and has continued to assert that the Antarctic treaty system remains the best legal and 
political base with which to govern Antarctic affairs.55
Summary
The argument presented here has been that, in terms of those goals laid down by 
Australia prior to the conference Australia fared extremely well if judged by the 
provisions of the final Convention.56
The winners from UNCLOS 111 were countries with long coastlines and significant 
living resources off their coasts and with wide continental margins. For the most part 
these are developed countries. Australia along with countries like the US, USSR, 
Canada, the UK and Norway were the major beneficiaries of the negotiations. The 
‘losers’ were landlocked countries and countries with short coastlines and narrow 
continental shelves. The establishment of 200 mile zones has led to some redistribution 
of resources— largely from distant-water nations to the states off whose coasts they 
fished: ‘Although the former are nearly all developed states, the latter are by no means 
exclusively— and perhaps even principally— developing states. As regards resources 
other than fish, in the case of offshore oil and gas the introduction of the EEZ effects no 
redistribution. Where the EEZ covers areas of the seabed that are continental shelf, any 
oil or gas there already belongs to the coastal state under the continental shelf doctrine. In 
areas of the EEZ where the sea-bed is too deep to be continental shelf under the pre- 
LOSC regime, it is highly unlikely that there is any oil or gas’.57 Sanger’s judgement on 
this result and on the overall benefits to developing countries is extremely shrewd:
Certainly there is an unequitable division between states, and some of them 
enjoy in jackpot quantities the lack of geography and geology. But there is 
inequity in national land boundaries, in the size of a country’s population, 
in its degree of social and economic development. There is no way to alter 
all these imbalances in a single treaty. What most developing countries 
have gained are sovereign rights and control over areas which other 
countries (richer than they) could previously plunder at will. What the 
world as a whole has gained is the assumption of responsibilities by 
coastal states for one-third of the oceans, where previously all the talk was 
of “freedom” and there was dangerously little consideration given to 
management and conservation of resources.58
Reasons for Australia’s Success
The argument presented in the previous section was that Australia suffered no major 
defeats at UNCLOS, and that the final Convention incorporated the large bulk of
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Australia’s negotiating objectives at UNCLOS 111. This section considers the reasons 
for that success—how and why did Australia achieve its law of the sea goals throughout 
the international negotiations to create a new ocean regime?
The answer suggested by Brumm in her study is quite simple: ‘Australian interests were 
favourably situated within the structure of issues of the conference, and in relation to the 
major power groups, and from the outset of the conference appeared certain of gaining 
recognition of its maritime claims’.59 Brumm goes on to suggest that Australia’s 
objectives were incorporated in the Convention ‘not due to its own lobbying and 
negotiating tactics but largely as a result of conference structure and trends which 
favoured coastal states...trends evident...through the 1960s and confirmed by UNCLOS 
111’.60
There is no doubt that there is a great deal of force in that argument. The conference was 
in effect a clash between coastal states and maritime powers. The law of the sea trend 
through the sixties and seventies had seen what Professor Gold has called the ‘rise of the 
coastal state’,61 so that Australia’s support for an expansion of coastal state interests was 
simply part of that broad movement. Johnson and Zacher make a similar point and have 
observed with respect to Canada that Canadian negotiators at UNCLOS 111 were 
‘fortunate as well as skilful in that law of the sea trends favoured coastal states’.62 It is 
clear that Australia was in the same boat here—it was ‘fortunate’ that pressures had been 
developing through the late 1960s by developing countries that meant at UNCLOS 111 
there would be a strong push for an ocean regime more favourable to coastal states. 
However, Australia’s success at the conference cannot be explained solely in terms of the 
delegation going along for an historical ride. A strategy of ‘sitting pat’ would not have 
seen Australian success in areas such as its margin policy, anti-subsidies and market 
access clause, and balanced marine environmental and MSR provisions. Nor does the 
‘historical ride’ explanation account for the fact that, as noted earlier, Australia played an 
influential role throughout the negotiations. Australia was probably dealt a ‘winning 
hand’ at UNCLOS 111 but a ‘winning hand’ still needs to be played skilfully. Other 
reasons are therefore necessary in order to account for Australia’s overall success at the 
conference. Several factors are offered below which explain why Australia was one of 
the most effective players throughout UNCLOS 111.
Early Establishment of Clear Goals
Winham points out that ‘ most real negotiations at the outset are fluid, unstructured, 
complicated, and noisy (in a communication sense). The first problem for negotiators is 
to structure the situation; hence, the emphasis in preparatory work and the establishment
of a negotiating framework’.63 Australia had supported the calling of an international 
conference on the law of the sea right from the days of the SBC and had worked 
diligently from 1970-73 to establish clear and carefully worked out objectives across 
virtually the whole gamut of law of the sea issues. The government’s 1973 position 
paper64 defined in summary form Australia’s law of the sea objectives and also carried 
clear evidence that the government had thought how best, in tactical terms, to achieve 
those objectives. In statements and interventions it was evident that on most issues 
before the conference Australia’s views were considered. In contrast many delegations 
objectives were vague, contradictory sometimes incoherent. This could be said with 
respect to both the US and Japan (although it would not apply to Canada).65 Having a 
clearly defined package from the start no doubt assisted Australia’s image at the 
conference as a competent and informed actor on law of the sea issues. Australia’s clear 
objectives were the result of good planning not only at the conference (where the 
delegation met every morning and evening to plan tactics and strategy) but also back in 
Canberra.
Strong Bureaucratic Co-ordination
One student of international negotiations has pointed out:
What is most evident in external negotiation is the interplay between a 
negotiator’s instructions and his bargaining behaviour; it is commonplace 
to describe good negotiatiors as individuals who can maximize their 
opportunities within the constraints or limitations of their instructions. In 
internal negotiation, however, the fabrication of those instructions is at 
stake, as well as the contingent planning that creates the flexibility needed 
to permit accommodation (or at least the possibility thereof) with the 
adversary. Of the two processes, the former emphasizes manipulation and 
is a classic concern of diplomatic history, as well as of modem theories of 
interpersonal bargaining. The latter emphasises political and bureaucratic 
policy making, and it is quite likely the more creative portion of the act of 
negotiation.66
One closer observer of UNCLOS 111 makes a similar point by pointing out that a ‘pre­
requisite for successful negotiations was the most solid unity over policy-making in the 
home capital that an interdepartmental or an inter-agency committee could possibly build. 
No team of negotiations could have worked confidently without a formulation of firm 
support at home’.67 Australia’s law of the sea objectives and priorities through the 
conference were undertaken by an interdepartmental Law of the Sea Task Force which 
was established on 16 October 1974.68 Before this there had been an interdepartmental 
committee. The Task Force was described by one former member as ‘made up of a 
number of public servants but its effect was far more wide ranging. It was the basis 
upon which considerable consultation was undertaken with industry and the States’.69
Without access to official records it is impossible to state with any certainty to what extent 
bureaucratic conflict was prevalent in the setting of Australian law of the sea priorities. 
There were some hints of departmental differences, which is hardly surprising over such 
a long period and considering the broad range of issues the Task Force would have 
considered.70 While some policy differences may have been inevitable there was never 
any suggestion that Australia’s unity of purpose was compromised at the conference. As 
opposed to Washington, the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics did not appear to play a 
major role in Canberra on law of the sea issues.71
The Department of Foreign Affairs was the dominant actor in setting Australian law of the 
sea policy and never really lost control even though law of the sea policy required the 
input of a range of departments. It provided the officers that formed the backbone of the 
delegation at UNCLOS 111 (see Table 1) and had the legal expertise (ably helped by key 
people in Attorney-General’s) necessary to give the lead on many of the complex issues 
that the conference generated. It chaired the EDC on the law of the sea and the 
government’s Law of the Sea Task Force, and was the department with easiest access to 
Australian diplomatic personnel to keep it informed on LOS issues between sessions. 
(Meetings were held in the offices of DFA). As the author has noted elsewhere 
bureaucratic differences did not compromise the overall coherence of Australia’s position 
for ‘within the bureaucracy DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs) was the custodian of 
the package approach to UNCLOS: no issue should be pushed so hard as to threaten the 
chances of achieving a comprehensive and widely accepted Convention. Generally 
speaking, other departments, while occasionally voicing concern that DFA was not 
pressing hard enough on some issues were willing to let foreign affairs make the running 
on law of the sea policy’.72
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[See Table 1]
Unlike say in the US where there was often divided leadership between the delegation 
and their Inter-Agency Task Force and where a ‘limping state of co-ordination hampered 
those in the US Administration who hoped for clear overall objectives and a consistent 
policy to achieve them’,73 in the Australian case key people on the Task Force were the 
delegation members.74 The DFA played the key co-ordinating role with respect to the 
numerous working groups of the Task Force which formed over the life of the 
conference. The fact that at five substantive sessions of the conference the delegation 
was led by the Foreign Minister assisted here: Ministers through briefings became 
knowledgeable about law of the sea issues and helped to bring about a situation where 
any policy differences were brought under control. Policy differences were ironed out in 
the Task Force and Cabinet submissions on law of the sea issues were joint submissions
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(although drafted by DFA) based on submissions of the Task Force. No separate 
departmental submissions were put to Cabinet although the Foreign Minister was charged 
with taking the law of the sea issue through Cabinet. The fact that the Task Force was 
able to generate confidence between various departments with an interest in UNCLOS 
111 issues was an important factor in Australia’s negotiating position for it permitted the 
negotiators from Foreign Affairs to freely pursue negotiations at the conference without 
feeling constrained by bureaucratic rivalries within the delegation.75 The fact that 
differences were ironed out in the Task Force often meant that the delegation were able to 
anticipate the range of views of other states at the next session of the conference.
Domestic Support
An important factor in successful international conference negotiations is to build the 
necessary domestic support for a state’s negotiating team. As Winham points out in ‘any 
major negotiation the interests of large groups must be accounted for, and this creates a 
problem of organisation, distillation, and representation for the negotiating team’.76
From the beginning of the UNCLOS 111 negotiations the Australian delegations enjoyed 
the strong support from the Australian government, state governments and industry 
groups, such as fishing, and the mining industry. That support meant that there were no 
dramatic changes of policy (apart from the production control issue) that could have led to 
undermining the delegation’s credibility. The fact, noted earlier, that Ministers attended 
five sessions contributed to the impression of a delegation with the strong backing of its 
government.
Australia’s law of the sea policy received bipartisan support during the period of the 
negotiations, which strengthened the delegation’s hand by the knowledge a change of 
government would not result in any radical shifts of policy. Australian policy was 
bipartisan both in the sense of inter-regime continuity of policy (i.e. during the Whitlam 
Labor government and the Fraser Liberal government years) and from the viewpoint of 
inter-party convergence on law of the sea policy within the life of the Whitlam 
government (1972-75) and the Fraser government (1975-82).77 There was really no 
attempt by the Opposition parties to make any political capital on law of the sea issues 
during UNCLOS 111 and the bipartisan spirit was demonstrated in the unanimous 
support given to a resolution introduced by the Opposition Labor party that urged the US 
government to look more favourably on the UNCLOS negotiations.78 Parliament itself 
played virtually no direct role on law of the sea issues, although the Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence did issue an interim report on Antarctica and the Law of the 
Sea.79 The bipartisan support for Australian law of the sea objectives meant that the
subject never attracted sufficient controversy to arouse widespread parliamentary 
interest.80
Despite the fact that for most of the conference period there was a great deal of 
intergovernmental conflict between the Commonwealth and the States over offshore 
matters, these matters did not affect the support by State governments for Australia’s 
stand at the conference.81 The only real tension with the States arose in 1976 when all 
States except New South Wales requested the federal government to be granted observer 
status at the conference, basing their claims on four Canadian provinces that had been 
granted such status at previous conference sessions. However, their claim was rejected 
by the government for fear of weakening Australia’s position at the conference. 
Following pressure from Premiers during the October 1977 Premiers’ conference, the 
government allowed the States to be represented on the Australian delegation.82 The 
supportive role of the Australian State delegates on the Australian delegation at UNCLOS 
111 is analysed by Herr and Davis, who first point out that the Canadian provinces opted 
for individual representation in the Canadian delegation:
By contrast the Australian States perceived a much greater ambit of 
common interests and adopted a collective approach to their involvement in 
the national delegation. Each of the six States took it in turn to represent 
all State interests at UNCLOS 111 on the basis of rotation from each 
session or resumed session. Although...State...delegates were formally 
listed as advisors they were fully integrated into the national delegation... 
Rather than attempt to protect each State’s interests separately, the 
Australian States pursued a ‘trip wire’ strategy of maintaining only one 
State representative who could sound a general alarm were either the 
Commonwealth or the UNCLOS 111 agreement to trespass upon the 
States’ interests. Financially this approach had clear advantages since all 
States shared the costs of their UNCLOS representative. Nevertheless, it 
also demanded a very large commonality of interest and a considerable 
amount of faith in one’s fellow States. Furthermore, to work effectively, 
the cooperative agreement required a high degree of liaison among the 
States. A primary vehicle for the coordination of the collective approach of 
the States to UNCLOS 111 was the regular meetings of the States’ 
Solicitors-General. These crown officers were, of course, the major 
source of legal advice to the States on the maritime issues discussed during 
the UN conference. Indeed, the importance of their advice was both 
emphasized and strengthened with the appointment of the first State’s 
Tasmanian Solicitor-General, Mr Roger Jennings, QC. All subsequent 
appointments were either from the ranks of, or recommended by the 
States’ Solicitors-General. Regular meetings of Solicitor-General not only 
served as arenas for reaching agreed positions for the States’ representative 
at UNCLOS 111 but also provided a venue for assessing progress to date. 
Practice varied as to reporting after each session. Some States’ advisors 
circulated an assessment to their State colleagues on their return from a 
session while others regarded the comprehensive national delegation’s 
report as sufficient...The absence of inter-state conflict amongst the 
Australian States at UNCLOS 111 extended also to relations between the 
States and Canberra. When rare differences of opinion arose the usual 
practice was for the two sides to continue to confer until a consensual 
position emerged. At first the novelty of the situation led to some
circumspection by both parties especially the experienced Foreign Affairs 
negotiators who were uncertain of the role that the States’ representatives 
were to play. As the relationship developed and it became clearer that the 
States’ advisors would not jeopardise the national negotiating position, the 
States representatives’ assumed a more active role not just at UNCLOS 
111 but also in the preparation for the sessions.83
Australian States support for Canberra’s positions at UNCLOS 111 was assisted by the 
fact that in contrast to say Canada there were no real conflicts over fisheries issues and 
that in coming to the negotiations rather late it ‘would have been almost impossible for the 
States to alter official positions taken over many years of hard bargaining’.84
In the case of industry groups there was, apart from one issue, general support for the 
Australian position at UNCLOS 111. The interest of the land based industry came late in 
the day. As explained by John Reynolds, one of the mining industry representatives that 
was to later join the delegation:
...consultation (with the Federal government) commenced in 1976 when 
the (mining) industry met on a few occasions with representatives of the 
Department of Trade and Resources who at that time were making an input 
into the Australian delegation’s work on Pan XI of the Treaty dealing with 
the exploitation of non-living resources of the area of the international 
seabed. Contact was lost in the late 70s but again renewed early in 1980 
when, upon learning of the trend of discussions at the United Nations, 
some members of the Australian mining industry appealed to the Prime 
Minister of the day to take into account its views particularly on the 
application of the production control formula.85
As a result industry representatives were attached to the delegation through 1980, 1981 
and the first session of 1982. While the mining industry intervention resulted in a change 
to Australia’s policy on the production control issue and the industry was hostile to the 
seabed mining section of the treaty, the industry never directed any criticism against the 
ultimate objective of the delegation to achieve a widely accepted Convention.86 Industry 
delegates, while observers at the sessions they attended, were able to provide technical 
advice to the delegation on aspects of the seabed mining regime.87 In the case of the 
offshore sector of the industry they appeared to be consulted on a formal basis fairly late 
in the conference.88 The Australian Petroleum Exploration Association (APEA) did, 
however, have an officer from BHP attached to the delegation for the resumed ninth 
session and tenth sessions. As the government’s opposition to revenue sharing was long 
established, APEA clearly felt no requirement to intervene to change policy as did the 
land based miners with regard to production controls. Industry views in favour of 
greater coastal state flexibility on offshore rig abandonment were also sought and no 
doubt contributed to the government’s change of direction on this issue late in the 
conference.89 (There is no evidence that APEA had any direct input into Australia’s 
margin policy). In the case of fisheries interests there were criticisms made that the
government was delaying too long in extending jurisdiction to 200 miles and were over­
cautious in accepting the delays associated with the international negotiations.90 This 
criticism ceased when the government moved formally to alter its fisheries jurisdiction in 
April 1978.91
It is difficult to judge whether there was widespread public support for government 
policy on law of the sea issues as no survey data exist that questioned public attitudes on 
ocean policy issues.92 There was certainly no evidence of public opposition to 
government policy over the life of the conference, a situation partly due, no doubt, to the 
very minimal press coverage that the conference received in Australia.93 The fact that 
there was no official public education on the issue may have also contributed to a lack of 
public interest in the issues at the conference.94 Early criticism that the government was 
adopting a greedy attitude in promoting coastal state jurisdiction to the edge of the margin 
and that the promotion of the 200 mile zone concept would deprive developing states of 
offshore resources never gathered sufficient strength to undermine the delegation.95 
Most media treatment of Australia’s positions at UNCLOS 111 was supportive of 
Australian policies.96
The support from industry groups and the states did not come about by chance— as noted 
earlier the Law of the Sea Task Force did undertake consultations in order to reach 
consensus on Australia’s position.
Strong Delegation Team
Winham points out that ‘most modem negotiations are carried out between teams that 
represent bureaucracies, and in large negotiations the teams themselves approach the 
status of small bureaucracies’.97 UNCLOS 111 was dominated by delegations with the 
UN Secretariat playing very much a facilitating role.98 In terms of its continuity and 
quality the Australian delegation contributed enormously to Australia’s overall negotiating 
success at the conference. On the issue of continuity it is important to note that ‘in the 
succession of encounters that constitute day-to-day negotiations, the teams achieve 
various kinds of organisational learning: they gather and store information, they develop 
procedures for communication, and they adopt organisational goals to fit the possibilities 
in the situation. Above all countries perceive the problems that are up for negotiation, 
and what priorities these countries place on different issues’.99 Australia was well 
served here in the stability of its delegations,100 and in particular its leader Keith 
Brennan. Brennan was deputy leader from the third session until the sixth session where 
he took over leadership and maintained that position for the duration of the conference.
Sanger in fact points to the continuity of leadership of the delegation as a key factor in 
Australia’s influential role at the conference:
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...those (states) which enjoyed ... continuity of leadership achieved more 
clout than they might normally expect to have internationally: for example, 
countries like Chile and Ireland, Australia, Kenya, Fiji and Canada. They 
knew the by-ways of the text, which had already been tried and failed, the 
time and means to introduce a new idea and a possible solution. They 
were also known to each other; friends negotiated as much as countries. 
This camaraderie involved, after a time, a determination to ‘see it through 
to the end’. A momentum was built up for success...those states 
(including several in Western Europe) that paid little heed to continuity and 
frequently changed their delegation heads had less influence on the 
outcome of UNCLOS 111 than they might have expected to have...The 
most striking example of Chop-and Change was the United States, which 
had six delegation heads in a dozen years.101
As can be seen from Table 1 the Department of Foreign Affairs provided the backbone of 
the delegation, but it is clear that the Department recognized that other departments had a 
vital role to play in the negotiations. (Final delegation lists were approved by Cabinet, 
with individual departments selecting their own delegates). Many of the interventions in 
particular areas were made by the depanmental representative that had particular expertise 
in the area, for instance the Transport Department delegate spoke on issues relating to 
marine pollution, the representative from Primary Industry on fisheries, Foreign Affairs 
officials were the Chief Spokesmen on Committee One issues, dispute settlement and 
MSR. The delegation carried experts across a wide range of subjects to enable 
interventions on specialist subjects. In any negotiations it is ‘especially important that 
negotiations be able to project an image of being in control of their portfolio’.102 
Australia’s image of a strong and united delegation was assisted by the fact that the 
delegation had a large pool of members with specialist knowledge in areas such as 
hydrography, pollution control, fisheries management, and geomorphology. This 
enabled Australia to participate across the gamut of UNCLOS issues. By having the 
qualified people ‘on call’ Australia could move not just to protect its own interests but 
was also in a good position (which the delegation took advantage) to promote 
compromise formulae when negotiations became difficult. This contrasted with many 
delegations from the third world who often lacked the qualified delegations to make an 
input into many of the more technical areas of debate.103 Australia’s strong delegation 
contributed to the confidence that other delegations had in Australia’s ability to play a 
useful role in negotiations, particularly the ability to call meetings.104 The continuity and 
high-calibre of the Australian delegation was undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that early 
on Australia had decided that at UNCLOS 111 Australia was playing for ‘high stakes’ 
and that a significant commitment of bureaucratic resources would be required to ensure 
the delegation’s success. The fact that delegates participated in the Task Force work in 
Canberra meant they were trained to think in terms not only of their own department’s
interests but wider Australian positions at the conference. Again, the continuity of Task 
Force members assisted this process.
Wide-Ranging Choice of Negotiating Partners
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that geographic accident and economic interests 
cut across traditional blocs at UNCLOS 111 and produced sometimes strange negotiating 
bed-fellows. In Australia’s case its choice of negotiating partners was largely dictated by 
its decision to promote its coastal state interests. It is not proposed to duplicate the 
discussion in the previous chapter on Australia’s role as a group player. Here it is simply 
noted that Australia’s decision to promote coastal interest meant that for the most part 
Australia worked with parties which did not adhere to traditional patterns of alignment. 
This can be seen in Table 2 that summarizes Australia’s alliance-building in terms of the 
number of countries Australia sponsored or co-sponsored a proposal during UNCLOS 
111.
[see Table 2]
The fact that Australia decided its goals at the conference would override traditional 
loyalties was no-where better illustrated than in its contrasting approach to law of the sea 
issues to that of its principal ally, the United States. At various stage throughout the 
conference Australia found itself opposing the US on:
(a) seabed mining where differences reflected a broader philosophical difference. 
Australia, as already noted, broadly supported the claims of G77 on deep seabed as 
part of its general sympathy for the South on North-South issues, whereas the US 
was at first unsympathetic and later adopted an openly hostile approach to those 
demands within the framework of the conference.
(b) On highly migratory species with Australia supported the right of coastal states to 
sovereign rights over tuna in their economic zone and the US stressing international 
management.
(c) marine mammal protection where (at first) Australia saw US proposals as 
weakening the position of the IWC.
(d) On marine scientific research where the US favoured a separate MSR regime on the 
shelf beyond 200 miles which Australia saw as an attack on ‘sovereignty’.
(e) the US hard-line stance in opting to basically drop-out of the conference in 1981.
These differences in approach did not spill-over into relations between Australia and the 
US delegations.105 In fact Australia worked closely with the US delegation on a range of 
issues throughout the conference particularly in the first committee, in the Evensen and
Table 2: AUSTRALIA'S NEGOTIATING PARTNERS AT UNCLOS 111
Countries Number of Times Country Sponsored or
Co-sponsored a Proposal with Australia
Angola 1
Argentina 3
Austria 1
Belgium 1
Bolivia 1
Brazil 1
Canada 9
Cape Verde 3
Chile 2
Columbia 5
Congo 1
Costa Rica 1
Denmark 5
Egypt 1
El Salvador 1
Fiji 2
Finland 1
Ghana 2
Guinea-Bissau 1
Guatemala 1
Guyana 1
Haiti 1
Iceland 5
India 1
Iran 2
Ireland 1
Ivor>' Coast 1
Jamaica 1
Kenya 1
Korea 1
Luxembourg 1
Madagascar 1
Mauritania 1
Mauritius 1
Mexico 3
Morocco 1
Mozambique 1
Netherland 1
New Zealand 8
Nicaragua 1
Norway 7
Oman 1
Pakistan 1
Papua New Guinea 2
Peru 1
Philippines 3
Portugal 1
Romania 1
Sao Tome and Principe 2
Samoa 1
Senegal 3
Sierra Leone 3
Singapore 1
Somalia 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Switzerland 1
Tanzania 1
United States of America 2
Uruguay 2
Venezuela 1
Yugoslavia 2
Source: Compiled from UNCLOS 111 Official Records; Platzöder Collection.
Castendeda groups and later in the conference in attempting to resolve the problems that 
the US had with the seabed text. The point to be made here, however, is that on a 
number of law of the sea issues Australia approached the issues differently to that of its 
major ally. In terms of the stakes at UNCLOS 111 Australia stood more to gain than 
most in terms of ocean space. A hard-headed approach meant that negotiating partners 
had to be chosen in terms of those countries which were prepared to give political 
backing to Australian positions. Traditional loyalties or ideological affinities would thus 
count for less if it meant that policy objectives could be compromised. Australia 
demonstrated a keen willingness to search out allies where it was necessary and to co­
ordinate positions with those countries. Often those allies varied from issue-to-issue and 
changed at various times in the conference. The Australian delegations’ instructions at 
the conference were normally quite specific but the means chosen to achieve those 
objectives were largely left to the delegation. Australia’s freedom of manoeuvre here was 
used to good advantage in the way in which the delegation quickly formed negotiating 
relationships with those states that looked the most promising negotiating partners.
Lessons for Future Australian Conference Diplomacy
Australia’s success at the conference in terms of achieving its pre-conference goals was in 
large measure due to the fact that law of the sea trends favoured coastal states. Once 
Australia had taken the basic policy choice to realize its coastal state interests it aligned 
itself with the dominant trend within the conference. However, it was also argued that 
Australia’s ‘hand’ was played skilfully and that in some areas Australia’s successes did 
not run entirely with the major trend and direction of the conference. Conference 
diplomacy redistributes influence toward less developed countries, allowing poor states 
to some extent to penetrate the richer and stronger states. Conference diplomacy thus can 
lead to an incongruence between power inside and outside of the conference 
diplomacy.106 The Australian case at UNCLOS 111 supports the notion that multilateral 
conferences permit opportunities for smaller to medium powers to exercise a degree of 
influence that they would otherwise not expect to have in world politics. Buzan’s point 
with respect to Canada’s position at the conference applies with similar force to the 
Australian case:
...a well mobilised and resourceful middle power has a reasonable chance 
of making a disproportionate impact on a selected multilateral negotiation.
The key to this influence, issue factors aside, seems to lie in well- 
organised, coherent, early, and adequately backed diplomacy. Although 
the circumstances in which this can be carried off effectively may be 
constrained by types of issues and patterns of alignment, it seems most 
likely to work in relation to functional issues that cut across traditional 
diplomatic lines.107
Whether Australia’s experience at UNCLOS 111 has any short term lessons for future 
Australian involvement in international multilateral negotiations is probably doubtful, 
simply because of the unique nature of the kind of law-making negotiation that was 
involved in the law of the sea. No previous law making exercise has been as big, 
complex and ambitious.
Plant points out that four main elements would seem necessary for a repeat of the 
UNCLOS 111 model for future UN law-making conferences: a politically important 
subject requiring regulation by a general international treaty which involves large 
elements both of codification and progressive development and limited but substantial 
amounts of ‘legislative’ innovation; the existence of major conflicting interests requiring 
trade-off; global concurrence on the need for action, because, for example, large areas 
and not merely aspects of the existing law are perceived to be in disarray, incomplete or 
unfair; and the prospect of substantial economic or political gains for the participants. 
Plant point out that while developing countries may be predisposed to repeat the 
UNCLOS style negotiations because the final Convention created precedents for 
‘development’ provisions in future treaties, western states may wish to avoid a repetition 
because such conference are expensive and because in that case the result was not wholly 
satisfactory to them.108 He goes on to point out that:
Even assuming willingness on all sides to repeat the experiment, however, 
there remains the present paucity of subjects to which the procedures might 
realistically be applied. The legal aspects of outer space, Antarctica, the 
geostationary orbit and certain other areas which some suggest might 
become parts of the common heritage of mankind are examples of possible 
candidates for such treatment, but there is little evidence of these 
possibilities being pursued at present. Although the UN is fast running 
out of areas of international law ripe for codification and a limited element 
of progressive development— indeed, the legal office of the secretariat has 
been considering the possibility of a special appointment to prepare an 
exhaustive list— it is nevertheless still engaged in that search. There is 
little sign of any moves to broaden the work of UN legal organs into new 
“progressive law-making’’ negotiations in which, as with the law of the 
sea, the “legislative” content of the conference’s work would be 
substantial...Many matters, moreover, which might be dealt with under 
procedures similar to UNCLOS 111 are already on the agendas of UN 
political organs. When the legal organs have substantially completed their 
codification efforts, pressure might arise to transfer these matters to those 
organs or to law-making conferences. But it is equally likely that the 
political organs will resist encroachments on their bailiwicks.109
Thus the factors contributing to Australia’s successful UNCLOS 111 experience may not 
have immediate short term relevance as the UNCLOS kind of mega law-making 
conference may not be repeated in the short term. However, the adoption of consensus 
and the package deal approach, the use of small groups and ad hoc informal consultations
was carried to new heights by UNCLOS 111 and the law of the sea negotiations made a 
substantive contribution to the process of multi-lateral diplomacy. The UNCLOS 111 
model of procedure has been applied flexibly in both the Preparatory Commission on the 
Law of the Sea and during the Antarctic Treaty mineral negotiations.110 In the longer 
term the prospects are that other UN conferences negotiating difficult issues such as 
global climate and environmental questions while perhaps not on the scale and duration of 
UNCLOS 111 will resort to UNCLOS 111 style consensus conference procedures.111
Australia’s experience at UNCLOS 111 demonstrated that in the event of a new era of 
global negotiations with law-making mega conferences the UNCLOS 111 style 
conference offers opportunities for medium powers such as Australia to make a 
significant contribution to the negotiations and that Australian foreign policy makers 
should be alert to the possibility of exploiting these opportunities. Australia’s law of the 
sea experience demonstrates that Australian interests can be promoted through such 
multilateral conferences, although they also pose risks that must be anticipated. The key 
to success appear to be in a number of factors; careful and early preparation of positions, 
the careful selection of delegations and the continuity of negotiators; the integration of 
conference diplomacy with overall foreign policy objectives; strong bureaucratic 
organisation to co-ordinate positions; consultation with interested groups to build public 
support for negotiation positions at the conference; coordination of positions with those 
countries that are most likely to be of assistance in the negotiations; and the inclusion of 
representatives from the States, the private sector and other groups that may be able to 
serve in an advisory capacity on matters requiring particular knowledge. For the most 
part these factors are hardly surprising: what needs to be stressed, however, is that the 
UNCLOS 111 case demonstrates the particular importance of these factors for a middle 
ranking country such as Australia and the necessity for Australia’s foreign policy makers 
to absorb these lessons if Canberra is to take advantage of the opportunities offered by 
future multilateral conferences to promote a co-operative approach to global problems. 
Through skilful conference diplomacy Australian negotiatiors played a key role at 
UNCLOS 111— the factors that have been outlined earlier deserve attention if Australia is 
to participate effectively in future global conferences.
CHAPTER TEN
CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP: RATIFICATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION
This chapter considers Australia’s follow up to UNCLOS 111 in terms of the 
implementation of the treaty. It first considers the issue of treaty ratification and then 
various modes of implementation. It is argued that Australia has developed a successful 
policy of implementation since the treaty was concluded although its hesitancy in ratifying 
the Convention undermines the extent to which Australia can be seen as a leader in 
developing policies of implementation. As a consequence Australia’s clear diplomatic 
success at UNCLOS 111 could be strengthened if Australia moved to ratify the 
Convention.
Treaty Ratification and Implementation
While an overwhelming majority of States have signed the LOS Convention the treaty 
will come into force only for those states ratifying it one year after following the receipt 
of the sixtieth ratification. As at August 1990 forty-three states have ratified. All 
indications are that the Convention will come into force in the early 1990s.1 Australia has 
not ratified the Convention. The major event colouring the period since the completion of 
the Convention was the US decision not to sign the treaty. It also declined to participate 
in the Preparatory Commission, the body designed to establish the technical regulations 
regarding seabed mining that will guide the International Seabed Authority (see below). 
The only major US allies not to sign the treaty are the UK and FRG although both 
participate as observers in Prepcom.2 US policy has been to express support for the 
provisions of the treaty not dealing with deep seabed mining.3 It proclaimed an exclusive 
economic zone in 1983 and argued that those parts of the LOS Convention that protect 
navigational rights are part of customary international law, particularly the right of transit 
through straits.4 It has also attempted to undermine the regime for sea mining by 
unilaterally granting licences to US firms for deep seabed mineral exploration, but has 
been unable to bring other mining states into a separate regime that would operate outside 
the LOS Convention.5
Before discussing the issue of Australia’s ratification and implementation of the treaty it is 
useful to point out that ratification and implementation are different concepts. Most 
multilateral treaties of the general law making type require almost ten years to come into
force under the law of treaties and many treaties are never fully implemented in the 
manner intended even by those states that ratify.6 Johnston points out that relatively few 
global conventions are ratified, much less fully implemented by a majority of the nations 
participating in the process of treaty making. Johnston goes on to point out that for many 
highly complex multilateral treaties the act of ratification and the process of 
implementation may be mutually independent, and that ratification is a symbolic act 
signalling that the state is committed to the promotional and demonstrative purposes of 
the treaty. Implementation on the other hand is not an either-or proposition.7
Ratification
Eight years after the completion of UNCLOS 111 Canberra has offered virtually no hints 
about its decision on ratification. While Australia was initially very enthusiastic about the 
outcome of the conference and despite the fact that Australia was a major beneficiary of 
the new law of the sea, curiously no senior Australian politician has ever found it 
necessary to explain publicly why ratification has not occurred.8 The only hints offered 
on the issue have come from some Australian officials.
In March 1986 the then head of the law of the sea section in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr Peter Shannon, stated that ‘we are moving slowly on the question of 
ratification’ and offered the reason that the government had been reviewing the whole 
question of the offshore constitutional settlement of 1980.9 Shannon then offered three 
perspectives on the issue of Canberra’s thinking on ratification. First was the question of 
whether Australian ocean interests would be enhanced by Australian ratifying the LOS 
Convention. Here Shannon pointed out Canberra had to consider the consequences of 
non-ratification on Australia being able to enjoy transit and navigation rights in a situation 
when Australia’s archipelagic neighbours (Philippines, Indonesia, Fiji) had already 
ratified the Convention.10 Second, how would the ratification affect A ustralia’s 
economic interests. Shannon noted that ‘what our financial burden in the Prepcom 
context will be a matter for consideration’.11 Finally, Shannon raised the whole question 
of ratification as a foreign policy issue. He pointed out that the expectation of the 
international community of Australia as far as ratification is concerned was one of the 
factors that Canberra needed to consider in deciding on ratification and that a decision 
based on giving weight to economic factors could mean that Canberra could find itself in 
a ‘rather lonely’ position given ratifications by Australia’s neighbours. Shannon 
observed that if the Convention comes into force Australia’s neighbours who have 
ratified ‘will look tow'ards Australia saying “what are you going to do?.”’12
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Since Shannon’s statement in March 1986 the Department of Foreign Affairs 
commissioned a legal study on the domestic legal implications of ratification by Mr W.R. 
Edeson of the ANU Law Faculty,13 but there has been no sign that Canberra perceives 
any urgency on the question.
Should Australia ratify the Law of the Sea Convention?
It is clear from the comments quoted above that any decision on this issue will need to 
take into account Australia’s ocean interests, economic factors and foreign policy goals.
(a) Ocean Interests
As far as Australian ocean interests are concerned we have already argued that one of 
Canberra’s strong interests in the negotiations at UNCLOS 111 was to gain some 
stability in ocean law. The more states ratify the Law of the Sea Convention the stronger 
the Convention will be in terms of a basic guide to state action. Part of the drive for a 
comprehensive Convention was because many states, particularly the maritime powers, 
felt that customary international law of the sea was uncertain. Australia’s reliance on the 
Law of the Sea treaty is much more predictable than customary law. Of course states 
have already adopted parts of the treaty irrespective of ratification. The issue of what 
parts of the Convention are already customary law has generated a considerable 
literature.14 There is no question, however, that the 200 mile economic or fishery zone 
and the twelve mile territorial sea is part of customary law.15
The option of simply adopting parts of the treaty as custom is one that should not be seen 
as attractive in the longer term simply because ‘customary international law tends to be a 
blunt instrument, often difficult to determine and harder to enforce’.16 In fact Canberra’s 
policy has been to question whether the alternative of relying on customary law is an 
acceptable alternative. Speaking in November 1986 the then Head of the Treaties and Sea 
Law Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Ian Nicholson, stated that the US 
position that, except for the deep seabed provisions, most of the remaining provisions, 
especially those on navigation and overflight, were grounded in customary law was ‘too 
sweeping’. Nicholson pointed out that the Convention did not merely codify existing 
customary international law: ‘it also clarified and resolved uncertainties and conflicts 
about what the law was, and provided appropriate rules to govern activities where the law 
had not developed in line with technological and other advances. The preamble to the 
Convention refers to the “codification and progressive development of the law of the sea 
achieved in this Convention”. It is difficult to argue, for example, that concepts such as 
transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage, which were put forward for the first time in
UNCLOS, were part of customary international law, and subsequently codified in the 
Convention’ (emphasis in original).17 The notion of selectively relying on customary 
law would also appear to undermine the way in which the Convention was negotiated as 
a package deal. Again, Australia was a strong defender of the package deal approach, 
and since UNCLOS 111 Canberra has explicitly rejected the ‘picking and choosing’ 
approach to the Convention.18
In terms of whether Australia should ratify the Convention to secure specific benefits 
created by the treaty there is probably no specific need. Australia while still having a 3 
mile territorial sea could introduce a 12 mile territorial sea without arousing any criticism 
simply because, as noted earlier, the twelve mile limit is undoubtedly part of customary 
international law. Any increase in the territorial sea may, however, result in political 
conflict with state governments who may well want the extra area to accrue to them.19 
Australia proclaimed a 200 mile fishing zone in 1979. Australia has not proclaimed an 
EEZ although again Australia could move here without any need to ratify the Convention 
because of the customary law status of the EEZ. As parts of the continental margin of the 
New South Wales coast, part of the Victorian coast and much of the south coast of 
Australia are less than 200 nautical miles wide20 an EEZ would provide Australia with 
seabed rights to two hundred nautical miles.21 The proclamation of an EEZ would also 
enable Canberra to move to exercise greater control over MSR in the 200 mile zone (see 
below).
Australia was a strong supporter of the view that it was entitled to jurisdiction over the 
full extent of its continental margin and as was noted in the previous chapter was largely 
successful at UNCLOS 111. Because Australia’s margin extends beyond 200 nautical 
miles off the North West Shelf Australia along with other broad margin countries, 
rejected any cut off limits at 200 miles. As we have seen a very complex formula (Article 
76) was incorporated in the Convention by which the broad margin states can exercise 
jurisdiction over the margin to almost the full extent of the shelf. Australian legislation 
concerning the shelf22 is based on the 1958 continental shelf definition which permits the 
exploration of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation beyond a 
depth of 200 metres ‘to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources’. The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, Sect 
12, also gives Australia latitude in regard to the extent of the shelf (although the adjacent 
area boundary generally serves as an artifical limit on A ustralia’s legislative 
jurisdiction).23 The Convention would however permit Australia to claim 200 nautical 
miles where the margin is narrower than 200 nautical miles, and as noted in the context of 
the EEZ Australia’s shelf is narrower than 200 miles in places.24 Edeson, however, 
points out that: ‘For Australia, the ratification of the Convention will be important not so
much for accepting a new, more complex definition of the continental shelf (see Art. 76), 
as for the acceptance of two particular constraints on the exercise of sovereign rights with 
respect to the shelf where it extends beyond 200 miles. These are: (a) the obligation to 
make certain payments or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of the margin 
beyond 200 miles (Art .82); (b) the obligation to determine the outer limits of the margin 
‘on the basis of’ the recommendation of the Commission on the Outer Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (Art.76(8) and Annex l l ) ’.25
The revenue sharing provision is considered below. As we have already seen Australia 
was unhappy about the role of the Commission believing it should be advisory only and 
not a body that could make its own determination on the limits of the shelf. Annex 11 
requires the coastal state to submit particulars as soon as possible but in any case within 
‘10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State’(Art. 4). Ratification 
would permit Australia to play a role in the formulation of membership of the 
Com m ission.26 An argument against ratification would be based on the notion that 
Canberra should not be restricted in setting its shelf limits and that there is, in any case, 
insufficient information to apply the complex formula of Art. 76.27 In that sense 
Canberra would be better off not setting a fixed limit— new technological developments 
could arise as to permit Australia under the 1958 Shelf definition to later move its 
boundaries outwards.
As far as other Australian ocean interests are concerned ratification would not have any 
adverse impact on Australian ocean boundaries. The most intractable issue here— the 
Australia/Indonesian boundary in the so-called Timor Gap has been resolved by the 
declaration of a Joint Development Zone28 and in the outstanding bilateral ocean 
boundaries the compromise articles (74 and 83) neither frustrate nor help Australia’s 
position.29
On navigational issues we have already argued that the Convention strikes a reasonable 
balance between coastal and maritime states and thus benefits Australia as a user of ocean 
transport and with interests in naval mobility.30 Whether third states can rely on the 
transit passage provisions is, as noted earlier, a debatable point. However there is no 
doubt that the Convention will provide a better basis for parties to preserve navigational 
freedoms and that Canberra’s interest in navigational freedoms would be best protected 
through ratification of the treaty rather than customary law. This argument has been well 
expressed by Professor Ivan Shearer who in addressing the issue of Australia’s 
ratification stated:
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When you deal with a world that is as heterogeneous as ours, where every 
country has such a sophisticated appreciation of the processes of 
customary international law, it is very useful indeed to have an agreed text, 
something on which you can actually read out the permissible limits of a 
claim to archipelagic waters or the definition of the rights of passage 
through straits, or the limits to which a country can interfere with your 
shipping when you are transiting that country’s economic zone. All of 
those sorts of questions can well arise and be possible great hindrances to 
our trade, to our Navy and to our general dependence on overseas 
communications. All of those things would be greatly clarified by our 
adherence to the Convention so that we can plead it against other countries, 
not merely as a convenient statement of customary international law but as 
a text which is actually binding, contractually, between us. That’s why I 
said that it was particularly significant that both Indonesia and the 
Philippines are parties to this Convention because we have had problems 
of transit rights with both of those countries. Both countries, Indonesia in 
particular, have had a somewhat exaggerated idea of their archipelagic 
entitlements and the Philippines has had a long-standing claim to its waters 
as historic and thus has required express permission before transit, at least 
by warships, is allowed. Now in the light of the Convention those 
positions can no longer be maintained.31
Reliance on customary law for rights of transit may have an impact on Australia’s foreign 
relations and this is considered below. It could be suggested, however, that while the 
US continues to adopt deliberate policy of challenging excessive maritime claims and 
insisting on navigational freedoms32 that Australia’s will continue to derive these benefits 
irrespective of ratification. The obvious point to make here is that there may well be 
situations where Australia would be acting without US assistance and where a coastal 
state allowed passage to only those states accepting the Convention regime.
On disputes settlement ratification of the Convention should not cause concern because 
Australia will become subject to compulsory disputes settlement. As Edeson has 
observed Canberra has ‘had a virtually open acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice for some years now. Furthermore, Australia has been a 
party since 1963 to the Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 
1958, which covered the “interpretation or application” of any of the four Geneva 
Conventions’.33 On the marine environment the Convention provisions on the 200 mile 
zone include marine pollution. Until Australia establishes a full exclusive economic zone 
it would not appear that Australia will assert its coastal enforcement jurisdiction for 
pollution purposes outside the territorial sea.34 For the most part Part XII of the 
Convention is a framework code for future measures. Where there already exist treaties 
on marine pollution and which are covered by the Convention Australia has already taken 
such measures (see below). With regard to MSR the proclamation of a full EEZ would 
enable Australia to move towards exercising greater control over MSR in the 200 mile 
zone. At present there is only very limited legislative controls over MSR.35 Ratification
would put Australia’s control over MSR on a strong legal footing, even though it is 
arguable that the main features of the new regime have become part of customary law.36
From the viewpoint of Australia ocean interests there appears to be clear grounds for 
ratification. The Convention represents a very acceptable balance between Australia’s 
desire for coastal state rights and the need to preserve navigational freedoms. The desire 
by Australia for greater stability in the law of the sea37 evident through UNCLOS 111 
would be enhanced by Australian ratifying the Convention thus strengthening the treaty, 
as opposed to a reliance on customary law. Finally ratification would offer the 
opportunity for Australia to generate a more coherent and directed approach to ocean 
matters. As Edeson has observed:
At present, responsibility for ocean affairs is scattered across several 
Commonwealth government departments, as well amongst and within state 
and territorial governments. Given that many provisions of LOSC provide 
a framework for future action, in which international negotiations in some 
cases leading to further multilateral treaties will figure prominently, it is 
vital that the occasion of ratification is seen not simply as the completion of 
a regime but rather a stage in the evolution of an important new regime for 
Australia, one which should be accompanied by an enhanced perception of 
the significance of ocean affairs to Australia.38
While it is true that ratification of the Convention would restrict Canberra’s ability to 
expand its jurisdiction it would be highly unlikely that Australia would ever wish to act 
unilaterally and go beyond the maxima i.e. either 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles 
from the the 2,500 metre isobath. Thus based on a consideration of Australia’s ocean 
interests Canberra should ratify the Convention.
(b) Economic Interests
In the period preceding UNCLOS 111 and during the conference the new ocean regime 
was perceived as holding out the promise of economic benefits to states in terms of 
expanded state jurisdiction. As far as Australia is concerned Canberra proclaimed its 200 
mile fishing zone in 1979 so in terms of resources Australia will not ‘miss out’ if a 
decision is taken not to ratify.39 Australia is, however, almost totally dependent on 
seaborne commerce so that to the extent that ratification strengthens the stability of ocean 
navigational rights Australia derives some economic benefit.40 Australia’s economic 
interests are more directly affected by the regime for deep seabed mining and the costs 
that Australia will bear if Canberra ratifies.
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(i) Seabed Mining Regime
Potential seabed mining states have been concerned with the way in which the seabed 
mining provisions will operate in practice. Since 1982 Australian interests in the mining 
regime have revolved around its interests as a land based producer of minerals that one 
day may be mined on the ocean floor. The main fear has been the threat to land based 
mining by possible subsidisation of seabed mining. (Australia ranks 3rd in world nickel 
production and fifth in manganese).41 Since 1983 Australia has taken quite a high 
profile in the Preparatory Commission. This Commission was established by a 
resolution of UNCLOS 111 and has been drafting the detailed rules necessary to 
implement the provisions of the LOS Convention.42 All of the seabed mining states have 
made it clear that there must be a satisfactory set of rules for sea bed mining before there 
can be ratification. The UK and FRG have attended the Prepcom as observers but the 
US has refused to participate (even though its signature of the final act would allow it 
observer status).
Australia’s role at Prepcom has been detailed elsewhere by the author and it is not 
proposed to repeat that discussion here.43 It should be noted in this context, however, 
that Australia has made it clear in the Prepcom that a critical factor for Australia in any 
ratification decision is that any regime for deep seabed mining should protect Australian 
metal producers from the dangers of subsidized mining.44 This has become a key focus 
of Australia’s Prepcom policy. Australia’s main fear has been that the Enterprise or 
national entities will undertake deep seabed mining for non-commercial reasons, entailing 
subsidisation and thereby annexing market shares which would otherwise be available to 
Australian producers, with consequent reduction of their market shares. Australian 
delegates at Prepcom have argued that the answer to potential problems posed by deep 
seabed mining is not compensation or production controls (the latter perhaps even 
promoting subsidisation in the race for an artificially limited number of mine sites) but 
rather in ensuring that seabed mining is a strictly commercial operation. Structural 
adjustment, it is argued, not compensation, is the only medium to long-term solution to 
loss of competitiveness that may follow the commencement of seabed mining. Australia 
has argued vigorously that its economic interests will best be protected if seabed mining 
is developed on a commercial basis i.e. at a profit, and has worked actively at Prepcom to 
develop a mining code which is not onerous or complex. In this policy Australia has 
consulted closely with the Australian mining industry and its views seem to have been 
influential in the drive by Australian delegates to resist compensation and to push a strong 
anti-subsidisation line. It is not the case that Australian delegates have accepted all 
industry’s views. Australian delegates have not supported a policy of total opposition to 
Part XI, or assumed that Pan XI will be subject to major renegotiations, or that the
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benefits of the Convention will accrue to Australia as part of customary international law 
and therefore Australia need not worry if Part XI is removed from the Convention. Such 
views, that have from time to time been expressed by the Australian mining industry, 
have not been endorsed by Australia at the Commission.45
At the time of writing the Prepcom is still meeting to determine the details of the deep 
seabed mining regime. The progress has been slow partly because the economics of the 
world mineral industry as well as that of seabed mining have changed significantly since 
UNCLOS 111 and the predicted shortages of copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese have 
not eventuated. It was predicted that demand for minerals would continue to increase 
steadily at previous rates and that the production of nodules from the deep seabed would 
be competitive with the increasing expensive extraction of the same minerals from the 
depleted and a less accessible land-based resources. As the Council of Ocean Law has 
pointed out ‘those predictions have proven to be mistaken. Altered market conditions, 
discoveries of additional land-based sources, and the improved efficiency of land based 
mining, will result in a long term postponement, (if not abandonment) of, and slower 
projected rates of growth for, commercial deep seabed mining operations.’46 In a major 
study undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources carried out for 
discussion at Prepcom the conclusion was reached that much higher metal prices, 
probably double current prices, would be needed for a project to give a satisfactory 
commercial return. Deep seabed mining, it concluded, was unlikely to be commercially 
viable for the forseeable future at least not until the next century.47 The Australian 
mining industry’s position has been that Australia should not ratify the Convention until 
the details of the regime are known and until it can be demonstrated that seabed mining 
may be viably developed on sound commercial principles 48 Given the pace at which 
Prepcom has worked the full parameters of the regime may not be available for some 
years. During Prepcom Australia has placed considerable importance on the need to 
protect Australia’s mining industry from the potential dangers of subsidised mining but 
given that Australia’s own study on the economics of mining has demonstrated that 
mining will not take place until into the next century if at all it can be argued that the 
seabed mining regime should not be given a high priority in Australia’s eventual decision.
(ii) Financial Aspects
The financial costs of Australia’s ratification have been a very important factor in 
Australian thinking on ratification. This is most clear in Australia’s policy at Prepcom 
where Australian delegates have continually raised the issue of the financial implications 
of Prepcom’s work and to generally encourage a lean Authority and Enterprise 49 The 
Seabed Authority is expected to be self financing through revenue generated from seabed
mining, but prior to this the Authority will be funded by the parties to the treaty based on 
the scale of assessment used for the regular United Nations budget.50 Australia pointed 
out at the Prepcom that taking a worse case, but by no means worst cast scenario (where 
the Convention came into force with countries paying only 10% of the UN budget) the 
cost to Australia would be $15.5 million a year. In 1985 this contribution to the 
Authority represented about 25% of what Australia paid to all international bodies to 
which it belonged.51 Annex IV, Art. 11.3(b) of the Convention requires States Parties 
to the Convention to provide interest-free loans to the Enterprise for half of the funds 
necessary to explore and exploit one mine site and to transport, process and market the 
minerals recovered and to meet initial administrative expenses. These loans would be 
pro-rated to countries UN contributions (adjusted to take account of non-members of the 
UN). In addition, State Parties are required to guarantee the debts incurred by the 
Enterprise in raising the other half in accordance with the same scale.52
Australia pointed out at the fifth session of the Prepcom in 1985 that the financial costs of 
funding a new international organisation would strongly influence Australia’s attitude on 
the ratification issue.53 Australia has thus been extremely active at Prepcom to ensure 
that a mining regime will be sufficiently attractive to bring in the major seabed mining 
states who are the major contributors to the UN budget and has sought to ensure that the 
Prepcom does not create some huge unwieldy bureaucratic structure.54
Australia may also face economic costs through ratification by virtue of the revenue 
sharing provision in respect of mineral resources on the shelf beyond the 200 mile limit. 
As we have seen Australia fought strongly against this provision and argued against it not 
only on sovereignty grounds but also because it would discourage exploration on its 
margin. Australia’s hydrocarbon activity takes place within 200 miles and at present 
there does not appear any likely prospect that Australian production would be beyond the 
200 nautical mile limit.55 However the revenue sharing provision is an element that 
Australia would need to consider in any ratification decision. However, even if Australia 
chose not to ratify the Convention it is arguable that Australia would still have some 
obligation regarding revenue sharing as this was part of the overall package on the 
continental shelf concept and Australia would not wish to be seen as adopting a ‘pick and 
choose’ approach to the Convention.56
From an economic viewpoint it is difficult to argue that Australia would derive any 
obvious benefits from ratification. The financial implications of ratification are unknown 
as far as the seabed mining regime are concerned and further developments at Prepcom 
will have to occur before Canberra has a clearer picture on this issue.
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(c) Foreign Policy Aspects
It was noted earlier that part of Canberra’s thinking on ratification is the foreign policy 
implications. A number of questions are involved here. First Australia would have to 
consider the reactions of its major ally, the United States. While the Reagan 
Administration was openly hostile to the Convention the reaction of the Bush 
Administration is unclear.57 Without the US it could be argued that the seabed regime 
will be rather weak particularly if other seabed mining countries categorically reject the 
treaty. In pan Australia’s policy at Prepcom has been predicated on that assumption for 
Australian delegates have worked consistently to ensure that the mining regime is 
sufficiently attractive to bring int the potential deep seabed mining countries, such as US, 
UK and FRG.58 It is doubtful, however ,whether deep seabed mining would take place 
outside the Convention. As noted earlier deep seabed is unlikely to take place until the 
next century, because of the state of the metal markets. Potential investors would have to 
consider also a possible legal challenge to mining outside the Convention59 and in any 
event it would be doubtful if such a mining operation would have a sufficiently clear legal 
title to a mine site to borrow the necessary capital.60 Thus even if the US continues to 
stand out from the DSBM regime being hammered out by the Prepcom the eventual 
outcome is likely to command the overwhelming support of the world community. On 
that basis it is possible to argue that irrespective of the US decision Canberra should 
consider its decision on ratification in the light of broader foreign policy factors than 
bilateral relations with the US.
Particularly important here is Australia’s relations with the developing countries. As 
noted previously Australia supported the developing countries on ocean issues at 
UNCLOS 111 (in part because Canberra’s interests coincided with the developing 
countries on the substantive issues at the conference). Generally speaking Australia has 
built up a great deal of credibility on North-South issues since the mid 1970s.UNCLOS 
111 was in part seen by the developing countries as part of their drive for a new 
international economic order and North-South conflict at the global level was injected into 
the whole question of a new ocean regime. Australia’s neighbours Indonesia and the 
Philippines have ratified the Convention61 as has Fiji.62 Given Australia’s high profile 
throughout the conference and the fact that in terms of ocean space Australia emerged as a 
beneficiary of the final negotiations, Canberra’s credibility as a supporter of the 
developing countries would probably be boosted if Australia ratified the Convention.
More generally a positive move on ratification would demonstrate Australia’s support for 
the UN. We have already noted that Australia’s UNCLOS diplomacy should be seen 
within the context of Australia’s support for the United Nations. Ratification would
demonstrate in a positive way Australia’s support for the UN in general and in particular 
the way in which through consensus agreement was able to be reached on virtually all 
issues (apart from seabed mining) at the conference. Australia has, like other middle 
powers, been able to find the UN forum a useful one in which to exercise some influence 
by gathering support from smaller states for its positions.63 This has, for example, been 
true with respect to disarmament in recent times.64 The multi-lateral forum of UNCLOS 
111 suited Australia precisely because it was able to gather support from other states for 
its positions while at the same time raising its diplomatic profile by being seen as playing 
a useful role within the forum in helping other states have their concerns raised. Australia 
was a major beneficiary of the multilateral approach of the UN in its negotiations on a 
new ocean regime so that a decision in favour of ratification would be consistent with 
Australia’s support for multilateral negotiations within the UN system. Canberra’s 
ratification of the Convention would demonstrate that not only was Canberra interested in 
the Law of the Sea Treaty but also was prepared to support the UN in the important areas 
of multilateral treaty making, and multilateral (and opposed to unilateral) approaches to 
global problem areas.
We have already argued that Australia played a leading role at UNCLOS 111. For 
Australia not to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention would not sit comfortably with its 
high profile during the negotiations and the efforts which Australia gave to supporting the 
integrity of those negotiations. While non-ratification would not seriously detract from 
Australia’s support for the UN or its credibility with developing states non-ratification 
could not be seen as helping Canberra’s diplomatic credibility in either the UN or in those 
fora where North -South issues are raised.
Concluding Remarks
Lack of progress at Prepcom has discouraged and in some cases prevented many states 
from ratifying the Convention. The Law of the Sea Convention should, however, enter 
force in the next few years. Canberra will thus at some stage have to make a decision on 
ratification. The main arguments against ratification for Australia revolve around the 
uncertain financial applications of ratification, that through customary law Australia can 
pick up the major navigational benefits and that land based mining interests should dictate 
caution before we know the full details of the mining regime. The most forceful 
argument in favour of ratification is the treaty provides an acceptable balance between 
coastal and maritime interests and therefore represents the best long term basis for 
stability and predictability in ocean affairs. Australian ratification would also be of 
important symbolic value in demonstrating Canberra’s commitment to the UN system and 
the multilateral approach to global problem solving. In particular Australian ratification
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would provide greater diplomatic credibility if Canberra wished to pursue a more active 
role on regional and international policy issues (see Final Conclusion).65 Canberra’s 
decision will obviously weigh economic and ocean interests as well as foreign policy 
considerations in any final decision. The argument presented here would tend to give 
weight to ocean interests and foreign policy factors in any final decision.
Treaty Implementation
Implementation, unlike ratification, is not an either-or decision. With the Law of the Sea 
Convention already national responses have varied from ratification and full 
implementation to simply ignoring it entirely.66 Johnston points out that the Convention 
might be regarded as involving the exercise (and possible reinforcement) of entitlements 
and fulfilment of softly articulated responsibilities as well as the discharge of specific 
duties.67
While the language in the Convention will raise questions of interpretation generally 
speaking Australia ‘look(s) to the Convention as an authoritative guide to the modem law 
of the sea and, for the purposes of national policy formulation and implementation (is) 
acting in accordance with its provisions’.68
Regime of EEZ
Australia has not made any formal claim to an EEZ, but in 1979 proclaimed a 200 mile 
fishing zone. The claim brought under national jurisdiction 1854.02 sq. n.m. of ocean.69 
A number of issues have been involved in implementing the fishing zone provisions of 
the Convention. First Australia’s proclamation of the two hundred mile zone overlapped 
the claims of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, France (Kerguelen Islands and Australia’s 
Heard and McDonald Islands), Solomon Islands and New Zealand. Agreements have 
been reached with all these states, apart from New Zealand and some areas with 
Indonesia.70 In the case of Indonesia a provisional fisheries and enforcement line was 
concluded in 1981 after Indonesia argued that the median line which gave full effect to the 
islands of Ashmore and Cartier Reefs put Indonesia at an unfair disadvantage. Indonesia 
urged instead that the median line should be drawn without reference to Australia’s 
offshore islands. Australia compromised and gave Indonesia control over about 70 
percent of the disputed area.71 In reaching these boundary settlements Australia has 
taken into account the Law of the Sea Convention provisions on delimitation. That is not, 
however, a significant obligation to discharge. These articles as previously noted simply 
require parties to solve their disputes by agreement in order to reach an equitable 
solution.72
225
The second issue relates to the discretionary language used in the EEZ fishery provisions 
in Articles 61-67 which grant the coastal state the pre-eminent role in determining who 
harvests how much of which stocks designated in its area and the coastal state is given 
wide latitude within eleven categories of national ‘laws and regulations’ designated in 
Article 62(4).73 In its Fisheries Act Australia has legislated to give effect to the wide 
coastal state discretions over fisheries.74 Particularly important in the context of 
Australia’s fisheries policy with respect to HMS Canberra has given strong support to the 
island countries of the South Pacific in their position that the coastal state has jurisdiction 
over highly migratory species as provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention. As a 
member of the FFA Australia was involved in two year negotiations between 1984-1986 
that culminated in 1987 with a treaty between FFA member states that would allow 
fishing by US vessels in specified areas and on terms and conditions set out in the 
Treaty.75
The Convention also has a good faith requirement: under Articles 61 and 62 the coastal 
state is obliged to detemiine the total allowable catch, to avoid overfishing through proper 
conservation and management, to comply with the maximum sustainable yield objective 
of conservation as qualified in the Convention, to make allowance for associated or 
dependent species in its conservation measures, to promote the objective of ‘optimum 
utilization’, to determine its own harvesting capacity and to determine the existence of 
surplus stocks which other states should have access as a matter of entitlement. 
Australian law76 and practice has demonstrated that Australia has been prepared to 
facilitate the negotiation of access arrangements. As the former Director of the Australian 
Fisheries Service has observed ‘when it comes to negotiating fisheries agreements with 
Japan, Korea and so forth we (i.e. the Australian Fisheries Service) all work as if the 
Convention was firmly bedded down’.77 Australia has permitted access by foreigners to 
the AFZ through either bilateral agreement or joint ventures with the most important 
countries being Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.78
Archipelagos
Australia does not claim to be an archipelagic state thus its interests here relate to the 
implementation of that part of the treaty by others, particularly Australia’s neighbours. 
Former Foreign Minister Bill Hayden stated in 1985 that ‘Australia accepts the concept of 
archipelagic waters as an equitable balance between the interests of archipelagic states and 
of maritime states’.79 Canberra has served to shore up the Convention here protesting at 
the Philippines government’s declaration made upon signature of the Convention in 1982
and again in August 1984 upon ratification. The Philippines government made 
declarations that:
The Provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea 
lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines or an 
archipelagic state over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to 
enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence and security; the 
concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters 
under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting 
these waters with the economic zone or high seas from the rights of 
foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation.’80
Australia protested to the Secretary General of the UN in September 1988 that the 
Philippines claim that the concept of archipelagic waters was similar to concept of internal 
waters in the former constitution of the Philippines and reaffirmed in Art. 1 of the New 
Constitution of the Philippines in 1987 could not be accepted:
It is clear...that the Convention distinguishes the two concepts and that 
different obligations and rights are applicable to archipelagic waters from 
those which apply to internal waters. In particular, the Convention 
provides for the exercise by foreign ships of the rights of innocent passage 
and of archipelagic sea lanes passage in archipelagic waters— Australia 
cannot, therefore, accept that the statement of the Philippines has any legal 
effect or will have any effect when the Convention comes into force and 
considers that the provisions of the Convention should be observed 
without being made subject to the restrictions asserted in the declaration of 
the Republic of the Philippines.81
Similar protests have been submitted to the UN office of Ocean Affairs and the Law of 
the Sea by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Bulgaria.82
Straits
In the application of the straits articles to Australia’s coastline the two key areas are 
Torres Strait and Bass Strait.83 In the case of Torres Strait Australia has concluded 
special arrangements with Papua New Guinea in relation to navigation through Torres 
Strait. A guaranteed right of passage through routes used for international navigation in 
the strait is recognized. The right is defined by reference to the provisions contained in 
the negotiating text current at UNCLOS 111 at the time the Torres Strait treaty was 
concluded in 1978. These provisions appear basically unchanged in Arts. 34 to 44 of the 
Law of the Sea Convention.84
In Bass Strait, the need to consider the straits regime will arise only if Australia 
proclaimed a 12 mile territorial sea, and if particular islands are employed as base points
for measuring a territorial sea.85 It would be possible to proclaim a territorial sea of a 
lesser distance in the Bass Strait, or to proclaim a territorial sea of 12 miles only from 
certain islands, ‘thus leaving a strip of EEZ or high seas through which ships could 
continue to pass without coming under the straits or territorial sea regime’.86
Australia has adopted the view that the Law of the Sea Convention reinforces Australia’s 
shipping and air passage rights through the Indonesian and other archipelagos.87 With 
that in mind Australia lodged a protest with the Indonesian foreign affairs department for 
the temporary closure in September 1988 of the Sunda and Lombok Straits for the 
purpose of sea and air battle manoeuvre exercises. Australia protested along with the US 
and West Germany . In an Aide Memoir handed to the Indonesian Department of 
Foreign Affairs on 10 October 1988 Australia stated that:
Australia considers that these straits are important routes for international 
navigation through and over which all ships and aircraft enjoy rights of 
passage, and that passage through and over these straits may not be 
hampered or suspended under international law. The Embassy is pleased 
to note, however, that no information has come to the attention of the 
Australian Government of any ships or aircraft having been actually 
hampered or prevented from passing through or over the Lombok and 
Sunda Straits on the dates m entioned in the N avigation 
warnings...Australia has long supported the Indonesian Government’s 
wish to establish and maintain a special regime for waters within its 
archipelago. At the same time, the Australian Government has always 
made it clear that its support has been given on the understanding that 
satisfactory guarantees would be provided to the international community 
with respect to passage not only through but also over archipelagic waters.
The regime for archipelagic waters, including archipelagic sea lanes 
passage, is now set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea...Australia reserves the right for its ships and aircraft to exercise 
rights of passage through and over Indonesia’s archipelagic waters, in 
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, and expresses the hope that Indonesia will respect these 
rights, which are enjoyed by the ships and aircraft of all countries.88
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Australia has not extended its territorial sea to 12 miles and under the permissive language 
of Art. 3 the coastal state is not obliged to go to 12 miles. Australia is only one of 11 
countries that continues to claim a three nautical mile territorial sea. (Australia has agreed 
in the Torres Strait Treaty not to extend the territorial sea around certain Australian islands 
north of the seabed line beyond the existing three mile limit. A decision to extend 
Australia’s territorial sea would need to have regard to this provision). Under Art. 24 the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea the coastal state could exercise contiguous zone 
jurisdiction to 12 miles. Under Art. 33 of the 1982 Convention the limit is 24 miles from 
the territorial sea baselines. So far Australia has, under the earlier Convention, exercised
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legislative jurisdiction only with respect to customs within 12 nautical miles of the 
coast89 but if Australia wanted to retain a 3 mile territorial sea limit it could extend its 
contiguous zone type jurisdiction up to 24 miles.90
No problem exists as far as implementing the baseline provisions of the Convention is 
concerned. The 1982 Convention has adopted substantially the same baseline provisions 
to be found in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone91. 
Australia drew its baselines for delineating its territorial sea in 1983. Australia’s regional 
strait baselines are modest92 and Australia has behaved fairly conservatively in drawing 
its baselines. One of the leading authorities on maritime boundaries, Professor Prescott, 
has pointed out that ‘most of the straight baselines are above reproach, and in the region 
of the Great Barrier Reef Australia has drawn lines well landwards of those which could 
have been justified’.93
Continental Shelf
Implementation of the Convention for Australia would involve new legislation clarifying 
the area of its shelf in accordance with the complex formula in Art. 7694 and to submit 
information on its limits to the Commission on the Continental Shelf. It will also involve 
Australian authorities in ‘defining the foot of the slope and to discover whether the 
application of the sediment formula will allow claims to be made more than 60 nautical 
miles seaward of the slope’.95 As we have already noted irrespective of ratification 
Australia may also be obliged to participate in revenue sharing in areas beyond its 200 
mile limit. Difficulties have arisen in the negotiations of a continental shelf boundary 
delimitation between Australia and Indonesia but in 1988 the two states have agreed to 
resort to an offshore joint development arrangement in lieu of a fixed delimitation 
settlement.96 Whether this will be a successful solution remains to be seen.97
High Seas
The provisions on the High Seas are for the most part a restatement of the 1958 High 
Seas Convention or in some instances an elaboration of that Convention. Two new 
freedoms of the high seas are to be found in Art. 87: the ‘freedom to construct artificial 
islands and other installations permitted under international law subject to Part VI’ and 
‘freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII’. It is not evident that this 
would have particular relevance for Australia. There are new provisions for the 
suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and of unauthorised broadcasts that may be 
more relevant.98 Johnston point out that because of the EEZ regime which encompasses 
most of the world’s most important commercial fisheries the newly renegotiated regime
of the high seas has only a minor impact on the contemporary international law of 
fisheries." The one notable exception here is driftnetting which is noted below.
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The main provisions of the 1958 Convention are excluded from the 1982 Convention and 
‘in their place the new treaty underlines the need for conservation of the living resources 
of the high seas, urges all states to cooperate to that end, and outlines the same guidelines 
which are applied to fishery conservation in the EEZ’.100 While Australia is not a distant 
fishing state Australia has participated in fisheries bodies such as the Indo Pacific 
Fisheries Council, the Indian Ocean Fisheries Council and the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency to work for cooperative conservation of the living resources of the high 
seas.101 Most significantly Australia has taken a lead in attempting to ban the destructive 
practice of driftnet fishing, a practice that occurs mainly in international waters in the 
South Pacific. Because the target fishery (albacore tuna) is mainly fished in international 
waters national fisheries laws and regional states laws cannot be applied to prevent the 
likely over-exploitation or to ban driftnet vessels. To achieve this international 
cooperation is essential. Both at the domestic and regional level Australia has adopted a 
very high profile in implementing the international legal requirements on the Convention 
relating to high seas fisheries conservation, management and environm ental 
principles.102 One rather rhetorical flourish in the High Seas Convention states simply 
that the ‘high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes’. Implementation here might 
be interpreted as a call for diplomatic action and here Australia’s action in introducing the 
notion of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific at the 14th Meeting of the South Pacific 
Forum in 1983 is relevant. The treaty entered into force on 11 December 1986, when 
Australia became the eighth Pacific nation to ratify the treaty. Australia was careful in 
ensuring that navigational rights were preserved in the treaty and that the language did not 
disturb existing US security arrangements in the area.103
The International Area
Implementing Part XI concerning the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
cannot be undertaken until the Seabed Authority is established and the entry into force of 
the Convention, 12 months after the date of the 60th instrument of ratification or 
accession. Signatory states have a responsibility to participate in the work of the 
Preparatory Commission and to refrain from any activity on the deep seabed incompatible 
with the purposes of Part XI. Australia has attended every session of Prepcom since its 
work commenced in 1983 and been an active player within that forum. In Prepcom 
Australia has given strong support to the common heritage principle. Australia has 
worked hard to achieve the goal of a widely accepted Convention and to that end 
Australian delegates have continued their role at UNCLOS 111 of playing the part of a
bridge builder, finding solutions and compromises which would bridge the gap between 
G77 and the Western Miners. Australia has sought to play a constructive role within 
Prepcom mainly in order to ensure that the Commission’s work is not a disincentive to 
states to conform with and eventually ratify the Convention. Australian policy has thus 
been very much ‘pro-Convention’ rather than simply ‘pro mining’.104
Islands
The provision in the Convention (Art. 121(3) that rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or Continental Shelf has not 
been acted upon by Australia. Australia has taken the view that any island generates full 
maritime rights. In the Torres Strait Treaty the most miniscule of islands was accorded a 
territorial sea in the drawing of baselines and in the Coral Sea Australia has used small 
sandy cays as base points in the drawing of delimitation lines with France.105
Preservation of the Marine Environment
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The implementation of the environmental provisions of the Convention has been detailed 
by Edeson106 and is also covered, in part by Burmester.107 Only a brief discussion of 
the issue is possible here.108
First as far as land based pollution is concerned the Convention provides a ‘best 
endeavours’ clause (Art. 207), although Art. 213 imposes a duty to enforce such laws 
adopted.109 Land based pollution is a serious problems in Australia,110 as elsewhere.111 
Australia had not legislated at the national level to control land-based discharges into the 
ocean. Agreement was reached in 1980 that the states would control discharges into the 
territorial sea, and the Commonwealth beyond that area.112 Burmester points out that as
a result the only legislation controlling matters such as the discharge of 
sewage effluent into the ocean from pipelines remains entirely a subject for 
state legislation, as no pipelines extend beyond 3 miles. General state 
water pollution legislation also controls discharges into rivers or estuaries 
which may end up in the ocean. This is one area where some 
Commonwealth supervision or involvement would seem to be required if 
Australia is to discharge properly its international obligations.113
There is no global convention apart from the Law of the Sea Convention that deals with 
land based pollution but at the regional level there are several which address the issue.114 
Within Australia’s region Australia participated in the negotiations to draw up the 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South 
Pacific Region.115 Art. 7 of that Convention reiterates the obligation recognized in Art. 
207 of the Law of the Sea Convention. Edeson has pointed out that as state laws operate
for the most part in the territorial sea, they may prove to be inadequate to deal with land 
based pollution having an effect beyond that sea.116
As far as pollution from vessels is concerned the Law of the Sea Convention integrates 
and reinforces many of the features of pre-existing multilateral convention on vessel 
sources pollution— OELPOL and MARPOL. OILPOL— the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 was ratified by Australia on 29 
August 1962. A 1971 amendment enabled the ‘nearest land’ to be defined for the 
purposes of the Convention as the outer edge of the Great Barrier Reef and this has been 
incorporated into Australian law.117 OILPOL was found to be inadequate in certain 
respects and new efforts to negotiate a new Convention were made to cover not only oil 
but other pollutants. This was known as MARPOL— International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, which has been amended by a Protocol of 
1978. New legislation to replace OILPOL legislation was enacted in 1983 which 
repealed OILPOL legislation, and incorporated certain aspects of MARPOL.118 While at 
UNCLOS 111 Australia managed to extend the range of matters for which special 
measures may be made. Until recently Australia has not felt it necessary to propose 
special measures for the Great Barrier Reef or other areas.119
Pollution by dumping is covered by Art. 210, while enforcement measures are covered 
by Art. 216. Australia signed the London Dumping Convention in 1973 and the 
Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Art. 1981 (amended 1986) gives effect to the 
Dumping Convention and largely anticipates Art. 210. The Act has also been made 
applicable to the AFZ by the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Regulations 
(Amendment) 1984.120 While Australia supported the jurisdiction of the coastal state to 
control dumping on its shelf at UNCLOS 111 and such jurisdiction is granted in the 
LOSC Australian legislation is fairly weak on this point.121 The Environment Protection 
(Sea Dumping) Act would enable dumping of low level radio active wastes in accordance 
with international guidelines and higher level radio active wastes are now covered by the 
1986 Amendment to the Act.122 It is provided that this prohibition applies in all waters to 
which the legislation applies and that no state legislation can deal with this issue. The 
issue was considered to be of national importance and unlike the 1981 Act the legislative 
amendments in 1986 prohibiting the dumping of any radioactive wastes at sea does not 
have any ‘roll back’ provision to enable state laws in the territorial sea if their laws are 
consistent with the London Dumping Convention. The issue was related directly to 
Australia’s obligations in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the South 
Pacific Environment treaty to prohibit radioactive waste dumping. The national and 
international significance of the issue was judged such that state involvement in control of 
this type of dumping should be excluded.123
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Finally the Convention imposes for the first time in a global treaty the general obligation 
to ‘protect and preserve the marine environment’ (Art. 192). The implementation of this 
provision really depends on ‘further and future detailed practical measures for it to have 
effect. In fact, Art. 197, which urges states to cooperate on a global basis, and as 
appropriate on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organisations, 
in formulating and elaborating international rules and Art. 235(3), which requires states 
to cooperate in the further development of international law relating to responsibility and 
liability, clearly underscores Art. 192 as a commitment as much to the future as to the 
present’.124 Australia’s has cooperated on a regional basis in negotiating the South 
Pacific Regional Environmental Program treaty and on a bilateral basis Australia and 
Papua New Guinea have agreed to take legislative and other measures necessary to 
protect and preserve the marine environment in or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone, 
which has been established in the central Torres strait area. One of the purposes of the 
Protected Zone is to protect and preserve the marine environment.125
Australia has also acted to carry out its more general obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment by establishing the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. The legislation 
provides for zoning and management plans and provides the Authority with extensive 
management powers.126 In order the fulfil its obligation to take measures to prevent or 
control pollution Australia has also established a National Plan to Combat Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil that became operational in October 197 3.127 As part of a states general 
environmental obligation states have an obligation ‘to protect and preserve rare or fragile 
ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other 
forms of marine life’ (Art. 194(5)). Australia has been in the process of establishing 
marine and estuarine protected areas128 and more attention has been given in recent years 
to the conservation objective of coastal zone management.129
MSR and Transfer of Marine Technology
Most of the provisions of the Convention deal with the maintenance of the consent regime 
set up to control and regulate MSR in the EEZ and on the shelf. ‘Implementation’ here 
involves taking of prescribed administrative measures by coastal and requesting foreign 
states. Australian practice here has involved relying solely on executive action to control 
MSR by foreign non-governmental vessels within 200 miles of Australia’s coast. This is 
in the form of a note issued on 21 October 1983 to all Diplomatic Missions in Australia 
and non-resident Diplomatic Missions accredited to Australia that basically implements 
the consent provisions in the Convention.
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While there are rather scattered reference to MSR in Australian legislation the reliance on 
executive action to control MSR potentially raises difficult issues in Australian domestic 
law and it would appear desirable that Australia rely on a new legislative regime for MSR 
that covered the territorial sea, the EEZ and the margin.130 Australia has also participated 
in wide-ranging international cooperation in the MSR field which is relevant to the 
obligation of Art. 243 that calls for states to ‘create favourable conditions for the conduct 
of marine scientific research in the marine environment and to integrate the efforts of 
scientists in studying the essence of phenomena and processes occurring in the marine 
environment and the interrelations between them’.131
In articles 275-277 of Part XIV (Development and Transfer of Marine Technology) 
emphasis is placed on the promotion of national and regional centres in ‘marine scientific 
and technological research’. Australia’s political support for marine science has not been 
strong in recent years,132 but Australia has attempted to implement its obligation to 
promote the development of marine science and technological capacity of regional states 
through various aid programs.133
Concluding Remarks
This brief survey has shown that Australia has made considerable effort to accept its 
responsibility as a signatory to the Convention on the Law of the Sea to implement the 
Convention although it has not declared either 12 mile territorial sea, an EEZ nor drawn 
the limits of its continental shelf in accordance with the Convention. There has also been 
some bureaucratic inertia with respect to translating into domestic law the new rules on 
the EEZ, continental shelf definition and marine scientific research. Australia’s general 
approach since the conclusion of UNCLOS 111 has been try and preserve the 
Convention from an erosion of legal significance by treating the Convention as the most 
authoritative guide to the law of the sea in terms of Australian ocean policy. Australia’s 
overall example with respect to implementation has been good and Canberra’s reluctance 
to ratify in this context becomes more difficult to understand. Ratification would 
demonstrate to the international community in a very clear way that Australia was pro- 
Convention. Australian implementation policy since the Convention was concluded has 
been quite consistent with its law of the sea diplomacy at UNCLOS 111. That is to say 
Canberra’s view since 1982 has clearly been that the Convention contains compromises 
that offer the best balance of interests that are possible and that Australia’s interests are 
best served by safeguarding those compromises by a policy of implementing the 
Convention. Just as prior to and during UNCLOS 111 Canberra has since 1982 rejected 
the notion that unilateral action will provide an effective basis for constructing a stable 
ocean regime.
CONCLUSION
After fourteen years of complex global negotiations the international community produced 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, an immense law-making treaty which consists of 
320 articles and nine annexes. The Convention is unique: no global treaty has been 
negotiated on the scale of UNCLOS 111 and it would be difficult to find any legal 
instrument of the scope of the Convention. The bulk of the Convention reflects a boldly 
innovative approach to the progressive development of international law.
The Convention represented the culmination of the work began in the summer of 1968 at 
the United Nations Seabed Committee. The Committee soon expanded its agenda to 
include virtually the entire body of the law of the sea. The desire to open the whole law of 
the sea area came about largely as a result of the push for coastal state expansion. Until 
well into the century, the law of the sea was stable and generally agreed. Its essential 
principle was the freedom of the seas, which implied freedom of navigation and freedom 
to fish. The exception to freedom for all was a small territorial sea where the coastal state 
exercised exclusive rights, subject to a right of innocent passage for vessels of other 
states. The last half century has seen the once stable law of the sea become unclear and 
unstable. Coastal states increased their control over foreign vessels and foreign nationals 
further from their shores. Even the maritime powers joined the expansionist trend. By the 
late 1960s the international community began to reopen the law of the sea to determine 
what kinds of authority and at what distance could the coastal state exercise jurisdiction 
and how much freedom could be guaranteed to other states. The question also arose as to 
how one could best provide a legal foundation to answer the questions relating to coastal 
state rights.
This study has attempted to show that Australia took a leading role in the attempt to 
restore order and stability to the law of the sea at UNCLOS 111. In the earlier UN law of 
the sea conferences Australia was firmly in the western camp. Australia believed that a six 
mile territorial sea and an additional six mile fishing zone was the maximum Australia 
required (or was prepared to concede to other coastal states). In the 1960s we saw how 
Australia developed a more coastal oriented view of its interests with increases in foreign 
fishing off Australia, a greater awareness of the dangers of marine pollution, the 
development of offshore energy and the opening of maritime boundary negotiations with 
Indonesia. At the domestic level Australia attempted to increase its control over offshore 
resources and activities and these moves were mirrored at the international level at the UN
Seabed Committee. Here Australia basically set the package of policies that it was to take 
into UNCLOS 111.
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UNCLOS 111 was significantly different to UNCLOS 1 and I I . The earlier conferences 
were basically codification exercises, whereas UNCLOS 111 was attempting to create a 
new body of law. The range of issues and the number of countries was much larger at 
UNCLOS 111 and the developing countries played a far bigger role at UNCLOS 111. 
The North-South division rather than East-West Division dominated UNCLOS 111 and 
the earlier conferences did not adopt the same consensus procedures of the later 
conference.
These contrasting features saw Australia playing a different role and they affected 
Australian diplomacy in different ways at UNCLOS 111. From a country strongly 
aligned to maritime powers on the law of the sea issues in the earlier period Australia 
chose to move towards a greater assertion of coastal state rights at UNCLOS 111. To the 
extent that the conference saw Australia play an influential role in an environment where 
many of the issues revolved around maritime and coastal state splits it can be argued that 
Australia was a significant actor in the development of the broad based coastal state 
movement.
The analysis presented here has shown that Australia not only successfully adjusted to the 
changes in the international regime of the oceans but that Australia made a significant 
contribution to the evolution and development of the single most important conference 
that transformed the international oceans regime. A number of features of Australian law 
of the sea policy clearly emerge from the study. First, an emphasis on multilateralism. 
Right from the early years of the SBC Australia was on the side of those countries 
wishing to negotiate a new package on the law of the sea and Australian always saw its 
interests closely bound up with a widely accepted and comprehensive multilateral treaty. 
Unilateralism was seen by Australian policy makers as weakening that goal.
The second feature of Australian policy was consistency; Australia perceived its primary 
goal as achieving greater control over offshore resources and activities (while balancing 
maritime interests) without any dramatic shifts. While it was prepared to accept tactical 
retreats on certain issues (except on the margin policy) Australian policy stayed fairly 
closely to those objectives that it had laid down in 1973, despite certain additions and 
subtractions. The study showed that on most issues at the conference Australia’s main 
goals were well matched with the changing structure and dynamics of conference politics.
Third, Australian law of the sea diplomacy was skilfully handled. Here we noted the early 
setting of its conference objectives, strong bureaucratic co-ordination and a high quality
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and stable delegation contributed to that. Fourth, Australia diplomacy was not governed 
by its major alliance partner, the US, or its traditional maritime state allies. At the earlier 
law of the sea conferences Australia was for the most part prepared to play the role of the 
junior ally of the maritime states and to take a modest supportive role. At UNCLOS 111, 
however, Australia saw the conference as involving exceptionally high stakes given 
A ustralia’s wide-ranging ocean interests. That perception dictated an enormous 
bureaucratic effort over the eight years of the conference. The analysis displayed a 
country with skilful negotiators which, while aggressively pur^jng national goals was 
also willing to embrace new concepts (like the ‘common heritage of mankind’) and which 
was independent in selecting those negotiating partners most willing to assist in achieving 
its goals.
Fifth, Australian diplomacy was reasonably hard-headed. Australia’s drive to realise its 
coastal interests derived from a clear recognition that a global solution to ocean issues 
would favour Australia given that UNCLOS 111 would favour the majority of states 
supporting an expansion of coastal state control of ocean space. This had now become 
more internationally acceptable given the changing structure of ocean politics to support 
the trend towards coastal state expansion.
Was UNCLOS 111 worth the effort that Australia devoted to it? The answer must be 
‘yes’. The innovative nature of the conference was evident in the creation of the regime of 
the EEZ, in the development of rules relating to the development of deep seabed mining, 
and a degree of creativity in the rules governing the prevention and control of marine 
pollution. Concepts like transit passage, archipelagic sealanes passage and the regime of 
archipelagos were also developed at UNCLOS 111. It certainly changed state perceptions 
of the law-making potential of the UN multilateral conference. Even the United States 
which refuses to sign the Convention because of the provisions regarding deep seabed 
mining has expressly accepted that, apart from deep seabed mining, the US will act in 
conformity with the provisions of the Convention and seek similar compliance from other 
states. A generally accepted Convention is the best means the international community has 
of slowing down the rate of creeping jurisdiction. While some parts of the Convention are 
clear others are very ambiguous and here, of course, the meaning will evolve from state 
practice. The significance of the Convention here, however, is that it does provide a kind 
of boundary around acceptable behaviour, shaping expectations about what is seen as 
perm issable.1 From Australia’s viewpoint, the Convention represents a fair balance 
between its coastal interests (and there Australia was a significant beneficiary in terms of 
increased ocean space), and its interests in preserving navigational freedoms.
Does UNCLOS 111 carry any lessons for Australian foreign policy makers? Again the 
answer is ‘yes’ on two counts. First, there is a clear inference from this study that
Australia should give ocean policy matters a high profile in Australian foreign policy. 
Australia’s UNCLOS diplomacy was largely played out amongst coastal states from the 
developing world where Australia’s interest in wider coastal state control coincided with 
the broad interests of mainly developing states making up the coastal state movement. 
Australia is now well placed to build on its reputation at UNCLOS 111 as a supporter of 
coastal state rights and responsibilities in the area of ocean development. Australia could 
well make a substantive contribution to facilitate the ocean management capabilities of 
those countries in the Asia-Pacific region that are increasingly looking to the opportunities 
that the era of expanded coastal state jurisdiction holds out.
Australia’s high profile at UNCLOS occurred in part because of the well considered 
views on the gamut of ocean issues at the conference and expertise in marine policy 
matters that made possible the preparation of clear objectives. There is no reason why 
Australia should not creatively elevate ocean policy matters in its international diplomacy. 
In such areas as the development of legal regimes, marine management techniques, 
marine science and technology, fisheries management, hydrography, maritim e 
surveillance, marine information systems and maritime training, Australia has an 
enormous reservoir of skills and expertise that it can draw on to assist those countries in 
its region that are attempting to realise the benefits of expanded ocean control.2
Australia should also make every effort to participate in ocean related issues at the 
regional and international level, particularly in UN programmes and agencies such as 
UNEP, FAO, IMO, UNESCO and the IOC. While Australia is already active in these 
programmes and at the regional level with the South Pacific Forum and the Forum 
Fisheries Agency, the argument here is that as a major beneficiary of the new law of the 
sea and as prominent actor on law of the sea issues for over 14 years at the SBC then at 
UNCLOS, Australia is well placed to support the developing world’s aspirations for 
greater economic justice through realizing the benefits of a redistribution of ocean space.
Speaking at the first substantive UNCLOS session Australian Foreign Minister Willesee 
stated that Australia hoped that UNCLOS would bring ‘not only order and certainty but 
also justice and equity into the law of the sea’.3 Ultimately Australia’s success at the 
conference will be judged not only in terms of whether Australia as a country with a long 
coastline and wide margin was able to benefit from the new ocean regime but whether 
Australia supported an international oceans regime that benefits all countries within the 
framework of the Law of the Sea Convention.
The second lesson for Australian foreign policy makers in our history of Australia’s law 
of the sea diplomacy is that multilateral diplomacy can greatly assist a middle ranking 
power like Australia to define its role in the international system. Our study showed that a
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well organised and well prepared delegation with clear objectives can play a very 
influential role within a multilateral forum. In contrast to the government’s recent 
statement on foreign policy that stated that Australia’s emphasis must be on bilateral 
diplomacy4 it is arguably the case that given the range of environmental issues on the 
international agenda that will require global action, Australia will need to give greater 
prominence to the practice of multilateral diplomacy. Issues relating to the atmosphere and 
planetary climate are now being addressed in a large number of multilateral bodies at the 
global and regional level. Australia’s economic, social and security interests will be 
directly affected by these multilateral forums. UNCLOS 111 demonstrated that Australia 
can play a creative and constructive role in a multilateral setting. Most importantly 
Australia demonstrated that it can play an independent role in such forums, a political 
position that is increasingly being forced on Australia with the passing of traditional blocs 
and groupings.5
Over the next few years environmental issues that transcend national borders will test the 
commitment of the rest of the world to multilaterism. UNCLOS 111 demonstrated that 
Australia can pursue its national interests in highly complex multilateral negotiations in a 
rapidly changing global environment. In that sense Australian law of the sea diplomacy 
demonstrates the advantages of Australia taking its role within multilateral settings very 
seriously. It may also have implications for the training and organisation of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (The law of the sea, for example, may well 
play a prominent role as a case study in the training for new recruits on conference 
diplomacy).
As far as oceans policy is directly concerned, it is very doubtful whether the conditions 
exist to trigger another global conference on the law of the sea. Most of the 1982 
Convention achieved consensus among 155 states. It would be unlikely that states would 
feel the necessity to embark on further arduous work on ocean law, particularly as there 
would be no guarantee of limiting discussion just to the more contentious area of the 
seabed mining regime. If UNCLOS IV were to happen it would be up to a new 
generation of law of sea policy makers in Canberra to decide on whether to change the 
priorities that Australia set through UNCLOS 111. It is to be hoped that such policy 
makers would continue to insist that multilateral negotiations on the basis of consensus 
should dictate a final agreement and that the rules of the law of the sea must fairly balance 
the respective interests of all states.
APPENDIX A
Sessions of UNCLOS 111: An Overview
S e s s i o n D a t e s L o c a t i o n C o m m e n t s
First 3-15 D ecem ber 1973 N ew  Y ork F ocus on organization  and procedural m atters
Second 20 June-24  A u g u st 1974 Caracas Substan tive n ego tia tions beg in
ThL-d 15 M arch-9  M ay 1975 Geneva Production  o f  firs t nego tia ting  texts and 
In fo rm a l S ing le  N e g o tia tin g  Texts
FOLrth 15 M arch-7  M ay 1976 N ew  Y ork P roduction  o f  R ev ise d  S ing le  N ego tia ting  
T ex t
Fifth 2 A u g u s t-17 S ep tem ber 1976 N ew  York
S ixth 23 M a y -15 Ju ly  1977 N ew  Y ork P roduction  o f  In fo rm a l C om posite  
N ego tia ting  Text (deals w ith  all the  law  o f the 
sea issues in one  com prehensive  text).
Seventh 28 M a rc h -19 M ay 1978 Geneva
R esum ed:
2 A u g u s t-15 S ep tem ber 1978 N ew  Y ork
E ighth 19 M arch-27  A pril 1979 Geneva R ev ision  o f  In fo rm a l C om posite  N ego tia ting  
T ex t
R esum ed:
19 Ju ly -24  A ugust 1979 N ew  Y ork
N inth 3 M arch-4  A pril 1980 N ew  Y ork R evision  2 o f  In fo rm a l C om posite  
N ego tia tin g  Text
R esum ed:
28 Ju ly -29  A ugust 1980 Geneva P roduction  o f  D raft C onven tion  on the L aw  
o f  the Sea
T enth 9 M arch-24  A pril 1981 N ew  Y ork
R esum ed:
3 A ugust-28  A ugust 1981 G eneva
E leven th 3 M arch -30  A pril 1982 N ew  Y ork A doption by con fe rence  o f C onven tion  on the 
L aw  o f the Sea
R esum ed:
22-24 S ep tem ber 1982 N ew  Y ork F inal D rafting  C om m itee C hanges A pproved
APPENDIX B
Groups at UNCLOS III
A. The Coastal States Group
1 . A rgentina 39. L ibyan A rab Jam ahiriya
2. A ustralia 40 . M adagascar
3. Bangladesh 41 . M auritania
4 . Baham as 42 . M auritiu s
5. Benin 43 . M exico
6 . Brazil 44 . M orocco
7. Burm a 45. M ozam bique
8. Canada 46 . Nauru
9. C ape Verde 47 . N ew Zealand
10. C h ile 48 . N icaragua
11. C o lo m b ia 49 . N igeria
12. C o n g o 50. Norw ay
13. C osta  R ica 51. O m an
14. D em ocratic K am puchea 52. P akistan
15. D em ocratic P eo p le ’s R epublic o f K orea 53. Panam a
16. D em ocratic Y em en 54. P apua N ew  G uinea
17. D om in ican  R epublic 55. Peru
18. Ecuador 56. P h ilip p in e s
19. E g y p t 57. P ortugal
20 . El Salvador 58. R epublic o f K orea
21 . E quatorial G uinea 59. Senegal
22. F iji 60. Sierra L eone
23. G abon 61. S om alia
24. G am bia 62. Spain
25 . G hana 63. Sri L anka
26. G uatem ala 64. Sudan
27 . G uinea 65 . S urinam e
28. G uinea-B issau 66. Thailand
29. G uyana 67. T ogo
30. H aiti 68. T onga
31. H onduras 69. Trinidad and Tobago
32. Iceland 70. T un isia
33. India 71. U ruguay
34. Indonesia 72. V enezuela
35. Iran 73. U nited  A rab E m irates
36. Ireland 74. W estern  Sam oa
37. Ivory  C oast 75. Y em en
38. K enya 76. Y ugoslav ia
B. The Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States Group 
(LL/GDS)
L a n d - L o c k e d  S ta te s G e o g r a p h ic a l ly  D i s a d v a n t a g e d  S ta te s
1. A fghanistan 1. A lgeria
2. A ustria 2. Bahrain
3. Bhutan 3. Belgium
4. B oliv ia 4 . Bulgaria
5. B otsw ana 5. E th iop ia
6. Burundi 6 . F in land
7. B yelo ru ssian  SSR 7. G am bia
8. C entral A frican R epublic 8. G erm an D em ocratic R epublic
9. Chad 9 . G erm any, Federal R epublic  o f
10. C zechoslovakia 10. Greece
11. H ungary 11. Iraq
12. L ao  P eo p le ’s D em ocratic  R epublic 12. Jam aica
13. L eso tho 13. Jordan
14. L iech tenstein 14. K uw ait
15. L uxem bourg 15. Netherlands
16. M alaw i 16. Poland
17. M ali 17. Qatar
18. M ongo lia 18. R om ania
19. Nepal 19. S ingapore
20. N iger 20 . Sudan
21 . Paraguay 21 . Sweden
22. Rw anda 22 . Syrian A rab R epub lic
23 . San M arino 23 . Turkey
24 . Sw aziland 24 . U nited  A rab E m irates
25 . Sw itzerland 25 . U nited  R epub lic  o f  C am eroon
26 . Uganda 26 . Zaire
27 . U pper V olta
28 . Z am bia
29 . Z im babw e
C .  T h e  T e r r it o r ia l is t  G r o u p
1. Benin 13. M adagascar
2. Brazil 14. M auritania
3. Cape Verde 15. M ozam bique
4 . C ongo 16. Panam a
5. D em ocratic Y em en 17. Peru
6. Ecuador 18. Sao T om e and P rincipe
7. El Salvador 19. Senegal
8. Equatorial G uinea 20 . Sierra Leone
9. G abon 21 . S om alia
10. G am bia 22 . T ogo
11. G uinea-B issau 23 . U ruguay
12. L ibyan A rab Jam ah iriya
D . T h e  M a r g in e e r s  o r  G r o u p  o f  B r o a d - S h e l f  S ta te s
1. A rgentina 8. Madagascar
2. A ustralia 9 . N ew  Zealand
3. Brazil 10. N o w a y
4. Canada 11. Sri L anka
5. Iceland 12. U nited K ingdom
6. India 13. V enezuela
7. Ireland
E. The Straits States Group
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1. C y rpus 6. O m an
2. Greece 7. P h ilip p in es
3. Indonesia 8. S pain
4 . M alaysia 9 . Y em en
5. M orocco
F. Group of Archipelagic States3
1. F iji
2 . Indonesia
3. M auritiu s
4 . P h ilip p in e s
a M auritiu s d ro p p ed  ou t o f  the group  in the la tte r stages o f the C onference. A lthough  the B aham as w as
no t fo rm ally  a m em ber o f the g roup , it cooperated  closely  w ith its m em bers.
G. The Delimitation Group Supporting the Median Line
1. Baham as 13. G uyana
2. Barbados 14. Italy
3. Canada 15. Japan
4 . C ape V erde 16. K uw ait
5. C h ile 17. M alta
6 . C o lo m b ia 18. N orway
7. C yp rus 19. P ortugal
8. D em ocratic Y em en 20. Spain
9. D enm ark 21. Sweden
10. G am bia 22. U nited  A rab E m irates
11. Greece 23. U nited  K ingdom
12. G uinea-B issau 24. Y ugoslav ia
H. The Delimitation Group Supporting Equitable Principles
1. A lgeria 16. M ali
2. A rgentina 17. M auritania
3. Bangladesh 18. M orocco
4 . Benin 19. N icaragua
5. Bhutan 20. N igeria
6. C o n g o 21. P ak istan
7. France 22. Papua N ew  G uinea
8. G abon 23. Poland
9 . Iraq 24. R om ania
10. Ireland 25. Senegal
11. Ivory  C oast 26. Syrian A rab R epublic
12. K enya 27. S om alia
13. L iberia 28. Turkey
14. L ibyan  A rab  Jam ahiriya 29. V enezuela
15. M adagascar 30.
I. The Oceania Group
1. A ustralia 5. Sam oa
2. F iji 6 . T onga
3. N ew  Zealand 7. T rus t T errito ries o f  the P acific
4 . P apua  N ew  G uinea 8.
J. The Group of Maritime States
1. France 6 . Norw ay
2. G erm any, Federal R epublic o f 7 . Panam a
3 Greece 8. U S S R
4. Japan 9 . U nited K ingdom
5. L iberia 10. U .S .A .
K. The Great Maritime Powers
1. France
2. Japan
3. U nited  K ingdom
4 . U .S .A .
5. U S S R
L. Co-ordinating Group of Five
1. France
2. G erm any, F ederal R epublic o f
3. Japan
4 . U nited  K ingdom
5. U .S .A .
M. The Group of Twelve
1. A ustralia 7 . Ireland
2. A ustria 8. N etherlands3
3 Canada 9 . N ew  Zealand
4 . D enm ark 10. N orw ay
5. F in land 11. Sweden
6. Iceland 12. Sw itzerland
a N etherlands subsequently  jo in ed  the group  as its tw elfth  m em ber.
N. The Land Based Producers
1. A rgentina 12. G abon
2. A ustralia 13. G uatam ala
3. A ngo la 14. Indonesia
4 . Brazil 15. Ivory  C oast
5 Burundi 16. N igeria
6 Canada 17. Peru
7 C h ile 18. P h ilip p in es
8 C o lo m b ia 19. V enezuela
9 C uba 20 . Z am bia
10. D om in ican  R epub lic 21 . Zaire
11. E g y p t 22 . Z im babw e
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O. The Traditional Groups
The Regional Groups
1. African 5. Eastern European
2. Asian 6. Western European
3 Arab 7. Others (WEO)
4. Latin American
The Arab Group
1 . Algeria 12. Oman
2. Bahrain 13. Qatar
3. Democratic Yemen 14. Saudi Arabia
4. Djibouti 15. Somalia
5 Iraq 16. Sudan
6 Jordan 17. Syrian Arab Republic
7 Kuwait 18. Tunisia
8 Lebanon 19. United Arab Emirates
9 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 20. Yemen
10. Mauritania 21. Palestine Liberation Organization2
11. Morocco
a Participating in the Conference as an observer.
Source:
Tommy T.B. Koh and Shanmugam Jayakumar, ‘Negotiating Process of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea’ in Myron Nordquist (ed.) United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982, A Commentary (Martinuus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1985) pp.29-134 at 
pp.68-85.
Countries in Land Based Producer Group taken from Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon Canada and the International 
Seabed (McGill University Press: Kingston, Montreal, London, 1989) p.134.
